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THE  
R O M A N  
H I S T O R Y,

FROM

The Building of *Rome* to the Ruin of  
the *Commonwealth*.

*Illustrated with MAPS and other PLATES.*

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V O L. IX.

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By N. H O O K E, Esq;

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МЕСЯЦІЙ

THE

VI. PART

# Roman History.

## NINTH BOOK.

### C H A P. III.

*Debates and contests in the Senate about restoring  
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Clodius is chosen Ædile. He impeaches Milo.  
Pompey pleads Milo's cause. Clodius turns the  
fury of his anger against Pompey. Civil feuds and  
contests ensue.*

*Cicero defends Sextius, inveighs against Vatinius, and moves to have Cæsar's Act relating to the Campanian lands reconsidered; but soon desists from this pursuit. The Senate refuses to decree a Thanksgiving for a victory obtained by Gabinius in Judæa. Prodigies are reported to have happened: Various interpretations of them. Piso is recalled from his government of Macedonia. Cæsar is continued in his command in Gaul. He comes to Luca: Pompey and Crassus meet him there. The Tribune Cato hinders the proceeding to an election of new Consuls. The government falls into an Interregnum.*

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A 3

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T H E

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THE  
ROMAN  
HISTORY.

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NINTH BOOK.

CHAP. III.

*Debates and contests in the Senate about restoring King PTOLEMY.*

*CLODIUS is chosen Ædile. He impeaches MILO.*

*POMPEY pleads MILO's cause. CLODIUS turns the fury of his anger against POMPEY. Civil feuds and conflicts ensue.*

*CICERO defends SEXTIUS, inveighs against VATINIUS, and moves to have CÆSAR's Act relating to the Campanian lands reconsidered; but soon desists from this pursuit. The Senate refuses to decree a Thanksgiving for a victory obtained by GABINIUS in Judæa. Prodigies are reported to have happened: Various interpretations of them. PISO is recalled from his government of Macedonia. CÆSAR is continued in his command in Gaul. He comes to Luca: POMPEY and CRAS-*

sus meet him there. The Tribune CATO binders the proceeding to an election of new Consuls. The government falls into an Interregnum.

Y.R. 697.  
Bef. Chr.

55.  
96 Conf.

**I**N the beginning of the new year, when the Consular fasces were transferred to *Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus*, and *L. Marcius Pbilippus*, the question concerning *the persons, by whom, and the manner, in which, King Ptolemy should be replaced* on the throne of *Ægypt*, came under deliberation. Cicero's letters to his friend *Publius Lentulus Spinther* (who had the best claim to the commission, and was Proconsul of *Cilicia*) being almost wholly *narrative* of what passed at *Rome* in relation to that affair, will probably be more satisfactory to the Reader, than any abridgment of the matter therein contained could be; especially as we have so good a translation of those letters into our language.

### To *Publius Lentulus*, Proconsul.

Ep. Fam.  
I. i. Ep. 1.  
Ed. Grav.  
b.i. let. 12.  
Melmoth.

" I find it much easier to satisfy the world than  
" myself, in those sacred offices of friendship I  
" exert in your behalf. Numberless indeed are  
" the obligations you have conferred upon me:  
" And as you persevered with unwearied zeal till  
" you had effected my recall from exile, I esteem  
" it the greatest mortification of my life, that I  
" cannot act in your affairs with the same suc-  
" cess. The truth is, *Ammonius*, who resides here  
" as Ambassador from *Ptolemy*, defeats all my  
" schemes, by the most shameless and avowed  
bribery:

“ bribery : And he is supplied with money for  
“ this purpose, from the same quarter as when  
“ you were in *Rome*. The party in the King’s in-  
“ terest (though their number, it must be owned,  
“ is inconsiderable) are all desirous that *Pompey*  
“ may be employed to re-instate him in his do-  
“ minions. The Senate, on the other hand, fall  
“ in with the pretended Oracle ; not indeed as  
“ giving any credit to its predictions, but as be-  
“ ing in general ill-inclined to this Prince, and  
“ detesting his most corrupt practices. In the  
“ mean while, I omit no opportunity of admo-  
“ nishing *Pompey* with great freedom, and con-  
“ juring him not to act such a part in this affair  
“ as would cast the deepest stain upon his cha-  
“ racter. I must do him the justice at the same  
“ time to acknowledge, that so far as his own  
“ conduct is concerned, there does not appear  
“ the least foundation for any remonstrances of  
“ this sort. On the contrary, he is perpetually  
“ expressing the highest zeal for your interest :  
“ As he lately supported it in the Senate, with  
“ the utmost force of eloquence, and the strongest  
“ professions of friendship. *Marcellinus* \*, I need  
“ not tell you, is a good deal displeased at your  
“ soliciting this commission : In all other respects,  
“ I dare venture to say, he will very strenuously  
“ promote your interest. We must be contented  
“ to take him in his own way : For I perceive  
“ it is impossible to dissuade him from proposing,  
“ that the injunction of the Oracle shall be com-

Y.R. 697.  
Bef. Chr.  
55.  
396 Cons.

\* One of the present Consuls.

Y.R. 697. " plied with : And, in fact he has already made  
Bef. Chr. " several motions to that purpose.

<sup>55.</sup>  
396 Conf. " I write this early *on the thirteenth*, and I  
" will now give you an account of what has  
" hitherto passed in the Senate. Both *Horten-*  
" *sius* and *Lucullus* agreed in moving, that the  
" prohibition of the Oracle should be obeyed :  
" And indeed it does not seem possible to bring  
" this matter to bear upon any other terms. But  
" we proposed, at the same time, that, in pur-  
" suance of the decree, which was made on your  
" own motion, you be appointed to re-establish  
" *Ptolemy* in his kingdom ; the situation of your  
" province lying so conveniently for that pur-  
" pose. In a word, we consented that army  
" should be given up, in deference to the Oracle ;  
" but insisted nevertheless, that you should be  
" employed in effecting this restoration. *Craffus*,  
" on the other side, was for having this com-  
" mission executed by three persons, to be chosen  
" from among the Generals : And, consequently,  
" he did not mean to exclude *Pompey*. *Marcus*  
" *Bibulus* joined with him as to the number ;  
" but thought, that the persons to be nominated  
" should not bear any military command. All  
" the rest of the Consulars were in the same  
" sentiments, except *Servilius*, *Afranius*, and *Vot-*  
" *catius*. The first absolutely opposed our en-  
" gaging in *Ptolemy's* restoration upon any terms  
" whatsoever : But the two last were of opinion,  
" that, agreeably to the motion of *Lupus*, this  
" commission should be given to *Pompey*. This  
" circumstance has increased the suspicion con-

Y.R. 697.  
Bef. Chr.  
<sup>55.</sup>  
396 Conf.

"cerning the real inclination of the latter: As  
"his most particular friends were observed to  
"concur with *Volcatius*, they are labouring this  
"point with great assiduity: And, I fear, it will  
"be carried against us. *Libo* and *Hypsæus* are  
"openly soliciting for *Pompey*: And, indeed,  
"the conduct of all his friends at this juncture  
"make it generally believed, that he is desirous  
"of the office. Yet the misfortune is, those  
"who are unwilling it should fall into his hands,  
"are not the more inclined to place it in yours:  
"As they are much displeased at your having  
"contributed to the late advancement of his  
"power <sup>b</sup>. For myself, I find I have the less in-  
"fluence in your cause, as it is supposed I am solely  
"governed by a principle of gratitude: At the  
"same time, the notion which prevails, that this  
"affair affords an opportunity of obliging *Pompey*,  
"renders my applications likewise not altogether  
"so effectual as they might otherwise prove.  
"It is thus I am labouring in this perplexed  
"business: Which the King himself, long before  
"you left *Rome*, as well as the friends and de-  
"pendants of *Pompey*, had artfully embarrassed.  
"To this I must add the avowed opposition I meet  
"with from the *Consulars*; who represent our  
"assisting *Ptolemy* with an army, as a measure  
"that would highly reflect upon the dignity of  
"the Senate: be assured, however, I shall em-

<sup>b</sup> *Lentulus*, during his Consulate, had proposed and carried that law, which, that *Pompey* might provide corn in a time of scarcity, invested him with the whole power of the *Roman empire*.

Y.R. 696.

Bef. Chr.

56.

395 Conf.

"ploy every means in my power of testifying  
 "both to the world in general, and to your  
 "friends in particular, the sincerity of that af-  
 "fection I bear you. And were there any honour  
 "in those who ought to have shewn themselves  
 "influenced by its highest and most refined prin-  
 "ciples, I should not have so many difficulties  
 "to encounter. Farewell."

## To the same.

Lib. i. Ep.

2. Ed.

Græv.

B. i. Let.

14. Melm.

"The Senate met *on the thirteenth of January*,  
 "but came to no resolution; the greatest part of  
 "that day having been spent in some warm  
 "contests which arose between *Marcellinus* the  
 "Consul, and *Caninius*, one of the Tribunes of  
 "the People. I had myself also a very consider-  
 "able share in the debates: And I represented  
 "the zeal you have always shewn towards the  
 "Senate, in terms that influenced them, I am  
 "persuaded, much to your advantage. The next  
 "day, therefore, we thought it sufficient briefly  
 "to deliver our opinions: as I perceived, not only  
 "by the favourable manner in which I was heard  
 "the day before, but also by enquiring into the  
 "sentiments of each particular member, that  
 "the majority was clearly on our side. The bu-  
 "siness of the day opened with reporting to the  
 "house the several opinions of *Bibulus*, *Horten-*  
*sus*, and *Volcatius*. The respective questions,  
 "therefore, were,

"In the first place, whether three commissioners  
 "should be nominated for restoring the King,  
 "agreeably to the sentiments of *Bibulus*?

"In

“ In the next, whether, according to those of  
“ *Hortensius*, the office should be conferred upon  
“ you, but without employing any forces ?

Y.R. 697.  
Bef. Chr.  
55.  
396 Cons.

“ Or, lastly, whether, in conformity to the ad-  
“ vice of *Volcatius*, this honour should be assigned  
“ to *Pompey* ?

“ The points being thus stated, it was moved,  
“ that the opinion of *Bibulus* might be referred  
“ to the deliberation of the house in two sepa-  
“ rate questions. Accordingly, as it was now in  
“ vain to oppose his motion so far as it related  
“ to paying obedience to the declaration of the  
“ Oracle, the Senate in general came into his  
“ sentiments: But as to his proposal of deputing  
“ three commissioners, it was rejected by a very  
“ considerable majority. The opinion next in  
“ order was that of *Hortensius*. But, when we  
“ were going to divide upon it, *Lupus*, a Tribune  
“ of the People, insisted that in virtue of his  
“ office he had the privilege of calling to a di-  
“ vision of the House, prior to the Consuls; and  
“ therefore demanded that the voices should be  
“ first taken upon the motion he had made in  
“ favour of *Pompey*. This claim was generally  
“ and strongly opposed: As indeed it was both  
“ unprecedented and unreasonable. The Consuls  
“ themselves, however, did not greatly contest  
“ that point: Nor did they absolutely give it up.  
“ Their view was to protract the debates: And  
“ they succeeded accordingly. They perceived  
“ indeed, that, notwithstanding the majority af-  
“ fected to appear on the side of *Volcatius*,  
“ yet, upon a division, they would certainly vote

Vid. supra,  
p. 6.

Y.R. 697.

Bef. Chr.

55.

396 Conf.

" with *Hortensius*. Nevertheless, several of the members were called upon to deliver their opinions; though, in truth, much against the inclinations of the Consuls, who were desirous that the sentiments of *Bibulus* should prevail. The debates continuing till night, the Senate broke up without coming to any resolution. I happened to pass the same evening with *Pompey*: And as I had that day supported your cause in the Senate with more than ordinary success, I thought it afforded me the most favourable opportunity of speaking to him in your behalf. And what I said, seemed to make so strong an impression, that I am persuaded I have brought him wholly over to your interest. To say the truth, whenever I hear him mention this affair himself, I entirely acquit him of being secretly desirous of this commission. On the other hand, when I observe the conduct of his friends of every rank, I am well convinced (and indeed it is now evident likewise to the whole world) that they have been gained by the corrupt measures which a certain party, with the consent of *Ptolemy* and his advisers, have employed. —— I write this before sunrise on the 16th of January: And the Senate is to meet again on this very day. I hope to preserve my authority in that Assembly, as far at least as is possible amidst such general treachery and corruption which has discovered itself upon this occasion. As to what concerns the bringing this matter before the Peo-

“ ple

“ ple; I think we have taken such precautions as  
 “ will render it impracticable, unless by actual  
 “ violence, and in direct and open contempt both  
 “ of our civil and religious institutions. For  
 “ this purpose a very severe ORDER of the SE-  
 “ NATE (which I imagine was immediately trans-  
 “ mitted to you) was entered yesterday in our  
 “ journals, notwithstanding the Tribunes, *Cato*  
 “ and *Caninius*, interposed their negatives.

Y.R. 697.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 55.  
396 Conf.

“ You may depend upon my sending you a  
 “ faithful account of every other occurrence  
 “ which may arise in this affair: And be assured  
 “ I shall exert the utmost of my vigilance and  
 “ my credit, to conduct it in the most advanta-  
 “ geous manner for your interest. Farewell.”

To the same.

“ When the Senate met *on the sixteenth of this month*, your affair stood in a very advantageous posture. We had succeeded the day before against the motion of *Bibulus* for appointing three commissioners, and had now only to contend with *Volcatius*; when our adversaries prevented the question from being put, by artfully protracting the debates. For, they saw we had

Lib. i. Ep.  
 4. Ed.  
 Græv.  
 B.i. Let.  
 16. Melm.

“ When an act passed the Senate in a full House, held according to the prescribed forms, and without any opposition from the Tribunes, (who had the privilege of putting a negative upon all proceedings in the Senate) it was called a *Senatus consultum*, a decree of the Senate: But if any of these essentials were wanting, or a Tribune interposed, it was then only styled a *Senatus auctoritas*, an order of the Senate, and considered as of less authority.” *Melm.* from *Manutius.*

“ in

Y.R. 697.     “ in a very full House, and amidst great contrariety of opinions, carried our point, to the considerable mortification of those, who were for 55.  
Bef. Chr.     “ taking the King’s affairs out of your direction,  

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396 Conf.     “ and transferring them to another hand. *Curio*  
“ opposed us upon this occasion with great warmth;  
“ while *Bibulus* spoke with more temper, and  
“ indeed seemed almost inclined to favour our  
“ cause. But *Cato* and *Caninius* absolutely re-  
“ fused to suffer any decree to pass, till a general  
“ Assembly of the People should be convened.

“ By the *Pupian* law, as you well know, there  
“ cannot be another meeting of the Senate till the  
“ *first of February*: Nor indeed throughout that  
“ whole month, unless all the foreign Ambassa-  
“ dors should have received, or be refused, au-  
“ dience. In the mean while, a motion prevails  
“ among the People, that your adversaries have  
“ insisted upon this pretended Oracle, not so  
“ much with an intent of obstructing your par-  
“ ticular views, as in order to disappoint the  
“ hopes of those who may be desirous of this ex-  
“ pedition to *Alexandria*, merely from the am-  
“ bition of commanding an army. The whole  
“ world is sensible indeed of the regard which  
“ the Senate has shewn to your character: And  
“ it is notoriously owing to the artifices of your  
“ enemies, that the House did not divide upon  
“ the question proposed in your favour. But  
“ should the same persons, under a pretended  
“ zeal for the public (though, in fact, upon the  
“ most infamous motives) attempt to bring this  
“ affair

" affair before a general Assembly of the People,  
 " we have concerted our measures so well <sup>d</sup>, that  
 " they cannot possibly effect their design without  
 " having recourse to violence; or at least without  
 " setting the ordinances of our country, both civil  
 " and religious, at avowed defiance —— But  
 " — if methods of violence should be employed, I  
 " cannot pretend, in this general contempt of all  
 " legal authority, to answer for the event: In  
 " every other respect I will venture to assure you,  
 " that both the Senate and the People will pay  
 " the highest attention to your dignity and cha-  
 " racter. Farewell."

Y.R. 697.  
 Bef. Chr.  
 55.  
396 Cons.

## To the same.

" — You are sensible, as I perceive by your  
 " last letter, that you have been treated with the  
 " same insincerity by those who ought to have  
 " concurred in supporting your dignities, as I for-  
 " merly experienced from some of my pretended  
 " friends, in the affair of my banishment. Thus,  
 " whilst I was exerting the utmost efforts of my  
 " vigilance, my policy, and my interest, in order  
 " to serve you in the article relating to *Ptolemy*,  
 " I was unexpectedly alarmed in a point of much  
 " more important concern, by the infamous law  
 " which *Cato* has lately proposed to your preju-  
 " dice." [Caius Cato, to cut off all hopes at once from *Lentulus* of obtaining this commission,  
 had proposed a law to the People for recalling

Lib. i. Ep.  
 5. Ed.  
 Græv.  
 Book i.  
 Let. 17.  
 Melm.

Ad Q. Fr.  
 i. 3.

<sup>d</sup> i. e. They had engaged some Tribune to say *Veto*, or some Magistrate to observe the Heavens.

**Y.R. 697.** him from his government.] “Where affairs  
**Bef. Chr.** “are thus embroiled, every thing is, undoubt-  
**55.** “edly, to be feared : Yet my principal appre-  
**396 Conf.** “hension, I confess, arises from the treachery of  
“your false friends. But however that may be,  
“I am earnestly endeavouring to counteract the  
“malevolent designs of *Cato*.

“As to the *Alexandrian* commission, both your-  
“self and your friends will, I trust, have abun-  
“dant reason to be satisfied with my conduct. But  
“at the same time I must say, I greatly fear it  
“will either be taken out of your hands, or en-  
“tirely dropped : And I know not which of these  
“alternatives I should least chuse.” — — —

To the same <sup>c</sup>.

**Lib. i. Ep.** “You are informed, I imagine, by many hands,  
**5. Ed.** “of what passes here. I leave it therefore to  
**Græv.** “your other friends to supply you with an ac-  
**Book. i.** “count of our transactions, and content myself  
**Let. 18.** “with only sending you my conjectures. To this  
**Melm.** “end I must previously acquaint you, that, *on the*  
“*sixth of February*, *Pompey* made a speech in a  
“general Assembly of the People in favour of  
“*Milo*, during which he was insulted with much  
“clamour and abuse. *Cato* afterwards inveighed  
“in the Senate against *Pompey* with great acri-  
“mony, and was heard with the most profound  
“silence and attention : Both which circumstances

<sup>c</sup> This and the foregoing letter are blended together in the common editions : But they are here separated upon the authority of *Manutius* and *Gronovius*. Melm.

" seem to have affected him very sensibly. Now Y.R. 697.  
Bef. Chr.  
55.  
936 Conf.  
" from hence I surmise, that he has laid aside all  
" thoughts of being employed in the Alexandrian  
" expedition. That affair remains as yet intirely  
" open to us: For the Senate has hitherto determined  
" nothing to your prejudice but what they are obliged,  
" in deference to the Oracle, to refuse to every other  
" candidate for this office. It is my present hope  
" therefore, as well as endeavour, that the King  
" may throw himself into your hands, when he  
" shall find that he cannot, as he expected, be re-  
" stored by Pompey; and that, unless he is re-  
" placed upon the throne by your assistance, his  
" affair will be entirely dropped. And this step he  
" will undoubtedly take, if Pompey should give the  
" least intimation of its being agreeable to him.  
" But I need not tell you the difficulty of discovering  
" the sentiments of a man of his reserve. However,  
" I shall omit no method in my power to effect  
" this scheme; as I shall easily, I trust, be able  
" to prevent the injurious designs of *Cato*.

" I do not find that any of the Consulars are  
" in your interest, except *Hortensius* and *Lucul-  
" lus*: All the rest of that rank, either openly,  
" or in a more concealed manner, oppose your  
" views. Nevertheless, my friend, be not dis-  
" couraged: On the contrary, let it be still your  
" hope, notwithstanding the attempts of the  
" worthless *Cato*, that you will again shine out in  
" all your former lustre. Farewell."

Y. R. 697.

To the same.

L. I. Ep.  
vi. Ed.  
Graev. ;  
Book I.  
Let. xix.  
Melm. ;

" You will receive a full account from *Pollio*  
 " of all that has been transacted in your affair, as  
 " he was not only present, but a principal mana-  
 " ger. *Believe me, I am much concerned at the un-*  
*" favourable aspect of this business.* However, it  
 " affords me a very sensible consolation, that there  
 " is strong reason to hope the prudence of your  
 " friends will be able to elude the force of those  
 " iniquitous schemes which have been projected  
 " to your prejudice. Even time itself will pro-  
 " bably contribute to this end; as it often wears  
 " out the malevolence of those who either pro-  
 " fessedly or in a disguised manner mean one  
 " ill." —

Midd. p.  
433.

The Senate grew at length so weary of this affair, that they resolved to leave the King to shift for himself, without interposing at all in his restoration; and so the matter hung; whilst other affairs more interesting were daily rising at home, and engaging the attention of the City.

Ad Quint.  
Frat. ii. 2.

THE election of *Aediles*, which had been industriously postponed through all the last summer, could not easily be kept off any longer: The City was impatient for its Magistrates, and especially for the plays and shews with which they used to entertain them; and several also of the new Tribunes being zealous for an election, it was held at last *on the twentieth of January*, when *Clodius* was chosen *Aedile* without opposition <sup>f</sup>.

Midd. p.  
434.

<sup>f</sup> It may justly seem strange (says Dr. Middleton) how a man so profligate and criminal as *Clodius*, whose life was a per-

This Magistracy, which freed him from all apprehension of Judges, and a trial, gave him a great advantage over his antagonist *Milo*, who

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petual insult upon all laws divine and human, should be suffered not only to live without punishment, but to obtain all the honours of a free City in their proper course; and it would be natural to suspect that we had been deceived in our accounts of him by taking them from his enemies, did we not find them too firmly supported by facts to be called in question: But a little attention to the particular character of the man, as well as of the times in which he lived, will enable us to solve the difficulty.

*First*, the splendor of his family — Cicero calls the nobles of this class *Prætors* and *Consuls elect* from their cradles by a kind of hereditary right, whose very names were sufficient to advance them to all the dignities of the state. [And therefore how worthless, how pestilent soever *Clodius* was, he did not fail to be defended and supported by the *Honesti*, the *Optimates*, when his attempts were not against the interest of their faction.]

In Verr. v.  
70.  
Pro Sext.  
9.

*Secondly*, his personal qualities were peculiarly adapted to indear him to all the meaner sort; his bold and ready wit, his talent at haranguing, his profuse expence, and his pursuing popular measures contrary to the maxims of his ancestors, who had [almost] all been stern asserters of the aristocratical power.

*Thirdly*, the contrast of opposite factions, who had each their ends in supporting him.—The Senate particularly, whose chief apprehensions were from the Triumvirate, thought that the rashness of *Clodius* might be of some use to perplex their measures, and stir up the People against them on proper occasions; or it humoured their spleen at least to see him insulting *Pompey* to his face. *Videtis igitur hominem per seipsum jam pridem afflictum ac jacentem perniciosis Optimatium discordiis excitari.* —*Nè a Republica Reipub. pestis amoveretur, restiterunt; etiam ne causam diceret; etiam ne privatus esset: Etiamne in sinu atque in deliciis quidam optimi viri viperam illam venenatam ac pestiferam habere potuerunt? Quo tandem decepti munere? Volo, inquiunt, esse qui in concione detrahatur de Pompeio.* — *De Harusp. Resp. 24.*

was

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Midd. p.

436—440.

Ad. Q. Fr.

ii. 3.

was become a private man. He now accused *Milo* of the same crime of which *Milo* had accused him, of public violence and breach of the laws, in maintaining a band of gladiators to the terror of the City. *Milo* made his appearance to this accusation on the second of February, when *Pompey*, *Cras-fus*, and *Cicero* appeared with him; and *M. Marcellus*, though *Clodius*'s colleague in the Ædileship, spoke for *Milo* at *Cicero*'s desire; and the whole passed quietly and favourably for him on that day. The second hearing was appointed on the ninth, when *Pompey* undertook to plead his cause; but no sooner stood up to speak, than *Clodius*'s mob, by a continual clamour of reproaches and invectives, endeavoured to hinder him from going on, or at least from being heard: Yet *Pompey*, with a presence of mind which, in spite of their attempts, commanded silence, spoke for near three hours. When *Clodius* rose up to answer him, *Milo*'s mob, in their turn, so disturbed and confounded him, that he was not able to speak a word; while a number of epigrams and lampoons upon him and his sister were thrown about, and publicly rehearsed among the multitude below, so as to make him quite furious: Till recollecting himself a little, and finding it impossible to proceed in his speech, he demanded aloud of his mob, who it was that attempted to starve them by famine? To which they presently cried out, *Pompey*: He then asked, who it was that desired to be sent into Egypt? *Pompey*, they cried out again. But when he asked, who it was that they themselves had a mind to send? they answered, *Cras-fus*:

*sus*: For the old jealousy was now breaking out again between him and *Pompey*; and though he appeared that day on *Milo's* side, yet he was not, as *Cicero* says, a real well-wisher to him.

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These warm proceedings among the chiefs brought on a fray below, among their partizans; the *Clodians* began the attack, but were repulsed by the Pompeians; and *Clodius* himself driven out of the *Rostra*: *Cicero*, when he saw the affair proceed to blows, thought it high time to retreat towards home; but no great harm was done; for *Pompey*, having cleared the Forum of his enemies, presently drew off his forces, to prevent any farther mischief or scandal on his side.

The Senate was presently summoned, to provide some remedy for these disorders, where *Pompey*, who had drawn upon himself a fresh odium from his behaviour in the *Egyptian affair*, was severely handled by *Bibulus*, *Curio*, *Favonius*, and others: *Cicero* chose to be absent, since he must either have offended *Pompey*, by saying nothing for him, or the honest party, by defending him. The same debate was carried on for several days, in which *Pompey* was treated very roughly by the Tribune *Cato*, who inveighed against him with great fierceness, and laid open his perfidy to *Cicero*, to whom he paid the highest compliments, and was heard with much attention by all *Pompey's* enemies.

Ad Quint.  
Fr. iii. 3.

*Pompey* answered him with an unusual vehemence; and reflecting openly on *Crassus*, as the author of these affronts, declared, he would guard his life with more care than *Scipio Africanus* did,

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when *Carbo* murdered him<sup>s</sup>. — These warm expressions seemed to open a prospect of some great agitation likely to ensue: *Pompey* consulted *Cicero* on the proper means of his security; and acquainted him with his apprehensions of a design against his life; that *Cato* was privately supported, and *Clodius* furnished with money by *Crassus*; and both of them encouraged by *Curio*, *Bibulus*, and the rest, who envied him; that it was necessary for him to look to himself, since the meaner people were wholly alienated, the nobility and Senate generally disaffected, and the youth corrupted.

*Cicero* readily consented to join forces with him, and to summon their clients and friends from all parts of Italy. For, though he had no mind to fight his battles in the Senate, he was desirous to defend his person from all violence, especially against *Crassus*, whom he never loved: They resolved likewise to oppose with united strength all the attempts of *Clodius* and *Cato* against *Lentulus* and *Milo*. *Clodius*, on the other hand, was not less busy in mustering his friends against the next hearing of *Milo*'s cause: But as his strength was much inferior to that of his adversary, so he had no expectation of getting him condemned, nor any other view but to seize and harass him: For, after two hearings, the affair was put off by several adjournments to the beginning of May; from which time we find no farther mention of it.

<sup>s</sup> N.B. That *Scipio* was murdered by *Carbo*, there is no shadow of proof. See Vol. II. Book VI. Chap. IX.

The Consul *Marcellinus*, who drew his colleague *Philippus* along with him, was a resolute opposer of the *Triumvirate*, as well as of all the violences of the other Magistrates: For which reason he resolved to suffer no Assemblies of the People, except such as were necessary for the elections into the public offices: His view was to prevent *Cato's law for recalling Lentulus*, and the monstrous things (so *Cicero* calls them) which some were attempting at this time in favour of *Cæsar*. *Cicero* gives him the character of one of the best Consuls that he had ever known, and blames him only in one thing; for treating Pompey on all occasions so rudely; which made *Cicero* often absent himself from the Senate, to avoid taking part either on the one side or the other. For the support therefore of his DIGNITY and interest in the City, he resumed his old task of PLEADING CAUSES<sup>b</sup>; which was always popular and respectable, and in which he was sure to find full employment. His first cause was the defence of *L. Bestia* on the tenth of February, who, after the disgrace of a repulse from the Prætorship in the last election, was accused of bribery and corruption in his suit for it; and, notwithstanding the authority and eloquence of his advocate, was convicted and banished. He was a man extremely corrupt, turbulent, and seditious, had always been an enemy to *Cicero*, and supposed to be deeply engaged in *Catiline's* plot; and is one in-

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Ad Q. Fr.  
ii. 6.

Ibid. ii. 3.

<sup>b</sup> It is very remarkable that *Cicero*, to preserve his DIGNITY, made himself Advocate-General for all STATE-FELONS.

Y.R. 697. stance of what Cicero says, that he was often forced, against his will, to defend certain persons who had not deserved it of him, by the intercession of those who had.

Ep. Fam.  
vii. 1.  
Midd. p.  
443.

Cicero was about this time engaged in the defence of *P. Sextius*, the late Tribune, accused of public violence, or breach of peace in his Tribunate: He had been a true friend to Cicero in his distress, and born a great part in his restoration; but fancying himself afterwards neglected, or not sufficiently requited by him, had since his return been very cold to him, and even churlish.

Ad Q. Fr.  
ii. 3.  
Ibid. 4.

But Cicero, instead of resenting this, having heard that Sextius was indisposed, went in person to his house, and cured him of all his jealousies, by freely offering his assistance and patronage in pleading his cause; which he managed so well, that Sextius was acquitted, and in a manner the most honourable, by the unanimous suffrages of all the Judges; and with an universal applause of Cicero's humanity and gratitude.

Midd. 444.

Pompey attended this trial as a friend to *Sextius*; while *Cæsar's creature*, *Vatinus*, appeared not only as an adversary, but as a witness against him: Which gave Cicero an opportunity of exposing the whole course of his profligate life<sup>1</sup>, (as *Sextius* particularly desired) with all the keenness of his raillery, to the great diversion of the

<sup>1</sup> We shall find that Cicero afterwards, notwithstanding the profligacy of Vatinus's whole life, appeared as a witness to his General Good Behaviour.

*audience* <sup>k</sup>. *Vatinius* made some attempt in his turn to rally *Cicero*, and contemptuously reproached him with the baseness of changing sides, and becoming *Cæsar's* friend, on account of the fortunate state of his affairs.

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[For *Cæsar*, being in the career of his victories in *Gaul*<sup>1</sup>, had lately sent a request to the Senate, "that money might be decreed to him for the payment of his army; with a power of chusing ten Lieutenants, for the better managing of the war, and the conquered provinces." It seemed strange, that, after all his conquests, he should not be able to maintain his army without money from home, at a time when the treasury was greatly exhausted: and the renewal of a commission, obtained at first by the People's favour, against the inclination of the Senate, was of hard digestion. But *Cæsar's* interest prevailed, and *Cicero* himself was the promoter of it, and procured a decree to his satisfaction, yet not without disgusting the pretended patriots, those counterfeit Republicans, scrupulously zealous against all extraordinary grants: But *Cicero* "alleged the extraordinary services of *Cæsar*, and that the course of his victories ought not to be checked by the want of necessary supplies, while he was so gloriously extending the bounds of the empire, and

De Prov.  
Conf. xi.  
13.

Midd. 440.

<sup>k</sup> This speech against *Vatinius* is still remaining, under the title of *The Interrogation*; because it consists chiefly of a string of questions.

<sup>1</sup> *Cæsar's* progress in conquest will be related hereafter, in an uninterrupted summary of his exploits.

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“conquering nations whose names had never been heard before at *Rome*: And though it were possible for him to maintain his troops without their help, by the spoils of the enemy, yet those spoils ought to be reserved for the splendor of his Triumph, which it was not just to defraud by their unseasonable parsimony.”]

What *Cicero* says he replied to *Vatinius*, will be seen in a long letter he wrote two years after this time to *Lentulus Spinther*, which will be inserted in its proper year, with some observations upon it.

**Midd. 445.**

In the beginning of *April*, the Senate granted the sum of three hundred thousand pounds to Pompey, to be laid out in purchasing corn for the use of the City, where there was still a great scarcity, and as great at the same time of money; so that the moving a point so tender could not fail of raising some ill humour in the Assembly: when *Cicero*, whose old spirit seems to have revived in him from his late success in *Sextius's* cause, surprized them by proposing, “that, in the present inability of the treasury to purchase the Campanian lands, which by *Cæsar's* act were to be divided to the People, the act itself should be reconsidered, and a day appointed for that de-liberation:” The motion was received with an universal joy, and a kind of tumultuary acclamation: The enemies of the *Triumvirate* were extremely pleased with it, in hopes that it would make a breach between *Cicero* and Pompey.

*Pompey,*

Pompey, whose nature was singularly reserved, expressed no uneasiness upon it, nor took any notice of it to Cicero, though they met and supped together familiarly, as they used to do: But he set forward soon after towards Afric, in order to provide corn; and, intending to call at Sardinia, proposed to embark at Pisa or Leghorn, that he might have an interview with Cæsar, who was now at Luca, the utmost limit of his Gallic government. He found Cæsar exceedingly out of humour with Cicero; for Crassus had already been with him at Ravenna, and greatly incensed him by his account of Cicero's late motion; which he complained of so heavily, that Pompey promised to use all his authority to induce Cicero to drop the pursuit of it; and for that purpose sent away an express to Rome, to entreat him not to proceed any further in it till his return; and when he came afterwards to Sardinia, where his Lieutenant Quintus, the brother of Cicero, then resided, he entered immediately into an expostulation with him about it.—But of the effect of this remonstrance we shall have a full account in the long letter to Lentulus, just now referred to for another particular.

Milo's trial being put off (as before mentioned) to the fifth of May, Cicero took the benefit of a short vacation to make an excursion into the country, and visit his estates and villas in different parts of Italy.—During this tour, his old enemy Gabinius, the Proconsul of Syria, having gained some advantages in Judæa against Aristobulus,

Y.R. 697.

Midd. p.

446.

V.R. 697.

Ad Quint.  
Fr. ii. 8.

*bulus* (who had been dethroned by *Pompey*, and carried prisoner to *Rome*, but had thence made his escape) sent public letters to the Senate, to give an account of his victory, and to beg the decree of a *Thanksgiving* for it. His friends took the opportunity of moving the affair in *Cicero's* absence, from whose authority they apprehended some obstruction; but the Senate, in a full House, slighted *Gabinius's* letters, and rejected his suit: An affront which had never been offered before to any Proconsul. *Cicero* was infinitely delighted with it, calls the resolution *divine*, and was doubly pleased for its being the free and genuine judgment of the Senate, without any struggle or influence on his part —.

Midd. p.

454, 455.

Vide Argum.

Magnum. Ma-

nuttii in

Orat. de

Harusp.

Resp.

Dio, lib.

xxxix. p.

100.

Many prodigies were reported to have happened about this time in the neighbourhood of *Rome*: Horrible noises under ground, with clashing of *armis*; and on the *Alban* hill, a little shrine of *Juno*, which stood on a table, facing the east, turned suddenly of itself towards the west. These terrors alarmed the City, and the Senate consulted the *haruspices*, who were the public Diviners or Prophets of the State, skilled in all the *Tuscan* discipline of interpreting portentous events, who gave the following answer in writing, "That supplications must be made to *Jupiter*, *Saturn*, *Neptune*, and the other Gods: that the solemn shews and plays had been negligently exhibited and polluted; sacred and religious places made profane; Ambassadors killed contrary to law; faith and oaths disregarded; ancient and hidden

sacrifi-

“ sacrifices carelessly performed and profaned.” — Y.R. 697  
Bef. Chr.  
55.22  
396 Cons.  
 “ That the gods gave this warning, lest, by the  
 “ discord and dissension of the better sort, dangers  
 “ and destruction should fall upon the Senate and  
 “ the chiefs of the City; by which means the  
 “ provinces would fall under the power of a  
 “ single person, their armies be beaten, great loss  
 “ ensue, and honours be heaped upon the un-  
 “ worthy and disgraced.” —

One may observe from this answer, that the *Diviners* were under the direction of those, who endeavoured to apply the influence of religion to the cure of their civil disorders: Each party interpreted it according to their own views: *Clodius* took a handle from it of venting his spleen afresh against *Cicero*; and, calling the People together for that purpose, attempted to persuade them, “ that this divine admonition was designed particularly against him, and that the article of the civil and religious places referred to the case of his house, which, after a solemn consecration to religion, was rendered again profane; charged all the displeasure of the gods to *Ciceron's* account, who affected nothing less than a tyranny, and the oppression of their liberties.”

*Cicero* made a reply to *Clodius* the next day in the Senate, where, after a short and general invective upon his profligate life, “ he leaves him,” he says, “ a devoted victim to *Milo*, who seemed to be given to them by heaven for the extinction of such a plague, as *Scipio* was for the destruction of *Carthage*: He declares the pro-

DeHarusp.  
Respons.  
vi. 10—18.

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**V.R. 697.** “digi to be one of the most extraordinary which  
**Bef. Chr.** “had ever been reported to the Senate; but  


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**55.** “laughs at the absurdity of applying any part of  
**396 Conf.** “it to him; since his house, as he proves at large,  
“was more solemnly cleared from any service or  
“relation to religion than any other house in  
“*Rome* by the judgment of the Priests, the Se-  
“nate, and all the orders of the City. *Then run-*  
“ning through the several articles of the ANSWER,  
“he shews them all to tally so exactly with the  
“notorious acts and impieties of *Clodius*’s life,  
“that they could not possibly be applied to any  
**Midd. p.** “thing else: — particularly, as to the violation  
**447.** “of faith and oaths, that it related evidently to  
“those Judges who had absolved *Clodius*, as be-  
“ing one of the most memorable and flagrant  
“perjuries which *Rome* had ever known; that  
“the answer itself suggested this interpretation,  
“when it subjoined that ancient and occult sacri-  
“fices were polluted, which could refer to nothing  
“so properly as to the rites of the *Bona Dea*,  
“which were the most ancient and the most occult  
“of any in the City, celebrated with incredible  
“secrecy to that goddess, whose name it was not  
“lawful for men to know, and with ceremonies  
“which no man ever pried into but *Clodius*. ”

**Midd. p.** About the middle of summer, and before the  
**459.** time of chusing new Consuls, which was com-  
monly in *August*, the Senate began to deliberate  
on the provinces which were to be assigned to  
them at the expiration of their office. *The Con-*  
*fular provinces*, about which the debate singly  
**De Prov.** turned,  
**Conf. 8, 9,**  
**&c.**

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turned, were *the two Gauls*, which *Cæsar* now held; *Macedonia*, which *Piso*; and *Syria*, which *Gabinius* possessed. All who spoke before *Cicero*, excepting *Servilius*, were for taking one or both the Gauls from *Cæsar*; which was what the Senate generally desired: But when it came to *Cicero's* turn, he gladly laid hold on the occasion to revenge himself on *Piso* and *Gabinius*; and exerted all his authority to get them recalled, with some marks of disgrace, and their governments assigned to the succeeding Consuls; but as for *Cæsar*, his opinion was, “that his command should be continued to him till he had finished the war, “which he was carrying on with such success, and “settled the conquered countries.” This gave no small offence; and the Consul *Philippus* could not forbear interrupting, and reminding him, “that “he had more reason to be angry with *Cæsar* than “with *Gabinius* himself; since *Cæsar* was the au-“thor and raiser of all that storm which had op-“pressed him.” But *Cicero* replied, “that, in this “vote, he was not pursuing his private resent-“ment, but the public good, which had recon-“ciled him to *Cæsar*; and that he could not be an “enemy to one who was deserving so well of his “Country: That a year or two more would com-“plete his conquests, and reduce all *Gaul* to a “state of peaceful subjection: That the cause was “widely different between *Cæsar* and the other “two: That *Cæsar's* administration was benefi-“cial, prosperous, glorious to the Republic; “their scandalous, ignominious, hurtful to their  
“subjects,

**X. R. 697.** “subjects, and contemptible to their enemies.”—  
**Bef. Chr.**  
**55.**  
**396 Conf.**  
In short, he managed the debate so, that the Senate readily consented to leave *Cæsar* in the possession of his government, and to recall *Piso* from Macedonia; but *Gabinius* was not now recalled from Syria.

**Midd. 465.** All People’s eyes and inclinations began now to turn towards *Cæsar*, who, by the eclat of his victories <sup>m</sup>, seemed to rival the fame of *Pompey* himself; and by his address and generosity gained ground upon him daily in authority and influence in public affairs. After three prosperous campaigns, he spent the winter of 697 at *Luca*, whither a vast concourse of all ranks resorted to him from *Rome*. So great was the number of Magistrates and other persons in command, who came to wait on him, that the Lictors at his gate are reckoned to have amounted to 120.

**Plut. in  
Pomp &  
in Cæs.**

At this interview of the Triumvirs, it was privately agreed among them, that *Pompey* and *Crassus*, who were now again made friends by *Cæsar*, should jointly sue for the Consulship, in order to defeat the hopes and designs of *L. Domitius Abenobarbus*, one of the competitors, a professed enemy of the Triumvirate; who, thinking himself sure of being elected, could not forbear boasting, “that he would effect, when Consul,

**Sueton. in Cæs. 24.** “what he had not been able to do when Praetor,

<sup>m</sup> *Cæsar*, in two campaigns (those of the years 695 and 696) had carried the Roman arms triumphantly through the very heart of Gaul, from the lake of Geneva to the German ocean, and in the present year (697) had subdued the *Veneti*.

“rescind

“*rescind the acts of Cæsar, and recall him from his government:*” For *Cæsar* had no sooner surrendered the Consular fasces to his successors in that Magistracy (the Consuls of 695) than he was affronted and attacked by this same *Domitius* and *C. Memmius*, two of the then newly-chosen *Prætors*, (than whom *Rome* perhaps never produced two more consummate knaves<sup>n</sup>), who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several rash efforts to get them annulled by public authority.

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Sueton. in  
Cæſ. 24.

*Pompey* and *Crassus*, the better to conceal their design upon the Consulship, let pass the time, when, according to custom, they should have put themselves among the candidates. And, because they thought it would be difficult to carry their point in an Assembly where the Consul *Marcellinus* presided, they laid a scheme to hinder all elections of Magistrates during his year: Their project happened to be favoured by the Tribune *C. Cato*, the same who had formerly been so active in opposing the desires of *Pompey* with relation to the affair of King *Ptolemy*, and in endeavouring to get *Lentulus Spinther* recalled from *Cilicia*. *Cato*, to revenge himself on *Marcellinus* for not

Dio, p.  
103.Ad Quint.  
Fr. ii. 6.

<sup>n</sup> Of the impudent wickedness of these men we shall find a notable proof in one of *Cicero's* letters, when we come to the year 699. Yet, unworthy and detestable as *Domitius* was, *Cicero* thinks it a most sad thing, that this illustrious noble, a Consul designed ever since he was born, should not be able at this time to obtain the Consulship. *Quid enim hoc miserius, quam eum, qui, tot annos quos habet, designatus Consul fuerit, Consulem fieri non posse?* *Ad Att. iv. 8. Dio, p. 103.*

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Bef. Chr.  
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suffering him to hold any Assemblies of the People <sup>o</sup>, for promulgating certain laws of his own fashion (disliked probably by the Aristocratic worthies), *would not suffer the Consuls to hold any for the choice of the Magistrates*; and in this resolution he was supported by two of his colleagues, as well as by the Triumvirate <sup>P</sup>, till the year <sup>q</sup>

<sup>o</sup> It is likely, that the means employed by *Marcellinus* was to proclaim all the days on which Assemblies of the People could lawfully be held, *Holidays*. Crevier.

Plut. in  
Pomp.

<sup>P</sup> Plutarch tells us, that the secret treaty among the Triumvirs having transpired, the partisans of the Aristocracy were filled with indignation, and that the Consul *Marcellinus*, to unmask *Pompey*, interrogated him in an Assembly of the People, whether he had any intention to stand for the Consulship? *Pompey* answered, that perhaps he would, and perhaps he would not: But *Craffus*, when the same question was put to him by the Consul, answered with more temper, that he would do what should appear to him to be most for the benefit of the Republic.

Val. Max.  
vi. 2.

*Valerius Maximus* writes, that, when *Marcellinus* was one day haranguing on the danger the City was in from the power of *Pompey*, and found himself encouraged by a general acclamation of the People, he said to them, *Cry out, Citizens, cry out while you may; for it will not be long in your power to do so with safety.*

Ibid. 4.

He reports likewise, that *Cn. Piso*, a young Nobleman, who had impeached *Manilius Crispus*, a man of Praetorian rank, and notoriously guilty, being provoked by *Pompey's* protection of him, turned his attack against *Pompey* himself, and charged him with many crimes against the State: Being asked therefore by *Pompey*, why he did not chuse to impeach him rather than the criminal, he briskly replied, that if he would give him a trial, without raising a civil war, he would soon bring him before his Judges.

<sup>q</sup> It was in this year, 697, that *Cicero* pleaded for *Cornelius Balbus* and *M. Cælius*.

Midd. 46c. *Balbus* was a native of *Gades* in *Spain*, of a splendid family in that City, who, for his fidelity and services to the *Roman* expired.

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expired. The government fell into an interregnum.

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55.  
396 Conf.

Generals in that province, and especially in the Sertorian war, had the freedom of Rome conferred upon him by Pompey, in virtue of a law, which authorized him to grant it to as many as he thought proper. But Pompey's act was now called in question, as originally null and invalid, on a pretence, that the city of Gades was not within the terms of that alliance and relation to Rome which rendered the citizens capable of that privilege. Pompey and Crassus were his advocates; and, at their desire, Cicero also, who had the third place or post of honour assigned him, to give the finishing hand to the cause. The prosecution was projected, not so much out of enmity to Balbus as to his patrons, Pompey and Cæsar, by whose favour he had acquired great wealth; being at this time General of the artillery to Cæsar, and the principal manager or steward of all his affairs. The Judges gave sentence for him, and confirmed his right to the City; from which foundation he was raised afterwards by Augustus to the Consulate itself: His nephew also, young Balbus, who was made free with him at the same time, obtained the honour of a triumph for his victories over the Garamantes; and, as Pliny tells us, they were the only instances of foreigners and adopted Citizens, who had ever advanced themselves to either of these honours in Rome.

Cælius was a young gentleman of Equestrian rank, of great parts and accomplishments, trained under the discipline of Cicero himself, to whose care he was committed by his father upon his first introduction into the Forum. Before he was of age to hold any Magistracy, he had distinguished himself by two public impeachments; the one of C. Antonius, Cicero's colleague in the Consulship, for the male-administration of his province of Macedonia; the other of L. Atratinus, for bribery and corruption. Atratinus's son was now revenging his father's quarrel, and accused Cælius of public violence, for being concerned in the assassination of Dio, the chief of the Alexandrian embassy; and of an attempt to poison Clodia, the sister of Clodius: He was a true libertine, and had been this lady's gallant; whose resentment, for her favours slighted by him, was the real source of all his trouble.—He was acquitted of both charges.

Pro Balb.  
1, 2, &c.

Hist. N.  
vii. 43.  
Ibid. v. 5.

Midd. 461.

Vid. Vol.  
VIII. p.  
358.

Vid. Vol.  
VIII. p.  
P. 487.

## C H A P. IV.

POMPEY and CRASSUS are elected Consuls for the year 698. The state of King PTOLEMY's affairs at this time, CATO repulsed from the Praetorship. Provinces assigned to the Consuls, by the law of TREBONIUS, for five years. They attempt reformations at home. POMPEY's theatre. Piso returns to Rome ignominiously from his government of Macedonia. CRASSUS, in spite of bad omens, embarks for Syria, (the province fallen to him by lot) even before the year of his Consulship is expired. L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS and APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER are elected Consuls for the year 699.

Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>54.</sup>  
397 Cons.

O F all those who had intended to present themselves candidates for the Consulship of the year 698, *L. Domitius* alone persisted in the

Midd. 462.  
Ad Att.  
iv. 5.  
Ad Quint.  
ii. 15.

Cicero seems to have composed a little poem about this time, in compliment to *Caesar*; and excuses his not sending it to *Atticus*, "because *Caesar* pressed to have it, and he had received no copy: Though, to confess the truth, he says, he found it very difficult to digest the meanness of recanting his old principles. But adieu, says he, to all right, true, honest counsels: It is incredible what perfidy there is in those who want to be leaders; and who really would be so, if there was any faith in them. [He speaks of THE HONEST.] I felt what they were to my cost, when I was drawn in, deserted, and betrayed by them: I resolved still to act on with them in all things; but found them the same as before; till by your advice I came at last to a better mind. You will tell me, that you advised me indeed to *act*, but not to *write*; it is true; but I was willing to put myself under a necessity of adhering to

purpose

purpose of entering the lists against Pompey and Crassus; and his constancy perhaps was owing to Cato's management, whose sister Porcia he had married: Cato pressed him to perseverance, by saying, that not his own elevation, but the LIBERTY<sup>a</sup> of the Romans, was the interest in question.

Y.R. 69.  
Bef. Chr.

34.  
965 Cons.

Plut. in  
Cat.

“ my new alliance [with the Triumvirs], and preclude the possibility of returning to those who, instead of pitying me, as they ought, never cease envying me.—But since those, who have no power, will not love me, my business is to acquire the love of those who have. You will say, I wish that you had done it long ago; I know you wished it; and I was a mere ass for not minding you.

In this year also, Cicero wrote that celebrated letter to Lucceius, in which he presses him to attempt the history of his transactions. Lucceius had just finished the history of the Italic and Marian civil wars, with intent to carry it down through his own times, and, in the general relation, to include, as he had promised, a particular account of Cicero's acts: But Cicero, who was pleased with his stile and manner of writing, labours in this letter to engage him to postpone the design of his continued history, and enter directly on that separate period, “from the beginning of his Consulship to his restoration, comprehending Catiline's conspiracy and his own exile:” And he desires this historian-friend, “to allow so much to friendship and affection, as not to confine himself to the strict laws of history and the rules of truth, but to exceed those bounds in his praises.” Ep. Fam. lib. v. 12.

A little before Cicero's return from exile, his son-in-law Piso Frugi died. Tullia, having lived a widow about two months, was married this year to Furius Crassipes; who, though little is said of him, seems to have been a Nobleman of principal rank and figure. The wedding-feast was held at Cicero's house on the sixth of April.

Midd. 463.  
Ad Quint.  
ii. 4.  
Ep. Fam.  
i. 7.

\* What a worthy champion this Domitius was of the laws and liberties of Rome, we shall see presently: But the villain

Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Conf.

*Plutarch* reports, that when *Domitius*, accompanied by *Cato*, went before day to the *Campus Martius* to sollicit votes, he fell into an ambush prepared by his rivals: The slave who carried the flambeau before him was killed, and *Cato* wounded in the arm: The latter nevertheless exhorted *Domitius* to fight it out to his last breath; but the intimidated candidate thought it more prudent to go home. So that *Pompey* and *Crassus*, without further opposition, were elected Consuls<sup>b</sup>.

*Pompey*, when, in concert with his two associates, he had entertained new schemes of ambition, laid aside all thoughts of obtaining for himself the commission to restore King *Ptolemy*; and, in appearance at least, became willing to serve *Lentulus* in that affair. This change of his disposition gave occasion to the two following letters from *Cicero* to that Proconsul. The first was probably written (if not in the end of 697) in the beginning of 698, during the Interregnum, and before the election of *Pompey* and *Crassus* to the Consulship; the second after that election.

### To *Publius Lentulus*, Proconsul.

Lib. I. Ep.  
viii. Ed.  
Græv.  
Book II.  
Lett. ii.  
Melm.

" I have received your letter, wherein you assure me, that the frequent accounts I send of your affairs, together with the convincing proofs

was *Cato's* brother-in-law, and *Cæsar's* enemy: And there we find his merit.

<sup>b</sup> This was the second time of their being Consuls: In their first Consulship they were colleagues, as now.

"I have given you my friendship, are circumstances extremely agreeable to you.—If you do not hear from me as frequently as you wish, it is solely because I dare not trust my letters to every conveyance.—

Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Cons.

"It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to your enquiry concerning the sincerity of your professed friends, and the disposition of others in general towards you. This only I will venture to say, that a certain party, and particularly those who have the strongest obligations, as well as the greatest abilities, to distinguish themselves in your service, look upon you with envy: That (agreeably to what I have myself experienced upon a different occasion) those whom, in justice to your Country, you have necessarily offended, are your avowed opposers; as others, whose interest and honours you have generously supported, are much less inclined to remember your favours than to oppose your glory. These are circumstances indeed which I long suspected, and have often intimated to you; but of which I am now most thoroughly convinced. I observed upon the same occasion, (and I believe I told you so in a former letter) both *Hortensius* and *Lucullus* to be extremely in your interest: As among those who were in the Magistracy, *Lucius Racilius* <sup>c</sup> appeared very sincerely and affectionately to espouse your

<sup>c</sup> Tribune  
in 697.  
Pigh.

\* Dr. Middleton dates this letter in 697, Mr. Melmoth in 698. If it was written in 697, it would seem to have been in December, after the Tribuneship of *Racilius* was expired.

V.R. 698. "cause. But, excepting the two former, I can-  
 Bef. Chr. "not name any of the Consulars who discovered  
 54. "the least degree of friendship towards you when  
397 Conf. "your affair was before the Senate. As for my  
 "own endeavours, they might perhaps be gene-  
 "rally considered as flowing rather from those si-  
 "gular favours I have received at your hands,  
 "than from the uninfluenced dictates of my real  
 "sentiments. With regard to *Pompey*, he fel-  
 "dom attended the house at that season: But I  
 "must do him the justice to say, he often takes  
 "an opportunity, without my previously leading  
 "him into the subject, of discoursing with me con-  
 "cerning your affair; as well as very willingly en-  
 "ters into the conversation, whenever I start it  
 "myself. Your last letter, I perceived, was ex-  
 "tremely agreeable to him: And I could not  
 "but observe, with equal admiration and plea-  
 "sure, the polite and most judicious manner in  
 "which you addressed him. Before he received  
 "this letter, he seemed a little inclined to suspect,  
 "that the notion, which some had entertained,  
 "of his inclination to be your competitor, had  
 "alienated you from him. But you have now  
 "wholly fixed that excellent man in your in-  
 "terest; who in truth had all the antecedent rea-  
 "sons for being so, that an uninterrupted series  
 "of the highest services could possibly give him <sup>a</sup>d.

Vid. vol.  
 VIII. p.  
 469.

<sup>a</sup> *Lentulus*, during his Consulate, had proposed and carried  
 that law in favour of *Pompey*, by which he was commissioned  
 to provide corn in a time of scarcity, a commission which in  
 effect invested him with the whole power of the Roman em-  
 pire.

I must

“ I must confess he always appeared to me, even Y.R. 698.  
 “ when the conduct of *Caninius* had raised the  
 “ strongest suspicions of the contrary <sup>e</sup>, to favour  
 “ your interest: But I can now assure you, that  
 “ I found him, after he had perused your letter,  
 “ intirely disposed to promote whatever may con-  
 “ tribute either to your interest or your honour.  
 “ You may consider then what I am going to offer  
 “ as his immediate sentiments and advice: As in-  
 “ deed it is the result of frequent consultations  
 “ which we have held together.

Vid. supr.  
p. 9.

“ We are of opinion, that it may be proper for  
 “ you to consider, whether any advantages may be  
 “ derived from your being in possession of *Cilicia*  
 “ and *Cyprus*. For if there should appear a suffi-  
 “ cient probability of being able to make yourself  
 “ master of *Alexandria* and *Egypt*, we think it  
 “ equally for your honour, and that of the Re-  
 “ public, to march thither with your army, sup-  
 “ ported by your fleet <sup>f</sup>; having first left the

<sup>e</sup> “ It was an usual artifice with *Pompey* to employ his friends in solliciting those honours in his behalf, to which he affected to appear himself perfectly indifferent, or even averse. This was his policy in the present instance: And at the same time that he pretended to serve *Lentulus* in this affair, his creature *Caninius*, a Tribune of the People, was practising every stratagem to procure the commission for *Pompey*. — But when *Pompey* found that this was impracticable, he pretended a friendship for *Lentulus*, and joined with *Cicero* in giving the advice which makes a great part of this letter.”

<sup>f</sup> It is very remarkable, that “ *Cicero* makes the very measures, which he here so strongly recommends to *Lentulus*, an article of his charge against *Antony*. For when the Senate, MELM. p. 96.

Y.R. 698. " King at *Ptolemais*, or some other convenient  
 Bef. Chr. " place in that neighbourhood. By these means,  
 54. " when you shall have quieted the disturbances  
397 Conf. " in Alexandria, and secured it by a proper num-  
 " ber of forces, Ptolemy may safely take posse-  
 " sion of his kingdom. Thus he will be restored  
 " by you, as the Senate had once decreed: And  
 " restored too without an army, agreeably to the  
 " sentiments of those who insist upon observing the  
 " injunctions of the Oracle. We are the rather  
 " confirmed in recommending this measure, as  
 " there is no decree of the Senate subsisting, which  
 " particularly prohibits you from replacing *Pto-*  
 " *lemy* on his throne. As to the *order*, which  
 " absolutely forbids all assistance whatever to be  
 " given to him, you know it was not only pro-  
 " tested against, when it was voted, but is gene-  
 " rally looked upon rather as the warm dictates  
 " after various debates, had resolved intirely to drop the affair  
 " of the King's restoration, *Ptolemy* applied himself to *Gabi-*  
 " *nus*, Proconsul of *Syria*, who, upon the promise often  
 " thousand talents, and at the recommendation of *Pompey*,  
 " boldly undertook and effected his restoration, without being  
 " authorised by any legal commission for that purpose: And  
 " it was by the persuasion of *Antony*, who commanded the  
 " *Roman* cavalry, that *Gabinius* engaged in that enterprize.  
 " This affords a topic of great indignation in one of the  
 " *Philippics*; and *Cicero* there speaks of this transaction as a  
 " most impudent violation of all authority, both sacred and  
 " civil: *Inde iter* (says he) ad *Alexandriam contra Senatus*  
 " *auctoritatem, contra Rempublicam & religiones*. *Philip.* ii.  
 " 19. But what opinion must every unprejudiced reader con-  
 " ceive of our author, when he finds him condemning and ap-  
 " proving the same transactions, and advising his friend to pur-  
 " sue a step which he afterwards publicly and justly reproached  
 " in his adversary?"  
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Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Conf.

" of an exasperated faction, than as having the  
" full authority of a *decree* of the Senate. How-  
" ever, we deem it necessary to add, that we are  
" sensible the world will judge of the propriety  
" of this scheme entirely by the event. Should  
" it succeed as we wish, your policy and reso-  
" lution will universally be applauded: On the  
" other hand, should it miscarry, it will undoubt-  
" edly be condemned as an action of ill-considered  
" and unwarrantable ambition. How far this  
" enterprize may be practicable, you, who are  
" situated almost within view of *Egypt*, are the  
" most competent judge. If therefore you are well  
" satisfied of being able to render yourself master  
" of that kingdom, we are clearly of opinion you  
" should not delay your march one moment: But  
" if you are doubtful of the success, it is our ad-  
" vice that you by no means make the attempt.  
" This I will venture to assure you, that, should  
" you execute this project in the manner we wish,  
" there will be a very considerable party to give  
" it applause, even during your absence; as all  
" *Rome* will unite in the same approbation, the  
" moment you shall return amongst us. Never-  
" theless I am persuaded, if this scheme should  
" not take the desired effect, it may be attended  
" with very disagreeable consequences to your-  
" self; not only upon account of that *order* of  
" the Senate which I just now mentioned, but  
" likewise in regard to the Oracle. When there-  
" fore I recommend such measures as you shall  
" have full assurance will terminate in your glory,

Y.R. 698.

Ref. Chr.

54.

397 Cons.

" I must at the same time strongly dissuade you  
 " from engaging in them, if you should have the  
 " least reason to apprehend an opposition. For  
 " (I repeat it again) the world will be deter-  
 " minded in their opinion of this whole transaction,  
 " not as it is reasonable, but as it shall be success-  
 " ful. If the method here proposed should ap-  
 " pear too dangerous to be hazarded in your own  
 " person, we think it may at least be adviseable  
 " to assist the King with a number of your forces,  
 " provided he shall give sufficient security to your  
 " friends in the province, for repaying them the  
 " money they have advanced in support of his  
 " cause. And the circumstances and situation of  
 " your government render it extremely easy ei-  
 " ther to promote or obstruct his restoration, as  
 " you shall see proper. After all, you are the  
 " best judge what method will be most expedient  
 " to pursue: I thought it my part, however,  
 " to inform you of these our concurrent senti-  
 " ments." [N. B. Lentulus, wisely judging the  
 affair too hazardous for one of his dignity and  
 fortunes, left it to a man of a more desperate cha-  
 racter, Gabinius.]

" You congratulate me on the present situation  
 " of my affairs in general, and particularly on the  
 " friendship of *Milo*, together with the vain and in-  
 " effectual schemes of the worthless *Clodius*. It is no  
 " wonder you should rejoice in these the generous  
 " effects of your own amicable offices. But, to say  
 " truth, such an incredible perverseness (not to give  
 " it a more severe appellation) prevails amongst a  
 " certain party, that they rather chuse to alienate  
 " me

V. R. 59.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Conf.

" me by their jealousies from the common cause,  
" than to retain me in that interest by their fa-  
" vour and encouragement". I will own to you,  
" their malice has almost driven me from those  
" principles which I have so long and so inva-  
" riably pursued. At least, if they have not pro-  
" voked me so far, as to make me forget the dig-  
" nity of my character, they have taught me that  
" it is high time I should act with a view like-  
" wise to my own safety. I might, consistently  
" with the highest views of patriotism, reconcile  
" both these distinct ends, were there any ho-  
" nour or fortitude in those of Consular rank  
" [the venerable bench of Consuls]. But such  
" a meanness of spirit in general prevails among  
" them, that, instead of applauding the resolu-  
" tion with which my actions have been ever  
" uniformly directed in the cause of the Com-  
" monwealth, they look with envy upon those  
" dignities to which my public services have ad-  
" vanced me. I the rather mention this, as it is  
" to you that I am principally indebted, not only  
" for the happiness of being restored to my  
" Country, but almost for my very first success-  
" ful steps in the paths of patriotism and of  
" glory. ——————

*Cicero at this time was falling into the measures of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus; measures which he thought to be contrary to the true interest of his country: He endeavours here therefore to palliate, as well as he can, this unworthy conduct: But as he enters more fully into the motives of it in Ep. Fam. lib. i. 9. the reader is referred to that epistle, which will be presently inserted.*

" As

Y.R. 698.  
Ref. Chr.54.  
397 Cons.

" As to your enquiry concerning the situation  
 " of public affairs, there are great divisions  
 " amongst us: But the zeal and prudence of  
 " the respective parties are by no means equal.  
 " Those who enjoy the largest share of wealth  
 " and power have gained a superiority of credit  
 " likewise by the folly and instability of their  
 " antagonists; as they have obtained from the Se-  
 " nate, with very little opposition, what they had  
 " no hopes of receiving even from the People,  
 " without raising great disturbances. Accordingly  
 " the House has voted *Cæsar* a sum of money  
 " for the payment of his army, together with a  
 " power of nominating ten Lieutenants: As they  
 " have also, without the least difficulty, dispensed  
 " with the Sempronian law<sup>h</sup> for appointing him  
 " a successor<sup>i</sup>. [—*Et stipendum Cæsari decretum*

<sup>h</sup> What Cicero here means by saying the Senate had dispensed with the Sempronian law for appointing a successor to *Cæsar*, I confess I understand not. The government of *Cisalpine Gaul* and *Illyricum* had been granted to *Cæsar*, at the motion of the Tribune *Vatinius*, by a LAW OF THE PEOPLE, for the term of five years\*. It would seem therefore, that the Senate could have no right, in virtue of the Sempronian law, or any other law, to appoint him a successor before the expiration of that term.

\*Vid. supr.  
p. 415.  
Plut. in  
*Cæs.*

Melm. p.  
104.

<sup>i</sup> — Cicero was the chief adviser and promoter of these very measures, which he here condemns. If this were a fact which stood upon the credit of historians, the passage before us would strongly incline one to suspect that they had misrepresented the truth. But we have a testimony to produce, which, though of undoubted authority, is the last one should have expected in the case: For it is the testimony of Cicero himself. In a speech which he pronounced at the bar, either a little before or soon after the date of this

e/f,

*est, et decem legati; et ne lege Sempronia succede-*  
*retrur, facile perfectum est.*

Y.R. 698.

Bef. Chr.

54.

797 Conf.

“ I do but slightly touch upon these particulars, as I cannot reflect on our affairs with any satisfaction. However I mention them as suggesting *an useful caution* to both of us, *to preserve a proper poise between our interest and our honour, and not to advance one by an undue depression of the other.* A maxim this, which I have learned, not so much from my favourite philosophy, as from sad experience; and which I would recommend to you, ere you are taught it by the same unpleasing method of conviction.”

To the same.

“ *Marcus Plætorius* will fully inform you of the promises we have received from *Pompey*, together with every thing that has hitherto been attempted or effected in your favour. He was not only present indeed, but a principal agent throughout the whole proceedings; as he acted in every article of your concerns agreeably to what might be expected from a judicious, a vigilant, and an affectionate friend. To him likewise I must refer you for an account of public affairs; as I know not well what to say of them myself. Thus much, however, I can

Lib. i. Ep.

8. Ed.

Græv.

B. ii. Let.

4. Melm.

“ letter, he mentions each of these particular grants, which he enumerates to *Lentulus*, and then adds: *Harum ego sententiæ & princeps & auctor fui.*” Orat. pro Balb. 27.

“ assure

V.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.54.  
397 Conf.

" assure you, that they are in the hands (and in  
 " the hands they are likely to remain) of our  
 " professed friends <sup>k</sup>. As for myself, both gra-  
 " titude and prudence, together with your par-  
 " ticular advice, have determined me, as they  
 " ought, to join in *his*<sup>1</sup> interest, whom you were  
 " formerly desirous of associating with you in  
 " mine. You are sensible, nevertheless, how dif-  
 " ficult it is to renounce our old and habitual no-  
 " tions of politics; especially under a full per-  
 " suasion of their rectitude. However, I con-  
 " form myself to *his* system, since I cannot with  
 " any decency oppose him: And, whatever  
 " some may perhaps imagine, I am by no means  
 " acting in this a counterfeit part. The truth of  
 " it is, Pompey has gained such an absolute pos-  
 " session of my esteem, that I begin to look upon  
 " every thing as just and reasonable which falls  
 " in with his interest or inclination. I should  
 " think too it would be no imprudent resolution,  
 " even in his adversaries themselves, to desist  
 " from an opposition to which they are evi-  
 " dently unequal. In the mean time, I have the  
 " satisfaction to find the world in general agreed,  
 " that my character requires I should support, or  
 " at least not obstruct, the measures of Pompey:  
 " While some are even of opinion, I may rea-  
 " sonably retire from all public business to my  
 " favourite pursuits of a literary kind. And, in-  
 " deed, were I not prevented by my friendship  
 " to Pompey, I should most certainly adopt this

<sup>k</sup> Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus.<sup>1</sup> Pompey.

" latter

Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Conf.

" latter scheme, as of all others the most suitable to my inclinations. For I can now no longer maintain that dignity in the Senate, and that freedom in the Commonwealth, which was the single motive of my ambition, and the sole end I proposed to myself in all my labours: A misfortune, however, which is not peculiar to myself, but extends to every *Roman* in general. In a word, I am under the sad necessity, either of tamely submitting to the sentiments of those few who lead the Republic, or of imprudently joining in a weak and fruitless opposition<sup>m</sup>. I the rather mention this, that you may deliberate, before your return amongst us, what part it may be advisable for you to act in the present conjuncture. To speak freely, the measures both of those of Senatorian and Equestrian rank, and indeed the whole system of the Commonwealth in general, are totally changed. All therefore

<sup>m</sup> A determined patriot could not have been reduced to the alternatives which Cicero here mentions, as there was a third expedient, which every man of strict political integrity, who dared to act up to his principles, would undoubtedly have embraced. *An honest physician* (says Sir William Temple) *is excused for leaving his patient when he finds the disease grown desperate, and can by his attendance expect only to receive his own fees, without any hopes or appearance of deserving them.* Our author, in one of his orations, mentions it to the immortal honour of the celebrated Metellus, that *de civitate decidere quam de sententia maluit*: And he who is actuated by the same sublime patriotism, will never find himself under the poor necessity of justifying wrong measures by the impossibility of enforcing right ones.

Melm. p.  
113.

Vid. vol.  
VII. p.  
181.

" that

Y.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.

54.

397 Cons.

Vid. vol.  
VIII. p.  
341 & 336.

" that I have now to wish, is the preservation  
" of the public tranquillity; which those who  
" are in the administration seem to give us a pro-  
" spect of enjoying, if *a certain party* could be  
" prevailed upon to submit with less impatience  
" to their power. As to any hopes of support-  
" ing in the Senate that true Consular character  
" of a firm and inflexible patriot, it is in vain  
" now to expect it: Every means for that pur-  
" pose is totally lost, by the mistaken conduct of  
" those who disengaged Pompey<sup>n</sup>, and dissolved  
" that strong union which subsisted between the  
" Senate and the Equestrian order.

" But to return to what more immediately re-  
" lates to your own private affairs: — Pompey  
" is extremely your friend: And, by all that I  
" can observe, you may obtain any thing you  
" shall desire during his Consulship<sup>o</sup>. At least  
" I shall sollicit him very strenuously for that  
" purpose: As you may rely on my most active  
" offices in every instance where you are con-  
" cerned. I am well persuaded my affiduity on  
" this occasion will not be disagreeable to him:  
" On the contrary, he will receive it with plea-  
" sure, were it for no other reason than as af-  
" fording him a proof of my grateful disposi-  
" tion. In the mean time I entreat you to be-  
" lieve, that whatever bears the least connection  
" with your interest, is of more importance to  
" me than my own. From these sentiments it

<sup>n</sup> Cato, Metellus, Celer, Lucullus, and others, had opposed Pompey's desire of having his acts in Asia confirmed by the Senate. Pompey and Crassus were at this time Consuls.

" is.

Y. R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.  
54.  
397 Conf.

" is that I despair, not only of being able to return, but, even sufficiently to acknowledge, the infinite obligations I owe you. Though at the same time I am conscious of having exerted, on all occasions, the most unwearied endeavours in your service.

" It is rumoured here, that you have obtained a complete victory <sup>P</sup>: And we impatiently expect an express with the confirmation of this agreeable news. I have already talked with Pompey upon this subject: And, as soon as your courier arrives, I shall employ my utmost diligence in convening the Senate. In fine, were I to perform much more for your interest than lies within the narrow compass of my present power, I should still think I had fallen far short of what you have a right to expect.

" Farewell."

DURING the continuance of the tumults occasioned by the election of new Consuls, Cicero retired into the country to one of his villas on the delightful shore of Baiae, the chief place of resort and pleasure for the great and rich. Pompey came thither in the month of April, and no sooner arrived, than he sent his compliments to Cicero; and he spent his whole time with him: They had much discourse on public affairs, in which Pompey expressed great uneasiness, and owned himself dis-

Ad Att.  
iv. 10.

<sup>P</sup> By a posterior \* letter from Cicero to Lentulus it appears, that this Proconsul was saluted Imperator by his soldiers: It was probably for the victory here mentioned: But against what power the battle was fought is no where said.

\* Ep. Fam.  
i. 9.

satisfied

Y.R. 698. satisfied with his own part in them : But *Cicero*,  
 ————— in his account of the conversation, intimates some  
 Ibid. 9. suspicion of his sincerity. — In the same letter he  
 Midd. 469. mentions a current report at *Puteoli*, that King  
 Ptolemy was restored, and desires to know what  
 account they had of it at Rome. The report  
 was very true : For *Gabinius*, tempted by *Ptolemy's* gold, and the plunder of *Egypt*, and en-  
 couraged also, as some write, by *Pompey* himself,  
 undertook to replace him on the throne with his  
*Syrian army*<sup>a</sup>; which he executed with a high

Dio, lib.  
xxxix. p.  
236, &c.  
a.

† Vid. sup.  
vol. VIII.  
p. 90 &  
337. note  
a.

<sup>a</sup> *Scaurus*, whom *Pompey* left in *Syria* †, did nothing there to gain him much honour. Neither did *Philippus* nor *Marcellinus*, who had the province of *Syria* successively after *Scaurus*, distinguish themselves by any considerable exploits. The incursions and depredations of the *Arabs*, whom those commanders could not totally suppress, served for a pretext to *Clodius* to make *Syria* a Consular province, and he recompensed *Gabinius* with it, who, during his Consulship, had so well served him in his attack upon *Cicero*.

Vid. vol.  
VIII. p.  
74, 86, 90.

*Judea*, dependent on the government of *Syria*, was agitated by great commotions when *Gabinius* arrived there. It has been mentioned that *Pompey* decided the quarrel between the two brothers, *Hyrcanus* and *Aristobulus*, in favour of the former, to whom he gave the office of High-Priest, and the authority of command, but without the diadem; and that he carried away *Aristobulus*, with his two sons, *Alexander* and *Antigonus*, and two daughters, prisoners. *Alexander* made his escape on the road, returned into *Judea*, and after concealing himself some time, got together a sufficient number of his father's party to dispossess *Hyrcanus*. He thought likewise of fortifying himself against the power of the *Romans*, by building the walls of *Jerusalem*, which *Pompey* had thrown down.

*Gabinius* quickly reduced *Alexander* to sue for favour ; nor did he refuse him his life and liberty. But though he brought back *Hyrcanus* to *Jerusalem*, and put him again in possession of

hand

hand and the destruction of all the King's enemies; in open defiance of the authority of the

Y.R. 698.

the High-Priesthood; he gave a new form to the government of the nation, making it Aristocratical. He divided all the country into five provinces, and in each of these created a Sovereign Council.

It was on his pacification of *Judea*, that *Gabinius* made application to the Senate to be honoured with a public thanks. giving, called *supplications*, and met with a refusal.

He was preparing to carry the war into the country of the *Arabs*, when the hopes of a richer booty than he could find among them, made him turn towards *Parthia*.

*Phraates*, King of *Parthia*, had been murdered by his own sons, *Orodes* and *Mithridates*, who afterwards contended with one another for the crown. *Mithridates*, finding himself the weaker, had recourse to *Gabinius*. He came to the *Roman* camp, accompanied by *Orsanus*, the most illustrious of the *Parthian* nobles; and by presents and promises he engaged the Proconsul to undertake his cause: But when *Gabinius* had passed the *Euphrates* with his army, the prospect of a yet richer prey, and more easy to be acquired, brought him quickly back again. For *Ptolemy Auletes* came to him, with commendatory letters from *Pompey*, and with a promise from himself of ten thousand talents, on condition that he would replace him on the throne of *Ægypt*. The greater part of the *Roman* officers did not approve of the enterprize, as being prohibited by a decree of the Senate; and the Oracle of the Sibyl. But *Marc Antony* [the future *Triumvir*] who commanded the cavalry, being gained by *Ptolemy*, and not being religiously scrupulous, connfessed and determined *Gabinius* to the undertaking.

Jos. Antiq.  
I. iv. 16.  
& de Bell.  
Jud. i. 6.

Dio, I.  
xxxix.  
App. in  
Parth. &  
Syr.  
Plut. in  
Crass. &  
in Anton.

After the death of *Seleucus Cybiosatres*; whom his queen *Berenice* put to death, as has been before mentioned, *Archelaus* (the son of that *Archelaus* who had commanded *Mithridates*'s army, but pretending to be that King's son) offered himself to the *Alexandrians* to be their King, and was accepted of by them. The only difficulty was how to get away from the *Roman* army, which he had joined, with the intention of accompanying *Gabinius* into *Parthia*; for *Gabinius*, having been

Vid. vol.

VIII. p.

486. vol. 2.

V.R. 698. B.C.  
397 Conf.

54.

*Senate, and the direction of the Sibyl.* This made a great noise at *Rome*; and irritated the People to such a degree, that they resolved to make him feel their displeasure for it very severely at his return.

Midd.  
467.

*Cicero* staid in the country till the beginning of *May*, much out of humour, and disgusted both with the Republic and himself. *Atticus's* constant advice to him was, *to consult his safety and interest, by uniting himself with the men of power*; and they, on their part, were as con-

informed of what was in agitation, kept a watch upon him. However, he made his escape; and, if we may believe *Dio*, by connivance of the *Roman* commander, who was willing that *Ægypt*, by possessing an able General, might be in a condition to make the greater resistance, and thereby furnish him with a pretence to raise the price of his services. *Archelaus* came to *Alexandria*, married *Queen Berenice*, was recognized King, and made preparations to defend his crown.

On *Gabinius's* arrival on the borders of *Ægypt*, he detached *Antony* with the horse to seize the passes, and open the way for the army to follow. *Antony* was greatly assisted by *Antipater the Idumæan*, who not only furnished him with money, arms, and provisions, but made the conquest of *Pelusium*\*, the key of *Ægypt* on that side, easy to him, by gaining the *Jews*, who were settled in the neighbourhood of it †. The Proconsul arrived at this place, entered *Ægypt* with all his forces, fought several battles, and at length, by the death of *Archelaus*, who was killed in the last action, remained master of *Alexandria*, and the whole kingdom of *Ægypt*, which he surrendered to *Ptolemy*. *Antony* caused funeral honours to be performed for *Archelaus*: But the King put his own daughter, *Queen Berenice*, to death; as also the richest of the *Alexandrians*, that with their spoils he might be the better able to satisfy the engagements he had entered into with *Gabinius*.

\* Damietta.      † They had here a Temple, built by *Onias*, after the model of that at *Jerusalem*.

stantly

stantly inviting him to it, by all possible assurances of their affection : But in his answers to *Atticus* he observes, "that their two cases were very different ; that *Atticus*, having no peculiar character, suffered no peculiar indignity ; nothing but what was common to all the Citizens ; whereas his own condition was such, that if he spoke what he ought to do, he should be looked upon as a madman ; if what was useful only to himself, as a slave ; if nothing at all, as quite oppressed and subdued : That his uneasiness was the greater, because he could not shew it without being thought ungrateful.—Shall I withdraw myself then, *says he*, from business, and retire to the port of ease ? That will not be allowed me. Shall I follow those leaders to the wars, and, after having refused a command, submit to be commanded ? I will do so ; for I see that it is your advice, and wish that I had always followed it. Or shall I resume my post, and enter again into affairs ? I cannot persuade myself to that, but begin to think *Philoxenus* in the right, who chose to be carried back to prison, rather than commend the tyrant's verses. This is what I am now meditating, to declare my dislike at least of what they are doing."

THE City continued, for a great part of this summer, without its inferior annual Magistrates : For the elections, which had been postponed from the last year, were still kept off by the Consuls till they could settle them to their minds,

Y. R. 698.  
Ad Att.  
iv. 6.

Diod. Sic.  
l. xv. p.  
331.

476.

**Y.R. 698.** which they effected at last, excepting in the case of two Tribunes. But the most remarkable repulse was of *M. Cato* from the Prætorship: For the Consuls, apprehending the trouble which in that office he might give them, resolved to disappoint him, if possible: And, in order to secure his competitors from impeachments for bribery, engaged the Senate to decree, that the new Prætors should enter upon their office without an interval of sixty days between *the nomination* and *the taking possession*; an interval usually allowed for examining whether bribery had been practised in the election, and for prosecuting the guilty. The pretence for this decree was, that, so much of the year being spent, the whole would pass without any Prætors at all, if a liberty of impeaching was allowed. “*From this moment*, says *Cicero*, “*they have given the exclusion to Cato*, and, being masters of all, resolve that all the world “shall know it.”

**Plut. in Cat. & in Pomp.** The first century, without a bribe, gave their votes for *Cato*. *Pompey* herenupon pretended that he saw something inauspicious in the Heavens, and broke up the Assembly. The two Consuls afterwards bestirred themselves so successfully, as to get *Cato* excluded, and *Vatinius* chosen, who had been repulsed the year before with disgrace from the AEdileship.

**Val. Max. vii. 5.** In the Assemblies for the election of AEdiles, the conflict between the contending parties proved to be a bloody one. It is said, that *Pompey's robe* was stained with the blood of some that were slain near

Y.R. 698.

near him; and that sending it home, when they had brought him another, his wife was so frightened at the sight of it, that she miscarried.

When all the Magistrates were chosen, the Tribune *Trebonius* proposed to the People a law for the assignment of provinces to the Consuls for the term of five years, with the power of raising what forces they thought fit: *Pompey* took upon himself to propose a law in favour of *Cæsar*, that, after the expiration of the *five years* which had been already granted him, he should hold the government of the *Gauls* for five years more. This law was opposed by the generality of the Senate, and above all by *Cato*, *Favonius*, (his great admirer and imitator) and two of the Tribunes, *C. Ateius Capito*, and *P. Aquilius Gallus*: But the superior force of the Consuls and the other Tribunes prevailed.

The Consuls applied themselves, in the beginning of their administration, to the work of reformation. With a view to remedy the most scandalous practice of corruption in judiciary affairs, they made several new laws, and with more rigorous penalties than those already denounced; and they ordained, that the Judges should be taken from the richest of the Citizens; imagining, doubtless, that poverty had induced some Judges to suffer themselves to be gained by presents: But could a strict regard to justice be with more reason expected from those who were become rich by all sorts of crimes? The Consuls prepared likewise certain sumptuary \* laws. What animated

Dio, I.  
xxxix.  
p. 109.Plut. in  
Cat. in  
Pomp. &  
in Crass.

Freinsheim.

**Y.R. 698.** their zeal in this particular, was perhaps the excessive luxury in which their principal adversaries **Bef. Chr.** lived, the chiefs of the Aristocratic faction. **Hortensius** did not conceal his taste, but took upon him boldly to defend the excess in question, by calling it magnificence and nobleness becoming the grandeur of the Commonwealth. Notwithstanding this spirit of reformation, which animated the Consuls, **Pompey** transgressed the ancient discipline by the construction, at his own expence, of a permanent theatre: For, till that time, there had never been any theatre built in *Rome* to continue longer than while the shews lasted that were to be then exhibited<sup>r</sup>.

**Midd. 473.** Pompey's theatre is much celebrated by the ancients for its grandeur and magnificence: The plan was taken from the **Plin. Hist.** theatre of *Mytilene*, but greatly enlarged, so as to receive commodiously forty thousand people.

**vii. 3.** It was surrounded by a portico, to shelter the company in bad weather, and had a curia or senate-house annexed to it; with a basilica also, or grand hall, proper for the sitting of Judges, or any other public business: which were all finished at Pompey's cost, and adorned with a great number of images of men and women, famed for something very remarkable or prodigious in their lives and characters. **Atticus** undertook the care of placing all these statues; for which Pompey charged **Cicero** with his thanks to him. What made this fabric the more surprising and splendid, was a beautiful temple, erected at one end of it to *Venus the Conqueress*; and so contrived, that the seats of the theatre might serve as stairs to the temple. This was designed, it is said, to avoid the reproach of making so vast an expence for the mere use of luxury; the temple being so placed, that those who came to the shews might seem to come to worship the Goddess. At the solemnity of this dedication, Pompey entertained the People with the most magnificent shews, which had ever been exhibited in *Rome*: In the theatre, were page-plays, prizes of music, wrest-

**Ad Att.**

**iv. 9.**

**A. Gell.**

**x. 1.**

**Vid. Tert.**

**de Spectac.**

**Pl. n. 1.**

**viii. 7.**

**Dio, p.**

**107.**

**Plut. in**

**Pomp.**

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It has been mentioned, that a decree of the Senate had passed for recalling *Piso* from his government of *Macedonia*. He returned to *Rome* about this time, after an inglorious administration of a province, whence no *Consular Senator* had ever returned but to triumph. For though, on account of some trifling advantage in the field, he had procured himself to be saluted *Emperor by his army*, yet the occasion was so contemptible, that he durst not send any letters upon it to the Senate : but, after oppressing the subjects, plundering the allies, and losing the best part of his troops against the neighbouring barbarians, who invaded and laid waste the country, he ran away in disguise from a mutiny of the soldiers, whom he disbanded at last without their pay. When he arrived at *Rome*, he stripped his fasces of their laurels, and entered the City obscurely and ignominiously, without any other attendance than his own retinue. On his first appearance in public, trusting

lings, and all kinds of bodily exercise : In the circus, the horse-races, and huntings of wild beasts for five days successively, in which five hundred lions were killed ; on the last day, twenty elephants ; whose lamentable howling, when mortally wounded, raised such a commiseration in the multitude, from a vulgar notion of their great sense and love to man, that it destroyed the whole diversion of the shew, and drew curses upon Pompey himself for being the author of so much cruelty. So true it is, what Cicero observes of this kind of prodigality, that there is no real dignity or lasting honour in it ; that it satiates while it pleases, and is forgotten as soon as it is over. It gives us, however, a genuine idea of the wealth and grandeur of those principal subjects of *Rome*, who, from their private revenues, could raise such noble buildings, and provide such shews, from the several quarters of the world, which no Monarch on earth is now able to exhibit.

Y.R. 698,  
Supra, p.  
487.  
Midd. 470.  
In Pison.  
16, &c.

De Off.  
ii. 16.

V.R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>54.</sup>  
397 Cons.

to the authority of his son-in-law *Cæsar*, he had the hardiness to attack *Cicero*, and complain to the Senate of his injurious treatment of him: But when he began to reproach him with the disgrace of his exile, he was interrupted by a loud and general clamour of the Assembly<sup>s</sup>.

Dio. Plut.  
in Crass. &  
in Pomp.

The Consuls having drawn lots for the provinces assigned them by the law of *Trebonius*, *Syria* fell to *Crassus*, agreeably to his wishes; *Spain* to *Pompey*, who was no less pleased with his fortune, having no mind to a command that would carry him far out of the way. His scheme was constantly to conduct the affairs of the City; and this scheme he pursued so faithfully, that for the six years, during which he was Proconsul of *Spain*, he never set foot in his province, but governed it by his Lieutenants; a thing without example in the Commonwealth: But the superintendance of provisions, with which he was

Midd.  
474.

<sup>a</sup> Among other things with which he upbraided *Cicero*, he told him, that it was not any envy for what he had done, but the vanity of what he had said, which had driven him into exile; and that a single verse of his,

*Cedant arma Tozæ, concedat laurea linguae,*

was the cause of all his calamity; by provoking *Pompey* to make him feel how much the power of the General was superior to that of the Orator: He put him in mind also, that it was mean and ungenerous to exert his spleen only against such whom he contemned, without daring to meddle with those who had more power, and where his resentment was more due. *Cicero* made a reply to him upon the spot, in an invective speech, the severest perhaps that ever was spoken by any man, on the person, the parts, the whole life and conduct of *Pijo*.

charged,

charged, furnished him with a specious pretence to continue at *Rome*.

Y.R. 6,84  
Bef. Chr.

54.  
397 Cons.

As for *Crassus*, whose heart was now fixed on the imagined boundless wealth of *Parthia*, he was in such haste to set forward on his Eastern expedition, that he left *Rome* above two months before the expiration of his Consulship: But his eagerness to involve the Republic in a desperate war, for which the *Parthians* had given no pretext, was generally detested. *The Tribune Ateius declared it impious, and prohibited by all the auspices*: And when he found *Crassus* determined to march, he waited for him at the gates of the City, and having there ready a kind of chafing-dish, with fire in it, he threw thereon perfumes, and poured libations; and invoking certain Gods with frightful names, devoted him, as he passed by, to destruction <sup>c.</sup>

Midd. p.  
478.

Plut. in  
Crass.

<sup>a</sup> *Ateius was afterwards turned out of the Senate by Appius, when he was Censor, for falsifying the auspices on this occasion; but the miserable fate of Crassus supported the credit of them; and confirmed the vulgar opinion of the inevitable force of those ancient rites, in drawing down the divine vengeance on all who presumed to contemn them.* Appius was one of the Augurs, and the only one of the college who maintained the truth of their auguries, and the reality of divination; for which he was laughed at by the rest; who charged him also with an absurdity in the reason which he subscribed for his censure upon Ateius, viz. that he had falsified the auspices, and brought a great calamity on the Roman People: For if the auspices, they said, were false, they could not possibly have any effect, or be the cause of that calamity. But, tho' they were undoubtedly forged, it is certain, however, that they had a real influence on the overthrow of Crassus: For the terror of them had deeply possessed the minds of the soldiers, and made them turn every thing which they saw, or

Midd. 479.

De Divin.  
i. 16.

*Crassus*

**V.R. 698.** *Crassus* was desirous, before he left *Rome*, to be reconciled to *Cicero*: They had never been real friends, but generally opposite in party; and *Cicero's* early engagements with *Pompey* kept him of course at a distance from *Crassus*: Their coldness was still increased on account of *Catiline's* plot, of which when *Crassus* was, by some, strongly suspected, he charged *Cicero* with being the author of that suspicion: They carried it however on both sides with much decency, out of regard to *Crassus's* son, *Publius*, a professed admirer and disciple of *Cicero*; till an accidental debate in the Senate blew up their secret grudges into an open quarrel. The debate was upon *Gabinius*, whose conduct in relation to King *Ptolemy*, *Crassus* undertook to defend, and, in that defence, made many severe reflections upon *Cicero*; who replied with no less acrimony, and gave a free vent to that old resentment of *Crassus's* many injuries, which had been gathering, he says, several years, but lain dormant so long, that he took it to be extinguished, till, from this accident, it burst out into a flame. The quarrel gave great joy to the heard, to an omen of their ruin; so that, when the enemy appeared in sight, they were struck with such a panic, that they had not courage or spirit enough left to make a tolerable resistance.

No people were ever more superstitious than the ancient *Romans*. When *Crassus* embarked his troops at *Brundusium*, there happened to be a man at the port who cried *Figs of Caunus* to sell, in Latin *Caueas*, a word which, by the manner of pronouncing, might be mistaken for *Cave ne eas*, " Beware of going." This was thought to be a warning from the Gods to *Crassus* not to pursue his enterprise. *Cic. de Divin. xi. 40.*

chiefs

**Midd. 479.**

**Ep. Fam.  
i. 9.**

chiefs of the Senate, who highly applauded *Cicero*, in hopes to embroil him with the *Triumvirate*: But *Pompey* laboured hard to make it up; and *Caesar* also by letter expressed his uneasiness upon it, and begged it of *Cicero*, as a favour, to be reconciled with *Crassus*: So that he could not hold out against an intercession so powerful, and so well enforced by his affection to young *Crassus*: Their reconciliation was confirmed by mutual professions of a sincere friendship for the future; and *Crassus*, to give a public testimony of it to the City, invited himself just before his departure, to sup with *Cicero*, who entertained him in the gardens of his son-in-law *Crassipes*, which were upon the banks of the *Tiber* and seem to have been famous for their beauty and situation.

Y.R. 69<sup>3</sup>.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>54.</sup>  
397 Cons.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 7.

Ad Att.  
iv. 12.

The Consuls, *Pompey* and *Crassus*, having reaped all the fruit which they had proposed from the Consulship, the securing to themselves the provinces which they wanted, were not much concerned about the choice of their successors; so that, after postponing the election to the end of the year <sup>u</sup>, they gave way at last to their enemy, *L. Domitius Ahenobarbus*, being content to have joined with him their friend, *Appius Claudius Pulcher*.

Midd. 484.

<sup>u</sup> *Cicero*, being a great part of the summer of this year in the country, put the last hand to his piece on the *Complete Orator*. This admirable work remains entire, a standing monument of *Cicero's* parts and abilities; which, while it exhibits to us the idea of a Perfect Orator, and marks out the way by which *Cicero* formed himself to that character, explains the rea-

Midd. 48<sup>3</sup>.  
Ep. Fam.

i. 9.

## C H A P. V.

CICERO defends, in the Senate, the interests of CRASSUS absent, and enters into a correspondence and intimacy of friendship with CÆSAR. Unprecedented knavery of the Consuls and Consular candidates. The Tribunician candidates do honour to CATO's virtue. CICERO defends several persons accused; and among the rest, VATINIUS: In justification of this, and of the whole change of his political conduct, he writes a long letter to LENTULUS SPINTHER.

V.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Conf.

C R A S S U S had been gone but a very little time, when he was attacked in the Senate by his enemies: Their design was, probably, to revoke his commission<sup>2</sup>, or at least abridge it of the power of *making war upon the Parthians*: But Cicero exerted himself so strenuously in his defence, that he baffled their attempts, after a warm contest with the *Consuls themselves, and several of the Consular Senators*.

son likewise why no body has since equalled him, or ever will, till there be found again united, what will hardly be found single in any man, *the same industry and the same parts*.

Ad Att.  
iv. 13. &  
v. 8.

He returned to *Rome* about the middle of *November*, to assist at *Milo's wedding*, who married *Fausta*, the daughter of *Sylla* the Dictator, a rich and noble lady, with whom, as some writers say, he found *Sallust* the historian in bed not long after, and had him soundly flogged, before he dismissed him.

<sup>2</sup> *Manutius* is of this opinion.

He gave *Crassus* an account of the debate by the following letter.

V. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf.

To *Marcus Licinius Crassus*.

" I am persuaded that all your friends have  
" informed you of the zeal with which I lately  
" both defended and promoted your dignities; as  
" indeed it was too warm and too conspicuous to  
" have been passed over in silence. The oppo-  
" sition I met with from the Consuls, as well as  
" from several others of Consular rank, was the  
" strongest I ever encountered: And you must  
" now look upon me as your declared advocate  
" upon all occasions where your glory is con-  
" cerned. Thus have I abundantly compensated  
" for the intermission of those good offices, which  
" the friendship between us had long given you a  
" right to claim; but which, by a variety of acci-  
" dents, have lately been somewhat interrupted.  
" There never was a time, believe me, when I  
" wanted an inclination to cultivate your esteem, or  
" promote your interest. Though, it must be  
" owned, a certain set of men <sup>b</sup>, who are the  
" bane of all amicable intercourse, and who en-  
" vied us the mutual honour that resulted from  
" ours, have, upon some occasions, been so un-  
" happily successful, as to create a coolness be-  
" tween us <sup>c</sup>. It has happened, however, (what

Ep. Fam.  
1. v. Ep. 8.  
Ed. Græv.  
B. ii. Let.  
7. Melm.

<sup>b</sup> He means, I presume, those whom he often styles THE HONEST.

<sup>c</sup> " How effectually foever *Cicero* might have served *Crassus* <sup>Melm.</sup> upon the occasion to which this letter relates, it is most

" I ra-

Y.R. 699. " I rather wished than expected ) that I have  
 Bef. Chr. " found an opportunity, when even your affairs  
 53. " were in the most prosperous train, of giving a  
398 Cons. " public testimony, by my services to you, that  
 " I always most sincerely preserved the remem-  
 " brance of our former amity. The truth is, I  
 " have approved myself your friend, not only to  
 " full conviction of your family in particular, but  
 " of all *Rome* in general : In consequence of  
 " which, that most valuable of women, your ex-  
 " cellent wife, together with those illustrious mo-  
 " dels of virtue and filial piety, your two amia-  
 " ble sons, have perpetual recourse to my assist-  
 " ance and advice : As the whole world is sen-  
 " sible, that no one is more zealously disposed to  
 " serve you than myself.

" Your family-correspondents have informed  
 " you, I imagine, of what has hitherto passed in  
 " your affair, as well as of what is at present in  
 " agitation. As for myself, *I intreat you to do*  
 " *me the justice to believe, that it was not any sud-*  
 " *den start of inclination, which disposed me to em-*

" certain his good offices did not proceed from a principle of  
 " friendship. It is extremely probable indeed, that his sup-  
 " porting the cause of *Crassus* in the Senate is one of those in-  
 " stances of our author's subjection, of which he complains" in  
 some of his letters: " And that it was entirely in compliance  
 " with the inclinations of *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, with whom  
 " *Crassus* was now united." — " It is certain that *Crassus*,  
 " from the time of *Catiline's* conspiracy, conceived a strong  
 " and lasting aversion to our author; as, on the other hand,  
 " that *Cicero*, after the death of *Crassus* published an oration,  
 " in which he expressly charged him with being engaged in  
 " that conspiracy."

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Conf.

"brace this opportunity of vindicating your honour: On the contrary, it was my ambition, from the first moment I entered the Forum, to be ranked in the number of your friends. And I have the satisfaction to reflect, that I have never, from that time to this hour, failed in the highest sentiments of esteem for you<sup>d</sup>: As I doubt not you have always retained the same affectionate regard for me. If the effects of this mutual disposition have been interrupted by any little suspicions (for suspicions only I am very sure they were), be the remembrance of them forever blotted out of our hearts. I am persuaded indeed from those virtues which form your character, and from those which I am desirous should distinguish mine, that our friendly union in the present conjuncture cannot but be attended with equal honour to us both. What instances you may be willing to give me of your esteem, must be left to your own determination: But they will be such, I flatter myself, as may tend most to advance my dignities. For my own part, I faithfully promise the utmost

<sup>d</sup> What credit is it possible to give to the professions, assertions, or even oaths, of this Saint of Dr. Middleton's canonization? In a letter to *Atticus*, written soon after this to *Crassus*, Cicero thus expresses himself concerning the latter: "Our friend Crassus, they say, did not set out from Rome in his General's robe, with so much dignity as Paulus Æmilius before, though, like him, a second time Consul. Oh the worthless man!" *Crassum quidem nostrum minore dignitate ait profectum paludatum, quam olim æqualem L. Paulum iterum Consulem.* O hominem nequam! *Ad Att. iv. 13.*

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

"exertion of my best services in every article  
"wherein I can contribute to increase yours.  
"Many, I know, will be my rivals in these am-  
"icable offices: But it is a contention in which  
"all the world, I question not, and particularly  
"your two sons, will acknowledge my superiority.  
"Be assured, I love them both in a very uncom-  
"mon degree: Though I will own *Publius* is my  
"favourite: From his infancy he discovered a  
"singular regard to me; as he particularly distin-  
"guishes me at this time with all the marks even  
"of filial respect and affection.

"Let me desire you to consider this letter, not as  
"a strain of unmeaning compliment, but as a sacred  
"and solemn covenant of friendship, which I shall  
"most sincerely and religiously observe. I shall now  
"persevere in being the advocate of your ho-  
"nours, not only from a motive of affection, but  
"from a principle of constancy: And, without  
"any application on your part, you may depend  
"on my embracing every opportunity, wherein  
"I shall think my services may prove agreeable  
"to your interest, or your inclination. Can you  
"once doubt then, that any request to me for  
"this purpose, either by yourself or your family,  
"will meet with a most punctual observance? I  
"hope therefore you will not scruple to employ me  
"in all your concerns, of what nature or importance  
"soever, as one who is most faithfully your friend:  
"And that you will direct your family to apply  
"to me in all their affairs of every kind, whether  
"relating to you or to themselves, to their

"friends

“ friends or their dependants. And be assured, “ I shall spare no pains to render your absence “ as little uneasy to them as possible. Fare- “ well.”

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

52.

398 Cœns

*Cicerō*, whose brother *Quintus* was one of *Cæsar's* Lieutenants in *Gaul*, began now likewise to enter into a particular intimacy and correspondence with *Cæsar*. *Quintus*, to pay his court the better to his General, had earnestly pressed his brother to an union with *HIM*, instead of adhering so obstinately to *Pompey*, who, as he tells him, *was neither so sincere nor so generous a friend as Cæsar*. To *Cæsar* therefore *Cicero*, not disliking the advice, wrote a letter in the familiar style; which *Cæsar* answered with all imaginable kindness, and the offer of every thing in which his power could serve him. — *Cicero*, in his account of this letter to his brother, says, “ It is kind in you, and like a brother, to press me to this friendship; though I am running that way apace myself, and shall do what often happens to travellers, who, rising later than they intended, yet, by quickening their speed, come sooner to their journey's end, than if they had set out earlier; so I, who have overslept myself in my observance of this man, though you were frequently rousing me, will correct my past laziness, by mending my pace for the future.” — With regard to *Cæsar's* professions of service, he adds, “ Believe me, you who know me, I have from him already, what I most value, the assurance of his affection,

Midd. p.  
488.

Ad Quint.  
Fr. ii. 134

Midd. 489.

Ad Quint.  
Fr. ii. 134

Y.R. 699. “ which I prefer to all the great things he offers me. In another letter he says [doubtless Ad Quint. Fr. iii. 5.] “ with equal sincerity], I lay no great stress on his promises, want no farther honours, nor desire any new glory, and *wish nothing more than the continuance of his esteem*; yet live in such a course of ambition and fatigue, as if I were expecting what I really do not desire.”

Ibid. 1. But, though he made no use of Cæsar’s generosity for himself, yet he used it freely for his friends<sup>e</sup>: Cæsar nevertheless was chiding him all the while for his reservedness in asking.

Midd. 497. Cicero had sent Cæsar a Greek poem, in three books, on the history of his Consulship, and Cæsar’s judgment upon it was, *that the beginning of it was as good as any thing which he had ever seen in that language; but the following lines to a certain place were not equal in accuracy and spirit.* Cicero desires therefore to know of his brother, *what Cæsar really thought of the whole, whether the matter or the stile displeased him; and begs that he would tell him the truth freely; since, whether Cæsar liked it or not, he should*

<sup>e</sup> Particularly for Trebatius the lawyer, Orfius, and Curtius. For the last of these he procured a regiment. Cicero, concerning Cæsar’s kindness to his brother Quintus, writes thus to Atticus: Perspice — cum Cæsare suavissimam conjunctionem (hæc enim me una ex naufragio tabula delectat) qui quidem Quintum meum, tuumque, Dii boni! quemadmodum tractat honore, dignitate, gratia! non secus ac si ego essem imperator. Hibernam legionem eligendi optio delata commodum, ut ad me scribit. Hunc tu non ames? Quem igitur istorum?

Ad Att. iv. 18.

not,

*not, he says, be a jot the less pleased with himself.* Y.R. 699.  
 He began however another poem, at his brother's earnest request, to be addressed to Cæsar; *Ibid. iii. 1.* but, after some progress, was so dissatisfied with it, that he tore it: Yet, *Quintus still urging, and signifying, that he had acquainted Cæsar with the design,* he was obliged to resume it, and actually finished an *Epic poem in honour of Cæsar!* which he promises to send, as soon as he could get a proper conveyance, *that it might not be lost,* as *Quintus's tragedy of ERIGONE was in coming from Gaul;* the only thing, says he, *which had not found a safe passage, since Cæsar governed that province.*

Ad Quint.  
ii. 9.

In a letter, which Cicero wrote this summer to his brother, he tells him, that there were some hopes of an election of Magistrates, but those uncertain; some suspicion of a DICTATOR, yet that not more certain; a great calm in the Forum; the calm of a City, that seemed to be quieted, rather by age and decay, than concord: That his own conduct, as well in public as in private, was just what *Quintus had advised, softer than the tip of his ear;* and his votes in the Senate such as pleased others rather than himself — — That bribery was never <sup>1</sup> carried so high as at this time by the Consular candidates, Memmius, Cn. Domitius, Scaurus, Messala; that they were all alike; no eminence in any; for money levelled the dignity of them all: That above eighty thousand pounds was promised to the first tribe; and money grown

Midd. p.  
499—504.  
Ad Quint.  
ii. 15.

Ad Att.  
iv. 15, &  
18.

<sup>1</sup> Ambitus redit immanis. Nunquam fuit par.

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

53.  
398 Conf.

so scarce by this profusion of it, that interest was risen from four to eight per cent.

*Memmius*, and *Cn. Domitius*, who joined their interests, made a strange sort of contract with the Consuls, *L. Domitius* and *Appius Claudius*, which was drawn up in writing, and attested in proper form by many of their friends on both sides; by which the Consuls obliged themselves to serve them with all their power in the ensuing election; and they on their parts undertook, when elected, to procure for the Consuls what provinces they desired; and gave a bond of above three thousand pounds to provide three Augurs, who should testify, that they were present at making a law for granting them those provinces, when no such law had ever been made; and two *Consular* Senators, who should affirm, that they were present likewise at passing a decree of the Senate for furnishing the same provinces with arms and money, when the Senate had never been consulted about it §.

Midd. p.  
501.

Montef-  
quieu,  
chap. x.  
sur les cau-  
ses de la  
grandeur,  
&c.

§ “ This detestable bargain of forging laws and decrees “ at pleasure, in which so many of the first rank were con-“ cerned, either as principals or witnesses, is alledged by an “ ingenious French writer, as a flagrant instance of *that liber- tinism* which hastened the destruction of *Rome*. This great “ Republic, of all others the most free and flourishing, owed “ the loss of its liberty to nothing else but a general de-“ fection of its Citizens from the probity and the discipline of “ their ancestors. *Cicero* often foretells their *approaching ruin* “ from this very cause.”

I confess, I see not the propriety of these expressions, *hastening the destruction of Rome*, the *approaching ruin* of the *Roman Citizens*. Was not *Rome* already totally ruined? But by the ruin

*Meumius*,

*Memmius*, finding some reason to dislike his bargain resolved to break it, and, by *Pompey's* advice, gave an account of it to the Senate. *Pompey* was pleased with the opportunity of mortifying the Consul *Domitius*, and willing likewise to take some revenge on *Appius*, who, though his near relation, did not enter so fully as he expected into his measures. *Appius* never changed countenance, nor lost any credit by the discovery ; but his Colleague *Domitius*, who affected the character of a patriot <sup>h</sup>, was extremely discomposed ; and *Memmius*, now grown desperate, resolved to promote the general disorder, and the creation of a DICTATOR.

*Quintus* sent his brother word from Gaul, that it was reported there, that he was present at this contract : But *Cicero* assures him that it was false ; and that the bargain was of such a nature, as *Memmius* had opened it to the Senate, that no honest man could have been present at it. The Senate was highly incensed ; and, to check the insolence of the parties concerned, passed a decree, that their conduct should be enquired into by what they

Y. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

53.  
398 Conf.

Dio, l.  
xxxix. p.  
118.  
Ad Att.  
iv. 18.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 1.

of the State *Cicero* seldom means any thing else but the loss of his own influence in the government. To an impartial eye, was Rome in a worse condition, were the Roman Citizens more ruined, when *Julius Cæsar* became their Lord and Master, than they were at this time ? *Cicero* himself, as we shall see presently, intimates that a DICTATOR was really wanted ; [but then he must be a DICTATOR, who would so regulate matters, that *Cicero* might resume his former dignity.]

<sup>h</sup> *Cæsar* had the honour to have this worthy patriot (*Cato's* friend and brother-in-law) for his avowed enemy, as we have formerly seen.

Vid. supr.  
P. 29, &  
32.

Y. R. 698.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>54.</sup>  
397 Conf.

Ad Att.  
iv. 16.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 2.  
Ad Att.  
iv. 16.

Ibid. 15.  
& 16.  
Ad Quint.  
ii. 15.

*called a private or silent judgment ; where the sentence was not to be declared till after the election, yet so as to make void the election of those who should be found guilty : This they resolved to execute with rigour, and made an allotment of Judges for that purpose : But some of the Tribunes were prevailed with to interpose their negative, on pretence of hindering all inquisitions not specially authorized by the People.*

The candidates however were all publicly impeached by different prosecutors, and the City was now in a great ferment about them ; since, as Cicero says, *either the men or the laws must necessarily perish ; yet they will all, says he, be acquitted ; for trials are now managed so corruptly, that no man will ever be condemned for the future, unless for murder.* But Q. Scævola, one of the Tribunes, took a more effectual way to mortify them, by resolving to hinder any election of Consuls during his Magistracy, in which he persevered, and by his authority dissolved all the assemblies convened for that purpose. The Tribunician candidates however were remarkably modest this year : For they made an agreement among themselves, which they all confirmed by an oath, *that, in prosecuting their several interests, they would submit their conduct to the judgment of Cato, and deposit four thousand pounds apiece in his hands, to be forfeited by those whom he should condemn of any irregular practice.* If the election proves free, says Cicero, as it is thought it will, Cato alone can do more than all the Laws and all the Judges.

A great

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A great part of this year was taken up in public trials: *Suffenas* and *C. Cato*, who had been Tribunes two years before, were tried in the beginning of July, for violence and breach of peace in their Magistracy, and both acquitted: But *Procilius*, one of their colleagues, was condemned for killing a Citizen in his own house: Whence we are to collect, says Cicero, that our Areopagites value neither bribery, nor elections, nor interregnums, nor attempts against the State, nor the whole Republic a rush: We must not murder a man indeed in his own house, though that perhaps might be done moderately, since twenty-two acquitted *Procilius*, when twenty-eight condemned him.

Y.R. 699.

Ad Att.

iv. 15. &amp;

16.

Cicero had no concern in these trials; yet he was continually employed in others through the rest of this summer. He defended *Messius*, one of *Caesar's* Lieutenants, who came from Gaul on purpose to take his trial: Then *Drusus*, accused of prevaricating, or betraying a cause which he had undertaken to defend; of which he was acquitted by a majority only of four voices. After that, *Vatinius*, the last year's Praetor, and *Æmilius Scaurus*, one of the Consular candidates, accused of plundering the province of *Sardinia*; and about the same time likewise his old friend *Cn. Plancius*, who had entertained him so generously in his exile, and, being now chosen *Ædile*, was accused by a disappointed competitor, *M. Laterensis*, of bribery and corruption. All these were acquitted; but the orations for them are lost, except that for *Plancius*.

Ad Att.

iv. 15.

Ad Quint.

ii. 16.

Ibid. iii. 1.

Y.R. 699.

Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

\*Vid.supr.

p. 20.

Vid. supra,

p. 38.

The reasons which induced *Cicero* to defend *Vatinius*, who had been one of his fiercest enemies, and against whom he had made that bitter \* *invective* before mentioned, we shall find in the following letter from the Orator to his friend *Lentulus*; a most curious piece, where he gives us his own picture at full length as a *patriot* and *politician*. We have already had him admirably well drawn by himself as a *casuist* in points of religious scruple.

To *Lentulus*.

Ep. Fam.

Lib. I. Ep.

ix. Ed.

Græv.

Book II.

Lett. xvii.

Melmoth.

“ —— Though I had much rather you should gain experience by my misfortunes than your own, yet it affords me some consolation under your present disappointment<sup>i</sup>, that you have not paid so severe a fine as I did for being taught the little dependence there is upon the professions of the world. A reflection this, which may very properly serve as an introduction to the account you require of the motive of my late transactions.

“ You are informed then, it seems, that I am reconciled with *Cæsar*, and *Appius*: A step, you assure me, you do not disapprove. But you are at a loss to guess what reasons could induce me to appear at the trial of *Vatinius*, not only as an advocate, but as a witness in his fa-

\* N.B. This is the letter above referred to, in p. 41.

<sup>i</sup> In not obtaining a commission to replace *Ptolemy* on his throne.

“ your.

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf.

"your<sup>k</sup>. To set this matter in the clearest light,  
"it will be necessary to trace back the motives  
"of my conduct to their original source. Let  
"me observe then, my *Lentulus*, that, when I was  
"recalled from exile by your generous offices, I  
"considered myself as restored, not only to my  
"friends and to my family, but to the Common-  
"wealth in general. And as you had a right to  
"the best returns of my affection and gratitude  
"for the distinguished part you acted in that  
"affair, so I thought there was something more  
"than ordinary due from me to my Country,  
"which had so singularly co-operated with you  
"upon this occasion. I often took an opportu-  
"nity, during your Consulate, of publicly de-  
"claring these my sentiments in the Senate: As  
"I always, you well know, expressed myself to  
"the same purpose in our private conversation.  
"Nevertheless I had many reasons at that time  
"to be highly disgusted. I could not, in truth,  
"but observe the disguised malice of some, and  
"the coolness of others, when you were endea-  
"vouring to procure a decree for restoring the  
"inscription of that honourable monument of  
"my public services, which had been erected by

<sup>k</sup> A very learned and polite author, [Dr. Middleton], whose *Melmoth*. just esteem for *Cicero's* writings has betrayed him perhaps into some partiality towards his actions, acknowledges that "the defence of *Vatinius* gave a plausible handle for some censures upon *Cicero*." The truth of it is, the censure was more than *plausible*: For nothing certainly could discover more meanness of spirit than thus, in compliance with those in power, not only to defend *Vatinius* as an advocate, but to bear public testimony likewise to his general good conduct.

" the

Y.R. 699. "the Senate. But it was not only in this in-  
 Bef. Chr. "stance, that those who had many obligations to  
 33. 966 Conf. "concur in your good offices towards me, acted  
 ——————"a part I had little reason to expect. They  
 "looked indeed with much ungenerous indiffer-  
 "ence on the cruel outrage which was offered  
 "to my brother and myself under our own roof ;  
 "and the estimate they made, in pursuance of  
 "the Senate's order, of the damages I had suf-  
 "fested by these acts of violence, was far un-  
 "equal to my real loss. This last article of  
 "their injustice, though least indeed in my con-  
 "cern, I could not but very sensibly feel amidst  
 "the general wreck of my fortunes. But, though  
 "these mortifying marks of their disposition to-  
 "wards me were much too notorious to escape  
 "my observation, they could not efface the more  
 "agreeable impressions of their former friend-  
 "ship. For this reason, notwithstanding those  
 "high obligations I had to *Pompey*, of which you  
 "yourself were witness, and have often men-  
 "tioned ; notwithstanding also the affection and  
 "esteem which I always entertained for him, yet  
 "I still firmly adhered to my political principles ;  
 "nor suffered these considerations of private amity  
 "to influence me in favour of his public mea-  
 "sures. Accordingly, when *Vatinius* (who at  
 "the trial of *P. Sextius* was examined as a wit-  
 "ness against him) intimated that *Cæsar's* suc-  
 "cesses had reconciled me to his party, I told  
 "him, in the presence of *Pompey*, that I prefer-  
 "red the fate of *Bibulus*, unhappy as he might  
 "esteem it, to all the splendid triumphs of the

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Cons.

“ most victorious general <sup>1</sup>. I asserted likewise upon another occasion (and asserted too in the hearing of *Pompey*) that the same persons who confined *Bibulus* to his house had driven me from mine. Indeed the whole series of those interrogatories, which I put to *Vatinius* at this trial, was entirely designed as an invective against his Tribune: And I particularly exposed, with much freedom and indignation, his contempt of the auspices, his corrupt distribution of foreign kingdoms, together with the rest of his violent and illegal proceedings. But it was not only upon this occasion that I spoke thus unreservedly: I frequently avowed my sentiments with the same resolute spirit in the Senate. Thus, when *Marcellinus* and *Philippus* were Consuls, I carried a motion, that the affair of the *Campanian* lands should be referred to the re-consideration of a full House on the fifteenth of May following. Now tell me, my friend, could I possibly have made a bolder or more formidable attack upon this party? Could I possibly have given a more convincing evidence that I had not departed from my old principles, notwithstanding all I had formerly suffered for their sake? The truth of it is, this motion greatly exasperated not only those whom it was reasonable to expect it would

Vid. supra,

P. 22.

<sup>1</sup> N. B. This letter was written two years after the trial of *Sextius*; and perhaps *Cicero* never said what he here pretends to have said, “ That he preferred the glory of *Bibulus* to the glory of *Pompey* and that of *Cæsar*, &c.” I cannot think he had the boldness to speak so.

“ offend,

Y.R. 699. " offend, but others upon whom I did not ima-  
 Bef. Chr. " gine it would have had any such effect. *Pom-*  
 53. <sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf. " *pey*, soon after this decree had passed, set for-  
 " ward upon his expedition into *Sardinia* and  
 " *Africa*, without giving me the least intimation  
 " of his being disgusted. In his way thither he  
 " had a conference with *Cæsar* at *Luca*, who made  
 " great complaints of this motion. He had be-  
 " fore, it seems, been informed of it by *Crassus*  
 " at *Ravenna*, who took that opportunity of in-  
 " censing him against me. And it appeared af-  
 " terwards, that *Pompey* was much dissatisfied  
 " upon the same account. This I learnt from se-  
 " veral hands, but particularly from my brother,  
 " who met him in *Sardinia* a few days after he  
 " had left *Luca*. *Pompey* told him he was ex-  
 " tremely glad of that accidental interview, as he  
 " wanted much to talk with him. He began  
 " with saying, that, as *my brother stood engaged*<sup>m</sup>  
 " *for my conduct*, he should expect him to exert  
 " all his endeavours to influence me accordingly.  
 " *Pompey* then proceeded very warmly to remon-  
 " strate against my late motion in the Senate,  
 " reminding my brother of his services to us both,  
 " and particularly of what had passed between  
 " them concerning *Cæsar's* edicts, and of those  
 " assurances, he said, my brother had given him

<sup>m</sup> " This alludes to those engagements which *Quintus Cicero* entered into in behalf of his brother, in order to induce *Pompey* to favour his recall from banishment. And it appears by what follows, that he promised, on the part of *Cicero*, an unlimited resignation to the measures of that ambitious chief."

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Cons.

" of the measures I would pursue with respect  
" to that article. He added, that my brother  
" himself was a witness, that the steps he had  
" formerly taken for procuring my recall were  
" with the full consent and approbation of *Cæsar*.  
" Upon the whole therefore, he intreated him,  
" if it were either not in my power or my incli-  
" nation to support the interest and dignity of  
" the latter, that he would at least prevail with  
" me not to oppose them. The account which  
" my brother gave me of this conversation, toge-  
" ther with a message I had before received  
" from *Pompey* by *Vibullius*, to request that I  
" would not proceed any farther in the affair of  
" the *Campanian* lands till his return, threw me  
" into a very serious train of reflections. I could  
" not but think, after having performed and  
" suffered so much for my Country, that I might  
" now at least be permitted to consider what was  
" due to gratitude and to the honour of my bro-  
" ther: And, as I had ever conducted myself with  
" integrity towards the Republic, I might be al-  
" lowed, I hoped, to act the same honest part  
" in my more private connexions <sup>a</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> " Had *Cæsar* and *Pompey* indeed been never so much Melm.  
" his real friends, no considerations of amity ought to have pre-  
" vailed with him to have acquiesced in a scheme which was  
" contrary to the sentiments of all the real patriots of the Re-  
" public, and contrary likewise to his own: A scheme which  
" he himself tells *Atticus* was formed for the destruction of the  
" Commonwealth. *Ad Att. ii. 17.* Had he attended to the  
" indisputable maxim which he himself lays down in one of  
" his Philosophical Treatises, it would have decided at once the  
" conduct which became him to observe upon an occasion

" During

Y. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

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398 Conf.

" During the time I was engaged in these  
" votes, and other proceedings with which *Pom-  
pey* appeared thus dissatisfied, I was informed  
" of what passed in the conversation of a set of  
" men, whom you will now guess without my  
" naming them. This party, though they ap-  
" proved of my public measures, as being agree-  
" able to what had ever been their professed  
" sentiments, were yet so ungenerous as to express  
" great satisfaction in believing, that my conduct  
" would by no means please *Pompey*, at the  
" same time that it would highly exasperate  
" *Cæsar*. Well might I resent, indeed, so inju-  
" rious a treatment; but much more when I saw  
" them, even before my face, maliciously encou-  
" raging and caressing my avowed enemy: —  
" Mine do I call him? rather let me say, an ene-  
" my to the laws and tranquillity of his Country,  
" and to every character of worth and virtue  
" amongst us.

" Their malevolence, however, had not the  
" effect intended, and it could not warm me into

" where private friendship interfered with more extensive  
" obligations: *Hæc prima lex in amicitia sanciatur* (says he) *ut  
neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati*. But the truth of  
" it is, private friendship was not concerned in the case: For  
" he well knew that neither *Pompey* nor *Cæsar* had any at-  
" tachments to him of that kind. It was fear alone that de-  
" termined his resolution: And having once already suffered  
" in [what he called] the cause of liberty, he did not find  
" himself disposed to be twice a martyr. The awkward man-  
" ner, however, in which he attempts to justify himself  
" throughout this letter, very evidently shews, how impossible  
" it is to bid farewell to integrity with a good grace."

" those

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.53.  
398 Cons.

"those transports of indignation, of which my  
"heart is now, indeed, no longer susceptible.  
"On the contrary, it only induced me to examine  
"my situation in all its various circumstances and  
"relations, with the greatest coolness and im-  
"partiality: The process and result of which I  
"will lay before you in as few words as I am  
"able.

*"There have been times, as experience no less  
"than history has taught me, when the power of  
"the Commonwealth was in worthless and wicked  
"hands. In such a conjuncture, no hope of interest  
"(which I have at all times most heartily con-  
"demned) nor fear of danger (which upon some  
"occasions, however, has influenced the greatest  
"minds) should prevail with me to co-operate in  
"their measures: No, not though I were attached  
"to them by the strongest ties of friendship and  
"gratitude. But, when a man of Pompey's di-  
"stinguished character presides over the Republic,  
"a man who has acquired that eminence of  
"power and honour by the most heroic actions,  
"and the most signal services, I could not ima-  
"gine it would be imputed to me as a levity of  
"disposition, if in some few instances I declined a  
"little from my general maxims, and complied  
"with his inclinations.* <sup>o</sup> But my justification, I

<sup>o</sup> — Cicero's compliance can by no means be considered in Melm.  
"the favourable light wherein he represents it; but was in  
"reality a confession most injurious to his honour. — It is  
"certain likewise, that it was not from any advantageous op-  
"nion of Pompey's political character and designs that he was  
"induced to fall in with his measures. On the contrary, Cicero  
"thought,

Y.R. 698. “thought, would still rise in its strength, when  
 “it should be remembered that I favoured his  
 “credit and dignity even from the earliest part of  
 “my life; as I particularly promoted them in my  
 “Prætorship \* and Consulate †: When it should

\* Vid. vol. VII. p.  
 431. † Vol. VIII. p.

93. “be remembered, that he not only assisted me  
 “with his vote and his influence in the Senate  
 “during my adversity, but joined his counsels  
 “and his efforts with yours, for the same gene-

“rous purpose: In a word, when it should be  
 “remembered, that he has no other enemy in the  
 “whole Commonwealth except [*Clodius*] the  
 “man who is my professed adversary. In conse-  
 “quence of these sentiments it was absolutely  
 “necessary for me, you see, to unite with *Cæ-*  
 “*far*, as one who was joined in the same views  
 “and the same interest. His friendship likewise,  
 “which you are sensible my brother and I have  
 “long shared together with *his humane and ge-*  
*“nerous disposition, which I have abundantly ex-*  
*“perienced both by his late letters and his good*  
*“offices towards me, contributed greatly to con-*  
*“firm me in these resolutions. To which I must*  
*“add, that the Commonwealth in general seemed*  
*“to be most strongly averse from giving any oppo-*

“most undoubtedly had no esteem for him: And as to his  
 “political views, he saw and acknowledged, long before the  
 “date of this letter, that they were turned on the destruction  
 “of the Republic. Ομολογειεται (says he in one epistle to *At-*  
*“ticus*) τυραννιδα συσκιαζειται; as in another, written upon  
 “the breaking out of the civil war, he calls him *bominem*  
 “απολιτικωταλον, a man utterly unacquainted with the arts of  
 “government.” *Ad Att. ii. 17. viii. 16.*

“sition

"sition to these extraordinary men; more especially  
"after Cæsar had performed such glorious exploits  
"for the honour of his Country. But what had  
"still a farther and very powerful weight in my  
"deliberations, was Pompey's having engaged his  
"word for me to Cæsar, as my brother had given  
"the same assurances to Pompey.

Y. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
39<sup>8</sup> Conf.

"Plato, I remember, lays it down as a maxim  
"in his divine writings, that "the people gene-  
"rally model their manners and their sentiments  
"by those of the great:" A maxim which at  
"this juncture, I thought, merited my particular  
"attention. I was convinced indeed of its truth,  
"when I reflected on the vigorous resolutions  
"which were taken in the Senate on the memo-  
"rable nones of December: And it seemed no  
"wonder so noble a spirit should appear in that  
"Assembly, after the animating example I had  
"given them upon my first entering on the Con-  
"sular office. I recollect also, that, during the  
"whole time which intervened between the ex-  
"piration of my Consulship and that of Cæsar  
"and Bibulus, when I still retained a very consi-  
"derable authority in the Senate, all the better  
"part of the Republic were united in their sen-  
"timents. On the other hand, about the time  
"you took possession of your government in Spain,  
"the Commonwealth could not so properly be  
"said to be under the administration of Consuls  
"as of infamous barterers of provinces <sup>p</sup>, and the  
"mean vassals and ministers of sedition. It was

<sup>p</sup> *Piso* and *Gabinius*. Vid. Vol. VIII. p. 401.

Y.R. 699. “ then that discord and faction spread through all  
 Bef. Chr. “ ranks amongst us: And I was marked out as  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf. “ the victim of party and rage. In this critical  
 “ season, however, not only every man of worth,  
 “ but the greater part of the Senators, and in-  
 “ deed *all Italy in general, rose up with remark-*  
 “ *able unanimity in my cause* <sup>q.</sup> What the event  
 “ proved I forbear to mention; as, in truth, it  
 “ is to be imputed to a complication of errors  
 “ and artifices. But this I will say, it was not  
 “ forces, so much as leaders to conduct them,  
 “ that were wanting to me in this crisis. I must  
 “ add, that whatever censure may justly fall on  
 “ those who refused me their assistance, most cer-  
 “ tainly *they who first promised it, and then de-*  
 “ *serted me, are not less to be blamed* <sup>r.</sup> In a  
 “ word, if some of my friends may well be re-  
 “ proached for the timid though sincere counsels  
 “ they gave me, how much more severe must  
 “ their condemnation prove, who artfully alarmed

q It is strange, that being thus defended, he should nevertheless be banished.

Melm.

r “ In this number was Pompey himself, who, though he  
 “ had given Cicero the most solemn assurances that he would at  
 “ the hazard of his life protect him against Clodius, yet, when  
 “ afterwards our author solicited the execution of this promise,  
 “ he absolutely refused to concern himself in the affair. *Ad Att.*  
 “ ii. 20. x. 4. It seems altogether unaccountable, that Cicero  
 “ should be so injudicious as to touch upon a circumstance that  
 “ destroys the whole force of his apology; so far, I mean, as  
 “ he intended to justify his conduct by his friendship to Pompey.  
 “ For it exceeds all power of credulity to imagine, that he  
 “ could really be influenced by a motive of that kind with  
 “ respect to a man whose insincerity he had so lately and so se-  
 “ verely experienced.”

Vid. vol.  
VIII. p.  
410.

“ me

“ me with their pretended fears? Let it be noted  
 “ at the same time to my honour, that, zealous  
 “ as my fellow Citizens shewed themselves to rise  
 “ up in the defence of a man who had formerly  
 “ stood forth in theirs, yet I would not suffer  
 “ them to be exposed (unsupported as they were  
 “ by those who ought to have been their pro-  
 “ tectors) to the barbarous insults of lawless  
 “ banditti. On the contrary, I rather chose the  
 “ world should judge, by the power of my friends  
 “ in recalling me from my exile, what their ho-  
 “ nest humanity could have effected, had I per-  
 “ mitted them to have drawn their swords to  
 “ prevent it.

Y. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

“ You were sensible of this general zeal in my  
 “ favour, when you undertook my cause: And  
 “ you not only encouraged but confirmed it by  
 “ your influence and authority. I shall always  
 “ most willingly acknowledge, that you were  
 “ assisted upon this occasion by some of the most  
 “ considerable persons in *Rome*; who, it must be  
 “ owned, exerted themselves with much greater  
 “ vigour in procuring my return, than in prevent-  
 “ ing my banishment: And had they persisted in  
 “ the same resolute disposition, they might have  
 “ recovered their own authority at the same time  
 “ that they obtained my restoration. The spirits,  
 “ in truth, of the Aristocratical part of the Re-  
 “ public were at this time greatly raised and ani-  
 “ mated by the inflexible patriotism of your con-  
 “ duct during your Consulship, together with  
 “ Pompey's concurrence in the same measures.  
 “ Cæsar likewise, when he saw the Senate di-

Vid. supr.  
P. 21 & 28.

Y.R. 699.     “ stinging his glorious actions by the most  
 Bef. Chr.     “ singular and unprecedented honours, joined in  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf.     “ adding weight to the authority of that Assem-  
 bly. Had these happy circumstances there-  
 fore been rightly improved, it would have  
 been impossible for any ill-designing Citizen to  
 have violated the laws and liberties of the Com-  
 monwealth. But let me intreat you to reflect  
 a moment on the subsequent conduct of my po-  
 litical associates. In the first place, they  
 screened from punishment that infamous in-  
 truder on the matronmysteries, who shewed no  
 more reverence for the awful ceremonies of  
 the Goddess, in whose honour these secret so-  
 lemnities are celebrated, than for the chastity  
 of his three sisters. And thus, by preventing  
 \* MILO.     “ *a worthy Tribune* \* of the People from obtaining  
 “ that justice upon *Clodius* which he endeavoured  
 “ to procure, they deprived future times of a most  
 “ salutary example of chastised sedition. Did not  
 “ they suffer likewise that monument, that glori-  
 “ ous monument, which was erected, not indeed  
 “ with the spoils I had gained in foreign wars,  
 “ but by the generosity of the Senate for my  
 “ civil services; did they not most shamefully  
 “ suffer it to be inscribed with the name of the  
 “ cruel and avowed enemy of his Country ?  
 “ Obliged most certainly I am to them for having

“ After the suppression of *Catiline's* conspiracy, the Senate  
 “ decreed that a temple should be erected to LIBERTY, as a  
 “ public monument of their late happy deliverance. This  
 “ temple was raised at the foot of mount *Palatine*, near *Cicero's*  
 “ house. And as the inscription fixed thereon undoubtedly  
 “ restored

" restored me to the Commonwealth : But I could  
 " wish they had conducted themselves, not only  
 " like physicians whose views terminate merely in  
 " the health of their patients, but like the *Alip-*  
 " *tæ* <sup>†</sup> also, who endeavour to establish the spirits  
 " and vigour of those under their care. Whereas  
 " they have acted with regard to me, as *Apelles*  
 " did in relation to his celebrated picture of *Ve-*  
 " *nus*; they have finished one part of their work  
 " with great skill and accuracy, but left all the  
 " rest a mere rude and imperfect sketch.

" In one article, however, I had the satis-  
 " faction to disappoint my enemies. They ima-  
 " gined my banishment would have wrought the  
 " same effect on me, which they falsely supposed  
 " a calamity of a like kind produced formerly in  
 " *Quintus Metellus*. This excellent person, whom  
 " I look upon to have been a man of the greatest  
 " fortitude and magnanimity of any in his time,  
 " they represented as broken and dispirited after  
 " his return from exile. But if broken he really  
 " were, it could not be the effect of his adversity,  
 " as it is certain he submitted to his sentence  
 " without the least reluctance, and lived under  
 " it, not only with indifference, but with chear-  
 " fulness. The truth is, no man ever equalled

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

Vid. Vol.  
VII. p.  
106.

" mentioned *Cicero* with honour, *Clodius* erased those words,  
 " and placed his own name in their stead." *Melm.* from *Ma-*  
*nutius*.

<sup>†</sup> " The *Aliptæ* were persons who prepared the athletic com-  
 " batants by unctions, and other proper methods, for rendering  
 " them vigorous and active in their gymnastic exercises."  
*Melm.*

Y.R. 699.  
B.C. Chr.  
53.  
398 Conf.

" him in the strength and heroism of his mind :  
 " No, not even the celebrated Marcus Scaurus "  
 " himself. Nevertheless, such as they had heard,  
 " or at least chose to imagine *Metellus* to have  
 " been, they figured me to themselves : Or, if  
 " possible indeed, even yet more abject. The  
 " reverse, however, proved to be the case : And  
 " that general concern which the whole Republic  
 " expressed at my absence, inspired me with more  
 " vigorous spirits than I had ever before enjoyed.  
 " The truth is, the sentence of banishment against  
 " *Metellus* was repealed by a law proposed only  
 " by a single Tribune of the People : Whereas  
 " I was recalled from mine upon the motion of  
 " the Consul himself, and by a law in which  
 " every Magistrate of *Rome* concurred. Let me  
 " add likewise, that *each order and decree in the*  
*" Commonwealth, headed by the Senate and sup-*  
*" ported by all Italy, zealously united in one common*  
*" effort for recovering me to my Country*". Yet,  
 " high as these unexampled honours were, they  
 " have never elated my heart with pride, or  
 " tempted me to assume an air which could give  
 " just offence even to the most malevolent of my  
 " enemies. The whole of my ambition is, not  
 " to be wanting either in advice or assistance to  
 " my friends ; or even to those whom I have no  
 " great reason to rank in that number : It is

" As infamous a Hypocrite and Traitor as ever lived. Vid.  
Vol VII. p. 38 and 43.

" If this was the case ; Whom had his friends to struggle  
with, in order to obtain his restoration ?

" this,

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

“ this, perhaps, which has given the real ground  
“ of complaint to those who view only the lustre  
“ of my actions, but cannot be sensible of the  
“ pains and solicitude they cost me. But what-  
“ ever the true cause may be, the pretended one  
“ is, *my having promoted the honours of Cæsar*:  
“ A circumstance which they interpret, it seems,  
“ as a renunciation of my old maxims. The ge-  
“ nüine motives however of my conduct in this  
“ instance are, not only what I just before men-  
“ tioned, but particularly what I hinted in the  
“ beginning of my letter, and will now more fully  
“ explain.

“ You will not find then, my friend, the Ari-  
“ stocratical part of the Republic disposed to pur-  
“ sue the same system as when you left them:  
“ That system, I mean, which I endeavoured to  
“ establish when I was Consul, and which, though  
“ afterwards occasionally interrupted, and at  
“ length entirely overthrown, was again fully  
“ restored during your administration. It is now,  
“ however, totally abandoned by those who ought  
“ most strenuously to have supported it. I do  
“ not assert this upon the credit only of appear-  
“ ances, in which it is exceedingly easy to dis-  
“ semble: I speak it upon the unquestionable  
“ evidence of facts, and the public proceedings  
“ of those who were styled patriots in my Con-  
“ sulate. The general scheme of politics, there-  
“ fore, being thus changed, it is time most cer-  
“ tainly for every man of prudence (in which  
“ number I have the ambition to be justly ac-

Y.R. 698. " counted) to vary likewise his particular plan.  
 Bef. Chr. " Accordingly, that chief and favourite guide of  
 54. " my principles, whom I have already quoted,  
397 Conf. " the divine *Plato* himself, advises, *not to press any*  
 " *political point farther than is consonant to the*  
 " *general sense of the community*: For methods of  
 " violence, he maintains, are no more to be used  
 " towards one's Country than one's parent. Upon  
 " this maxim, he tells us, he declined engaging in  
 " public affairs: And as he found the People of  
 " *Athens* confirmed by long habit in their mista-  
 " ken notions of government, he did not think it  
 " lawful to attempt by force what he despaired  
 " of effecting by persuasion. My situation, how-  
 " ever, is in this respect different from *Plato's*:  
 " For, on the one hand, as I have already em-  
 " barked in public affairs, it is too late to deli-  
 " berate whether I should now enter upon them  
 " or not; so, on the other, the *Roman* people  
 " are by no means so incapable of judging of  
 " their true interests as he represents the *Atheni-*  
 " *ans.* *It is my happiness indeed to be able, by the*  
 " *same measures, to consult at once both my own*  
 " *and my Country's welfare* <sup>x</sup>. To these confi-

Melm.

<sup>x</sup> It is not very easy to see how *Cicero* can be justified, accord-  
 ing to his own principles, in being accessory to the cementing  
 an union between *Pompey* and *Cæsar*. " For he assures *Atticus*,  
 " in a letter which was written at the breaking out of the civil  
 " war, that he foresaw the storm that had been gathering to de-  
 " stroy the Republic fourteen years, before it fell; and calls  
 " the union of these ambitious chiefs, *sceleratæ consensionis fide*;  
 " a wicked confederacy. To which he adds, that they had  
 " upon all occasions preferred the interest of their families,

" derations

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Cons.

" derations I must add those uncommon acts of generosity, which Cæsar has exerted both towards my brother and myself: So much indeed beyond all example, that even whatever had been his success, I should have thought it incumbent on me at least to have defended him. But now, distinguished as he is by such a wonderful series of prosperity, and crowned with so many glorious victories, I cannot but esteem it a duty which I owe to the Republic, abstracted from all personal obligations to himself, to promote his honours as far as lies in my power. And believe me, it is at once my confession and my glory, that next to you, together with the other generous authors of my restoration, there is not a man in the world from whom I have received such amicable offices.

" And now, having laid before you the principal motives of my conduct in general, I shall be the better able to satisfy you concerning my behaviour with respect to *Craffus* and *Vatinius* in particular: For, as to *Appius* and *Cæsar*, I have the pleasure to find that you acquit me of all reproach.

" My reconciliation then with *Vatinius* was effected by the mediation of *Pompey*, soon after the former was elected Prætor. I must confess, when he petitioned to be admitted a candidate for that office, I very warmly opposed him in the Senate: But it was much less from

" and the advancement of their power, to the honour and welfare of their country." *Plut. in vit. Pomp. Ad Ant. x. 4.*

" my

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

" my resentment to the man himself, than in order to support the honour and interest of *Cato*.  
 " Soon after this he was impeached : And it was  
 " in compliance with the earnest solicitation of  
 " *Cæsar* that I undertook his defence. But you  
 " must not enquire why I appeared at this trial,  
 " or indeed at any other of the same kind, as a  
 " witness in favour of the accused, lest I should  
 " hereafter have an opportunity of retorting the  
 " question upon you. Though, to say truth, I  
 " may fairly ask it even now : For do you not  
 " remember, my friend, in whose behalf it was  
 " that you formerly transmitted certain honourable  
 " testimonials even from the utmost limits of  
 " the *Roman* empire? You need not scruple, however,  
 " to acknowledge the fact : For I have  
 " acted, and shall continue to act, the same part  
 " towards those very persons. But to return to  
 " *Vatinius* : Besides the reasons I have already  
 " assigned, I was provoked to engage in his de-  
 " fence by an opposition of the same sort which  
 " the parasite recommends to the amorous soldier  
 in the play. The obsequious *Gnatho*, you know,  
 " advises his friend the captain, whenever his  
 " mistres endeavours to pique his jealousy by  
 " mentioning his rival *Phædria*, to play off *Pam-*  
*phila* upon her in return. Thus, as I told the  
 " Judges at this trial, since certain honourable  
 " persons, who were formerly much in my in-  
 " terest, had thought fit, by many little mortify-  
 " ing instances in the Senate, to careſs my avowed  
 " enemy before my face, I thought it but equi-

table

“ table to have a *Clodius* on my part, in opposition to the *Clodius* on theirs. Accordingly I have, upon many occasions, acted suitably to this declaration: And all the world acknowledges I have reason.

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Conf.

“ Having thus explained my conduct with regard to *Vatinius*, I will now lay before you those motives which determined me in respect to *Crassus*. I was willing, for the sake of the common cause, to bury in oblivion the many and great injuries I had formerly received from him. Agreeably to this disposition, as we were then upon good terms, I should have born his unexpected defence of *Gabinius* (whom he had very lately with so much warmth opposed) if he had avoided all personal reflections on myself. But when, with the most unprovoked violence, he broke in upon me whilst I was in the midst of my speech, I must confess it raised my indignation: And perhaps I took fire so much the sooner, as possibly there remained in my heart some latent sparks of my former resentment. However, my behaviour in the Senate upon this occasion was much and generally applauded. Among the rest, I was complimented likewise by the same men whom I have often hinted at in this letter; and who acknowledged I had rendered a very essential service to their cause, by the spirit which I had thus exerted. In short, they affected to speak of me in public, as being now indeed restored to the Common-wealth in the best and most glorious sense.

“ Never-

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

398<sup>53.</sup>  
Conf.

" Nevertheles, they had the malice in their private conversations (as I was informed by persons of undoubted honour) to express singular satisfaction in the new variance that had thus happened between *Crassus* and myself: As they pleased themselves with imagining it would for ever throw me at a distance from those who were joined with him in the same interest. *Pompey* in the mean time employed incredible pains to close this breach: And *Cæsar* also mentioned it in his letters as an accident that gave him much concern. Upon these considerations, therefore, I thought it expedient to act agreeably both to the dictates of my natural temper, and to that experience which I had gained by my former misfortunes. In pursuance of these sentiments, I consented to a reconciliation: And, in order to render it more conspicuous to the world, *Crassus* set out for his government almost from under my roof: For, having invited himself to spend the preceding night with me, we supped together in the gardens of my son-in-law *Crassipes*. It was for these reasons that I thought my honour obliged me to defend his cause in the Senate: And I confess I mentioned him with that high applause of which, it seems, you have been informed.

" Thus I have given you a full detail of the several views and motives by which I am governed in the present conjuncture, as well as of the particular disposition in which I stand with respect

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
933 Conf.

" to the slender part I can pretend to claim in the administration of public affairs. And, believe me, I should have judged and acted in the same manner, had I been totally free from every sort of amicable bias. For, on the one hand, I should have esteemed it the most absurd folly to have attempted to oppose so superior a force; and, on the other, supposing it possible, I should yet have deemed it imprudent to weaken the authority of persons so eminently and so justly distinguished in the Commonwealth <sup>y</sup>. Besides, it appears to

<sup>y</sup> " It will appear very evident perhaps from the foregoing observations, that what Cicero here asserts could not possibly be his real sentiments. That it was not practicable to bring down Cæsar and Pompey from that height of power to which they were now arrived, will not, probably, be disputed: Tho' at the same time it is very difficult to set limits to what prudence and perseverance may effect. This at least seems undeniably, that, if their power were absolutely immovable, Cicero's conduct was in the number of those causes which contributed to render it so. However one cannot but be astonished to find our author seriously maintaining, that, granting it had not been impossible, it would yet have been impolitic, to have checked these towering chiefs in their ambitious flight. For it is plain, from a passage already cited out of his letters to Atticus, that he long foresaw their immoderate growth of power would at last over-run the liberties of the Commonwealth <sup>Ad Att. x. 4.</sup> wealth\*. It had already indeed destroyed his own, and this too by the confession of himself. For in a letter which he writes to his brother, taking notice of the strong application that Pompey had made to him to defend Gabinius, he declares he never will comply with that unworthy request so long as he retained the least spark of liberty. But comply however he actually did: Equally, in truth, to his own disgrace and the confutation of the doctrine he here advances." *Ad Q. Fr. iii. 1.*

\* i. e. would extinguish the detestable Aristocratical tyranny under which Rome had unhappily fallen.

" me

Y. R. 699. " me to be the dictates of sound policy to act in  
 Bef. Chr. " accommodation to particular conjunctures, and  
 53. " not obstinately persevere in one invariable  
398 Conf. " scheme, when public circumstances, together  
 " with the sentiments of the best and wisest mem-  
 " bers, of the community, are evidently changed.

" In conformity to this notion, the judicious  
 " reasoners on the great art of government have  
 " universally condemned an inflexible perseve-  
 " rance in one uniform tenor of measures. The  
 " skill of the pilot is shewn in weathering the  
 " storm at least, though he should not gain his  
 " port: But if shifting his sails, and changing his  
 " direction, will infallibly carry him into the in-  
 " tended harbour, would it not be an instance  
 " of most unreasonable tenaciousness, to continue  
 " in the more hazardous course wherein he began  
 " his voyage? *Thus* (and it is a maxim I have  
 " often had occasion to inculcate) *the point we*  
 " *ought all of us to keep in view, in our admini-*  
 " *stration of the Commonwealth, is the final enjoy-*  
 " *ment of an honourable repose; but the method of*  
 " *securing to ourselves this dignity of retreat, is by*  
 " *having been inflexible in our intentions for the*  
 " *public welfare, and not by a positive perseverance*  
 " *in certain favourite modes of obtaining it* <sup>z</sup>. To

Melm.

" " The reasoning which Cicero here employs is certainly just,  
 " considered abstractedly: But by no means applicable to the  
 " present case. The QUESTION between the Aristocratical party  
 " and those who were favourers of Cæsar and Pompey, was not  
 " what road should be taken to the same end; but whether  
 " Rome should be FREE or ENSLAVED."

I must here take the liberty to differ from the ingenious and

" repeat,

"repeat, therefore, what I just now declared, *Had* Y.R. 699.  
 "I been absolutely uninfluenced by every motive of Bef. Chr.  
 "friendship, I should still have pursued the same 53.  
 398 Conf.  
 "public measures in which I am now engaged.  
 "But when gratitude and resentment both con-  
 "spire in recommending this scheme of action to  
 "me, I cannot hesitate a moment in adopting it;  
 "especially since it appears most conducive to  
 "the interest of the Republic in general, as well  
 "as to my own in particular. *To speak freely, I*  
 "act upon this principle so much the more fre-  
 "quently, and with the less reserve, not only as my  
 "brother is Lieutenant under Cæsar, but as the  
 "latter receives the slightest action, or even word  
 "of mine in his favour, with an air that evidently  
 "shews, that he considers them as obligations of the  
 "most sensible kind. And, in fact, I derive the  
 "same benefit from that popularity and power  
 "which you know he possesses, as if they were so  
 "many advantages of my own. The sum of the  
 "whole in short is this: *I imagined I had no*  
 "other method of counteracting those perfidious  
 "designs with which A CERTAIN PARTY were  
 "secretly contriving to undermine me, than by thus  
 "uniting the friendship and protection of the men

judicious Gentleman, to whom I am so much indebted for these translations and remarks. The QUESTION, at this time, does not seem to have been, whether Rome should be FREE or ENSLAVED; but whether Rome should be under the domination of the TRIUMVIRATE, or of the FISH-POND-MEN, the VENERABLE BENCH of CONSULARS, such monsters as the CONSULS and Vid. supra, CONSULAR CANDIDATES of this year 699; or, if you please, p. 67. whether ANARCHY should prevail in the empire, or a GOVERNMENT BY THREE MEN.

"in

Y.R. 699. “in power with those internal aids which have  
 Bef. Chr. 53. “never yet been wanting to my support \*.”  
398 Conf.

## C H A P. VI.

*The trial of GABINIUS for treasonable conduct in King PTOLEMY's affair. He is brought to trial a second time for plundering his province of Syria. CICERO defends him at this second trial; and defends likewise RABIRIUS, accused of being an accomplice in GABINIUS's treason. JULIA, the daughter of CÆSAR, and wife of POMPEY, dies. PONTINIUS fights his way to the Capitol in triumph. CICERO accepts, and presently after resigns, a Lieutenancy under POMPEY. The election of new Consuls is obstructed by the Tribunes. A design is started to create POMPEY DICTATOR, but is quickly dropt. An Interregnum during the first six months of the year 700. M. MESSALA and CN. DOMITIUS are chosen Consuls.*

CICERO's English Historian observes, that the long and elaborate answer of the Patriot to his friend *Lentulus's* enquiry, concerning

Melm. “There is no character in all antiquity that lies so open to discovery as that of Cicero, and yet there is none at the same time which seems to be less generally understood. Had there been no other of his writings extant, however, but this single letter, the Patriot character, one should have imagined, would have been the last that the world would ever have ascribed to our author. It is observable, (and it is an observation for which I am obliged to a gentleman, who,

the

the change in his political conduct, was written before Cicero's defence of *Gabinius*: Otherwise he would have had a still harder task to make an apology for himself.

The recall of *Gabinius* from his government of *Syria* had been decreed the last year; but he did not return to *Rome* till about the end of September in the present year. He boasted every where on his journey that he was going to demand a triumph; and, to carry on that farce, continued a while without the gates, till, perceiving how odious he was to all within, he stole privately into the City by night to avoid the disgrace of being insulted by the populace. There were three different impeachments provided against him: The first, for treasonable practices against the State; the second, for plundering his province; the third, for bribery and corruption: And so many persons offered themselves to be prosecutors, that there was a contest among them before the *Prætor*, how to adjust their several claims.

"amidst far more important occupations, did not refuse to be  
"the censurer of these papers) that "The principles by which  
"Cicero attempts to justify himself in this epistle, are such as will  
"equally defend the most abandoned profligacy and desertion in  
"political conduct. Personal gratitude and resentment; an eye to  
"private and particular interest, mixed with a pretended regard  
"to public good; an attention to a brother's advancement and  
"farther favour; a sensibility in being caressed by a great man in  
"power; a calculation of the advantages derived from the po-  
"pularity and credit of that great man to cn's own personal self;  
"are very weak foundations indeed, to support the superstructure  
"of a true patriot's character. Yet these are the principles  
"which Cicero here expressly avows and defends!"

V. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398. Conf.

The first indictment fell to *L. Lentulus*, who accused him the day after he entered the City, *that, in defiance of religion and the decree of the Senate, he had restored the King of Egypt with an army, leaving his own province naked, and open to the incursion of enemies, who had made great devastations in it.* — *Gabinius* durst not shew his head for the first ten days, till he was obliged to come to the Senate, in order to give them an account, according to custom, *of the state of his province and the troops which he had left in it.* As soon as he had told his story, he was going to retire; but the Consuls detained him, to answer to a complaint brought against him *by the publicans, or farmers of the revenues*, who were attending at the door to make it good. This drew on a debate, in which *Gabinius* was so urged and teized on all sides, but especially by *Cicero*, *that, trembling with passion, and unable to contain himself, he called Cicero a banished man:* Upon which, says *Cicero*, in a letter to his brother, *nothing ever happened more honourable to me: The whole Senate to a man left their seats, and with a general clamour ran up to his very face; while the publicans also were equally fierce and clamorous against him, and the whole company behaved themselves just as you yourself would have done.*

Ad. Q. Fr.  
iii. 2.

*Cicero* had been deliberating for some time, *whether he should not accuse Gabinius himself;* but, out of regard to Pompey, was content to appear only as a witness against him, and, when  
the

the trial was over, gives the following account Y.R. 699.  
of it to his brother.

"*Gabinius* is acquitted: Nothing was ever so  
"stupid as his accuser *L. Lentulus*; nothing so  
"sordid as the bench: Yet, if *Pompey* had not  
"taken incredible pains, and the rumour of a  
"Dictatorship had not infused some apprehen-  
"sions, he could not have held up his head even  
"against *Lentulus*: Since, with such an accuser  
"and such judges, of the seventy-two, who sat  
"upon him, thirty-two condemned him. The  
"sentence is so infamous, that he seems likely  
"to fall in the other trials; especially that for  
"plundering. But there is no Republic, no Se-  
"nate, no justice, no dignity in any of us: What  
"can I say more of the Judges? There were but  
"two of them of Praetorian rank; *Domitius*  
"*Calvinus*, who acquitted him so forwardly, that  
"all the world might see it; and *C. Cato*, who,  
"as soon as the votes were declared, ran off  
"closely from the bench, to carry the first news  
"to *Pompey*. Some say, and particularly *Sallust*,  
"that I ought to have accused him: But should  
"I risk my credit with such Judges? What a  
"figure should I have made, if he had escaped  
"from me? But there were other things which  
"influenced me: *Pompey* would have considered  
"it as a struggle, not about *Gabinius*'s safety,  
"but his own dignity: It must have made a breach  
"between us: We should have been matched  
"like a pair of gladiators; as *Pacidianus* with  
"*Aeserninus* the Samnite; he would probably  
"have bit off one of my ears, or have been re-

Ibid. 4.

Y. R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.53.  
398 Conf.Ad Att.  
iv. 16.

" conciled at least with *Clodius*. — For, after  
 " all the pains which I had taken to serve him,  
 " when I owed nothing to him, he every thing to  
 " me, yet he would not bear my differing from  
 " him in public affairs, to say no worse of it; and  
 " when he was less powerful than he is at present,  
 " shewed what power he had against me in my  
 " flourishing condition, why should I now, when  
 " I have lost even all desire of power, when  
 " the Republic certainly has none, when he alone  
 " has all, chuse him of all men to contend with?  
 " For that must have been the case: I cannot  
 " think that you would have advised me to it.  
 " *Sallust* says, that I ought to have done either  
 " the one or the other, and in compliment to *Pom-*  
 " *pey* have defended him; who begged it of me  
 " indeed very earnestly. — A special friend this  
 " *Sallust*! to wish me to involve myself in a dan-  
 " gerous enmity, or perpetual infamy. I am de-  
 " lighted with my middle way; and when I had  
 " given my testimony faithfully and religiously,  
 " was pleased to hear *Gabinius* say, that, if it  
 " should be permitted to him to continue in the  
 " City, he would make it his business to give me  
 " satisfaction; nor did he so much as interrogate  
 " me. — He gives the same account of this  
 " trial to his other friends; how *Lentulus* acted  
 " his part so ill, that people were persuaded that  
 " he prevaricated. — and that *Gabinius*'s escape  
 " was owing to the indefatigable industry of *Pom-*  
 " *pey* and the corruption of the bench.

About the time of this trial there happened  
 a terrible inundation of the Tiber, which did much  
 damage

damage at *Rome*; many houses and shops were carried away by it, and the fine gardens of Cicero's son-in-law, Crassipes, demolished. It was all charged to the absolution of *Gabinius*, after his daring violation of religion, and contempt of the *Sibyl's books*: Cicero applies to it the following passage of *Homer*:

Y.R. 699.

Ad Q. Fr.  
iii. 7.

*As when in autumn Jove his fury pours,  
And earth is loaden with incessant showers ;  
When guilty mortals break th' eternal laws,  
And Judges brib'd betray the righteous cause ;  
From their deep beds he bids the rivers rise,  
And opens all the flood-gates of the skies.*

Mr. POPE, Il. xvi. 466.

But *Gabinius's* danger was not yet over: He was to be tried a second time, for the plundering his province, where *C. Memmius*, one of the Tribunes, was his accuser, and *M. Cato* his judge, with whom he was not likely to find any favour: Pompey pressed *Cicero* to defend him, and would not admit of any excuse; and *Gabinius's* humble behaviour in the late trial was intended to make way for Pompey's solicitation. *Cicero* stood firm for a long time: Pompey, says he, labours hard with me, but has yet made no impression; nor, if I retain a grain of liberty, ever will;

Ibid. 1.

*Oh ! ere that dire disgrace shall blast my fame,  
O'erwhelm me, earth : ——————*

Il. iv. 218.

**Y. R. 699.** But Pompey's incessant importunity, backed by  
**Bef. Chr.** Cæsar's earnest request, made it vain to struggle  
**53.** any longer; and forced him against his judgment,  


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**398 Conf.** his resolution, and his dignity, to defend *Gabinius*; at a time when his defence at last proved  
of no service to him; for he was found guilty  
by *Cato*, and condemned of course to a perpetual  
banishment.

**Midd. p.** The trial of *C. Rabirius Posthumus*, a person  
**515.** of Equestrian rank, was an appendix to that of  
*Gabinius*. It was one of the articles against *Gabinius*, that he had received about two millions  
for restoring King *Ptolemy*; yet all his estate that  
was to be found was not sufficient to answer the  
damages in which he was condemned; nor could  
he give any security for the rest: In this case,  
the method was, to demand the deficiency from  
those, through whose hands the management of  
his money affairs had passed, and who were sup-  
posed to have been sharers in the spoil: This  
was charged upon *Rabirius*, and "that he had  
" advised *Gabinius* to undertake the restoration of  
" the King, and accompanied him in it, and was  
" employed to sollicit the payment of the money,  
" and lived at *Alexandria* for that purpose, in the  
" King's service, as the public Receiver of the  
" taxes, and wearing the Pallium or habit of the  
" Country."

**Pro C.** Cicero urged in defence of *Rabirius*, "that  
**Rab. 8, 9.** " he had born no part in that transaction; but  
**75.** " that his whole crime, or rather folly, was, that  
" he had lent the King great sums of money for  
" his support at *Rome*; and ventured to trust a

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.  
53.  
398 Conf.

" prince, who, as all the world then thought,  
" was going to be restored by the authority of  
" the *Roman* people : That the necessity of going  
" to *Egypt* for the recovery of that debt, was the  
" source of all his misery ; where he was forced to  
" take whatever the King would give or impose :  
" That it was his misfortune to be obliged to  
" commit himself to the power of an arbitrary  
" monarch : That nothing could be more mad,  
" than for a *Roman Knight*, and Citizen of a Re-  
" public of all others the most free, to go to  
" any place where he must needs be a slave to  
" the will of another ; and that all who ever did  
" so, as *Plato* and the wisest had sometimes done  
" too hastily, always suffered for it : This was  
" the case of *Rabirius* ; necessity carried him to  
" *Alexandria* ; his whole fortunes were at stake,  
" which he was so far from improving by his  
" traffic with that King, that he was ill treated  
" by him, imprisoned, threatened with death,  
" and glad to run away at last with the loss of  
" all : And at that very time, it was wholly  
" owing to *Cæsar's* generosity, and regard to the  
" merit and misfortunes of an old friend, that  
" he was enabled to support his former rank  
" and Equestrian dignity.—"

*Gabinius's* trial had so near a relation to this, and was therein so often referred to, that the prosecutor could not easily neglect the fair opportunity of rallying *Cicero* for the part which he had acted in it : *Memmius* observed, that the deputies of *Alexandria* had the same reason for appearing in behalf of *Gabinius*, which *Cicero* had for defend-

*Y.R. 699.* *ing him, the command of a master.—“ No, Mem-*  
*Pro C.* *“ mius,” replied Cicero, “ my reason for defending*  
*Rab. 12.* *“ him, was a reconciliation with him; for I am not*  
*“ ashamed to own, that my quarrels are mortal, my*  
*“ friendships immortal: And if you imagine that I*  
*“ undertook that cause for fear of Pompey, you*  
*“ neither know Pompey nor me; for Pompey would*  
*“ neither desire it of me against my will, nor would*  
*“ I, after I had preserved the liberty of my Citi-*  
*“ zens, ever give up my own.”*

*Midd. p.*  
*517.*

*Ad Quint.*  
*iii. 5.*

Whatever Cicero might say for himself in the flourishing stile of an orator, it is certain, that he knew and felt his *defence of Gabinius* to be, what it really was, an indignity and dishonour to him, which he was forced to submit to by the iniquity of the times, and his engagements with Pompey and Cæsar, as he often laments to his friends in a very passionate strain: “ I am afflicted,” says he, “ my dearest brother, I am afflicted, that there is no Republic, no justice in trials; that this season of my life, which ought to flourish in the authority of the Senatorian character, is either wasted in the drudgery of the bar, or relieved only by domestic studies; that what I have ever been fond of from a boy,

“ In every virtuous act and glorious strife  
 “ To shine the first and best—

“ is wholly lost and gone; that my enemies are partly not opposed, partly even defended by me; and neither what I love nor what I hate left free to me.”

About

About this time, and while *Cæsar* was engaged in his second expedition into *Britain*, his daughter *Julia*, *Pompey's* wife, died <sup>a</sup> in child-bed at *Rome*, having been first delivered of a son, which died also soon after her. Her loss was not more lamented by the husband and father, who both of them tenderly loved her, than by all their common friends, and the well-wishers to the public peace, who considered it as a source of fresh disturbance to the State, from the ambitious views and clashing interests of the two chiefs, whom the life of one so dear, and the relation of son and father, seemed hitherto to have united by the ties both of duty and affection.—The jealousies and separate interests of the *Triumvirs* had obliged them to manage their power with some decency, and to extend it but rarely beyond the then customary forms; but whenever that league, which had made them already too great for private subjects, should happen to be dissolved, it was thought that the next contest must of course be for dominion, and the single mastery of the empire.

On the second of November, C. Pontinius triumphed over the *Allobroges*: He had been *Prætor* when *Cicero* was *Consul*, and, at the end of his magistracy, obtained the government of that part of *Gaul*, which some time after, provoked by oppression, broke out into rebellion, but was reduced by the vigour of this General. For this

<sup>a</sup> *Cæsar* is said to have born the news of her death with an uncommon firmness. *Senec. Consol. ad Helv.* p. 116.

Y. R. 699.

Vell. Pat.  
ii. 47.  
Val. Max.  
iv. 6.  
Plut. in  
*Cæs.*

Midd. 519.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 5.  
Ad Att.  
iv. 16.  
Dio, p.  
120.

Y.R. 699. service he demanded a *Triumph*, but met with  
 Bef. Chr. great opposition, which he surmounted with in-  
 53.  
 398 Conf. credible patience: For he persevered in his suit  
 for five years successively; residing all that while,  
 according to custom, in the suburbs of the City,  
 till he gained his point at last by a kind of  
 violence. *Cicero* was his friend, and coatinued  
 in *Rome* on purpose to assist him; and the *Con-*  
*ful* Appius served him with all his power; but  
 Cato protested that Pontinius should never tri-  
 umph while he lived; though this, says *Cicero*,  
 like many of his other threats, will end in no-  
 thing. The *Prætor* Galba, who had been Pon-  
 tinius's Lieutenant, having procured by stra-  
 gem an *act of the People* in his favour, he en-  
 tered the City in his triumphal chariot, where  
 he was so rudely received and opposed in his  
 passage through the streets, that he was forced  
 to make his way with his sword, and the slaughter  
 of many of his adversaries.

Ad Att.  
iv. 18.

In the end of the year *Cicero* consented to be  
 one of Pompey's Lieutenants in Spain, which he  
 began to think convenient to the present state of his  
 affairs, and resolved to set forward for that pro-  
 vince about the middle of January: But this seem-  
 ing to give some umbrage to *Cæsar*, who in his  
 letters desired him to continue at *Rome*, he soon  
 changed his mind, and resigned his Lieutenancy:  
 To which he seems to allude in a letter to his  
 brother, where he says, that he had no second  
 thoughts in what concerned *Cæsar*; that he would  
 make good his engagements to him; and being en-  
 tered

Ad Quint.  
ii. 15.

Ibid. iii. 1.

tered into his friendship with judgment, was now attached to him by affection.

Y.C.R. 699.  
Befi Chr.33.  
966 Cons.

The prodigious unprecedented knaveries of the Consuls and Consular candidates, and what followed thereupon, so retarded the elections; that the year expired before the State was provided with new Consuls; and the Tribunes, whose authority, while there were no Consuls to controul them, was in a manner absolute, did for that reason, perhaps, keep off all Assemblies for the election of those Magistrates: But it seems more probable that Pompey was at the bottom of this opposition, having entertained the fond desire of being appointed DICTATOR. He chose however to keep himself out of sight; and retired into the country, to avoid the suspicion of affecting a sovereignty which Sylla had made so odious. "The rumour of a DICTATORSHIP, says Cicero, is disagreeable to the Honest; but the other things which they talk of <sup>b</sup> are more so

Midd. 522.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 8.

<sup>a</sup> What these other things were does not appear. Dio says, That some of the Tribunes proposed, that, instead of Consuls, military Tribunes with Consular power should be once again placed at the head of the Republic. But if by other things he meant nothing worse than this proposal, I cannot guess why Dr. Middleton says, that Cicero judged rightly in thinking, that there were other things, which, in the present situation of the Senate and the honest, were of more dangerous consequence than a Dictatorship. Indeed the Doctor is of opinion, that there was no great reason to be afraid of a DICTATORSHIP at this time. "For the REPUBLIC (says he) was in so great a disorder, that NOTHING LESS THAN THE DICTATORIAL POWER COULD REDUCE IT TO A TOLERABLE STATE." [I pray the Reader to remember this concession.]

p. 524.

Y.R. 699. "to me. The whole affair is dreaded, but flags :  
 Bef. Chr. "Pompey flatly disclaims it, though he never de-  
 53. nied it to me before. The Tribune *Hirrus*  
398 Conf. "will probably be the promoter: Good Gods !  
 "How silly and fond of himself without a rival !  
 "At Pompey's request I have deterred *Crassus*  
 "Junianus, who pays great regard to me, from  
 "meddling with it. It is hard to know whe-  
 "ther Pompey really desires it or not; but he  
 "will not convince us that he is averse to it,  
 "if *Hirrus* stir in the affair." In another let-  
 Ad Quint. "ter ——" Nothing is yet done as to the  
 iii. 9. "Dictatorship; Pompey is still absent; *Appius*  
 "in a great bustle; *Hirrus* preparing to propose  
 "it; but several are named, as ready to interpose  
 "their negative: The People do not trouble their  
 "heads about it; the chiefs are against it; I  
 "keep myself quiet."

\* called  
 LUCILIUS  
 by Plut. in  
 Pomp.

Dio, lib.  
 xl. p. 141.

The Tribune *Hirrus* \*, mentioned in these letters, did actually drop some hints leading to a *Dictatorship*; for which *Cato* treated him so roughly, that he was almost reduced to throw up his office. *Q. Pompeius Rufus*, another of the Tribunes, the grandson of *Sylla*, and the most warm espouser of a Dictator, was, by a decree of the Senate, committed to prison <sup>c</sup>. This

c This is a fact, says M. Crevier, I can scarce believe, as it is not to be paralleled in all the history of the *Roman Republic*. The persons of the Tribunes were sacred.—Besides it is clear from the testimony of *Asconius Pedianus*, that this *Pompeius Rufus* was Tribune the year following the present. Now it was no longer the custom for the same Magistrates to be continued in office several years; and if there had been checked

checked all proceeding in that project : And Pompey himself, finding the greater part of the leading men utterly averse to his Dictatorship, he yielded at last, *after an Inter-regnum of six months*, that *Cn. Domitius Calvinus* and *M. Messala*, two of the four candidates (who, Cicero tells us, were all alike) should be declared Consuls. *Domitius* was one of the contractors for forging decrees, and was without doubt supported in this election by the interest of his kinsman, *L. Domitius*, the Consul, another of the Contractors : As for *Messala*, Cicero had particularly recommended him to Cæsar ; as appears by what he writes to his brother *Quintus* : “ *As to your reckoning Messala and Calvinus sure Consuls, you agree with what we think here; for I will be answerable to Cæsar for Messala.*”

Y.R. 699.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>53.</sup>  
398 Cons.

Vid. supr.  
P. 507.

Ad Quint.  
iii. 8.

## CHAP. VII.

CRASSUS makes war upon the Parthians : The enterprize unjust, the event unfortunate. CICERO, at Rome, is elected into the college of AUGURS.

THE first news from abroad, after the inauguration of the Consuls, was of the ill success of Crassus's hostile expedition into the Parthian territories ; a war commenced with-

Y.R. 700.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>52.</sup>  
399 Cons.

an exception in favour of Rufus, Asconius would probably have taken notice of it.

<sup>a</sup> We are told that the Parthians were originally a people of Scythia, from whence being banished, they, for that very reason Justin, lib. xli. c. out

Y.R. 700. out any order or explicit permission from the Senate, and to which the insatiable avarice of the Roman General was the sole motive. The Republic had, first by *Sylla*, and afterwards by *Pompey*, made leagues of peace and amity with the *Parthians*, and had never complained of any infraction of them; so that this people, having no reason to apprehend an invasion, had made no preparations against it. *Craffus* therefore, begin-

*Plut. in Craff.*

*Appian in Parth.*

*Dio, lib. xl.*

*Prid. vol.*

*III. p.*

*460—464.*

*Just. lib.*  
*xli. c. 4 &*  
*5.*

*Strabo,*  
*xvi. 743.*

called themselves *Parthians*, which word in the *Scythian* language signifies *exiles*. The country to which they retired for a settlement, was a small tract, lying to the south of *Hyrcania*, and to the east of *Media*, and consisted chiefly of barren mountains and sandy plains. During the empires of the *Affyrians*, *Medes*, and *Persians*, and the first *Macedonian* Kings of *Syria*, scarce any mention is made of the *Parthians*. It was about the year of *Rome* 502, 250 years before the beginning of the Christian æra, and while *Antiochus*, surnamed *The God*, was King of *Syria*, that, wearied out with the oppressive tyranny of the *Macedonian* governors, the *Parthians* revolted, under the leading of *Arsaces*. Who *Arsaces* was, is not agreed, but it is certain that he was always considered as the founder of the *Parthian* empire, and that his memory was in such veneration among them, that all his successors took his name. *Arsaces* extended the *Parthian* dominion beyond the limits of *Parthia*; and in length of time it became so far enlarged, by the conquests of the following Kings, as to include almost all the Country between the *Oxus* and the *Euphrates*. Its royal cities were *Ctesiphon* upon the *Tygris*, and *Ecbatana* in *Media*. The *Parthian* soldiery were almost all horsemen. Some, clad in compleat armour, made use of long spears in fight. The rest had scarce any other offensive weapons than the bow and arrow: But they were so dextrous in the management of these, as to be no less formidable when they turned their backs upon their enemies than when they faced them.

ning

ning his march <sup>b</sup> soon after his arrival in the East, passed the *Euphrates*, over a bridge of boats, without opposition, over-ran a great part of *Mesopotamia*, and possessed himself of several towns; which being most of them *Græcian* colonies, averse to the *Parthian* government, readily submitted to him.

V.R. 700.  
Bef. Chr.

53.  
398 Cons.

It is said, that for vanquishing a small body of horse, commanded by a *Parthian* officer, and for reducing by force an inconsiderable fortress, called *Zenodotia*, *Crassus* had the weakness to suffer himself to be saluted **IMPERATOR** by his soldiers, who at the same time despised him for his vanity.

But his greatest folly (says *Plutarch*) next to the enterprise itself, was, that, instead of pursuing his advantage, and pushing on to *Selæucia* and *Babylon*, he repassed the *Euphrates*, leaving behind him only 7000 foot and 1000 horse to garrison the places he had taken, and retired into *Syria*, for his winter-quarters; thereby giving leisure to the *Parthians* to prepare an army against the next year's campaign. Nor did *Crassus*, during the winter, take the prudent care to see his troops well exercised, and well provided for

<sup>b</sup> *Plutarch* relates, that *Crassus*, crossing *Galatia* in the way to his province, and finding King *Dejotarus*, who was advanced in years, employed in building a new city, said to him pleasantly, *Why, King, you begin your day's work at the twelfth hour.* The King instantly replied, *And you, General, methinks you are not too early in your expedition against the Parthians.* *Crassus* was past sixty, and looked much older than he was.

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the war, but acted the part of a Publican rather than a General, examining into the revenues of the province, screwing them up to the utmost height, and using all other methods of exaction whereby to enrich himself. Being told of immense treasures deposited in the temple of *Jerusalem*, thither he impatiently hasted, with a part of his army, to seize so delicious and so easy a prey. *Eleazer*, one of the priests, was then treasurer of the Temple. Among other things, which he had under his charge, was a bar of gold of the weight of three hundred *Hebrew minæ*. This, for the better securing of it, he had put into a beam, which he had caused to be made hollow for that purpose; and placing this beam over the entrance, which was from the *Holy Place* into the *Holy of Holies*, caused the veil, which parted these two places, to be fastened to it, and to hang down from it. Perceiving *Crassus's* design of plundering the Temple, he endeavoured to compound the matter with him, and therefore telling him of such a bar of gold in his custody, promised to discover and deliver it to him, upon condition that he would be satisfied with it, and spare all the rest: *Crassus* accepted of the proposal, and solemnly promised with an oath, that, on having this bar of gold delivered to him, he would be contented with it, and meddle with nothing else. Relying on this promise, *Eleazer* put him in possession of the gold. *Crassus* had no sooner received it, but, forgetting his oath, he not only seized the two thousand talents which *Pompey* had left untouched, but ransacked the temple

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temple all over, and robbed it of every thing he thought worth taking away, to the value of eight thousand talents more; so that the whole of what he took from thence amounted to ten thousand talents, which is above two millions of our money <sup>c</sup>.  
[*Joseph. Antiq. lib. xiv. & de Bell. Jud. lib. i.*]

As soon as the season of the year permitted, *Crassus*, strengthened by a thousand *Gallic* horse, which his son *Publius* brought him from *Cæsar's* army, drew all his forces together, in order to prosecute the war against the *Parthians*, who had now got ready a very great army for their defence. But, before they entered upon action, Ambassadors were sent from *Orodes*, the *Parthian* King, to the *Roman* General, to ask, For what reason he made war upon him. *Crassus* answered with haughtiness, that he would declare his reason when he should come to *Seleucia*. The King, on the return of his Ambassadors, finding war to be unavoidable, divided his army into two parts, marched in person with one of them to-

<sup>c</sup> The plundering of the Temple at *Jerusalem* [which I do not find any where mentioned by the Greek historians] was not the only sacrilege committed by *Crassus*. He acted the like part all over the province, wherever any riches were to be got, particularly at *Hierapolis*. For there being in that city an ancient temple of the *Syrian Goddess*, called *Atergetis*, where much treasure was laid up, as having been the collection of many years, he seized it all, and was so greedy of securing the whole of it, that, lest any should be detained or embezzled, he spent a great deal of his time to see it all told out and weighed before him. On his last coming out of this temple, his son going before him stumbled at the threshold, and he immediately after it upon him. This was afterwards interpreted as an ill omen, that foreboded what soon happened.

Prid. vol.  
III. p. 461.

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\* or Artavasdes.

wards the borders of *Armenia*, and sent the other under the command of *Surenas*<sup>4</sup>, the most illustrious of all his nobles, and a most accomplished general, into *Mesopotomia*; who, immediately after his arrival there, retook some of those places of which *Craffus* had possessed himself the year before. The garrisons, that escaped to the *Roman* camp, filled it with a terrible report of the number, power, and strength of the enemy; which cast a damp upon the whole army, and sunk the courage, not only of the common soldiers, but of the general officers. *Cassius* (the same who was afterwards concerned in the murder of *Cæsar*) was at this time *Craffus's* Quæstor, and endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding any further in his enterprise, till he had well considered it again. At the same time came to him *Artabazes* \*, King of *Armenia*, who had lately succeeded his father *Tigranes* in that kingdom. He brought with him six thousand horse, which were only his lifeguard. Besides these, he told *Craffus*, he had ten thousand Cuirassiers, and thirty thousand foot ready for his service: But advised him by no means to march his army through the plains of *Mesopotamia*, but to take his way through *Armenia* into the *Parthian* dominions. His reasons for it were, that *Armenia* being a rough mountainous country, the *Parthian* horse, of which their army almost wholly consisted, would there be useless; and he could take care

<sup>4</sup> This is said to be the name, not of a person, but of a dignity, and equivalent to that of Grand Vizir.

that

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that the *Roman* army should be there plentifully provided with all necessaries: both which advantages he would fail of, if he led his army through *Mesopotamia*, where he would often meet with sandy deserts, and be distressed for want both of water and other provisions. This was the best advice that could be given him; yet *Crassus* answered, that, having left many brave *Romans* to garrison the towns which he had taken last year in *Mesopotamia*, he was under a necessity of going that way, that they might not be abandoned to the mercy of the enemy: But he accepted of the auxiliaries which the King offered him, and desired they might be speedily brought to him. The prospect of so considerable a reinforcement was, perhaps, what chiefly encouraged *Crassus*, contrary to the advice of the wisest about him, to proceed on his expedition, and, without further delay, to pass the *Euphrates* \*, and again enter *Mesopotamia* with his army. But *Artabazes*, on his return, finding *Orodes* with a great army near his borders, was forced to stay at home to defend his own country, and therefore could not give *Crassus* the assistance he had promised him.

After *Crassus* had thus re-entered *Mesopotamia*, *Cassius* advised him to put in at some of his garrisoned towns, and there rest and refresh his army till he should have got certain intelligence of the number and strength of the enemy, and in what place and posture they were; or, if he

\* He passed the river at a town in the province of *Comagena*, called *Zeugma*; which word signifies a bridge.

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thought not fit to make that delay, he should at least take his march to *Seleucia*, along the banks of the *Euphrates*. For, by keeping close to that river, he would avoid being surrounded by the *Parthians*, and might be constantly supplied with provisions, and all other necessaries, from his barks that were upon it : But, while *Crassus* was considering on this advice, there came to him a crafty *Arabian*, who diverted him entirely from following it. He was the head of an *Arabian* tribe, (such as the *Greeks* called *Phylarchs*, and the present *Arabs*, *Sheks*) and having formerly served under *Pompey*, was well known to many in the *Roman* army, and looked on as their friend ; for which reason he had been made choice of, and sent by *Surenas* to act this part. He is, by different authors, called by different names <sup>f</sup> ; but whatever his name was, he effectually dissuaded *Crassus* from following the good advice given him by *Cassius*. He told the *Roman* General, that the *Parthians* durst not stand before him ; that he had nothing to do, for the gaining an absolute victory over them, but to march on ; and he offered himself for a guide to conduct him the shortest way to the enemy. *Crassus*, deceived by the fair words, and fooled by the flattery, of this man, accepted of his offer ; and so was led by him into the open plains of *Mesopotamia* : And although *Cassius* and others suspected the guide of treachery, and therefore pressed *Crassus* to

<sup>f</sup> By *Dio Cassius* he is called *Augarus*, or *Abgarus* ; by *Plutarch*, *Ariamnes* ; by *Florus*, *Mazeres* ; and by *Appian*, *Acbarus*.

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follow him no longer, but to retreat to the mountains, where he might best be able to baffle the power of the *Parthian* horse; and though messengers came to his camp from *Artabazes*, on purpose to persuade him to the same thing, yet he still continued in his delusion, till at length the traitor, having brought him into a sandy desert, where the *Parthians* might have all the advantage in a battle, rode off to *Surenas*, and acquainted him with what he had done: adding, that now was the time to attack the *Romans*, who were come to deliver themselves into his hands. Nor was it very long before *Crassus* perceived his error. While he was making forced marches, fearing nothing but that the enemy should escape him, his scouts came back full speed to inform him, that the *Parthians* were advancing in prodigious numbers, in good order, and with much confidence.

This report threw the whole army into a consternation<sup>s</sup>, and especially the General, who now began, though with a good deal of irresolution, to put his troops in order of battle. At first, following the advice of *Cassius*, he drew up his infantry in one line, extended to a great length, that the *Parthian* horse might not be able easily

<sup>s</sup> According to *Plutarch* (whom *Appian* copies all along) the *Roman* soldiers had been already terrified with about a dozen bad omens; of which the most worthy to be remembered (or, if you please, most worthy to be forgot) was, that, when, in order to begin their march, they were going to pull up the foremost standard, the eagle upon it turned its head about, and looked back, as if it had no mind to go forward.

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to surround it; and he placed all his cavalry in the wings: Then, altering his mind, he formed the foot into a square body, having twelve cohorts in each of its four sides; and he flanked each cohort with a squadron; to the end that every part of his battalion, being supported by cavalry, might charge with the more safety and confidence. To his son he gave one of the wings, to *Cassius* the other, and placed himself in the center.

In their march towards the enemy, they came to a rivulet, the sight of which, though its waters were not very abundant, greatly comforted and rejoiced the soldiers, after their long march over so parched and sandy a soil. Most of the officers were for passing the night in that place, and for endeavouring, before they proceeded farther, to get more exact information of the number and posture of the enemy: But *Publius Crassus*, full of ardour and confidence, persuaded his father to advance: So that he only made a short halt, to give those who needed refreshment, time for a scanty meal, as they stood in their ranks: After which he pursued his march, pushing on with great haste and precipitation.

When the two armies were near enough to engage, the *Parthian* pike-men soon perceived, that the *Roman* battalion, which they had hoped to break by the force of their ponderous and well-steeled lances, was too deep, compact, and firm, to be by them easily penetrated and dissolved. They retreated therefore, and, by their dispersion and feigned confusion, seemed as if they

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meant to quit the field: But the *Romans*, presently after, to their great astonishment, found themselves entirely surrounded by the *Parthian* cavalry. *Crassus* ordered out against them his dart-men, and other light-armed infantry. These, meeting with a flight of arrows, quickly recoiled, fell back on the legions, disordered them in some degree, and terrified them still more: For the *Romans* now became sensible that they had no defensive armour that was proof against the force of those murderous arrows, which the enemy incessantly showered upon them. Nor had they any means to revenge themselves; because, as soon as they advanced with that intent, the enemy fled, and, even in flying, continued to gall them with the same weapons.

The *Romans* for some time entertained hopes, that the *Parthians* would at length exhaust their stock of arrows, and then be obliged either to run away or come to a close fight; hopes ill-grounded; for the bowmen were supplied with arrows as fast as they wanted them, from a great number of camels loaded with them, and placed in the rear of the army for that purpose: Which, when *Crassus* understood, he ordered his son to attempt, at all hazards, a close engagement with those troops of the enemy which had approached the nearest to him. *Publius*, therefore, with the thousand *Gallic* horse he had brought from *Cæsar*, three hundred other horse, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts of legionary foot, advanced to the attack. The *Parthians* instantly gave ground, and even fled before him; and the sanguine

V. R. 700. young warrior, imagining himself victorious, pursued them with his whole detachment, horse and foot. Soon he perceived that the enemy's flight had been only feigned. The runaways stopt on a sudden, and, rallying, boldly returned upon him. The pikemen, in good order, faced the *Romans*; while the bowmen, without observing any order, galloped round them, and raised such a mighty dust, as deprived them at once both of sight and respiration: Exposed to the *Parthian* arrows, and unable to make any defence against enemies whom they saw not, they now perished in great numbers, and by very painful deaths; and those who remained alive were in no condition to fight. When their commander urged them to advance against the pikemen of the enemy, some shewed him their hands nailed to their bucklers, others their feet pinned to the ground, so that they could neither defend themselves nor fly.

In this extremity, young *Craffus*, who manifested throughout the engagement an heroic bravery, had recourse to his *Gallie* cavalry as his last resource; and so well managed, as with these to force the *Parthian* pikemen to a close fight. But the match was very unequal. The *Gallie* javelins, or half-pikes, had little effect on troopers covered almost from head to foot with iron: Whereas the long, stout lances of the *Parthians* proved fatal to the *Gauls*, whose defensive arm, our, if indeed they had any, was very slight. They are said to have performed wonders in the action; but being distressed by the excessive heat and drought,

drought, to which they were not accustomed, and having lost most of their horses (transfixed by the *Parthian* lances) they at length resolved to rejoin, if possible, the main body of the army. Carrying with them young *Crassus*, grievously wounded in many places, they made to a small sandy hill, not far from them. Here tying their horses one to another, and placing them in the midst, they formed themselves into a circle, and made a rampart of their shields, hoping to find it an effectual defence against the arrows of the Barbarians. But herein they fatally mistook: For on even ground, the foremost rank in some measure defended those that were behind it; whereas on an ascent, the hinder ranks standing necessarily higher than those before, all were equally exposed to the enemies arrows: So that they quickly found their case desperate, and that they must perish without glory, and almost without resistance. The young General, disdaining to desert his troops, and attempt a precipitate flight, to which some advised him, and being deprived by a wound of the use of his own hand, commanded his armour-bearer to run him through <sup>b</sup>. Most of the nobles who had accom-

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<sup>b</sup> " *Publius Crassus* was a youth of an amiable character; educated with the strictest care, and perfectly instructed in all the liberal studies; he had a ready wit and easy language; was grave without arrogance, modest without negligence, adorned with all the accomplishments proper to form a principal Citizen and Leader of the Republic: By the force of his own judgment he had devoted himself very early to the observation and imitation of *Cicero*, whom he perpetually accompanied

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panied him killed themselves. The rest were all slain by the enemy, except about five hundred, who fell alive into their hands. The *Parthians* cut off the head of young *Craffus*, and, taking it with them, marched to attack the Proconsul.

*Publius*, from the beginning of his distress, had dispatched messengers to his father, to give him notice of the difficulties and dangers he had run himself into, by his inconsiderate pursuit of the *Parthians*. The first messengers were intercepted and killed: Others reached the army. *Craffus* remained awhile unresolved what to do. He feared the loss of all, if he marched to the succour of his son; yet his affection for his son urged him irresistibly to it. He moved forward: the enemy presently appeared, and, by their terrible shouts and exulting noises, proclaimed their recent victory. Before them, as they approached, was

" tended, and reverenced with a kind of filial Piety. Cicero  
" conceived a mutual affection for him, and observing his eager  
" thirst of glory, was constantly instilling into him the true  
" notion of it, and exhorting him to pursue that sure path to  
" it, which his ancestors had left beaten and traced out to him,  
" through the gradual ascent of civil honours. But, by serving  
" under *Cæsar* in the Gallic wars, he had learnt, as he fancied,  
" a shorter way to fame and power than what Cicero had been  
" inculcating; and, having signalized himself in a campaign  
" or two as a soldier, was in too much haste to be a General;  
" when *Cæsar* sent him at the head of a thousand horse to the  
" assistance of his father in the *Parthian* war." — But, " while  
" he aspired, as Cicero says, to the fame of another *Cyrus* or  
" *Alexander*, he fell short of that glory which many of his pre-  
" decessors had reaped from a succession of honours conferred  
" by their country as the reward of their services," *Ep. Fam.*  
iii. 8. & *ib.* xiii. 16. *Vid. Brut.* p. 407. *It. Plut.* in *Craff.*

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carried, upon the end of a lance, the head of *Publius Crassus*, whilst scoffingly they asked aloud — *Of what family was that young man? who were his parents?* — a scene which sunk the spirits of the *Roman* soldiers more than all the calamities they had before suffered. *Crassus* is reported to have acted the hero upon this occasion. Riding through the ranks, as the army marched on, he said aloud: “This misfortune, fellow-soldiers, concerns me only: The glory and felicity of our country remains yet entire, so long as you are in a condition to defend it. And, if you compassionate me for having lost so brave a son, let your concern be shewn, by punishing the cruelty of our enemies.” The soldiers gave a shout; but with a voice so faint and languid, as spoke more of dejection than courage.

The fight presently began. The *Parthian bowmen*, wheeling about the *Romans*, galled them in flank with showers of arrows, while the *pike-men*, assailing them in front, made them recoil and crowd closer together, which hastened their destruction. Night coming on, the *Parthians* retired, it being contrary to their custom to pass the night near an enemy, because they never fortified their camps, and because their horses and arrows could be but of little use in the dark. Their retreat, however, did not kindle in the *Romans* the least spark of hope. Giving all for lost, they had no attention to bury their dead, or console the dying, or succour the wounded: Every one bewailed his own fate: For, should they remain

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main where they then were till day-light, or should they set forward in the dark, to traverse an almost boundless plain; in neither supposition did they see any chance of escaping. They were much perplexed likewise on account of their wounded men. If they took these with them, it would retard their flight; if they forsook them, the cries of the wretched, so abandoned, would publish the departure of the army. Though the soldiers knew their General to be the faulty cause of all their calamities, yet they wished to see him, and to hear him. But *Crassus* had not the confidence to appear. He had cast himself on the ground, and there he lay, as a man quite stunned and senseless <sup>i</sup>. *Octavius* and *Cassius*, (the one his Lieutenant, and the other his Quæstor) having found him in this posture of dejection, endeavoured to rouse him to a more manly deportment; but without success. They took upon themselves therefore to hold a council of war; and it was

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<sup>i</sup> What a striking example of the short-sightedness of man, the instability of human grandeur, and the madness of unbounded ambition! Plutarch tells us, that when the province of Syria fell by lot to *Crassus*, he thought, that Fortune had never, in any instance, been so favourable to him. Transported with his good luck, he could not, even in the company of strangers, contain his joy; but, to his familiar friends and confidents, he blurted out many extravagant and childish boastings; a folly, which he had never been guilty of in the former part of his life. *Lucullus* had done nothing against Tigranes; Pompey nothing against Mithridates: But, as for himself, the limits of Parthia should not be the limits of his conquests; the Roman eagles, under his conduct, were to fly triumphant over Bactria and India, quite to the great Ocean and the extremities of the East. resolved,

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resolved to retire immediately. The troops dé-camped in silence. Doleful and affecting were the lamentations of the miserable men, whom necessity constrained their fellows to abandon. The care of such of the wounded, who, having some strength left, dragged themselves along with the army; the apprehension of being pursued and overtaken; and the drawing up frequently in battalia upon false alarms, made the march of the army very slow. A certain officer, named *Egnatius*, at the head of three hundred horse, leaving the main body, and pushing forward with all diligence, arrived under the walls of *Cattræ*<sup>k</sup> about midnight. Calling out to the guard, he bad them tell *Caponius*, the Governor, that *there had been a great battle between the Romans and the Parthians*. He said no more, nor discovered himself, but immediately pursued his route to *Zeugma*: And by this he saved indeed his three hundred horse; yet was much blamed for deserting his General. The message, however, which he sent to *Caponius*, proved of service to the army: For the Governor, conjecturing from the words and manner of *Egnatius*, that affairs went ill, sallied out with his garrison, met *Craffus* and his troops, and conducted them safely into the City.

The *Parthians*, though apprized of *Craffus's* retreat, waited for day, according to their custom. Then entering the *Roman* camp, they massacred

<sup>k</sup> The *Haran* or *Charran* of the Holy Scriptures, where *Abraham* sojourned.

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the sick and wounded to the amount of about four thousand men. Many of the *Roman* soldiers they likewise overtook and slaughtered in the plain ; particularly four cohorts, which had lost their way in the dark. Out of these, only twenty men escaped. It is said, that the invincible courage, with which they defended themselves, struck their assailants with such admiration, that they voluntarily opened to them a free passage to *Carræ*.

*Surena* being told, as he approached that city, of a rumour which prevailed, that *Crassus* and the principal men of the *Romans* had all made their escape, began to fear the loss of what he esteemed the chief fruit of his victory. To know the truth, he ordered one of his people, who could speak Latin, to go near the walls ; and in his name invite *Crassus* and *Cassius* to a conference with him. This messenger was attended by some *Arabians*, who, having formerly served in the *Roman* army, knew the persons of both. *Cassius* appeared upon the walls, and was told, that *Surena* consented to make peace with the *Romans*, on the condition of their evacuating *Mesopotamia*. The proposal, as affairs then stood, appeared to the *Roman* Quæstor far from being disadvantageous : He promised therefore to report it to the General. The *Parthian*, having thus learnt what he wanted to know, laughed at the credulity of the *Romans* ; and the next day, while he was preparing to attack the place, gave them to understand, that, if they would obtain leave to retire

tire in safety, they must deliver up to him *Crassus* and *Cassius*. No thought remained now but of running away in the dark ; and it was necessary to keep this resolution concealed till the moment of execution. *Crassus*, once more fatally deceived, imparted the secret to a traitor, named *Andromachus*, and even took the same traitor for his guide. *Andromachus* sent advice to *Surena* of what was intended ; and, in order to complete the destruction of the *Roman* army, contrived to lead them, by ways so indirect, such windings and turnings, that they gained but little ground in a long march ; and at length he brought them into a place full of ditches and enclosures. Many began now to suspect treachery, and would follow him no farther. *Cassius*, with five hundred horse, returning to *Carrae*, provided himself there with some *Arabian* guides<sup>1</sup>, who faithfully conducted him and his followers into *Syria*. *Ostavius* too, the General's Lieutenant, convinced of *Andromachus*'s perfidy, made a timely retreat, leading off five thousand men to a hilly ground, where they could not be much annoyed by the enemy's cavalry. Yet, when he learnt that *Crassus* had somehow gained an eminence, about a mile off, where he was in great danger from the *Parthians*, whom daylight had brought upon him, he boldly marched thither, followed by his five thousand

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<sup>1</sup> It is related, that these *Arabians*, being superstitious about the moon, exhorted *Cassius* earnestly not to advance, till the moon had passed *Scorpio*. To which *Cassius* answered, that he was much more afraid of *Sagittarius* ; alluding to the *Parthian* arrows.

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men; who, encompassing Crassus, and making a rampart for him of their shields and bodies, vowed, that no arrow should reach their General, so long as a man of them remained alive to defend him. Surena, perceiving the ardor of his own soldiers to abate, and apprehending, that, if the Romans should spin out the battle till night, they might then gain the mountains and be safe, for the future, from his attacks, had again recourse to his wonted craft. He suffered some prisoners to escape; before whom the Parthians, discoursing with one another, had designedly said, that *their King was far from intending an implacable war with the Romans, and would be glad to regain their friendship by treating Crassus with generosity.* That this stratagem might more easily take effect, he ceased hostilities, and, attended by his principal officers, advanced in pacific guise toward the hill, having his bow unbent, and holding out his hand, as a friend to Crassus; whom he invited to a treaty of accommodation. *The King, he said, having, much against his will, made the Romans sensible of his power, and of the bravery of his troops, is now disposed to give them proofs of his clemency and goodness, by suffering them to retire in safety.* Crassus, who saw no reason for so sudden a change, was not deceived; his soldiers were: And, notwithstanding all he could say to persuade them to have patience till night, when they might make a retreat to the mountains, they seditiously, and with threats, compelled him to accept of Surena's invitation: (A beha-

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behaviour strangely ill suiting with what has been just related of their zeal and fidelity). At going from them, he is reported to have said; “*Octavius and Petronius, and you the rest of the commanders here present, you are witnesses of the violence offered me: Nevertheless, for the honour of the Roman name, I desire you will declare to all the world, that Crassus perished by the craft of his enemies, “not by the perfidy of his soldiers and fellow-citizens.”*”

*Octavius and Petronius, and some other officers, not enduring the thought, that their General should go alone, descended the hill with him; but he sent back his Lictors. Certain heralds from Surena, having accosted him with profound respect, desired him, in the Greek language, to send some body before, to see that the Parthian General and his retinue were without arms. Crassus answered, that, if he had retained the least concern for his life, he would never have put himself into their hands.* However, to learn what appearance things had, he sent forward two men, who were to bring him word. These were instantly seized, by Surena’s order; who then, attended by his principal officers, coming up him, with an air of astonishment, said; *How! what an indecent sight is this! a Roman General on foot, and we on horseback!* “No error committed on either side (answered Crassus); each follows the custom of his country.” “From this moment (said the Parthian) there is a league of amity between the King my master and the Roman People; but it must be put in writing; for

Y. R. 700. “you, Romans, are very apt to forget your engagements and covenants. Let us go, therefore, and  
 Bef. Chr. 52.  
 399 Cons. “finish the treaty on the banks of the Euphrates.”

*Crassus* hereupon ordered a horse to be brought him. There is no need, said *Surena*, the King makes you a present of one; and immediately a horse, with rich trappings, was led to him; and he was forcibly put into the saddle: some of *Surena*'s attendants switching the horse, to hasten him forward. The *Romans* now saw plainly, that the purpose of the *Parthian* was to take *Crassus* alive. *Octavius* therefore seized the bridle of the horse, and stopt him. *Petronius* and the other officers surrounded their General, putting themselves in a posture to defend him. A tumult and scuffle ensued. *Octavius* killed one of the *Parthian* grooms, and was himself killed by a stroke of a lance run into his back. *Crassus* himself fell dead quickly after; but whether he was dispatched by the hand of an enemy, or of a friend who would preserve him from the disgrace of becoming a prisoner, is uncertain.

*Surena*, by fair words, notwithstanding the experience which the *Romans* had of his perfidy, decoyed many of those who had remained on the hill to surrender themselves prisoners. The most courageous waited for the night, to attempt a retreat; but of these few escaped, the rest being intercepted by the *Arabs*, who scoured the country with that intent. In the several actions and disasters of this war, the *Romans* are said to have lost twenty thousand men killed, and ten thousand

thousand taken prisoners. It was one of the greatest blows that *Rome* had ever received from a foreign enemy, and for which she was ever after meditating revenge.

Y.R. 700.  
Bef. Chr.

52.

399 Cons.

*Orodes*, at the time of *Craffus's* death, was in *Armenia*, having there made peace with *Artabazus*. For this prince, on the return of the messengers, which he last sent to the *Roman* camp, finding, by the account which they brought of the measures which *Craffus* took in the *Parthian* war, that he must necessarily be undone, compounded all matters with *Orodes*; and by giving one of his sisters in marriage to *Pacorus*, the son of the *Parthian*, restored himself to full amity with him. And while they were sitting together at the nuptial feast, in came a messenger, who presented *Orodes* with the head and hand of *Craffus*, which *Surena* had caused to be cut off with that intent<sup>m</sup>. This much increased the mirth and joy of the feast. And it is said, that melted gold was then poured into the mouth of the lifeless head by way of mockery; as if they would thus satiate that thirst after riches, for which *Craffus* had been so remarkable.

The chief and immediate concern which the City felt on the news of *Craffus's* death, and the destruction<sup>n</sup> of his forces, was for the detriment

Dio, lib.  
xl.  
Florus, iii.  
ii.

<sup>m</sup> *Surena* did not long rejoice in his victory: For *Orodes*, envying him the glory of it, and growing jealous of the great augmentation of his power and interest from his late successes, soon after caused him to be put to death. *Plut. in Craff.*

<sup>n</sup> The *Roman* writers generally imputed this disaster to *Craffus's* contempt of the auspices; "as some Christians have

Y.R. 60.  
Bef. Chr.  
52.  
399 Conf.

that the Republic had suffered, and the dangers to which it was exposed, by the loss of so great

Ibid.

since charged it “*to his sacrilegious violation of the temple of Jerusalem — both of them with equal superstition* (says “Dr. Middleton) pretending to unfold the counsels of heaven, “and to fathom those depths, which are declared to be *unsearchable*.”

Connect.  
part ii. p.  
465. 8vo.  
Ed. 1718.

D. *Prideaux* is one of the *Christians* here referred to; his words are these — “*Craffus made a great number of false steps in the whole conduct of this war; and although he was often warned, yet, being deaf to all good advice, he obstinately followed his own delusions till he perished in them. For, being, for his impious sacrilege at Jerusalem, justly destined to destruction, God did cast infatuations into all his counsels, for the leading him thereto.*”

Prideaux,  
part ii. p.  
474.  
Vid. vol.  
VIII. p.  
89.

The same author, speaking afterwards of the deplorable end of *Pompey the Great*, writes thus: “*No man had enjoyed greater prosperity till he profaned the temple of God at Jerusalem: After that, his fortunes were in a continual decline, till at length; to expiate for that impiety, he was thus vilely murdered in the confines of that country where he had committed it.*”

Tom.  
XIII. p.  
71.

M. *Crevier*, another Christian, speaks to the same effect with regard to both these *Roman Generals*. But it would seem, that D. *Prideaux* delivered these opinions not as peculiar to a believer of the Holy Scriptures, but as proper to

Prideaux,  
part i. p.  
171. p.  
173.

every religious philosopher: For, having related how *Cambyses*, King of *Perse*, in a rage, drew out his dagger, and ran it into the thigh of the sacred bull, the *Egyptian God Apis*, of which wound the God died, he afterwards relates the death of *Cambyses* in the following words — “*As he mounted his horse, his sword, falling out of the scabbard, gave him a wound in the thigh, of which he died a few days after. The Egyptians remarking, that it was in the same part of the body where he had wounded the Apis, reckoned it as an especial judgment from heaven upon him for that fact; and perchance they were not much out in it. For it seldom happens in an affront given to any particular mode of worship, how erroneous soever it may be, but that RELIGION is in general wounded*”

an

an army ; yet the principal mischief lay in what they did not at first regard, and seemed rather to rejoice at, *the loss of Crassus himself.* For, after the death of *Julia*, *Crassus's* authority was the only means left of curbing the power of *Pompey* and the ambition of *Cæsar*, being ready always to support the weaker against the encroachments of the stronger, and keep them both within the bounds of a decent respect to the laws : But this check being now taken away, and the power of the empire thrown, as a kind of prize, between two, it gave a new turn to their several pretensions, and created a fresh competition for the larger share.

By the death of young *Crassus*, a place became vacant in the college of *Augurs*, for which *Cicero* declared himself a candidate : Nor was any one so hardy as to appear against him, except *Hirrus the Tribune*, who, trusting to the popularity of his office, and *Pompey's* favour, had the vanity to pretend to it : But a competitor so unequal furnished matter of raillery only to *Cicero*, who was chosen without any difficulty or struggle, with the unanimous approbation of the whole body <sup>o</sup>.

Y.R. 700.  
Bef. Chr.

52.  
399 Conf.

Philip. ii.  
2.  
Ep. Fam.  
83.

"bereby ; there are many instances in history, wherein God hath  
"very severely punished the prophanations of RELIGION in the  
"worst of times, and under the worst mode of heathen idolatry."

<sup>o</sup> This college, from the last regulation of it by *Sylla*, consisted of fifteen, who were all persons of the first distinction in Rome : It was a priesthood for life, which no crime or forfeiture could efface : The priests of all kinds were originally chosen by their colleges, till *Domitius*, a Tribune, about fifty years before, transferred the choice of them to the people,

Midd. 529.  
De Leg.  
Agr. II. 7.

## C H A P. VIII.

*Scandalous proceedings of the candidates for the Consulship. MILO, who is one of them, has a fatal encounter with CLODIUS on the Appian way, which occasions terrible tumults and mischiefs in the City. To remedy these disorders, POMPEY is elected SOLE CONSUL: He publishes several new laws, MILO is brought to trial, and, though defended by CICERO, is condemned. CICERO's conduct in relation to the sale of MILO's effects. Two of the late candidates for the Consulship are tried for bribery by POMPEY's new laws. His shameful partiality on this occasion. Two of the late Tribunes are sentenced to banishment, for their riotous proceedings in their magistracy. The government of Cilicia falls by lot to CICERO. The usurious extortion practised by M. BRUTUS [the renowned patriot-assassin.] CICERO's military achievements. His excellent conduct in the civil government of his province. APPIAS and PISO are chosen CENSORS, the last who bore that office during the Republican state of Rome.*

Y. R. 701.

Bef. Chr.

51.

400 Conf.

**T**H E candidates for the Consulship of the coming year were *T. Annius Milo, Q. Metellus Scipio, and P. Plautius Hypsæus*, who pushed

whose authority was held to be superior in sacred as well as civil affairs. This act was reversed by *Sylla*, and the ancient right restored to the colleges; but *Labienus*, when Tribune, in *Cicero's* Consulship, repealed the law of *Domitius*, to facilitate

on

on their several interests with such open violence and bribery, as if the Consulship was to be carried only by money or arms. *Clodius* was putting in at the same time for the Pretorship, and employing all his credit and interest to disappoint *Milo*. *Pompey* was wholly averse to *Milo*, who did not pay him that court which he expected, but seemed to affect an independency, and to trust to his own strength, while the other two competitors were wholly at his devotion: *Hypsæus* had been his Quæstor, and always his creature; and as for *Scipio*, *Pompey* designed to become his son-in-law, by marrying his daughter *Cornelia*, a lady of celebrated accomplishments, the widow of young *Craffus*. *Cicero*, on the other hand, served *Milo* to the utmost of his power, and ardently wished his success. — In the heat of this competition, *Curio* was coming home from *Asia*, and expected shortly at *Rome*; whence *Cicero* sent an express to meet him on the road, or at his landing in *Italy*, with a most earnest and pressing letter to engage him to *Milo*'s interest.

The Senate and the Aristocratical party were generally for *Milo*: But three of the Tribunes were violent against him, *Q. Pompeius Rufus*,

Y.R. 701.

Midd. 530.  
Plut. in  
Cat.Ad Quint.  
iii. 9.  
Ep. Fam.  
ii. 6.

Midd. 534.

*Cæsar's* advancement to the high-priesthood. It was necessary however, that every candidate should be nominated to the People by two Augurs, who gave a solemn testimony upon oath of his dignity and fitness for the office: This was done in *Cicero's* case by *Pompey* and *Hortensius*, the two most eminent members of the college; and, after the election, he was installed with all the usual formalities by *Hortensius*.

Brut. init.

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Quintil. I.  
vi. c. 5.

Dio, l. xl.  
p. 143.  
Ascon.  
Argum.  
in Mil.

*Munatius Plancus Bursa*, and *Sallust* the Historian ; the other seven were his fast friends, but above all *M. Cælius*, who, out of regard to *Cicero*, served *Milo* with a particular zeal. But, while all things were proceeding very prosperously in his favour, and nothing seemed wanting to crown his success, but to bring on the election, which his adversaries for that reason laboured to keep back, all his hopes and fortunes were blasted at once by an unhappy encounter with his old enemy *Clodius*.

Their meeting was wholly accidental on the *Appian* road, not far from the City ; *Clodius* coming home from the country towards *Rome*, *Milo* going out about three in the afternoon ; the first on horseback, with three companions, and thirty servants well armed ; the latter in a chariot, with his wife and one friend, but with a much greater retinue, and among them some gladiators. The servants on both sides began presently to insult each other ; when *Clodius*, turning briskly to some of *Milo*'s men, who were nearest to him, and threatening them with his usual fierceness, received a wound in the shoulder from one of the gladiators ; and, after receiving several more in the general fray, which instantly ensued, finding his life in danger, was forced to fly for shelter into a neighbouring tavern. *Milo*, heated by this success, and the thoughts of revenge, and reflecting that he had already done enough to give his enemy great advantage against him, should he be left alive to pursue it, resolved,

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Y. R. 701,  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

whatever was the consequence, to have the pleasure of destroying him, and ordered the house to be stormed, and *Clodius* to be dragged out and murdered: The master of the tavern was likewise killed, with eleven of *Clodius's* servants, while the rest saved themselves by flight: So that *Clodius's* body was left in the road where it fell, till *S. Tedium*, a Senator, happening to come by, took it up into his chaise, and brought it with him to *Rome*; where it was exposed in that condition, all covered with blood and wounds, to the view of the populace, who flocked about it in crouds to lament the miserable fate of their leader. The next day the mob, headed by *S. Clodius*, a kinsman of the deceased, and one of his chief incendiaries, carried the body naked, so as all the wounds might be seen, into the Forum, and placed it on the Rostra, where the three Tribunes, *Milo's* enemies, were prepared to harangue upon it, in a stile suited to the lamentable occasion; by which they inflamed the multitude to such a height of fury, that, snatching up the body, they ran away with it into the Senate-house, and, tearing up the benches, tables, and every thing combustible, dressed up a funeral pile upon the spot, and, together with the body, burnt the house itself, with a *Bastica* also, or public hall adjoining, called the *Porcian*; and in the same fit of madness proceeded to storm the house of *Milo*, and of *M. Lepidus* the Inter-rex, but were repulsed in both attacks with some loss.

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V.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>51.</sup>  
~~400 Conf.~~

These extravagancies raised great indignation in the City; and gave a turn in favour of *Milo*; who, looking upon himself as undone, was meditating nothing before but *a voluntary exile*: But now taking courage, he appeared in public, and was introduced into the Rostra by *Cælius*, where he made his defence to the People; and to mitigate their resentment, distributed through all the tribes *above three pounds a man to every poor Citizen*. But all his pains and expence were to little purpose; for the three Tribunes made it their business to keep up the ill humour of the populace; and what was more fatal, *Pompey* would not be brought into any measures of accommodating the matter; so that the tumults still increasing, the Senate passed a decree, *that the Inter-rex, assisted by the Tribunes and Pompey, should take care that the Republic received no detriment; and that Pompey in particular should raise a body of troops for the common security*; which he presently drew together from all parts of *Italy*. In this confusion the rumour of a *Dictator* was again industriously revived, and gave a fresh alarm to the Senate, who, to avoid the greater evil, came to the resolution of creating *Pompey Consul* without a colleague. *Bibulus* had made the motion; assigning for his reason, that *by this means the Commonwealth would be freed from its present confusion; or, if it must be enslaved, would have the best master it could hope for*. Every body was surprized at this language from *Bibulus*, who had always shewed himself an enemy

Plut. in  
Pomp. &  
in Cat.

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

my of Pompey : But they were yet more surprised by what Cato said on this occasion : He declared, that, though he could never have prevailed with himself to be the author of such an advice, nevertheless, since it had been moved by another, his opinion was, that it should be followed. That any government was preferable to ANARCHY ; and that he thought no man better qualified than Pompey to hold the reins of government in a time of so great disorder. Hereupon the Senate passed a decree, that Pompey should be sole Consul ; and accordingly, on the twenty-fifth of February, he was, by Servius Sulpicius, the Inter-rex, declared elected alone to that magistracy. Pompey, highly pleased with the honour which Cato had done him, returned him abundant thanks for it ; requesting at the same time, that he would in private give him his advice and assistance for the worthy discharge of his office. Cato answered ; Pompey, you owe me no thanks : What I said in the Senate was with a view to serve the Commonwealth, not to serve you ; if you consult me in private, I will freely give you my advice : And, in public, I shall always speak my opinion, though you should not ask it.

Dio tells us that the Senate, and Bibulus in particular, were apprehensive, at this time, lest Cæsar should be chosen one of the Consuls at the next election, and for that reason took this unprecedented step : Which, if true, sufficiently accounts for Cato's favour to Pompey : For the reader must have already observed, and will hereafter have fresh occasion to observe, that the

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Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>51.</sup>  
400 Cons.

Midd. 537.  
Dio, xl.

<sup>143.</sup>  
Ascon.

Argum. in  
Mil.

main spring of some of *Cato's* political movements was neither the love of virtue, nor the love of his Country, but *a personal hatred to Cæsar*.

Pompey applied himself immediately to calm the public disorders, by the promulgation of several *new laws*<sup>a</sup>, prepared by him for that purpose. One of them was, to appoint *a special commission to enquire into Clodius's death, the burning of the Senate-house, and the attack on M. Lepidus; and to appoint an extraordinary Judge of Consular rank to preside in it*: A second was *against bribery and corruption in elections, with the infliction of new and severer penalties on those who had been guilty*. *Cato*, according to *Plutarch*, objected to this law, as unjust with regard to past offences; and he advised him to provide only for the future. *Appian* reports, that, by Pompey's new law, all who, from the time of his first Consulate, (twenty years before) had been in any public office, might be called to account for corruption in obtaining it, or male-administration in the exercise of it. As this space of time comprised the Consulate of *Cæsar*, those of his party imagined there was a design to affront him; and they hinted what they thought to Pompey. He answered them, that their suspicion was injurious to *Cæsar*, whose conduct, being out of the reach of censure, secured him from all danger. *Appian* adds, that Pompey shortened the retrospect to his second Consulate; but would not

Midd. 548.

<sup>a</sup> Cicero seems to have written his *Treatise on Laws* soon after the death of Clodius.

entirely

entirely drop the new law. [App. *de Bell. Civ.* Y.R. 701.  
lib. ii. p. 441.]

By these laws the method of trials was altered, and the length of them limited : *Three days were allowed for the examination of witnesses, and the fourth for the sentence ; on which the accuser was to have two hours only to enforce the charge ; the criminal three for his defence*<sup>b</sup>. Cælius opposed his negative to these laws, as being rather privileges than laws, and provided particularly against Milo ; but he was soon obliged to withdraw it, upon Pompey's declaring that he would support them by force of arms.

Pompey was the only man in Rome who had *Ibid. 539.* the power to bring Milo to a trial. He was not concerned for Glodius's death, or for the manner of it, but rather pleased that the Republic was freed from so pestilent a demagogue ; yet he resolved to take the benefit of the occasion for getting rid of Milo too, from whose ambition and high spirit he had cause to apprehend no less trouble. He would not listen therefore to any overtures from Milo's friends ; and when Milo offered to drop his suit for the Consulship, if that would satisfy him, he answered, *That he would not concern himself with any man's suing or desisting, nor give any obstruction to the power and inclination of the Roman People.* He attended the

<sup>b</sup> Tacitus seems to consider this regulation as the first step towards the ruin of the Roman eloquence, by imposing reins, as it were, upon its free and ancient course. *Primus tertio consulatu Cn. Pompeius astrinxit, imposuitque veluti frænos eloquentiæ — &c. Diag. de Orator. 38.* Midd. 537.

Y. R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.51.  
400 Conf.

trial in person with a strong guard, to preserve peace and prevent any violence from either side.

When the examination was over (in which many clear and positive truths were produced against *Milo*) *Manutius Plancus* called the People together, and exhorted them to appear in a full body the next day, when judgment was to be given, and to declare their sentiments in so public a manner, that the criminal might not be suffered to escape; which *Cicero* in his defence of *Milo*, reflects upon as an insult on the liberty of the bench.

Ascon.  
Argum.

Early in the morning, on the eleventh of April, the shops were all shut, and the whole City gathered into the Forum, where the avenues were possessed by *Pompey's* soldiers, and he himself seated in a conspicuous part, to overlook the whole proceeding, and hinder all disturbance.

The accusers were young *Appius*, the nephew of *Clodius*, *M. Antonius*, and *P. Valerius*; who, according to the new law, employed two hours in supporting their indictment.

*Cicero* was the only advocate on *Milo's* side; but, as soon as he rose up to speak, he was received with so rude a clamour by the Clodians, that he was much discomposed and daunted at his first setting out; yet recovered spirit enough to go through his speech of three hours; which was taken down in writing, and published as it was delivered; though the copy of it now extant is supposed to have been retouched and corrected by him afterwards [or rather a new composition] for a present to *Milo* in his exile.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

In the council of *Milo's* friends, several were of opinion, that he should defend himself by avowing the death of *Clodius*, and pleading that it was an act of public benefit: But *Cicero* thought that defence too desperate, as it would disgust the grave, by opening so great a door to licence; and offend the powerful, lest the precedent should be extended to themselves. But young *Brutus* [discovering from his early years, an apt and promising genius for the glorious business of assassination] in an oration, which he composed and published in vindication of *Milo*, maintained the killing of *Clodius* to be right and just, and of great service to the Republic.

It was notorious that they had often threatened death to each other: *Clodius* had declared several times, both to the Senate and the People, that *Milo* ought to be killed, and that, if the Consulship could not be taken from him, his life could: And when *Favonius* asked him once, what hopes he could have of playing his pranks while *Milo* was living; he replied, that in three or four days at most he should live no more; which was spoken just three days before the fatal encounter, and attested by *Favonius*. Since *Milo* then was charged with being the contriver of their meeting, and the aggressor in it, and several testimonies were produced to that purpose, *Cicero* chose to risk the cause on that issue, in hopes to persuade, that *Clodius* actually laid wait for *Milo*, and contrived the time and place; and *Milo's* part was but a necessary act of self-defence. This had somewhat of a plausibility, from the nature

J.M. 071  
9. 2. 3.  
Midd. 541.  
Pro Mil.  
9. 2. b. 11 M

Y.R. 701.

Pro Mil.  
10 & 21.

nature of the equipage, and the circumstances in which they met: For though Milo's was the more numerous, yet it was much more encumbered and unfit for an engagement than his adversary's; *he himself being in a chariot with his wife, and all her women along with him; while Clodius with his followers were on horseback, as if prepared and equipt for fighting.* He did not preclude himself however by this from the other *plea*<sup>c</sup>, which he often takes care to insinuate, *that if Milo had really designed and contrived to kill Clodius, he would have deserved honours instead of punishment, for cutting off so desperate and dangerous an enemy to the peace and liberty of Rome.*

Pro Mil.  
28, &c.

Midd. 544.

Of one and fifty Judges, who sat upon *Milo*, thirteen only acquitted and thirty-eight condemned him: The votes were usually given by ballots; but *Cato*, who absolved him, chose to give his vote openly; and, if he had done it earlier, says *Velleius*, would have drawn others after him.

<sup>c</sup> Asconius speaks as if *Cicero* approved neither the use of this plea in the present case, nor the doctrine itself whereon the plea is founded. — Respondit his [accusatoribus] unus *M. Cicero*, & cum quibusdam placuisse, ait defendi crimen, interfici *Clodium pro Républica* suisse (quam formam *Marcus Brutus* secutus est in ea oratione quam pro *Milone* compositum & edidit, quamvis non egisset) *Ciceroni* id non placuit, quod quis bono publico damnari, idem etiam occidi indemnatus posset. Nevertheless *Cicero*, in the case of *Catiline's* accomplices, seems to have followed this maxim, *That whoever may, for the public good, be justly condemned, may, for the same public good, be justly put to death without trial and condemnation.*

Milo

*Milo* went into exile at *Marseilles* a few days after his condemnation ; and his whole estate was sold by public auction for the satisfaction of his creditors <sup>d</sup>.

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

*Philotimus*, a freedman of *Cicero*'s wife, bought this estate, in partnership with some others, at an under-value. It was thought strange, that *Cicero* should suffer *Philotimus*, who acted as a sort of steward in his family, to engage in the purchase of a banished man's estate, such purchases being always looked upon as odious ; and this was particularly so, *Cicero* having received great obligations from *Milo*. Accordingly the latter complained of it in the letters he wrote to his friends at *Rome*. This alarmed *Cicero* for his reputation ; and he seems to have written to *Cælius*, as he did to several others of his correspondents, to accommodate this affair in the way that would be most for his honour. He pleaded in his justification an intent of serving *Milo* ; yet it appears very evidently, from the following letters to *Atticus* on this subject, that he shared with *Philotimus* in the advantages of the purchase.

Melm.  
vol. I. p.  
298.

" They write to me from *Rome*, that they have Ad Att.  
" seen letters from *Milo*, who complains of my v. 8.  
" having suffered *Philotimus* to enter into part-  
nership with those who bought his estate : Yet  
" I did it by the advice of *Duronius*, *Milo*'s par-

<sup>d</sup> *Milo* had wasted three estates in giving plays and shews to the People ; and when he went into exile was found to owe above half a million of our money. *Plin. lib. xvi. 15.* Midd. 531.  
*Aeson. Argum. in Milon.*

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.

51.  
400 Conf.

" ticular friend, and whom you know to be an  
" honest man. Our view was to hinder his fall-  
" ing into the hands of strangers, and oppressive  
" people, who might have demanded a great  
" number of slaves that he has with him. We  
" were, in the next place, desirous, that the pro-  
" vision which he intended should be made for  
" his wife might be secured. We likewise  
" thought, that, if there was a possibility of sav-  
" ing any thing for him, we could manage that  
" matter better than any body else. Endeavour,  
" I beseech you, to search this whole matter to  
" the bottom; for things are often magnified in  
" the relation. But if it be true that *Milo* com-  
" plains, and writes to his friends on this head,  
" and if *Fausta* be of the same mind, *Philotimus*  
" shall not have any concern in the purchase;  
" for I made him promise, before I left *Rome*,  
" that, without *Milo*'s consent, he would not. The  
" profit has not been any thing considerable: But  
" you will judge. Talk with *Duronius*. I have  
" writ to *Camillus* and to *Lamia*, being uncertain  
" whether you were at *Rome*. In a word, you  
" will resolve to act as honesty, reputation, and  
" my interest shall require."

Mong.  
Tome III.  
p. 22.

[We see here, says an ingenious writer, *Ciceron's*  
reasons for his friendly officiousness; but I doubt  
whether they will convince any body, that inter-  
est was not his principal motive; and the rather,  
as *Milo*'s goods were sold greatly under value.  
It appears by two other letters to *Atticus*, and  
by one from *Cælius* to *Ciceron*, that *Philotimus* re-  
stored

stored to *Milo* the estates he had bought, on condition of allowing him a certain profit, in which *Cicero* was a sharer.]

V.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

Ad Att.  
vi. 4.

"I have one thing more to mention to you. I shall write mysteriously, but you will guess my meaning. My wife's freedman (you know whom I speak of) has embezzled, as I judge by his lame account, part of the profit made by the purchase of the estate of the *Crotoniate Tyrant-killer*\*. If you guess the meaning of this last word, you will understand all the rest. I dare not be more explicit."

"Do not forget the affair I wrote to you *Ibid. 5.* about in my last letter; where I told you, that I have for some time suspected, from the confused inconsistent talk of my wife's freedman in several companies, that he has not given me a faithful account of the profits arising to me from the purchase of the *Crotoniate's* estate.

"—While I suffered him to be here, I was constantly upon my guard: For he came to found me, in the hopes that I would remit something of what he owes me; but, finding himself disappointed, he flung away at once—I will be gone; it would be shameful for me to stay any longer, and at last go away with empty hands: And he twitted me with the old proverb, *A gift admits of no accounting*;" or, as *Mongault* translates the passage, *We should be content with*

\* *Milo*, who carried an ox upon his back at the *Olympic* games, was of *Crotona*. The *Milo*, now in question, is called *Tyrant-killer*, because he killed *Clodius*.

Y.R. 701. Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Conf.

*what is given.* By this (says the ingenious French writer) *Philotimus* intimated to *Cicero*, that he ought to be satisfied with his yielding to him part of the profit he had made by the purchase of *Milo's* estate, since his name had never been mentioned in the purchase. The proverb, of which *Cicero* cites here only the first words, *τὰ μὲν διδομένα* — is in the *Gorgias* of *Plato*, and answers to the *English* proverb, *We should not look a gift-horse in the mouth.* From all this, I think, we may conclude, that *Philotimus* had *Cicero* in his power.

### *M. Cælius to Cicero.*

Ep. Fam.  
l. viii.  
Ep. 3.

— “ As to what concerns the behaviour of *Philotimus*, in relation to *Milo's* estate, I have endeavoured that he shall act in such a manner as to give full satisfaction to *Milo* and his friends, and at the same time clear your character from all imputation.”

Midd. p.  
545—547.

The next trial before the same tribunal, and for the same crime, was of *M. Saufeius*, one of *Milo's* confidants, charged with being the ring-leader in storming the house and killing *Clodius*. *Cicero* defended him, and he was acquitted by one vote only: But being accused a second time on the same account, though for a different fact, and again defended by *Cicero*, he was acquitted by a great majority. But *Sext. Clodius*, the Captain of the other side, was condemned and banished, with several others of that faction, for burning

burning the Senate-house, and the other violences committed upon *Clodius's* death.

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.

<sup>51.</sup>  
<sub>400 Conf.</sub>

Pompey no sooner published his *new law against bribery*, than the late Consular candidates, *Scipio* and *Hypsæus*, were severally impeached upon it, and, being both of them notoriously guilty, were in great danger of being condemned: But Pompey, calling the Judges together, begged it of them as a favour, *that out of the great number of state criminals they would remit Scipio to him*: Whom, after he had rescued from the prosecution, he declared his *colleague in the Consulship for the last five months of the year* <sup>c</sup>; having first made him his father-in-law, by marrying his daughter *Cornelia*, a lady of fine accomplishments. The other candidate *Hypsæus* was left to the mercy of the law, and being likely to fare the worse for *Scipio's* escape, he watched an opportunity of access to Pompey, *as he was coming out of his bath*; and, throwing himself at his feet, implored his protection: But, though he had been

<sup>c</sup> Pompey was preparing an inscription this summer for the front of the new temple, which he had lately built to *Venus the Conqueress*, containing, as usual, the recital of all his titles: But, in drawing it up, a question happened to be started about the manner of expressing his third Consulship, whether it should be by *Consul*, *Tertium*, or *Tertio*. This was referred to the principal critics of Rome, who could not, it seems, agree about it. Pompey therefore left it to *Cicero* to decide the matter: But *Cicero*, being unwilling to give judgment on either side, when there were great authorities on both, and *Varro* among them, advised Pompey to order *TERT.* only to be inscribed, which fully declared the thing, without determining the dispute.

A. Gell.

x. 1.

**Y. R. 701.** his Quæstor, and ever obsequious to his will, yet  
**Bef. Chr.** *Pompey* is said to have *spurned* him away with  


---

<sup>51.</sup>  
**400 Conf.** great haughtiness and inhumanity, telling him,  
*that he would only spoil his supper by detaining*  
*him* <sup>f</sup>.

Before the end of the year, two of the late Tribunes, whose office was just expired, *Q. Pompeius Rufus*, and *T. Munatius Plancus Bursa*, were tried, condemned, and banished, *for the violences of their Tribuneate, and burning the Senate-house*. *Cælius* accused the first, *Cicero* the second, the only cause, excepting that of *Verres*, in which he ever acted the part of an accuser. It seems *Bursa* had been formerly defended by him, and had proved ungrateful. *Pompey*, before Judges of his own appointing, pleaded the cause of *Bursa*: Yet he was condemned by an unanimous vote of the whole bench.

<sup>f</sup> *Cn. autem Pompeius quam insolenter? Qui balneo egressus ante pedes suos prostratum Hypsæum ambitus reum & nobilem virum & sibi amicum, jacentem reliquit, contumeliosa voce proculcatum. Nihil enim eum aliud agere, quam ut convivium suum moraretur, respondit. — Ille vero P. Scipionem sacerum suum, legibus noxiis quas ipse tulerat, in maxima quidem reorum & illustrium ruina muneris loco a judicibus deposcere.* — *Val. Max. ix. 3. It. Plut. in Pomp.*

**Ad Att.** This is that *Pompey* of whom *Cicero* says, that *he knew him to be a man of integrity, an honest, sincere, and grave man* —  
**xi. 6.** **Vol. II. P.** *hominem integrum, & castum, & gravem, cognovi.* And Dr. *Midleton* is of opinion, that this was his true character. Nevertheless the Reader, I imagine, will not judge that this grave *Pompey* was a proper person to be invested with that **DICTATORIAL POWER**, which the Doctor thinks was necessary, in the present disorders of the Republic, to reduce it to a tolerable state.

**Vid. supr.**  
**p. 106.**

Among

Among the other acts of Pompey, in this his third Consulship, there was a new law against bribery, contrived to strengthen the old ones that were already subsisting against it, by *disqualifying all future Consuls and Praetors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of their Magistracies*: For this was thought likely to give some check to the eagerness of suing and bribing for those great offices, *when the chief fruit and benefit of them was removed to such a distance*. But, before the law passed, Pompey took care to provide an exception for himself, and *to get the government of Spain continued to him for five years longer, with an appointment of money to pay his troops*: And, lest this should give offence to Cæsar, if something of an extraordinary kind was not provided for him too, he proposed *a law to dispense with Cæsar's presence in suing for the Consulship*, of which Cæsar at that time seemed very desirous. Cælius was the promoter of this law, engaged to it by Cicero, at the joint request of Pompey and Cæsar; and it was carried with the concurrence of all the Tribunes, though not without difficulty and obstruction from the Senate.

By Pompey's law, just now mentioned, it was provided, that, for a supply of governors for the interval of five years, in which the Consuls and Praetors were disqualified, the Senators of Consular and Praetorian rank, who had never held any foreign command, should divide the vacant provinces among themselves by lot: In consequence of which, Cicero, who was obliged to take his chance with the rest,

Y.R. 701.

Midd. 550.

Dio, p.

142.

Ad Att.

vii. 1.

Suet. J.

Cæs. 26.

Ad Att.

v. 15.

V.R. 701. obtained the government <sup>§</sup> of *Cilicia*, now in the hands of *Appius*, the late Consul. This province

Midd.      § These preferments were, of all others, the most ardently  
vol. II. p. desired by the Great, for the advantages which they afforded  
1 and 2. both of acquiring power and amassing wealth: For their command, though accountable to the *Roman People*, was absolute and uncontrollable in the province; where they kept up the state and pride of sovereign princes, and had all the neighbouring Kings paying a court to them, and attending their orders. If their genius was turned to arms, and fond of martial glory, they could never want a pretext for war, since it was easy to drive the subjects into rebellion, or the adjoining nations to acts of hostility by their oppressions and injuries, till, from the destruction of a number of innocent people, they had acquired the title of *Emperor*, and with it the pretension to a triumph, without which scarce any Proconsul was ever known to return from a remote and frontier province \*. Their opportunities of raising money were as immense as their power, and bounded only by their own appetites: The appointments of the treasury, for their equipage, plate, and necessary furniture, amounted, as it appears from some instances, to near a hundred and fifty thousand pounds: And besides the revenues of

\* While the ancient discipline of the Republic subsisted, no General could pretend to a triumph who had not enlarged the bounds of the empire by his conquests, and killed at least five thousand enemies in battle, without any considerable loss of his own soldiers. This was expressly enacted by an old law: In support of which a second was afterwards provided, that made it penal for any of their triumphal Commanders to give a false account of the number of slain either on the enemies side or their own, and obliged them, upon their entrance into the City, to take an oath before the *Quæstors*, or public Treasurers, that the accounts which they had sent to the Senate of each number was true. [Val. Max. ii. 8.] But these laws had long been neglected, and treated as obsolete; and the honour of a triumph usually granted, by intrigue and faction, to every General of any credit who had gained some little advantage against pirates or fugitives, or repelled the incursions of the wild barbarians who bordered upon the distant provinces.

included

included also *Pisidia, Pamphilia, and three dioceses*, as they are called, or districts of Asia, together with the island of Cyprus; for the guard of all which a standing army was kept of two legions, or about twelve thousand foot, with two thousand six hundred horse. But, whatever benefit or glory this government seemed to offer, it had no charms for Cicero: The thing itself was disagreeable to his temper, nor worthy of his talents, which (in his own opinion) were formed to sit at the helm, and shine in the administration of the whole Republic: So that he considered it only as an honourable exile, or a burden imposed by his Country, to which his duty obliged him to submit. His first care therefore was to provide, that this command might not be prolonged to him beyond the usual term of a year. Before his departure he solicited

Y.R. 701.  
Bef. Chr.  
51.  
400 Cons.

Midd.  
vol. II. p.  
3.  
Ep. Fam.  
ii. 11.  
Ad Att.  
v. 10. &  
15.

kingdoms, and pay of armies, of which they had the arbitrary management, they could exact what contributions they pleased, not only from the cities of their own jurisdiction, but from all the states and princes around them, who were under the protection of Rome. But, while their primary care was to enrich themselves, they carried out with them always a band of hungry friends and dependents, as their Lieutenants, Tribunes, Praefects, with a crew of freedmen and favourite slaves, who were all likewise to be enriched by the spoils of the province, and the sale of their master's favours. Hence flowed all those accusations and trials for the plunder of the subjects, of which we read so much in the Roman writers: For as few or none of the Proconsuls behaved themselves with that exact justice as to leave no room for complaint, so the factions of the City, and the quarrels of families, subsisting from former impeachments, generally excited some or other to revenge the affront in kind, by undertaking the cause of an injured province, and dressing up an impeachment against their enemy.

all

Y.R. 702.

S. Sulpicius and  
M. Marcellus,  
Consuls.  
Midd. P.  
7.

Ad Att.  
v. 6. 7, 8,  
9.

all his friends not to suffer such a mortification to fall upon him. He left the City about the first of *May*, attended by his brother, and their two sons: For *Quintus*, in order to accompany him in the post of Lieutenant, had quitted his Lieutenantcy under *Cæsar*.

When *Cicero* arrived at *Tarentum*, he made a visit to *Pompey*, who was taking the benefit of that soft air for the recovery of his health at one of his villas in those parts, and had invited and pressed him to spend some days with him upon his journey: They proposed great satisfaction on both sides from this interview, for the opportunity of conferring together with all freedom on the present state of the Republic, which was to be their subject: And *Cicero* expected likewise to get some lessons of the military kind from this renowned Commander. He promised *Atticus* an account of this conference; but, the particulars being too delicate to be communicated by letter, he acquainted him only in general, *that he found Pompey an excellent Citizen, and provided for all events that could possibly be apprehended*.

After three days stay with *Pompey* he proceeded to *Brundusium*, where he was detained for twelve days by a slight indisposition, and the expectation of his principal officers, particularly of his Lieutenant *Pontinius*, an experienced leader, the same who had triumphed over the *Allobroges*, and on whose skill he chiefly depended in his martial affairs. From *Brundusium* he sailed to *Actium* on the fifteenth of June; whence partly by sea, and

Vid. supra,  
p. 105.

and partly by land, he arrived, *on the twenty-sixth,* at *Athens*, where he spent ten days, and where *Pontinius* at length joined him.

Upon leaving *Italy* he had charged his friend *Cælius* with the task <sup>h</sup> of sending him the news of *Rome*; and, while he was at *Athens*, he received from him the first letter of intelligence.

*Cælius to Cicero.*

" **A**GREEABLY to my promise when we parted,  
" I have sent you a full account of every event  
" that has happened since you left *Rome*. For  
" this purpose I employed a person to collect the  
" news of the Town, and am only afraid you  
" will think he has executed his office much too  
" punctually. &c. &c.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

Midd. p.  
10.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 1.  
Melm.  
iii. 25.

" *M. Marcellus* [the Consul] not having yet  
" moved that *Cæsar* may be recalled from his go-  
" vernment in Gaul, and intending to defer it, as  
" he told me himself, to the first of June, it has

<sup>h</sup> *Cælius* (who by his father had been introduced to *Cicero's* acquaintance and friendship) performed the task very punctually, in a series of Letters, which make a considerable part in the collection of his Familiar Epistles; and as they contain the jealousies and fears which gave birth to the civil war which soon broke out, it may not be disagreeable to the Reader to present him with some extracts of them. He had been Tribune of the People in 701, the year before this letter was written, and had distinguished himself in that office, by zealously supporting the interests of the Aristocratical Faction. His morals were suitable to the degenerate age in which he lived; luxurious and dissolute; and his temper was remarkably inflammable, and apt to kindle into the most implacable resentment. *Vid. Ad Att. v. 2.*

Melm.

" occa-

Y.R. 702. “ occasioned the revival of those suspicions to his  
 Bef. Chr. “ disadvantage, which so strongly prevailed when  
 50.  
 461 Conf. “ you were here. If you saw Pompey, as you  
 “ designed to do, pray send me word in what tem-  
 “ per you found him; what conversation he had  
 “ with you; and what you could discover of his  
 “ designs: For, though he seldom speaks his real  
 “ sentiments, he has not wit enough to conceal them,  
 “ As for Cæsar, there are many ugly reports about  
 “ him; but propagated only in whispers: Some  
 “ say that he has lost all his cavalry; which I  
 “ take indeed to be true: Others, that the seventh  
 “ legion has been beaten, and that he himself is  
 “ so surrounded and besieged by the *Bellovaci* \*,  
 “ that he cannot receive succours from the main  
 “ body of his army. There is nothing yet certain;  
 “ nor are these uncertain stories publicly talked  
 “ of; but among a few, whom I need not name,  
 “ told openly by way of secrets: *Domitius* <sup>i</sup> never  
 “ mentions them without clapping his hand to  
 “ his mouth. &c.”

\* a people  
of the Bel-  
gic Gaul.

M. T. Cicero to M. Cælius.

Ep. Fam. “ Could you seriously then imagine, my friend,  
 iii. 8. “ that I commissioned you to send me the idle  
 Melm. iii. “ news of the town; matches of gladiators, ad-  
 28. [dated July 6. “ journments of causes, robberies, &c.—? Far  
 702.] “ other are the accounts which I expect from your  
 “ hand, as I know not any man whose judgment in  
 “ politics I have more reason to value.—I passed

<sup>i</sup> This is *Domitius*, the decree forging Consul, and the declared enemy of Cæsar. *Vid. Jūtra*, p. 68.

several

"several days with *Pompey*, conversing with him  
"on nothing else but the Republic: But it is  
"neither prudent nor possible to give you the  
"particulars in a letter. Take this only from  
"me, that *Pompey* is an excellent Citizen<sup>k</sup>, pre-  
pared both with courage and counsel for all events  
"which can be foreseen: Wherefore give yourself  
"up to the man; believe me, he will embrace  
"you; for he now holds the same opinion with  
"us of good and bad Citizens. I have been ten  
"days at *Athens*, and am just now leaving it,  
"this sixth of *July*. As I earnestly recommend  
"all my affairs to your care, so nothing more par-  
ticularly, than that the time of my provincial  
"command be not prolonged.—Farewel."

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

*Cicero* set sail for *Asia* the sixth of *July*, and landed at *Ephesus* on the twenty-second, after a slow<sup>l</sup> but safe passage of fifteen days. Having

Midd. 14.

\* "Cicero so often changed his opinion, or at least his lan-  
guage, in regard to *Pompey*, that it is difficult to determine  
what his true sentiments of him were. It is probable, how-  
ever, that he here speaks the dictates of his real thoughts,  
not only as he gives the same account to *Atticus*, but because  
*Pompey* received him with particular civility; a circumstance  
which seems at all times to have had a very considerable in-  
fluence upon *Cicero's* judgment concerning the characters and  
designs of men." *Vid. Ad Att. v. 6, 7.*

Mel. vol. I. p.  
290.

<sup>1</sup> The tediousness of this voyage was agreeably relieved by touching on the way at several of the islands of the Ægean sea, of which he sends a kind of journal to *Atticus*. Many deputations from the cities of *Asia*, and a great concourse of people, came to meet him as far as *Samos*; but a much greater still was expecting his landing at *Ephesus*: The Greeks flocked eagerly from all parts to see a man, so celebrated through the empire

Midd. p.  
14.

Y.R. 702. Ad Att. i. v. 13 & 15. reposed himself for three days at *Ephesus*, he marched forwards towards his province ; and on the last of July arrived at *Laodicea*, one of the capital cities of his jurisdiction. From this moment the date of his government commenced ; which he bids *Atticus* take notice of, that he might know how to compute the precise extent of his annual term.

Midd. p. 14. It was *Cicero's* resolution, in his provincial command, to practise those admirable rules which he had drawn up formerly for his brother ; and from an employment wholly tedious and disagreeable to him, to derive fresh glory upon his character, by leaving the innocence and integrity of his administration as a pattern of governing to all succeeding Proconsuls.

Ad Att.  
v. 9, 10, 11.

Ibid. 16.  
17.

When any governors went abroad to their provinces, the custom had always been, that the countries through which they passed should defray the charges of their journey : But *Cicero* no sooner set his foot on foreign ground, than he forbade all expences whatsoever, public or private, to be made either upon himself or any of his company ; which raised a great admiration of him in the cities of *Greece*. In *Asia* he did the same, not suffering his officers to accept, what was due to them even by law, forage and wood for firing, nor any thing else, but mere house-room, with four beds ; which he remitted also, as oft as was practicable, and

for the fame of his learning and eloquence ; so that all his boastings, as he merrily says, of many years past were now brought to the test.

obliged

obliged them to *lodge in their tents*; and, by his example and constant exhortations, brought his *Lieutenants, Tribunes, and Praefects, so fully into his measures, that they all concurred with him*, he says, *wonderfully in a jealous concern for his honour.*

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

About the twenty-fourth of *August* he went to the camp at *Iconium in Lycaonia*, where he had no sooner reviewed the troops than he received an account from *Antiochus, King of Comagene*, which was confirmed from the other princes of those parts, that the *Parthians* had passed the *Euphrates* with a mighty force, under the conduct of *Parcorus* the King's son, in order to invade the *Roman* territory. Upon this news he marched towards *Cilicia*, to secure his province from the inroads of the enemy, or any commotions within: But as all access to it was difficult, except on the side of *Cappadocia*, an open country, and not well provided, he took his route through that Kingdom, and encamped in that part of it which bordered upon *Cilicia*, near to the town of *Cybiatra*, at the foot of mount *Taurus*. His army, as it is said above, consisted of about twelve thousand foot and two thousand six hundred horse, besides the auxiliary troops of the neighbouring states, and especially of *Dejotarus, King of Galatia*, the most faithful ally of *Rome*, and *Cicero's* particular friend; whose whole forces he could depend upon at any warning.

Midd. 16.  
Ep. Fam.  
xv. 1.

While he lay in this camp he had an opportunity of executing a special commission, with which

Ibid. 2. 3.

4.

he

Y. R. 702. he was charged by the Senate; to take *Ariobar-*  
 Bef. Chr. *zanes*, King of *Cappadocia*, under his particular  
 50. protection; and provide for the security of his  
 401 Cons. person and government: In honour of whom the  
 — Senate had decreed, what they had never done  
 before to any foreign Prince, *that his safety was*  
*of concern to the Senate and People of Rome*. His  
 father had been killed by the treachery of his  
 subjects, and a conspiracy of the same kind was  
 apprehended against the son: *Cicero* therefore,  
 in a council of his officers, gave the King an ac-  
 count of the decree of the Senate, and that, in  
 consequence of it, he was then ready to assist him  
 with his troops and authority in any measures that  
 should be concerted for the safety and quiet of  
 his Kingdom. — The King, after great pro-  
 fessions of his thanks and duty to the Senate for  
 the honour of their decree, and to *Cicero* himself  
 for his care in the execution of it, said, *that he*  
*knew no occasion for giving him any particular*  
*trouble at that time, nor had any suspicion of any*  
*design against his life or crown*: Upon which  
*Cicero*, after congratulating him upon the tran-  
 quillity of his affairs, advised him however *to re-*  
*member his father's fate, and from the admonitions*  
*of the Senate, to be particularly vigilant in the care*  
*of his person*; and so they parted. But the next  
 morning the King returned early to the camp,  
 attended by his brother and counsellors, and with  
 many tears implored the protection of *Cicero*, and  
 the benefit of the Senate's decree, declaring, “ that  
 “ he had received undoubted intelligence of a  
 “ plot,

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

"plot, which those, who were privy to it, durst  
"not venture to discover till *Cicero's* arrival in  
"the Country ; but, trusting to his authority,  
"had now given him information of it ; and that  
"his brother, who was present, and ready to  
"confirm what he had said, had been sollicited  
"to enter into it by the offer of the crown : He  
"begged, therefore, that some of *Cicero's* troops  
"might be left with him for his better guard  
"and defence." *Cicero* told him, "that, under  
"the present alarm of the *Parthian* war, he  
"could not possibly lend him any part of his ar-  
"my ; that, since the conspiracy was detected,  
"his own forces would be sufficient for prevent-  
"ing the effects of it ; that he should learn to act  
"the King, by shewing a proper concern for  
"his own life, and exert his regal power in pu-  
"nishing the authors of the plot, and pardoning  
"all the rest ; that he need not apprehend any  
"farther danger, when his people were acquaint-  
"ed with the Senate's decree, and saw a *Roman*  
"army so near to them, and ready to put it in  
"execution." And having thus encouraged and  
comforted the King, he marched towards *Cilicia*,  
and gave an account of this accident, and of the  
motions of the *Parthians*, in two public letters to  
the *Consuls and Senate*<sup>m</sup>.

<sup>m</sup> He added a private letter also to *Cato* who was a par-  
ticular favourer of *Ariobarzanes*, in which he informed him,  
"that he had not only secured the King's person from any Ep. Fam.  
"attempt, but had taken care, that he should reign for the xv. 4.  
"future with honour and dignity, by restoring to his favour  
"and service his old Counsellors, whom Cato had recommended.

Y. R. 702. While he lay incamped in *Cappadocia*, expecting what way the *Parthians* would move, he re-

*Ad Att.*

v. 23.

" and who had been disgraced by the intrigues of his court;  
" and by obliging a turbulent young priest of *Bellona*, who  
" was the head of the malecontents, and the next in power to  
" the King himself, to quit the country."

Midd. 18. This King, *Ariobarzanes*, seems to have been poor even to a proverb :

*Manicipiis locuples, egest aeris Cappadocum rex.*

Hor. Ep. i. 6.

For he had been miserably squeezed and drained by the *Roman* Generals and Governors, to whom he owed vast sums, either actually borrowed, or stipulated to be paid for particular services. It was a common practice with the great men of *Rome*, to lend money, at an exorbitant interest, to the Princes and Cities dependent on the empire. The ordinary interest of the provincial loans was one per cent. by the month, with interest upon interest : This was the lowest ; but it was frequently four times as much. *Pompey* received monthly, from this very King, above six thousand pounds sterling ; which yet was short of his full interest. *Brutus* also had lent him a very large sum, and earnestly desired *Cicero* to procure the payment of it, with the arrears of interest : But *Pompey's* agents were so pressing, and the King so needy, that, though *Cicero* solicited *Brutus's* affair very heartily, he had little hopes of getting any thing for him. When *Ariobarzanes* came, therefore, to offer him the same present of money which he had usually made to every other Governor, he generously refused, and desired only, that, instead of giving it to him, he would pay it to *Brutus* : But the poor Prince was so distressed, that he excused himself by the necessity which he was under of satisfying some other more pressing demands ; so that *Cicero* gives a sad account of his negotiation in a long \* letter to *Atticus*, who had warmly recommended *Brutus's* interests to him.

*Ad Att.*

vi. 1.

Y. 703.

\* ---- " I come now to *Brutus*, whom, by your authority, I embraced with inclination, and begun even to love : But — what am I going to say ? I recall myself, lest I offend you. ---- Do not think that I ever

ceived

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

ceived an account that they had taken a different route, and were advanced to *Antioch* in *Syria*, where they held *C. Cassius* blocked up; and that a detachment of them had actually penetrated into *Cilicia*, but were routed and cut off by those troops which were left to guard the Country. Upon this he presently decamped, and, by great journeys over mount *Taurus*, marched in all haste to possess himself of the passes of *Amanus*, a great and strong mountain, lying between *Syria* and *Cilicia*, and the common boundary of them both. By this march, and the approach of his army to the neighbourhood of *Syria*, the *Parthians*, being discouraged, retired from *Antioch*, which gave *Cassius* an opportunity of falling upon them in their retreat, and gaining a considerable advan-

"entered into any thing more willingly, or took more pains, than in what "he recommended to me. He gave me a memorial of the particulars "which you have talked over with me before: I pursued your instructions "exactly: In the first place I pressed *Ariobarzanes* to give to *Brutus* "that money which he promised to me. As long as the King continued "with me, all things looked well; but he was afterwards seized by "six hundred of *Pompey's* agents; and *Pompey*, for other reasons, can do "more with him than all the world besides; but especially when it is "imagined that he is to be sent to the *Partbian* war: They now pay "Pompey thirty-three Attic talents per month out of the taxes; though "this falls short of a month's interest: But our friend *Cneius* takes it "calmly; and is content to abate somewhat of the interest without "pressing for the principal. As for others, he neither does nor can pay "any man: For he has no treasury, no revenues: He raises taxes by "Appius's method of capitation: But these are scarce sufficient for *Pom-* "pey's monthly pay: Two or three of the King's friends are very rich; "but they hold their own as closely as either you or I. —— I do not "forbear however to ask, urge, and chide him by letters: King *Deiotarus* "also told me, that he had sent people to him on purpose to solicit for "Brutus; but they brought him word back, that he had really no money: "Which I take indeed to be the case; that nothing is more drained than "his Kingdom; nothing poorer than the King."

Y.R. 702. tage, in which one of their principal commanders,  
Bef. Chr. Osaces, was mortally wounded.

<sup>50.</sup>  
~~401~~ Conf.

In the suspense of the *Parthian* war, which the late disgrace of *Crassus* had made terrible at *Rome*, *Cicero's* friends, who had no great opinion of his military talents, were in some pain for his safety and success, as appears by the following letter from *Cælius*.

*Marcus Cælius to Cicero.*

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 10.  
Melm. iv.  
14. (dated  
18th  
Novemb.)

" We have received an express from *Caius Cælius*, and another from *Deiotarus*, which greatly alarm us. The former writes that the *Parthian* army had passed the *Euphrates*, and the latter, that they are actually marching towards your province, by the way of *Comagene*. As I well know how ill provided you are with troops, the principal concern I feel from this invasion, with respect to you, is, lest you should be a loser by it in point of reputation. Had you been better prepared indeed to receive the enemy, I should have been in great pain for your life: But, as the very small number of your forces will incline you, I imagine, rather to think of a retreat than an engagement, I am only anxious concerning your honour. For how far the world may consider the necessity of the case, and approve of your thus declining a battle, is a point, I confess, which gives me much uneasy reflection. In short, I shall be in continual anxiety, till I hear of your arrival in *Italy*. In the mean time,

Y.R. 702.

Bef. Chr.

50.

401 Cons.

" time, this news of the *Parthians* has occasioned a variety of speculations. Some are of opinion, that *Pompey* ought to be sent against them: And others, that it is by no means convenient that he should leave *Rome*. A third party is for assigning this expedition to *Cæsar* and his army; whilst a fourth names the *Consuls* as the most proper persons to be employed. But all agree, however, in being silent as to any decree of the Senate for placing this command in private hands. The *Consuls*, in the apprehension that they shall either be nominated to a commission which they do not relish, or suffer the disgrace of its being given from them, forbear to convene the Senate: And by this means incur the censure of neglecting the public interest. But whether indolence or pusillanimity be the real motive of their declining the conduct of this war, it is concealed under the specious appearance however of modesty.

" *As we have received no courier from you, it was suspected, till the dispatch from Deiotarus arrived, that the whole was an invention of Cassius, who, it was thought, in order to colour his own rapine, had suffered a parcel of Arabs to make an incursion into the province, and then represented them to the Senate as a formidable body of Parthians.* Whatever therefore may be the true state of the affair, let me persuade you to be extremely circumspect in giving a faithful and accurate account of it to the Senate: That you may nei-

Y. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
491 Cons.

" ther be reproached with magnifying matters, in  
" order to gratify the private purposes of *Cassius*,  
" nor with concealing any thing which may be  
" of importance for the public to know.

" It is now *the eighteenth of November*; and as  
" we are advanced thus far towards the end of  
" the year, I do not see that any thing can be  
" done in this affair till the first of *January*. For  
" you know how slow and inactive *Marcellus* is  
" upon all occasions, and are no stranger to  
" the dilatory disposition of *Sulpicius*: You will  
" easily judge therefore what is to be expected  
" from two men of this unperforming cast; and  
" that those who usually act with so much cold-  
" ness as to make one doubt their inclinations,  
" even in points they really desire to effect, will  
" not be very warm in forwarding a busines to  
" which they are certainly averse.

" If the *Parthian* war should become a serious  
" matter, the new Magistrates will be engaged  
" for the first two or three months of their office  
" in adjusting the proper measures to be taken  
" in this conjuncture. On the other hand, if it  
" should appear to be an invasion of no conse-  
" quence, or such at least, as, with the supply  
" of a few additional troops, may easily be re-  
" pelled by you and the other Proconsuls already  
" in those provinces, or by your successors: *Cu-*  
" *rio*, I foresee, will begin to play his double  
" game; that is, he will in the first place at-  
" tempt to weaken the authority of *Cæsar*;  
" and in the next, endeavour to throw some  
" little advantages on the side of *Pompey*. As  
" for

“ for *Paulius*\*, he declares most vehemently  
“ against suffering *Cæsar* to continue in *Gaul* :  
“ And our friend *Furnius* is the only Tribune  
“ whom I suspect of obstructing his measures for  
“ that purpose. You may depend upon these  
“ articles as certain : But beyond these I can-  
“ not with any assurance pronounce. Time in-  
“ deed may produce much ; as many schemes I  
“ know are concerted : But they all turn upon  
“ the points I have already specified. — I for-  
“ got to mention, that *Curio* designs to make an  
“ attempt to procure a division of the lands in  
“ *Campania*. It is pretended that *Cæsar* does  
“ not concern himself in this matter : Certain,  
“ however, it is, that *Pompey* is very desirous of  
“ having the distribution settled before *Cæsar*’s  
“ return, that he may be precluded from ap-  
“ plying them to his own purposes.

“ As to what concerns your leaving the pro-  
“ vince, I dare not promise that you shall be re-  
“ lieved by a successor ; but you may rely upon  
“ my endeavouring all I can, that your admini-  
“ stration shall not be prolonged. Whether you  
“ will think proper to remain in your govern-  
“ ment, if affairs should be so circumstanced as to  
“ render it indecent for me to oppose any decree  
“ of the Senate for that purpose, depends upon  
“ yourself to determine : As it does upon me to  
“ remember, how warmly you made it your re-  
“ quest, when we parted, that I would prevent  
“ any such resolution from being taken. Fare-  
“ wel.”

Y.R. 702.

\* one of  
the Con-  
suls elect.  
Midd. 25.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

Ad Att.  
v. 15.

It is no wonder that *Cicero's* friends should be in pain for him, when they thought he would have to do with the *Parthians*: Nevertheless, when he found himself engaged, and pushed to the necessity of acting the General, he wanted (by his own account) neither the courage nor conduct of an experienced leader. In a letter to *Atticus*, dated from his camp: "We are in great spirits, " says he; and, as our counsels are good, have "no distrust of an engagement: We are securely "encamped, with plenty of provisions, and in "sight almost of *Cilicia*; with a small army in- "deed, but, as I have reason to believe, intirely "well affected to me: which I shall double by "the accession of *Deiotarus*, who is upon the "road to join me. I have the allies more firmly "attached to me than any Governor ever had: "They are wonderfully taken with my easiness "and abstinence: We are making new levies "of Citizens, and establishing magazines: If "there be occasion for fighting, we shall not "decline it; if not, shall defend ourselves by the "strength of our posts. Wherefore be of good "heart; for I see, as much as if you were with "me, the sympathy of your love for me."

The danger of the *Parthians* being over, *Cicer*o, unwilling to dismiss his army without attempting something, led it against an untamed race of banditti, or freebooters inhabiting the mountains, close to which he now lay. They had never submitted to the *Roman* power, but lived in defiance of it. *Cicero* thought the re-  
duction

duction of them a matter of importance. To take them unprovided, he drew off his forces, on pretence of marching to the distant parts of *Cilicia*; but, after a day's journey, stopped short, and, having refreshed his army and left his baggage behind, turned back again in the night with the utmost celerity, and reached *Amanus* before day on the thirteenth of *October*. Coming upon the natives by surprise, he easily killed or made them all prisoners. *Erana*, indeed, the capital of the mountain, made a brave resistance; for it held out almost a whole day. Upon this success, *Cicero* was saluted **EMPEROR**.

It appears, by a letter from the VICTORIOUS EMPEROR, that he thought his victory gave him a just claim to a *Triumph*.

*Cicero to M. Cælius, Curule Aedile elect.*

“ I wish you would enquire the reason that  
“ your letters miscarry; for I cannot be induced  
“ to think that you have not once written to me  
“ since your election. But to turn to the princi-  
“ pal purpose of this Epistle—Your wish has  
“ succeeded, and *I have just had employment*  
“ *enough of the military kind to entitle me to a*  
“ *Triumph*. You were under some apprehen-  
“ sions, I perceive, about the *Parthians*, as  
“ being diffident of my forces. I must acquaint  
“ you then, that, having received advice, that  
“ the *Parthians* had committed hostilities, I took  
“ the advantage of some defiles, and of the  
“ neighbouring mountains, to lead my army,  
“ supported

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

Ep. Fam.  
Melm. iv,  
13. [writ-  
ten about  
the end of  
Novem-  
ber.]

V.R. 702. " supported by a tolerable number of auxiliaries,  
 Bef. Chr. " to *Amanus*. The reputation of my name was  
 50. " of some benefit to me likewise in my march:  
403 Conf. " As you cannot imagine of what importance it  
 " is, in places of this kind, to have the populace  
 " ask, *Is this the Consul that saved Rome? Is*  
 " *this he that was so honoured by the Senate?*  
 " Together with other questions of the same im-  
 " port, which I need not add. When I approach-  
 " ed to *Amanus*, a mountain which separates  
 " *Cilicia* from *Syria*, I had the satisfaction to  
 " hear that *Cassius* had obliged the enemy to  
 " abandon the siege of *Antioch*; and that *Bi-*  
 " *bulus* had taken upon himself the command  
 " of the province. However, I employed my  
 " army in harassing the *Amanenses*, our eternal  
 " enemies: And, having put many of them to  
 " the sword, as well as taken a great number  
 " of prisoners, and entirely dispersed the rest,  
 " I surprized and burnt some of their fortresses.  
 " Having thus obtained a compleat victory, I was  
 " saluted with the title of *Imperator* by the  
 " whole army at *Iffus*, the very place where  
 " *Alexander* defeated *Darius*. From thence I  
 " marched into the most infested parts of *Ci-*  
 " *licia*, where I am now before *Pindenissum*; a  
 " city of great strength, and *which I have al-*  
 " *ready been battering above these three weeks*<sup>n</sup>.  
 " The garrison makes a most obstinate and vigo-

<sup>n</sup> The siege was begun about the first of November: So  
 that this Letter was written towards the end of November, if  
 he began to batter in a few days after his investing the  
 place.

" rous

"rous defence: So that nothing seems wanting  
"to complete the glory I shall here obtain, but  
"that the name of this place were less obscure".

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

"If I should make myself master of it, as I  
"trust I shall, I will send an immediate express  
"to the Senate. In the mean time, I have given  
"this general account of my operations, to let  
"you see there is some foundation to hope that  
"your good wishes will be accomplished. But  
"to return to the *Parthians*: This summer's  
"campaign has proved, you find, tolerably suc-  
"cessful: I am in great pain, however, for the  
"next. Let me intreat you, therefore, my dear  
"friend, to endeavour that a successor be ap-  
"pointed to my government: But, if that should  
"prove a matter of too much difficulty (as you  
"intimate in one of your letters, and as I am  
"myself inclined to suspect) be careful at least  
"to guard against what may easily be prevented,  
"I mean the prolongation of my residence P.

<sup>o</sup> Cicero, in a Letter to Atticus, speaking of this siege, writes thus: "What the plague, you will say, are these *Pindian missans*? I never heard their name before. — How can I help that? Could I turn *Cilicia* into *Ætolia* or *Macedonia*? Take this however for certain, that no man could do more than I have done with such an army, &c."

Ad Att.  
v. 20.

P Cicero wrote, about the same time, a Letter of congratulation to Curio, on his being elected to the Tribuneate; and presses him to be steady to the interests of the Senate, and to employ his Tribunitian power in his favour, that he may not be continued in his government beyond his year.

#### *Cicero to Curio, Tribune of the People.*

"The congratulations of a friend are not usually considered as too late, if they are paid as early as possible: My great

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 7.  
Melm. iv.  
16.

"I ex-

Y. R. 702.

Bef. Chr.

50.

491 Conf.

" I expect from your letters (as I mentioned  
" in one of my former) not merely an account

" distance therefore from *Rome*, together with the slow progress  
" with which news travels into this corner of the world, will  
" excuse me for not sooner sending you mine. But now I fin-  
" cerely give them you: And most ardently wish you may  
" obtain immortal honour by your administration of the Tri-  
" bunate. To this end, I must exhort you not to suffer yourself  
" to be turned aside from your natural bias, in compliance with  
" the sentiments and advice of others: On the contrary, let  
" me intreat you to be directed in your ministry by the faith-  
" ful light of your own superior wisdom. No man indeed  
" is capable of giving you more prudent counsels than will  
" arise from the suggestions of your own good sense: And, be-  
" lieve me, you can never be misguided, so long as you pursue  
" the honest dictates of your uninfluenced judgment. I say  
" not this inconsiderately, but as perfectly well knowing the  
" genius and principles of him to whom I am addressing  
" myself. Yes, my friend, I can never be apprehensive that  
" you will act either weakly or irresolutely, whilst you support  
" the measures your heart approves. It was neither chance  
" nor ignorance that led you to sollicit the Magistracy in so im-  
" portant a crisis. It was a deliberate and well-considered refo-  
" lution that engaged you in this design: And you were per-  
" fectly sensible of the great and general confusion in which the  
" Commonwealth is involved, together with the utter uncer-  
" tainty in what manner these our unhappy divisions will fi-  
" nally be terminated. You frequently reflect, I doubt not, on  
" the vain, the treacherous, and the pliant dispositions of the  
" present generation. To repeat then what I just now men-  
" tioned: Let me conjure you to persevere steadfastly in your  
" old principles, to consult the dictates of your own breast,  
" and faithfully to comply with its wise and worthy admoni-  
" tions. Hardly, perhaps, is any man more qualified than  
" yourself to direct the conduct of others: None, I am sure,  
" to steer your own. Good Gods! why am I thus prevented  
" from being a witness of your glorious actions, and an asso-  
" ciate of your patriot designs? The latter, I am persuaded,  
" you are far from wanting: However, the strength and warmth

of

“ of what is at present going forward in the Re-  
“ public, but a clear prospect of what is likely  
“ to happen — Farewel.”

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

To satisfy the earnest desire which *Cicero* had formerly expressed (and which he here again expresses) of being informed of what passed at *Rome* in his absence, his correspondent wrote several letters to him concerning the state of public affairs; particularly *one of the first of August,*

“ of my affection might possibly render the conjunction of my  
“ counsels with yours not altogether unprofitable.

“ You will hear from me again very soon, as I purpose in a few days to send an express to the Senate, with particulars of the success of my arms during the last summer's campaign. In the mean time you will perceive, by the Letter which I delivered to your freedman *Thraso*, with what zealous pains I have solicited your election to the Pontifical Dignity: An election indeed which will be attended with much difficulty. I conjure you in return, my dear *Curio*, not to suffer this my very troublesome provincial administration to be lengthened out beyond the usual period: And I intreat it by all the strong and tender ties of our mutual friendship. When I first made this request to you in person, and several times afterwards repeated it by letter, I had not the least imagination of your being Tribune. I then indeed only intreated your good offices as an illustrious Senator, and one who stood high in the favour and esteem of every *Roman*. But I now apply to *Curio*, not only as my noble friend, but as a powerful Tribune. I do not desire however (what indeed would be more difficult to obtain) that any thing unusual should be decreed in my favour: But, on the contrary, that you would support that decree, and maintain those laws, by which I was appointed to this government. In a word, my single and most earnest request is, that the terms upon which I set out for this province may not be changed. Farewel.”

and,

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

\* p. 555.

and, *a short time after, another*, which refers to it, and which *Cicero*, by some words in the beginning of the letter now before us, appears to have received: But it is not improbable, that a letter from *Cælius*, dated *the second of September*, and another written in *October*, full of intelligence, were not yet come to *Cicero's* hands; and as to that (above \* transcribed) of *the eighteenth of November*, he had unquestionably not received it; and this perhaps occasioned his apprehensions, that some of *Cælius's* letters had *miscarried*.

I doubt not but the Reader has a portion of the same curiosity which *Cicero* had; nor do I know how it can be better gratified, than by adding here, to the Letter of *the eighteenth of November*, *the other Four*, just above mentioned, *of dates prior to that*; or so much of them, at least, as is to the purpose. There will be occasion hereafter to refer to them as the best vouchers of the facts they relate.

#### *M. Cælius to Cicero.*

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 4.  
Melm. iii.  
32. [dated  
Aug. 1.  
702.]

— “*Curio* is a candidate [for the Tribunehip.] This greatly alarms those who are unacquainted with the real good qualities of *Curio's* heart. I hope, and indeed believe, he will act agreeably to his professions, and join with the Senate in supporting the friends of the Republic: I am sure, at least, he is full of these designs at present; in which *Cæsar's* conduct has been the principal occasion of engaging

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
399 Conf.

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“ engaging him. For *Cæsar*, though he spares  
“ no pains or expence to gain over even the lowest  
“ of the People to his interest, has thought fit  
“ to treat *Curio* with singular contempt. The  
“ latter has behaved himself with so much tem-  
“ per upon this occasion, that he, who never  
“ acted with artifice in all his life, is suspected  
“ to have dissembled his resentment, in order the  
“ more effectually to defeat the schemes of those  
“ who oppose his election; I mean the *Lælii* and  
“ the *Antonii*, together with the rest of that won-  
“ derful party.

“ I have been so much engaged by the difficul-  
“ ties, which have retarded the several elections,  
“ that I could not find leisure to write to you  
“ sooner: And indeed, as I every day expected  
“ they would be determined, I waited their con-  
“ clusion, that I might give you at once an ac-  
“ count of the whole. But it is now *the first of*  
“ *August*, and they are not yet over; the elections  
“ of *Prætors* having met with some unexpected de-  
“ lays. As to that in which I am a candidate [the  
“ *Curule Aedileship*] I can give no account which  
“ way it is likely to be decided: Only it is gene-  
“ rally thought that *Hirrus* will not be chosen.  
“ This is collected from the fate that has at-  
“ tended *Vincianus*, who was a candidate for  
“ the office of *Plebeian Aedile*. That foolish  
“ project of his, for the nomination of a DIC-  
“ TATOR<sup>q</sup>, (which we formerly, you may re-

<sup>q</sup> *Vincianus* and *Hirrus*, elected Tribunes for the year 700, were the chief promoters of the project of making *Pompey* Dictator. *Vide supra*, p. 107 & 139. And *Vid. Ad Q. Fr. iii. 8.*

“ member,

**Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.**

**50.**

**401 Conf.**

" member, exposed to so much ridicule) suddenly turned the election against him; and the People, by the loudest acclamations, expressed their joy at his repulse. At the same time *Hirrus* was universally called upon by the populace to give up his pretensions at the ensuing election. I hope therefore you will very soon hear, that this affair is determined in the manner you have wished with regard to me, but have scarce dared to wish with regard to him."

— " As to the state of the Commonwealth, we begin to give up all expectation that the face of public affairs will be changed. However, at a meeting of the Senate, held on the twenty-second of the last month, in the Temple of *Apollo*, upon a debate relating to the payment of the forces commanded by *Pompey* <sup>5</sup>, mention was made of that legion, which, as appeared by his accounts, had been lent to *Cæsar*: And he was asked of what number of men it consisted, and for what purposes it was borrowed. In short, *Pompey* was pushed so strongly upon this article, that he found himself under a necessity of promising to recall this legion out of Gaul: But he added at the same time, that the clamours of his enemies

<sup>5</sup> Because *Hirrus* was supported by *Pompey*. *Melm.*

" " *Pompey*, though he remained in *Rome*, was at this time Governor of *Spain*; which had been continued to him for four years at the end of his late Consulship. It was the payment of his troops in that province which was under the consideration of the Senate." *Plut. in Pomp.*

"should not force him to take this step too precipitately." Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr. 50.

"It was afterwards moved, that the question might be put concerning the election of a successor to *Cæsar*. Accordingly the Senate came to a resolution, that *Pompey* (who was just going to the army at *Ariminum*<sup>t</sup>, and is now actually set out for that purpose) should be ordered to return to *Rome* with all expedition; *That the affair relating to a general election of Governors for all the provinces might be debated in his presence*. This point, I imagine, will be brought before the Senate on the thirteenth of this month, when, if no infamous obstacles should be thrown in the way by the Tribunes<sup>v</sup>, the House will certainly come to some resolution: "For *Pompey*, in the course of the debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought every man owed obedience to the authority of that Assembly. However, I am impatient to hear what *Paullus*, the senior Consul elect, will say, when he delivers his opinion upon this question, &c.—Farewell."

<sup>t</sup> Now called *Rimini*; situated upon the *Rubicon*, a river which divides *Italy* from that part of the *Roman* province called *Cisalpine Gaul*. The army here mentioned is supposed to be part of those four legions, which were decreed to *Pompey* for the support of his government in *Spain*. *Plut.* ibid.

"Some of the Tribunes, together with *Sulpicius*, one of the present Consuls, were wholly in *Cæsar's* interest. They thought, or pretended to think, that it was highly unjust to divest *Cæsar* of his government before the time was compleated for which it had been decreed; of which there remained about two years unexpired." *Dio*, xl. p. 148.

Y. R. 702.

## Marcus Cælius to Cicero.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 5.  
Melm. iii.  
33. written  
in August.

“ How far you may be alarmed at the invasion  
 “ which threatens your province and the neigh-  
 “ bouring countries, I know not : But for myself,  
 “ I confess, I am extremely anxious for the con-  
 “ sequence. Could we contrive indeed, that the  
 “ enemies forces should be only in proportion  
 “ to yours, and *just sufficient to entitle you to the*  
 “ *honour of a Triumph*, there could not be a more  
 “ desirable circumstance. But the misfortune is,  
 “ if the *Parthians* should make any attempt, I  
 “ well know it will be a powerful one : And I  
 “ am sensible at the same time, that you are so  
 “ little in a condition to oppose their march, that  
 “ you have scarce troops to defend a single defile.  
 “ But the world in general will not be so rea-  
 “ sonable as to make the proper allowances for  
 “ this circumstance. On the contrary, it is ex-  
 “ pected from a man in your station, that he  
 “ should be prepared for every occurrence that  
 “ may arise : Without once considering whether  
 “ he be furnished with the necessary supplies for  
 “ that purpose. I am still the more uneasy on  
 “ your account, as *I foresee the contest concerning*  
 “ *affairs in Gaul will retard the nomination of your*  
 “ *successor* : And, though I dare say you have al-  
 “ ready had this contingency in your view, yet I  
 “ thought proper to apprise you of its probabi-  
 “ lity, that you might be so much the more early  
 “ in adjusting your measures accordingly. I need  
 “ not tell you the usual artifices will undoubtedly

“ be

" be played off. A day will be appointed for considering of a successor to Cæsar; upon which some Tribune will interpose his negative; and that a second will probably declare, that, unless the Senate shall be at liberty to put the question freely concerning all the provinces in general, he will not suffer it to be debated with regard to any in particular. And thus shall we be trifled with for a considerable time: Possibly indeed two or three years may be spun out by these contemptible arts.

" If any thing new had occurred in public affairs, I should, as usual, have sent you the account, together with my sentiments thereupon: But at present the wheels of our political machine seem to be altogether motionless. Marcellus is still pursuing his former designs concerning the provinces: But he has not yet been able to assemble a competent number of Senators. Had this motion been brought on the preceding year, and had Curio at the same time been Tribune, it would probably have succeeded: But, as affairs are now circumstanced, you are sensible how easy it will be for Cæsar, regardless as he is of the public interest, when it stands in competition with his own, to obstruct all our proceedings. Farewell."

## M. Cælius to Cicero:

— " I mentioned, in one of my former, that the affair of the provinces would come before the Senate on the thirteenth of the last month:

N 2

" Never.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 9.  
Melm. iii.  
34. [dated  
Sept. 2.  
702.]  
Vid. supr.  
P. 377.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
403 Cons.

" Nevertheless, by the intervention of [Caius] Marcellus, the Consul elect, it was put off to the first of this instant. But, when the day arrived, they could not procure a sufficient number of Senators to be present. It is now the second of September, and nothing has yet been done: And I am persuaded it will be adjourned to the following year. As far as I can see, therefore, you must be contented to leave the administration of your province in the hands of some person whom you shall think proper to appoint for that purpose, as I am well convinced you will not soon be relieved by a successor. For, as Gaul must take the same fate with the rest of the provinces, any attempt that should be made for settling the general succession will certainly be obstructed by Cæsar's party. Of this I have not the least doubt: And therefore I thought it necessary to give you notice, that you might be prepared to act accordingly.

" \_\_\_\_\_  
 " Your friend Pompey openly declares, that Cæsar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the Consulship while he retains his command in the province \*. He voted however against

Mehm.

\* " Pompey, who contributed more than any man to the advancement of Cæsar's power, had lately procured a law, by which the personal appearance of the latter was dispensed with, in soliciting the Consular office. But Pompey now began to repent: — Not that his own designs were more favourable to the liberties of Rome than those of Cæsar, but as discovering at last, that they could not both subsist together."

" the

“ the passing a decree for this purpose at present.  
 “ *Scipio* moved, that *the first of March next*  
 “ might be appointed for taking into considera-  
 “ tion the nominating a successor in the *Gallic*  
 “ provinces; and that this matter should be pro-  
 “ posed to the House separately, and without  
 “ blending it with any other question. *Balbus*  
 “ *Cornelius* was much discomposed at this motion:  
 “ And I am well assured he has complained of it  
 “ to *Scipio* in very strong terms.”

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

*M. Cælius to Cicero.*

— — — “ As to public affairs, we had waited  
 “ several days, in expectation that something  
 “ would be determined concerning *Gaul*; fre-  
 “ quent motions having been made in the Senate  
 “ for this purpose, which were followed by very  
 “ warm debates. At length, however, *it plainly*  
 “ *appearing agreeable to Pompey's sentiments, that*  
 “ *Cæsar's command in Gaul should not be conti-*  
 “ *nued longer than the first of March, the SE-*  
 “ *NATE passed the following ORDERS and DE-*  
 “ *CREES* <sup>x</sup>.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 8.  
Melm. iv.  
7. written  
in Octo-  
ber.

“ BY AUTHORITY OF THE SENATE, held in  
 “ the Temple of APOLLO, on the thirtieth day of

\* When an act passed the Senate in a full House, held ac-  
 cording to the prescribed forms, and without any opposition  
 from the Tribunes (who had the privilege of putting a ne-  
 gative upon all proceedings in the Senate) it was called a *Se-*  
*natus consultum*, a decree of the Senate. But if any of those  
 essentials were wanting, or a Tribune interposed, it was then  
 only styled a *Senatus auctoritas*, an ORDER of the Senate, and  
 considered as of less authority. *Manut.*

Melm.  
vol. I. p.  
64.

V. R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  

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50.  
401 Cons.

" September. Signed; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus;  
 " Q. Caecilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius  
 " Annalis; C. Septimius; Caius Lucceius Hirrus;  
 " C. Scribonius Curio; L. Atteius Capito; M.  
 " Oppius. WHEREAS a motion was made by  
 " Marcus Marcellus, the Consul, concerning the  
 " Consular provinces; it is ORDERED, that Lucius  
 " Paullus and Caius Marcellus, Consuls elect, shall,  
 " on the first of March, next following their enter-  
 " ing upon their office, move the Senate concerning  
 " the Consular provinces: At which time no other  
 " business shall be proceeded upon, nor any other  
 " motion made in conjunction therewith. And for  
 " this purpose the Senate shall continue to assemble,  
 " notwithstanding the Comitial 7 days, and until  
 " a decree shall be passed.

" ORDERED, That, when the Consul shall move  
 " the Senate upon the question aforesaid, they shall  
 " be empowered to summon such of the three hun-  
 " dred Judges, who are members of the Senate, to  
 " attend.

Mel'm.

" " The Comitial days were those on which the Comitia  
 " or Assemblies of the People were held: And on these days  
 " the Law prohibited the Senate to be convened. The Senate,  
 " however, in the present instance, and upon many other oc-  
 " casions, took upon themselves to act with a dispensing power."  
 See Midd. on the Rom. Sen. p. 121. They had the impu-  
 dience, as we see, to resolve, That, if the Tribunes made use of  
 their legal privilege, they should be deemed enemies to the  
 Republic. And, what is worthy to be observed, the Tribunes,  
 in the present case, were using their legal privilege in support  
 of Justice; the Senate were dispensing with the laws, in order  
 to injure and oppress. The Reader will remark, that Curio is  
 one of those who sign this resolution of the House.

Y.R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

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"RESOLVED, That if any matters shall arise upon the question aforesaid, which shall be necessary to be laid before the People, that Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Marcellus, the present Consuls, together with the Praetors and Tribunes of the People, or such of them as shall be agreed upon, shall call an Assembly of the People for that purpose: And if the Magistrates aforesaid shall fail herein, the same shall be proposed to the People by their successors.

"THE THIRTIETH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, in the temple of APOLLO. Signed; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus; Q. Cæcilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius Annalis; C. Septimius; C. Scribonius Curio; M. Oppius,

"The Consul, Marcus Marcellus, having moved the Senate concerning the provinces.

"RESOLVED, That it is the opinion of the Senate, that it will be highly unbecoming any Magistrate, who has a power of controuling their proceedings, to occasion any hindrance, whereby the Senate may be prevented from taking the aforesaid motion into consideration as soon as possible: And that whosoever shall obstruct or oppose the same, shall be deemed an enemy to the Republic.

"ORDERED, That if any Magistrate shall put a negative upon the foregoing resolution, the same shall be entered as an ORDER of the Senate, and again referred to the consideration of this House.

"This resolution was protested against by Caius

**X.R. 702.** "Cælius, Lucius Vinicius, Publius Cornelius, and  
**Bef. Chr.**

50.

"Caius Vibius Pansa.

**401 Conf.**

"RESOLVED, That the Senate will take into consideration the case of such of the soldiers under Cæsar's command who have served out their legal time <sup>2</sup>, or who, for other reasons, are entitled to a discharge; and make such order thereupon as shall be agreeable to equity.

"RESOLVED, That, if any Magistrate should put his negative upon the foregoing DECREE, the same shall stand as an ORDER of the Senate, and be again referred to the consideration of this House.

"This resolution was protested against by Caius Cælius and Caius Pansa, Tribunes of the People.

— "In the debates which preceded these decrees, Pompey let fall an expression that was much observed, and gave us confident hopes of his good intentions. He could not, without great injustice, he said, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæsar's command, before the first of March: But after that time, he assured the Senate, he should have no sort of scruple. Being asked, what if a negative should then be put upon a decree of the Senate for recalling Cæsar? Pompey answered, he should look upon it as just the same thing, whether Cæsar openly refused to obey the authority of the Senate, or se-

**Melm.**

<sup>2</sup> As the strength of Cæsar's army in Gaul consisted principally in his veterans, this clause was added, as Gronovius observes, with a view of drawing off those soldiers from his troops,

"cretly

"cretly procured some Magistrate to obstruct their  
"decrees. But suppose, said another member,  
"Cæsar should insist upon being a candidate for  
"the Consulship, and, at the same time, of retain-  
"ing his command? " Suppose, replied Pompey  
"with great temper, my own son should take a  
"stick and beat me?" From expressions of this  
"kind the world has conceived a notion, that a  
"rupture will undoubtedly ensue between Pompey  
"and Cæsar. I am of opinion <sup>a</sup> however,  
"that the latter will submit to one of these two  
"conditions: Either to give up his present pre-  
"tensions to the Consulate, and continue in Gaul;  
"or to resign his command of the province, pro-  
"vided he can be assured of his election. Curio  
"is preparing most strongly to oppose his de-  
"mands. What he may be able to effect I know  
"not; but sure I am, that a man who acts upon  
"such patriot principles must gain honour at least,  
"if he gain nothing else — — —".

FROM Amanus Cicero led his army to another part of the Highlands, the most disaffected to the Roman name, possessed by a stout and free people, who had never been subject even to the

Y. R. 702.

Bef. Chr.

50.

401 Cons.

Midd. 27.

Ep. Fam.

xv. 4.

<sup>a</sup> It is remarkable that Cælius, the writer of this Letter, whom Cicero judged to be an able politician, and to have a longer foresight than any body, was mistaken in almost all his conjectures; mistaken concerning Cæsar, concerning Curio, and concerning himself. For Cæsar did not submit, &c. and Curio took Cæsar's part; and so did Cælius himself in the beginning of the civil war. Cælius obtained the Ædileship this year [702] from his competitor Hirrus, formerly Cicero's competitor for the Augurate,

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Cons.

Kings of that country. Their chief town was called *Pindenissum*, situated on a steep and craggy hill : It was the constant refuge of all deserters, and the harbour of foreign enemies, and at that very time was expecting and prepared to receive the *Parthians*. *Cicero* laid siege to it in form; and though he attacked it with all imaginable vigour, and a continual battery of his engines, yet it cost him above six weeks to reduce it to the necessity of surrendering at discretion. The inhabitants were sold for slaves; all the other plunder, excepting the horses, was given to the soldiers.

After this action, another neighbouring nation, called *Tiburani*, terrified by the fate of *Pindenissum*, voluntarily submitted, and gave hostages; so that *Cicero* sent his army, under the command of his brother, into winter-quarters, in those parts of the province which were thought the most turbulent.

Midd. 29.  
Ad Att.  
L. 20.

These martial exploits spread *Cicero's* fame into *Syria*, where *Bibulus* was just arrived to take upon him the command; but kept himself close within the gates of *Antioch* till the country was cleared of all the *Parthians*: His envy of *Cicero's* success, and title of *EMPEROR*, made him impatient to purchase the same honour by the like service on the Syrian side of the mountain *Amanus*: But he had the misfortune to be repulsed in his attempt, with the intire loss of the first cohort, and several officers of distinction, which *Cicero* calls an ugly blow, both for the time and the effect of it.

Though

Though *Cicero*, for his victory (which he calls a *just* victory) at *Amanus*, had been saluted *Emperor*, and had ever since assumed that appellation, yet he sent no public account of it to Rome till after the affair of *Pindennissum*, an exploit of more eclat and importance; for which he expected the honour of a *Thanksgiving*, and began to entertain hopes even of a *Triumph*. His public Letter is lost, but that loss is supplied by a particular narrative of the whole action in a private letter to *Cato*. His design, in paying *Cato* this compliment, was to engage his vote and concurrence to the decree of the *supplication* <sup>q</sup>.

Y.R. 702.  
Bef. Chr.  
50.  
401 Conf.

Ad Att.  
vii. 1. and  
Vid. *supra*,  
p. 169.

After a detail of his proceedings, and successes from the time of his arrival in the province, he thus continues— “ And now, if a motion should be made in the Senate concerning the honours due to the success of my arms, I shall esteem it the highest glory to be supported in my pretensions by your suffrage. I am sensible it is usual for the gravest characters to *request*, as well as to be *requested for*, favours of this nature, in the strongest terms: But I persuade myself it will be more proper for me to remind than to sollicit you in the present instance. You have frequently indeed, not only distinguished me with your vote, but with your highest applause, both in the Senate and in the Assemblies of the People. And, believe me, I have ever

Y.R. 703.  
Melm.  
B. v. Let.  
i. Ep. Fam.  
xv. 4. Ed.  
Græv.

<sup>q</sup> *Cicero* wrote at the same time, for the same end, to *C. Claudius Marcellus*, and *P. Attilius Paullus*, the two *Consuls* of the present year 703.

“ thought

Y.R. 703.     “ thought there was so much weight and autho-  
 Bef. Chr.     “ rity in all you uttered, that a single word of  
 49.     “ yours in my favour was the highest honour I  
 402 Conf.     “ could possibly receive. I remember upon a cer-  
                “ tain occasion, when you refused to vote for a  
                “ *public thanksgiving*, which was proposed in fa-  
                “ vour of a very worthy and illustrious Citizen,  
                “ you told the Senate, you should willingly have  
                “ given your suffrage in support of the honour in  
                “ question, had it been designed as a reward for  
                “ any *civil services* which that Consul had per-  
                “ formed in *Rome*. Agreeably to this maxim, you  
                “ formerly concurred in voting that a *public*  
                “ *thanksgiving* should be decreed to me, not indeed  
                “ for having advanced the glory of our Country  
                “ by my military atchievements (for that would  
                “ have been a circumstance nothing uncommon)  
                “ but for having, in a most singular and unex-  
                “ ampled manner, preserved the liberties of the  
                “ whole Commonwealth without drawing a sword.  
                “ I forbear to mention the general share you have  
                “ taken in all the envy, the difficulties, and the  
                “ dangers, to which my life has been exposed:  
 Vid. supra,  
 vol. VIII.  
 p. 413, &c.

\* Clodius.     “ And a far greater you were willing to have taken,  
                “ if I could have been prevailed upon to have con-  
                “ fented\*. I forbear to mention likewise that you  
                “ considered my enemy \* as your own : And that,  
                “ in order to give me a convincing proof of your

\* This seems to import, that *Cato* would have concurred in  
 measures to defend *Cicero* by arms, against the sovereign autho-  
 rity of the People, if *Cicero* had followed that counsel. But  
 Plutarch reports, that *Cato* advised *Cicero* to submit. *Plut.* in  
*Cat.*

Y.R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Conf.

“ great regard, you scrupled not to shew your ap-  
“ probation even of his death, by defending *Milo*  
“ in the Senate. In return, (and I speak of it,  
“ not as a favour for which you are indebted to  
“ me, but as a tribute which I owed to truth) I  
“ have been no silent admirer of your virtues :  
“ For who indeed can suppress his applause of  
“ them ? In all my speeches, both in the Forum  
“ and in the Senate, as well as in the several  
“ pieces I have published, either in our own lan-  
“ guage or in Greek, I have ever represented  
“ your character as superior, not only to the  
“ noblest amongst our contemporaries, but to the  
“ most celebrated in history.

“ After all, you will wonder, perhaps, what  
“ should induce me to set so high a value upon  
“ these little transient honours of the Senate. I  
“ will acknowledge then the whole truth, and  
“ lay open my heart before you with a freedom  
“ becoming that philosophy we cultivate, and that  
“ friendship we profess : A friendship delivered  
“ down to us from our parents, and improved by  
“ many reciprocal good offices.

“ Let me previously observe, that, *if ever any*  
“ *man was a stranger to the desire of empty ap-*  
“ *plause and vulgar admiration, it is myself :* And  
“ this frame of mind, which I possess by temper,  
“ has been still strengthened (if I am not de-  
“ ceived) by reason and philosophy. As an evi-  
“ dence of this, I appeal to my Consulate ; in  
“ which, as in every other part of my life, though  
“ I pursued that conduct, I confess, from whence  
“ true

Y.R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

40. Conf.

" true honours might be derived, yet I never  
 " thought they were of themselves an object  
 " worthy of my ambition. On the contrary, I  
 " refused the government of a very noble pro-  
 " vince : And, notwithstanding it was highly pro-  
 " bable I might have obtained a Triumph, yet I  
 " forbore to prosecute my pretensions of that  
 " kind. I forbore too the offering myself as a  
 " candidate for the office of Augur : Though you  
 " are sensible, I dare say, that I might have suc-  
 " ceeded without much difficulty. But I will ac-  
 " knowledge, that the injurious treatment I after-  
 " wards suffered, though you always speak of it  
 " indeed as a circumstance which reflects the  
 " highest honour upon my character, and as a  
 " misfortune only to the Republic, has rendered  
 " me desirous of receiving the most distinguished  
 " marks of my Country's approbation. For this  
 " reason, I solicited the office of Augur, which  
 " I had before declined : And, as little as I once  
 " thought the military honours deserved my pur-  
 " suit, I am now ambitious of that distinction which  
 " the Senate usually confers on its successful Ge-  
 " nerals. I will own, I have some view by this  
 " means of healing the wounds of my former un-  
 " merited disgrace : And therefore, though I just  
 " now declared that I would not *request* your aid  
 " on this occasion, I recall my words, and do most  
 " earnestly request your suffrage and assistance ;  
 " upon the supposition, however, that what I  
 " have performed in this campaign shall not ap-  
 " pear contemptible in your eyes, but, on the  
 " contrary, far superior to the actions of many of  
 " those

"those Generals who have obtained the most  
"glorious rewards from the Senate.

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Conf.

"I have observed (and you are sensible I always listen with great attention whenever you deliver your opinions) that as often as any question of this nature has come before the Senate, you were less inquisitive into the military than civil conduct of the Proconsul. It was the political ordinances he had established, and the moral qualities he had displayed, that seemed to have the principal weight in determining your vote. If you should examine my pretensions in this view, you will see, that, with a weak and inconsiderable army, I found a strong defence, against the danger of a very formidable invasion, in the lenity and justice of my government. By these aids I effected what I never could by the most powerful legions: I recovered the friendship of our alienated allies, firmly strengthened their allegiance to the Republic, and conciliated their affection at a time when they were waiting the opportunity of some favourable revolution to desert us. But perhaps I have expatiated farther upon this subject than was necessary; especially to you, before whom all our allies in general are accustomed to lay their complaints. To them therefore I refer you for an account of the benefits they have received by my administration. They will all of them, as with one voice, I am persuaded, give you the most advantageous testimony in my favour; but particularly those illustrious clients of yours, the

"*Cyprians*

Y.R. 703. "Cyprians" and Cappadocians: To whom I may  
Bef. Chr. "likewise add your great and royal friend, Prince

49.

402 Conf.

Vid. supra,  
p. 162. the  
note.  
Midd. p.  
21—27.

The debt above mentioned, that was owing from *Ariobarzanes* to *Brutus*, was not the only affair which the latter had recommended to *Cicero*: He had burdened him with another much more troublesome.

Ad Att.  
vi. 1.

Ad Att.  
v. 21.

The city of *Salamis* in *Cyprus* owed to two of his friends, as he pretended, *Scaptius* and *Matinius*, above twenty thousand pounds sterling upon bond, at a most extravagant interest; and he begged of *Cicero* to take their persons and concerns under his special protection. *Appius*, who was *Brutus's* father-in law, had granted every thing which was asked to *Scaptius*, a *Praefecture* in *Cyprus*, with some troops of horse, with which he miserably harassed the poor *Salaminians*, in order to force them to comply with his unreasonable demands: For he shut up their whole Senate in the Council room, till five of them were starved to death with hunger. *Brutus* laboured to place him in the same degree of favour with *Cicero*: But *Cicero*, being informed at *Ephebus* of this violence, by a deputation from *Salamis*, made it the first act of his government to recall the troops from *Cyprus*, and put an end to *Scaptius's* *Praefecture*; having laid it down for a rule, to grant no command to any man, who was concerned in trade, or negotiated money in the province: To give satisfaction however to *Brutus*, he enjoined the *Salaminians* to pay off *Scaptius's* bond, which they were ready to do according to the tenor of his edict, by which he had ordered, that no bond in his province should carry above one per cent. by the month. *Scaptius* refused to take the money on those terms, insisting on four per cent., as the condition of his bond expressed; which by computation almost doubled the principal sum; while the *Salaminians*, as they protested to *Cicero*, could not have paid the original debt, if they had not been enabled to do it by his help, and out of his own dues, that he had remitted to them, which amounted to somewhat more than *Scaptius's* legal demand.

This extortion raised *Cicero's* indignation; and, notwithstanding the repeated instances of *Brutus* and *Atticus*, he was determined to over-rule it; though *Brutus*, in order to move him the more effectually, thought proper to confess, what he

Deio-

*Deiotarus.* If thus to act is a merit of the most superior kind, if, in all ages, the number has

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Conf.

*had all along dissembled, that the debt was really his own, and Scaptius only his agent in it.* This surprized Cicero still more, and though he had a warm inclination to oblige Brutus, yet he could not consent to so flagrant an injustice, but makes frequent and heavy complaints of it in his letters to Atticus. In one of them he says, " You have now the ground of my conduct ; " if Brutus does not approve it, I see no reason why we " should love him ; but I am sure it will be approved by his " uncle Cato \*." In another, " If Brutus thinks, that I ought " to allow him four per cent., when by edict I have decreed " but one through all the provinces, and that to the satisfaction " of the keenest usurers ; if he complains, that I denied a " Praefecture to one concerned in trade, which I denied for " that reason to your friend Lanius, and to Sex. Statius, though " Torquatus sollicited for the one, and Pompey himself for the " other, yet without disgusting either of them ; if he takes it " ill, that I recalled the troops out of Cyprus, I shall be sorry " indeed, that he has any occasion to be angry with me ; but " much more, not to find him the man that I took him to be. — " I have not forgot, however, what you intimated to me " in several of your letters, that if I brought back nothing else " from the province but Brutus's friendship, that would be " enough : Let it be so, since you will have it so ; yet it must " always be with this exception, as far as it can be done, with- " out my committing any wrong." — In a third, " How, my

Ad Att.  
vi. 2.

\* It is very difficult to suppose that Cato was ignorant of his nephew's infamous extortion, and the horrible proceedings of his nephew's agent. For Cato (as Plutarch informs us) having settled a correspondence throughout all the Roman provinces, received constant intelligence of the conduct of the several Governors in their respective commands. And the Cyprians had a particular claim to the patronage of Cato, as he had been employed in executing a commission, by which the island was annexed to the dominions of the Republic. Cicero, in a letter to Cato, calls them (as we see) *those illustrious clients of yours* — and refers him to them for a testimony of his good conduct in his government, of which Cyprus was a part.

See Melm.  
Vol. I. p.  
426. note  
12 and 13.  
Vid. *tupra*,  
p. 192.

Y. R. 703. " been far less considerable of those who knew  
 Bef. Chr. " how to subdue their desires than to vanquish  
 49. " their enemies, he that has given an instance of  
402 Conf. " both, cannot certainly but be deemed, in *Cato's*  
 " estimation at least, to have strengthened his  
 " claim to the honours of his Country, and to  
 " have improved the splendor of his military at-  
 " chievements, by the more unusual lustre of his  
 " civil conduct.

" Let me in the last place, and as in diffidence  
 " of my own solicitations, call in Philosophy for  
 " my advocate; than which nothing has afforded  
 " me a more valuable satisfaction. The truth is,  
 " she is one of the noblest blessings that the gods  
 " have bestowed on man. At her shrine we have  
 " both of us, from our earliest years, paid our

Ibid. vi. 1. " dear *Atticus*, you, who applaud my integrity and good con-  
 & 3. " duct, and are vexed sometimes, you say, that you are not  
 " with me, how can such a thing, as *Ennius* says, come out  
 " of your mouth, to desire me to grant troops to *Scaptius*, for  
 " the sake of extorting money? Could you, if you were with  
 " me, suffer me to do it, if I would?—If I really had done  
 " such a thing, with what face could I ever read again, or  
 " touch those books of mine, with which you are so much  
 " pleased?" He tells him likewise in confidence, that all *Brutus's* letters to him, even when he was asking favours, were un-  
 mannerly, churlish, and arrogant, without regarding either what  
 or to whom he was writing; and, if he continued in that hu-  
 mour, you may love him alone, says he, you shall have no rival  
 of me; but he will come, I believe, to a better mind. But, to  
 shew, after all, what a real inclination he had to oblige him,  
 he never left urging King Ariobarzanes till he had squeezed  
 from him a hundred talents, in part of *Brutus's* debt, or about  
 twenty thousand pounds; the same sum, probably, which had  
 been destined to *Cicero* himself.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

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" joint and equal adorations : And, while she has  
" been thought, by some, the companion only of  
" indolent and secluded speculatists, we (and we  
" alone I had almost said) have introduced her into  
" the world of business, and familiarized her with  
" the most active and important scenes. She  
" therefore it is that now sollicits you in my be-  
" half ; and when Philosophy is the suppliant,  
" *Cato*, surely, can never refuse. To say all in  
" one word: Be well assured, if I should prevail  
" with you to concur in procuring a decree I so  
" much wish to obtain, I shall consider myself as  
" wholly indebted for that honour to your autho-  
" rity and friendship. Farewel."

But *Cato* was not to be moved from his purpose Mid<sup>d</sup>. p.  
29.  
by these compliments, or motives of friendship : He was an enemy by principle to all decrees of this kind, and thought them bestowed too cheaply, and prostituted to occasions unworthy of them ; so that, when *Cicero's Letters* came under deliberation, though he spoke with all imaginable honour and respect of *Cicero*, and highly extolled both his civil and military administration, yet he voted against the supplication <sup>t</sup>, which was decreed however, without any other dissenting voice, except that of *Favonius*, who loved always to mi-

<sup>t</sup> *Cicero* had undoubtedly no claim to the honour he demanded ; and for this reason, among others, because the number of the slain, on the side of the enemy, was not so great as the laws in these cases required ; as is evident from a Letter of *Cælius* to *Cicero* on the subject. *Vid. Ep. Fam.* VIII. ii. *Melm.* vi. 6. Melm.  
Vol. II.  
P. 51.

Y.R. 703.

Ep. Fam.  
xv. 6.

mic *Cato*, and of *Hirrus*, who had a personal quarrel with *Cicero*: Yet, when the vote was over, *Cato himself assisted in drawing up the decree, and had his name inserted in it*, which was the usual mark of a particular approbation of the thing, and friendship to the person in whose favour it passed. But *Cato's answer to Cicero's Letter* will shew the temper of the man, and the grounds on which he acted on this occasion.

*M. Cato to M. T. Cicero, Emperor.*Ep. Fam.  
xv. 5.  
Melm. v.  
2.

“ Not only my regard for the Republic, but  
 “ my affection for you, makes me very sincerely  
 “ rejoice in finding, that you exercise the same  
 “ integrity and vigilance in the conduct of our  
 “ arms abroad, as distinguished our administra-  
 “ tion of your most important affairs at home.  
 “ I have therefore paid your actions that honour,  
 “ which, according to my best judgment, was due  
 “ to them: And, in speaking of them before the  
 “ Senate, as well as afterwards, when I assisted in  
 “ drawing up the decree in your favour, I ascribed  
 “ to your probity and prudent conduct the de-  
 “ fence of your province, the preservation of the  
 “ crown and person of *Ariobarzanes*, and the re-  
 “ covery of the allies to their duty and affection  
 “ to our empire. If you rather chuse, however,  
 “ that we should ascribe to the gods those ad-  
 “ vantages, for which the Republic is not at all  
 “ indebted to fortune, but wholly to your mode-  
 “ ration and consummate wisdom, I am glad that  
 “ the Senate has decreed a *thanksgiving*. But if  
 “ your

“ your willingness to let fortune have the credit  
 “ of your actions be for this reason, that you  
 “ imagine a *thanksgiving* necessarily opens your  
 “ way to a *triumph*, I must observe, that the lat-  
 “ ter is not always a consequence of the former.  
 “ Yet granting it were, *is it not far more to the*  
 “ *honour of a General to have it declared, by a*  
 “ *vote of the Senate, that he preserved his province*  
 “ *by the mildness and equity of his administration,*  
 “ *than that he owed it either to the strength of*  
 “ *his troops, or to the favour of the gods?* such, at  
 “ least, were my sentiments when this question  
 “ came before the House: And, if I have employ-  
 “ ed more words than usual in explaining them,  
 “ it was from a desire of convincing you, that,  
 “ though I proposed to the Senate what I thought  
 “ would be most for the advantage of your re-  
 “ putation, I rejoice that they have determined  
 “ what is most agreeable to your wishes. I have  
 “ only to request the continuance of your friend-  
 “ ship; and to intreat you steadily to persevere in  
 “ those paths of integrity which you have hi-  
 “ therto pursued, both in respect to our allies  
 “ and to the Republic <sup>u</sup>. Farewel.”

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Bef. Chr.  
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402 Conf.

<sup>u</sup> “ This letter (to speak in Virtuoso language) is an *unique*, Melm.  
 “ and extremely valuable, as being the only composition that Vol. I. p.  
 “ has been transmitted to us from the hands of *Cato*. It con- 431. n. 1.  
 “ firms what *Plutarch* expressly asserts, that *Cato's* manners  
 “ were by no means of a rough and unpolished cast, as no  
 “ refusal could have been drawn up in more decent and civil  
 “ terms. A judicious eye, however, cannot but discern, through  
 “ this veil of politeness, the nice touches of a delicate and con-  
 “ cealed raillery.” — Nevertheless, as *Cicero* had a farther suit

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Midd. 31.

Ad Att.

vii. 2.

*Cæsar* was not displeased, perhaps, to hear of *Cato's* stiffness, as it might naturally create a cold-

to make to the Senate, in the demand of a triumph, he chose to dissemble his resentment, and returned the following civil answer to *Cato*.

To *Marcus Cato*.

Ep. Fam,

xv. 6.

Melm. vi.

19.

"Praise from thy lips 'tis mine with joy to boast :

"He best can give it who deserves it most :

"As *Hector*, I think, says to the venerable *Priam* in one of  
 " *Nævius's* plays. Honourable indeed is that applause which  
 " is bestowed by those who have themselves been the constant  
 " object of universal approbation. Accordingly, I esteem the  
 " encomiums you conferred upon me in the Senate together  
 " with your congratulatory letter as a distinction of the highest  
 " and most illustrious kind. Nothing could be more agreeable  
 " to my wishes, as nothing could be more glorious for my repu-  
 " tation, than your having thus freely given to friendship what-  
 " ever you could strictly give to truth. Were *Rome* entirely  
 " composed of *Catos*, or could it produce many (as it is sur-  
 " prizing it can furnish even one) of that venerable character, my  
 " desires would be amply satisfied : And I should prefer your  
 " single approbation to all the laurels and all the triumphal  
 " cars in the universe. In my own judgment, indeed, and ac-  
 " cording to the refined estimate of true philosophy, the com-  
 " pliments you paid me in the Senate, and which have been  
 " transmitted to me by my friends, are undoubtedly the most  
 " significant distinction I can possibly receive. I acquainted you,  
 " in my former letter, with the particular motives which in-  
 " duced me to be desirous (for I will not call it ambitious) of  
 " a triumph : And if the reasons I have assigned will not, in  
 " your opinion, justify a warm pursuit of that honour, they must  
 " prove, at least, that I ought not to refuse it, if the Senate  
 " should make me the offer. And I hope that Assembly, in con-  
 " sideration of my services in this province, will not think me  
 " undeserving of a reward so usually conferred. If I should  
 " not be disappointed in this hope, my only request is, (what

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ness between him and *Cicero*: For, in a congratulatory letter to *Cicero* upon the success of his arms, and the *supplication* decreed in his honour, he aggravated the rudeness and ingratitude of *Cato*. *Cicero* himself was highly disgusted at it, especially when *Cato* soon afterwards voted a *supplication* to his son-in-law *Bibulus*. *Cato*, says *Cicero*, was shamefully malicious; he gave me what I did not ask, a character of integrity, justice, and clemency, but denied me what I did — Yet this same man voted a supplication of twenty days to *Bibulus*: Pardon me if I cannot bear this usage.

*Cicero*, in writing afterwards to *Atticus* on the same subject, says, "Consider what you would advise me with regard to a Triumph, to which my friends invite me: For my part, if *Bibulus*, who, while there was a *Parthian* in *Syria*, never set a foot out of the gates of *Antioch*, any more than he did upon a certain occasion out of his own house \*, had not solicited a triumph,

Midd. 58.  
Ad Att.  
vi. 8.

"indeed you kindly promise) that, as you have paid me the honour you thought most to my glory, you would rejoice in my obtaining those which are most to my inclination. And this disposition you have already very sincerely shewn, not only by your letter, but by having signed the decreee that has passed in my favour. For decrees of this kind, I know, are usually subscribed by those who are most in the interest of the person to whose honour they are voted. I will only add, that I hope to see you very soon: And may I find the Republic in a happier situation than what my fears present! Farewell."

Vid. supr.  
vol. VIII.  
P. 356 &  
372.

\* N. B. This is that *Bibulus*, of whose lot, when the contempt he met with abroad made him shut himself up in his own house, *Cicero* once said, or pretends to have said, even in the presence of *Pompey*, that he preferred it, unhappy as

**Y.R. 703.** “I should have been quiet; but now it is a shame to sit still.” Again, “As to a Triumph, I had no thoughts of it before Bibulus’s most impudent letters, by which he obtained an honourable supplication. If he had really done all that he has written, I should rejoice at it, and wish well to his suit; but for him, who never stirred beyond the walls while there was an enemy on this side the Euphrates <sup>x</sup>, to have such an honour decreed; and for me, whose army inspired all their hopes and spirits into his, not to obtain the same, will be a disgrace to us; I say to us, joining you to myself: Wherefore I am determined to push at all, and hope to obtain all.”

**Midd. 33.** The remaining part of Cicero’s government was employed in the civil affairs of the province, where his whole care was to ease the several cities and districts of that excessive load of debts, in

*it might appear, to all the splendid Triumphs of the most victorious General.* Vide supra, p. 75.

**Midd. 15.**

\* After the contemptible account which Cicero gives of Bibulus’s conduct in Syria, it must appear strange to see him honoured with a *supplication*, and aspiring even to a *triumph*: But this was not for any thing that he himself had done (for he had suffered \* a defeat) but for what, before the arrival of Bibulus, his Lieutenant Cassius had performed against the Parthians; the success of the Lieutenants being ascribed always to the auspices of the General, who reaped the reward and glory of it: And as the Parthians were the most dangerous enemies of the Republic, and the more particularly dreaded at this time for their late victory over Crassus, so any advantage gained against them was sure to be well received at Rome, and repaid with all the honours that could reasonably be demanded.

\* Vid. supr. p. 186.

Vid. supr. p. 161,  
162, 163.

which the avarice and rapaciousness of former Governors had involved them. He laid it down for the fixt rule of his administration, not to suffer any money to be expended either upon himself or his officers : And when one of his Lieutenants, *L. Tullius*, in passing through the country, exacted only the forage and firing which was due by law, and that but once a-day, and not, as all others had done before, from every town and village through which they passed, he was much out of humour, and could not help complaining of it, as a stain upon his government, since none of his people besides had taken even a single farthing. All the wealthier cities of the province used to pay to all their Pro-consuls large contributions, for being exempted from furnishing winter-quarters to the army : Cyprus alone had paid yearly, on this single account, two hundred talents, or about forty thousand pounds : But Cicero remitted this whole tax to them, which alone made a vast revenue ; and applied all the customary perquisites of his office to the relief of the distressed province : Yet for all his services and generosity which amazed the poor people, he would accept no honours but what were merely verbal, prohibiting all expensive monuments, as statues, temples, brazen horses, &c. which, by the flattery of Asia, used to be erected of course to all Governors, though never so corrupt and oppressive. While he was upon his visitation of the Asiatic districts, there happened to be a kind of famine in the country ; yet, wherever he came, he not only provided for his family at his own expence, but prevailed with the

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the merchants and dealers, who had any quantity of corn in their storehouses, to supply the people with it on easy terms; living himself all the while splendidly and hospitably, and keeping an open table, not only for all the Roman officers, but the gentry of the province. In the following letter to *Atticus*, he gives him a summary view of his manner of governing.

Ad Att.  
vi. 2.

" I see, says he, that you are much pleased  
" with my moderation and abstinence; but you  
" would be much more so, if you were with  
" me; especially at *Laodicea*, where I did won-  
" ders at the sessions, which I have just held, for  
" the affairs of the dioceses, from the thirteenth  
" of February to the first of May. Many cities  
" were wholly freed from all their debts; many  
" greatly eased; and all, by being allowed to  
" govern themselves by their own laws, have  
" recovered new life. There are two ways, by  
" which I have put them in a capacity of freeing,  
" or of easing themselves at least from their debts;  
" the one is by suffering no expence at all to be  
" made on the account of my government. When  
" I say none at all, I speak not hyperbolically;  
" there is not so much as a farthing: It is incre-  
" dible to think, what relief they have found  
" from this single article. The other is this;  
" their own Greek Magistrates had strangely  
" abused and plundered them. I examined every  
" one of them who had born any office for ten  
" years past: They all plainly confessed; and,  
" without the ignominy of a public conviction,  
" made restitution of the money, which they  
" had

" had pillaged : So that the people, who had  
 " paid nothing to our farmers for the present  
 " lustrum, have now paid the arrears of the last,  
 " even without murmuring. This has placed me  
 " in high favour with the publicans : A grate-  
 " ful set of men, you will say : I have really  
 " found them such. — The rest of my jurisdiction  
 " shall be managed with the same address, and  
 " create the same admiration of my clemency and  
 " easiness'. There is no difficulty of access to

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
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Surely a corrupt and vicious taste for glory was never more visible in any man than it is in *Cicero*, when he affects to despise \* his provincial government of *Cilicia*; where he had done more good and deserved more praise, than in any one scene of his life ; having, agreeably to his determined purpose, when he entered upon that employment, so conducted himself as to leave the innocence and integrity of his administration for a pattern of government to all succeeding Proconsuls. But, though he had there (as our late Laureate observes) " thrown into actual practice those various virtues, of which, as a private man, he had hitherto only recommended the precepts ; yet so quiet, so confined an eminence, such simplicity of virtue, alas ! had no charms for *Cicero*. The thing itself was quite disagreeable to his temper. And truly a temper more delicately difficult to please we seldom meet with ; yet was not this distaste more extraordinary than the reasons for it. — The whole affair is too inconsiderable for a man of my strength and capacity, who am able to sustain, as I used to do, the weightier business of the Republic. [Iustum negotium non est dignum

Cibb. p.  
178.

Vid. supr.  
p. 153.

\* When just setting out from his province for Italy, he writes thus to *Cælius* : " Rome, my friend, Rome alone, is the object that merits your attention : And may you ever live within the splendor of that illustrious scene ! All foreign employments (and it was my sentiment from my first entrance into the world) are below the ambition of those who have talents to distinguish themselves on that more conspicuous theatre. And would to God, as I was ever well convinced of this truth, I had always acted accordingly."

Ep. Fam. ii.  
12.  
Melm. vi. 4.

" me,

Y.R. 703. " me, as there is to all other provincial Govern-  
 Bef. Chr. " ors; no introduction by my Chamberlain: I  
 49. " am always up before day, and walking in my  
492 Conf. " hall, with my doors open, as I used to do  
 " when a candidate at *Rome*: This is great and  
 " gracious here; though not at all troublesome

" *viribus nostris, qui majora onera, in Republica, sustinere et  
 possem et soleam.]*

This weightier business of the Republic, if we consider the whole political conduct of *Cicero* we must, observe to be mere party business; nothing more than employing his utmost eloquence to defend the Senate in its usurpations upon the rights of the People, and to defend every super-egregious villain who professed himself his admirer, or to be of the Aristocratical faction; because, so long as the Senate governed with sovereign authority, so long *Cicero*, by the means of that same eloquence, had a considerable share in the government.

For, as to what the Laureate imagines, that *Cicero's* great object was "to mend the morals of *Rome*, an enterprize not "within the reach of human policy, benevolence, or wisdom to "effect," it does not appear that *Cicero* had any such chimerical project. Ill qualified must he have been for a Reformer of manners, who made it his business to skreen from punishment the most notorious violators of the laws, even corrupt Judges, that sold decrees. *Vid. vol. VIII. p. 335 & 344.* He employed his eloquence to defend *Antonius*, of whose robberies he shared the profit: He defended *Vatinius* and *Gabinius*, men whom he himself had branded for knaves; and, as we have seen, was ready to defend *Catiline*, if *Catiline* would have requested that favour. *Vid. vol. VIII. p. 785.* Even in the suppression of *Catiline's* Conspiracy, which he for ever boasts of as the most glorious of all exploits, his manner of doing it was absolutely illegal and inexcusable, and of so pernicious a tendency, that he seems richly to have deserved the banishment to which he was condemned on that account. *Vide vol. VIII. p. 283, the note; and 305.*

Vid. Vol.  
VIII. p.  
359.

" to

“ to me, from my old habit and discipline, Y.R. 703.  
 “ &c.—”<sup>z.</sup>

But *Cicero's* method of governing gave no small umbrage, it seems, to his predecessor *Appius*, who considered it as a reproach upon himself, and sent several querulous letters to *Cicero*, because he had reversed some of his constitutions : “ *And Midd. 36.*  
*no wonder, says Cicero, that he is displeased with*  
*“ my manner ; for what can be more unlike than*  
*“ his administration and mine ? Under him the*  
*“ province was drained by expences and exactions ;*  
*“ under me, not a penny levied for public or private*  
*“ use : What shall I say of his Præfects, attendants,*  
*“ Lieutenants ? Of their plunders, rapines, inju- *Ad Att.**  
*“ ries ? Whereas now, there is not a single family*  
*“ governed with such order, discipline, and mo- *vi. 1.**  
*“ desty, as my province. This some of Appius's*  
*“ friends interpret ridiculous, as if I was taking*  
*“ pains to exalt my own character, in order to*  
*“ depress his ; and doing all this, not for the*  
*“ sake of my own credit, but of his disgrace.”*

*Vid. infra,*  
*P. 215.*

*Cicero's* letters to *Appius* make one book of *Midd. 40.*  
 his familiar epistles, the greatest part of which are of the expostulatory kind, on the subject of

<sup>z</sup> What pity it is that a man who knew so well what was right, and could occasionally conform his conduct so strictly to it, should appear, even by his own account of himself, to have had no better motive for so doing than *mere vain-glory*, and the *desire of applause*; and should be all the while a detestable hypocrite, a villain in his heart, and so shameless as to make no scruple to own to his intimate friend, that he practised falsehood and hypocrisy without scruple, and as a necessary means to the living comfortably in the world. We shall meet with this confession very soon, in one of his letters.

their

V.R.703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Conf.

Ad Att.

vii. 1.

Ad Att.

vi. 6.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 6.

Ib. iii. 12.

their mutual jealousies and complaints. In this slippery state of their friendship, an accident happened at *Rome*, which had like to have put an end to it. His daughter *Tullia*, after parting from her second husband *Crassipes*, as it is probably thought, by *divorce*, he being alive at this time, and under *Cicero's* displeasure, was married, in her father's absence, to a third, *P. Cornelius Dolabella*: Several parties had been offered to her, and, among these, *Tib. Claudius Nero*, who afterwards married *Livia*, whom *Augustus* took away from him: *Nero made his proposals to Cicero in Cilicia*, who referred him to the women, to whom he had left the management of that affair; but, before these overtures reached them, they had made up the match with *Dolabella*, being mightily taken with his complaisant and obsequious address. He was a nobleman of *Patrician descent*, and of great parts and politeness; but of a violent, daring, ambitious temper, and, by a life of pleasure and expense, greatly distressed in his fortunes; which made *Cicero* very uneasy when he came afterwards to know it. *Dolabella*, at the time of his marriage, for which he made way also by the divorce of his first wife, gave a proof of his enterprizing genius, by impeaching *Appius Claudius* of practices against the state in his government of Cilicia, and of bribery and corruption in his suit for the Consulship. This put a great difficulty upon *Cicero*, and made it natural to suspect that he privately favoured the impeachment, where the accuser was his son-in-law. But, in clearing himself

self of it to *Appius*, though he dissembled in disclaiming any knowledge of that match, yet he was very sincere in professing himself an utter stranger to the impeachment, and was in truth, for his own sake, greatly disturbed at it. But as, from the circumstance of his succeeding to *Appius* in his government, he was of all men the most capable of serving or hurting him at the trial, so *Pompey*, who took great pains to screen *Appius*, was extremely desirous to engage *Cicero* on their side, *and had thoughts of sending one of his sons to him for that purpose*: But *Cicero* saved them that trouble, by declaring early and openly for *Appius*, and promising every thing from the province that could be of any service to him: So that *Appius*, instead of declining a trial, contrived to bring it on as soon as he could; and with that view, having dropt his pretensions to a Triumph, entered the City, and offered himself to his Judges, before his accuser was prepared for him: He was acquitted, without any difficulty, of both the indictments.

The following Letters not only lay before us the base hypocritical conduct of *Cicero*, with regard to *Appius* and *Dolabella*, but contain several important particulars of what at this time was doing at *Rome* in relation to *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, and the approaching breach between them.

*Marcus Cælius to Cicero.*

" You have been informed, I doubt not, that  
" *Dolabella* has exhibited articles of impeachment  
against

Y.R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Conf.

Ep. Fam.  
viii. 6.  
Melm. v.  
4.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

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" against Appius : And this prosecution seems to be  
 " more agreeable to the world in general than I  
 " imagined. Appius however has acted with great  
 " prudence upon the occasion : For, as soon as his  
 " adversary had lodged his information, he with-  
 " drew his petition for a Triumph, and imme-  
 " diately entered the City. By this means he si-  
 " lenced the reports to his disadvantage ; as he  
 " appeared more willing to take his trial than his  
 " prosecutor expected. Appius relies greatly, in  
 " this conjuncture, upon your assistance : And, I am  
 " persuaded, you are not disinclined to serve him.  
 " You have it now in your power to do so, as  
 " far as you shall think proper : Though I must  
 " add, you would be more at liberty to limit  
 " your good offices toward him, if you and he  
 " had never been ill together. But, as the case  
 " now stands, were you to measure out your  
 " services by the right he has to demand them, it  
 " might be suspected that you were not sincere in  
 " your reconciliation : Whereas you can ha-  
 " zard no censure by obliging him, as you will  
 " shew that you are not to be discouraged from  
 " acting a generous part, even where *friendship*  
 " might incline you to the contrary. This re-  
 " minds me of acquainting you, that Dolabella's  
 " wife obtained a divorce just upon the commence-  
 " ment of this prosecution. I remember the com-  
 " mission <sup>a</sup> you left with me, when you set out for

<sup>a</sup> It seems very evident from this passage, that there was some prospect of a divorce between Dolabella and his wife before Cicero left Rome ; and that Cicero had commissioned Cœlius,

" the

"the province: As, I dare say, you have not forgotten  
"what I afterwards wrote to you concerning that  
"affair. I have not time to enlarge upon it at  
"present: Only let me advise you, how much soever  
"you may relish the scheme, to wait the event of  
"this trial, before you discover your sentiments. If,  
"indeed, your inclinations should be known, it will  
"raise a very invidious clamour against you: And  
"should you give Dolabella the least intimation of  
"them, they will certainly become more publick than  
"will be convenient either for your interest or your  
"honour. He would undoubtedly be unable to  
"conceal a circumstance so advantageous to his  
"present views, and which would give so much  
"credit to the prosecution in which he is engaged:  
"And, I am persuaded, he would scarce refrain  
"from making it the subject of his conversation,  
"notwithstanding he was sure the discovery would  
"prove to his prejudice.

"Pompey, I am told, interests himself extremely  
"in behalf of Appius; insomuch that it is gene-  
"rally imagined he has a design of sending one  
"of his sons to sollicit you in his favour. Mean  
"while we are in the humour here of acquitting  
"all criminals: Nothing, in truth, so base and so  
"villainous can be perpetrated, that is not sure  
"of escaping punishment. You will perceive how  
"wondrously active our Consuls are in their office,  
"when I tell you that they have not yet been

as some  
before  
Cælius,  
"the  
*in case this event should happen, to take some measures for pro-  
curing a match between Dolabella and his daughter Tullia.*  
Melm. Vol. I. p. 438.

Y.R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Cons.

**Y. R. 703.**  
Bef. Chr.

49.

**402 Conf.**

Vid. supr.  
p. 186.

" able to procure a single decree of the Senate,  
" except one for appointing the *Latian festivals*.  
" Even our friend *Curio* has not hitherto acted  
" with any spirit in his Tribune: As indeed it  
" is impossible to describe the general indolence that  
" has seized us. If it were not for my contest  
" with the vintners, and the surveyors of the  
" public aqueducts, all *Rome* would appear in a  
" profound lethargy. In short, I know not to  
" what degree the *Parthians* may have animated  
" you: But as for us, in this part of the world, we  
" are fast asleep. But how much soever we may  
" want to be awakened, I hope it will not be by  
" the *Parthians*. It is reported, nevertheless,  
" though I know not on what foundation, that  
" they have gained some slight advantage over  
" the troops of *Bibulus* near mount *Amanus*.

" Since I wrote the above, I must recall what  
" I said concerning *Curio*: The cold fit is at length  
" expelled by the warmth of those censures to  
" which the levity of his conduct has exposed  
" him. For, not being able to carry his point  
" with respect to the intercalation [for which he  
" had applied himself to the Pontifical college, in  
" order to lengthen out the period of his Tribune-  
" cian ministry] he has deserted the interest of  
" the Senate, and harangued the People in favour  
" of *Cæsar*. He threatens likewise to propose a  
" *Viarian Law*, somewhat of the same tendency  
" with the *Agrarian*, which was formerly at-  
" tempted by *Rullus*: As also another, empow-  
" ering the *Ædiles* to distribute corn among the  
" People.

" If

" If you should determine (as I think you  
 ought) to employ your good offices in behalf of  
 Appius, I beg you would take that opportunity  
 of recommending me to his favour. Let me  
 prevail with you likewise not to declare yourself  
 with respect to Dolabella; as your leaving that  
 point at large will be of singular importance, not  
 only to the affair I hint at, but also in regard to  
 the opinion the world will entertain of your justice  
 and honour.

Y.R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Conf.

" Will it not be a high reflection upon you, if  
 I should not be furnished with some Grecian  
 panthers? Farewel."

### To Marcus Cælius.

" Would you imagine I should ever be at a loss  
 for words? I do not mean of that chosen and  
 elegant kind which are the privilege of you ce-  
 lebrated Orators, but those of ordinary and com-  
 mon use. Yet, believe me, I am utterly inca-  
 pable of expressing the solicitude I feel con-  
 cerning the resolutions that may be taken in  
 the Senate in regard to the provinces. I am  
 extremely impatient indeed to return to my  
 friends at Rome: Among which number you  
 are principally in my thoughts. I will confess  
 likewise, that I am quite satiated with my go-  
 vernment. For, in the first place, I have more  
 reason to apprehend that some reverse of fortune  
 may deprive me of the glory I have here acquired,  
 than to expect I should be able to raise it higher:

Ep. Fam.

ii. 11.

Melm. v.

12

Y.R. 703. " And, in the next place, I cannot but look upon  
 Bef. Chr. " the whole busines of this scene as much inferior  
 49. " to my strength; which is both able and accu-  
402 Conf. " stomed to support a far more important weight.  
 " I will acknowledge too, that I am uneasy in the  
 " expectation of a very terrible war [with the Par-  
 " thians] which is like to be kindled in this part  
 " of the world; and which I may probably escape,  
 " if I should obtain my dismission at the stated time.

" I do not forget the panthers you desired;  
 " and have given my orders to the persons usually  
 " employed in hunting them: But these animals  
 " are exceedingly scarce with us. They take it  
 " so unkind, you must know, that they should be  
 " the only creatures in my province for whom any  
 " snares are laid, that they have withdrawn them-  
 " selves from my government, and are gone into  
 " *Caria* — Be well assured the honour of your  
 " *Ædileship* is much my care: And *this day* par-  
 " ticularly reminds me of it, as it is the festival  
 " of the *Megalensian games*, [which were under  
 the conduct of the *Curule Ædiles*, of whom Cœlius  
 was now one. The festival began on the fourth  
 of April, and continued six days.]

" I hope you will send me a minute detail of  
 " our public affairs; as I have an entire depend-  
 " ance on the accounts which are transmitted to  
 " me by your hand. Farewel."

To *Marcus Cælius, Curule Aedile.*

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.

49.  
402 Conf.

Ep. Fam.  
ii. 13.  
Melm. v.  
15  
\*Vid. supr.  
P. 207.

" YOUR very agreeable letters visit me but seldom: Perhaps by some accident or other they lose their way. *How full was the last* \* *which came to my hands of the most prudent and obliging advice!* I had determined indeed to act in the manner you recommend: But it gives an additional strength to one's resolutions, to find them agreeable to the sentiments of so faithful and so judicious a friend. I have often assured you of my extreme affection for Appius: And I had reason to believe, after our mutual reconciliation, that he entertained the same favourable disposition towards me. For he distinguished me, in his Consulate, with great marks of honour and amity.—I appeal to you, that I was not wanting, on my part, in a suitable return: And, indeed, he stood so much the higher in my esteem, as I was sensible of the affection he had conceived for you. Add to this, that I am, as you well know, wholly devoted to Pompey, and tenderly attached also to Brutus. Can I then want a reason of uniting myself with Appius, thus supported, as he is, by the most powerful friends and alliances, and flourishing in every other advantage that can be derived from affluent possessions, in conjunction with great abilities? — Believe me, I have never said or done the least thing, throughout the whole course of my government, with a view of prejudicing his reputation. And now, that my friend Dolabella

Y. R. 703. Bef. Chr. 49. 402 Conf.  
 \* Curio.

" has so rashly attacked him, I am exerting all  
 " my good offices to dissipate the rising storm with  
 " which he is threatened. You mentioned some-  
 " thing of a lethargic inactivity that had seized  
 " the Republic. I rejoiced, no doubt, to hear  
 " that you were in a state of such profound tran-  
 " quillity, as well as that *our spirited friend*\* was  
 " so much infected with this general indolence, as  
 " not to be in a humour of disturbing it. But  
 " the last paragraph of your letter, which was  
 " written, I observed, with your own hand, changed  
 " the scene, and somewhat indeed discomposed  
 " me. Is *Curio* really then become a convert to  
 " *Cæsar*? But, extraordinary as this event may  
 " appear to others, believe me, it is agreeable to  
 " what I always suspected. Good Gods! how  
 " do I long to laugh with you at the ridiculous  
 " farce which is acting in your part of the world!

" I have finished my juridical circuit; and not  
 " only settled the finances of the several cities  
 " upon a more advantageous basis, but secured  
 " to the farmers of the revenues the arrears due  
 " to their former agreements, without the least  
 " complaint from any of the parties concerned.  
 " In short, I have given entire satisfaction to all  
 " orders and degrees of men in this province. I  
 " propose, therefore, to set out for *Cilicia* on the  
 " seventh of May. From whence, after having  
 " just looked upon the troops in their summer  
 " cantonment, and settled some affairs relating to  
 " the army, I intend, agreeably to the decree of  
 " the Senate for that purpose, to set forward to

" *Rome*,

“*Rome.* I am extremely impatient, indeed, to re- Y.R. 703.  
 “turn to my friends; but particularly to you, Bef. Chr.  
 “whom I much wish to see in the administration 49.  
 “of your *AEdileship*.—Farewel.” 40. Conf.

To *Appius Pulcher.*

“WHEN I first received an account of the ill-  
 “judged prosecution which had been commenced  
 “against you, it gave me great concern; as no-  
 “thing could possibly have happened that I less  
 “expected. But, as soon as I had recovered from  
 “my surprise, I was well satisfied that you will  
 “easily disappoint the malice of your enemies; as  
 “I have the highest confidence in your own ju-  
 “dicious conduct for that purpose; as well as a  
 “very great one in that of your friends. I see  
 “many reasons, indeed, to believe, that *the envy*  
 “of your adversaries will only brighten that cha-  
 “racter they meant to fully. Though I cannot but  
 “regret, that they should have thus snatched from  
 “you an honour you so justly merit, and of which  
 “you had so well-grounded an assurance; the ho-  
 “nour I mean of a *Triumph*. However, you will  
 “shew your judgment, if you should consider this  
 “pompous distinction in the light it has ever ap-  
 “peared to my own view; and at the same time  
 “enjoy a triumph of the completest kind, in the con-  
 “fusion and disappointment of your enemies: As I  
 “am well convinced, that the vigorous and pru-  
 “dent exertion of your power and influence will  
 “give them full reason to repent of their violent  
 “proceedings. As for myself, be well assured (and

Ep. Fam.  
 iii. 10.  
 Melm.  
 vi. 1.

Y.R. 703.

Vid. supr.

P. 205.

" *I call every God to witness the sincerity of what I  
promise) that I will exert my utmost interest in  
support, I will not say of your person, which, I  
hope, is in no danger, but of your dignities and  
honour. To this end, I shall employ my best good  
offices for you in this province, where you once  
presided; and employ them with all the warmth  
of an intercessor, with all the assiduity of a re-  
lation, with all the influence of a man, who, I  
trust, is dear to those cities, and with all the  
authority of one who is invested with the su-  
preme command. In a word, I hope you will  
both ask and expect of me every service in my  
power: And, believe me, I shall give you  
greater proofs of my affection than you are  
disposed, perhaps to imagine. Notwithstanding,  
therefore, the letter I received from you by  
the hands of *Quintus Servilius* was extremely  
short, yet I could not but think it much too  
long: For it was doing an injury to the sen-  
timents of my heart, to suppose you had any occasion  
to sollicit my assistance. I am sorry you should  
have an opportunity of experiencing, by an in-  
cident so little agreeable to you, the rank you  
bear in my affection, the esteem which I entertain  
for Pompey, whom I justly value above all men,  
and the measure of my unfeigned regard for Bru-  
tus: Circumstances, I should hope, of which  
our daily intercourse had rendered you suffi-  
ciently sensible. However, since it has so hap-  
pened, I should think I acted a most unworthy,  
not to say a criminal part, if I were to omit any  
article wherein my services can avail you.*

" Ponti-

"Pontinius remembers the singular instances Y.R. 703,  
"of friendship he has received from you, and of Bef. Chr.  
"which I myself was a witness <sup>b</sup>, with all the 49.  
"gratitude and affection to which you have so 402 Conf.  
"undoubted a right. The urgency of his affairs  
"had obliged him, though with great reluctance,  
"to leave me. Nevertheless, having been in-  
"formed, just as he was going to embark at  
"Ephesus, that his presence in this province  
"might be of advantage to your cause, he imme-  
"diately returned back to Laodicea. I am per-  
"suaded you will meet with numberless such in-  
"stances of zeal upon this occasion: Can I doubt  
"then that this troublesome affair will prove, in  
"the conclusion, greatly to your credit?

"If you should be able to bring on an election  
"of CENSORS, and should exercise that office in  
"the manner you certainly ought, and for which you  
"are so perfectly <sup>c</sup> well qualified, you can never  
"want that authority in the Republic which will  
"afford at once a protection both to yourself and  
"your friends. Let me intreat, therefore, your  
"most strenuous endeavours to prevent my admini-  
"stration from being prolonged: That, after having  
"filled up the measure of my affectionate services

<sup>b</sup> Pontinius met with so strong an opposition to his claim of a Triumph for quelling the Allobroges, and particularly from Cato, that it was four years before his petition was granted. Appius was then Consul, and favoured him. *Vid. supra, p. 106.*

<sup>c</sup> N. B. Cicero, while he wrote this, thought no man less qualified for the office than Appius; whose projects of reformation are a subject of ridicule to him and his correspondent Cælius. *Ep. Fam. viii. 14.*

Y.R. 703. "to you here, I may have the satisfaction also of  
Bef. Chr. "presenting them to you at *Rome*.

49. "I read with pleasure, though by no means  
403 Conf. "with surprize, the account you gave me of that

"general zeal which all orders and degrees of men  
"have shewn in your cause: A circumstance of  
"which I had likewise been informed by my other

\*Vid. sup. "friends\*. It affords me great satisfaction to  
P. 207. "find, that a man, with whom I have the honour

"and pleasure to be so intimately united, is thus  
"distinguished with that universal approbation he  
"so justly deserves. But I rejoice in this upon  
"another consideration likewise; and as it is a  
"proof that there still remains a general disposition  
"in Rome to support the cause of illustrious<sup>a</sup> me-  
"rit: A disposition, which I have myself also ex-  
"perienced, upon every occasion, as the honour-  
"able recompence of my pains and vigils in the  
"public service. But I am astonished that *Dola-*  
"bella, a young man whom I formerly rescued  
"with the utmost difficulty from the consequences  
"of two capital impeachments, should so ungrate-  
"fully forget the patron to whom he owes all  
"that he enjoys, as to be the author of this ill-  
"considered prosecution of my friend. And what  
"aggravates the folly of his conduct is, that he  
"should thus adventure to attack a man, who is  
"distinguished with the highest honours, and sup-  
"ported by the most powerful friendships; at  
"the same time that he himself (to speak of him

Melm.

<sup>a</sup> The illustrious merit of *Appius* we have seen above. Vid.  
supra, p. 205.

" in

" in the softest terms) is greatly deficient in both  
 " these respects. I had received an account from  
 " our friend *Cælius*, before your letter reached  
 " my hand, of the idle and ridiculous report he has  
 " propagated, and on which you so largely ex-  
 " pitate. There is so little ground, however, for  
 " what he asserts, that be assured I would much  
 " sooner break off all former friendship with a man  
 " who had thus declared himself your enemy, than  
 " be prevailed upon to engage with him in any  
 " new connexions e.

Y. R. 703.  
Bef. Chr.  
49.  
402 Conf.

e " Nothing could be more distant from *Cicero's* heart than  
 " what he here pretends. For there is the strongest evidence  
 " to believe that it was his fixed intention, at this very time,  
 " to enter into an alliance with *Dolabella*: And, in fact, *Tullia*  
 " was married to him soon after the date of this letter. *Cicero*  
 " affirms, I must acknowledge, in an epistle to *Atticus*, that  
 " this transaction was intirely without his knowledge; But he  
 " seems to have dealt as insincerely upon this occasion with  
 " his bosom friend, as he too frequently did with all the world  
 " beside. Accordingly he assures *Atticus*, he so little expected  
 " the news of his daughter's match, that he was actually in  
 " treaty for the disposal of her to another person. But, if the  
 " latter part of this assertion were true, it aggravates his dis-  
 " simulation: For the former most evidently was false. For,  
 " not to mention the great probability there is that he left a  
 " commission with *Cælius*, when he set out for the province, re-  
 " lating to the marriage in question, it appears that he had received  
 " more than one letter from him upon this subject, before he

Ad Att.  
xi. 6.

" wrote the last mentioned to *Atticus*; and consequently that  
 " he could not have been so much a stranger to the affair as he  
 " chose to represent himself. For *Cicero's* answer to the letter  
 " of *Cælius*, concerning this treaty with *Dolabella*, is extant,  
 " and it cannot be dated later than the beginning of May in the  
 " present year; because he mentions the seventh of that month  
 " as a future day, on which he proposed to return from ano-  
 " ther part of his province into *Cilicia*. But the letter to

Vid. supr.  
p. 208.

**Y.R. 703.** " You have not the least reason to doubt of  
**Bef. Chr.** " my zeal to serve you; of which I have given  
49.  
**492 Conf.**

" Atticus must have been written in the latter end of the same  
" year, because he takes notice in it of the death of Hortensius.  
" Now he was not informed of that event till he came to  
" Rhodes, in his voyage from Cilicia; as he himself tells us in  
" the introduction of his oratorical treatise, inscribed to Brutus.  
" If Cicero then was capable of thus disguising the truth con-  
" cerning Dolabella, to the nearest and most valuable of his  
" friends; it is no wonder he should not scruple to act a still  
" more counterfeit part in all that he says of him to Appius.

" And this dissimulation he very freely acknowledges to *Cælius*, who indeed was in the whole secret of the affair; as it was by his intervention that it seems to have been principally conducted. Accordingly *Cicero*, taking notice to *Cælius* of the Letter now before us, which he tells him was written in consequence of the information he had received from him, expresses himself in the following remarkable words: "What would you have said, had you seen the letter I wrote to *Appius* after my receiving yours upon that subject? *Quid si meam* (*sc. epistolam.*) *legas quam ego tum ex tuis literis misi ad Appium?* *sed quid agas?* *sic vivitur:* Which, in plain English, amounts to this, That, if a man will live in the world, he must submit to the lowest and most contemptible hypocrisy\*. " And it must be owned that *Cicero*, in the present instance, as well as in most others, acted up to the full extent of his maxim." *Ad Att.* vi. 6. *Ep. Fam.* viii. 6. *De Clar. Orator.* i. *Ep. Fam.* ii. 15.

Vid. *infra*, " *lifz*, amounts to this, *That, if a man will live in the world,*  
P. 222. " *he must submit to the lowest and most contemptible hypocrisy*\*.  
" And it must be owned that Cicero, in the present instance,  
" as well as in most others, acted up to the full extent of his  
" maxim." *Ad Att.* vi. 6. *Ep. Fam.* viii. 6. *De Clar.*  
*Orator.* i. *Ep. Fam.* ii. 15.

**Ep. Fam.** The letter to *Cælius*, in which we find this convenient maxim,  
**iii. 15.** contains the following passage.  
**Makr.**

— “ It is with great pleasure I find that *Dolabella* enjoys  
“ the happiness of your esteem and friendship. I was at no  
“ loss to guess the circumstance to which you alluded when you  
“ mentioned your hopes, that the prudence of my daughter *Tullia*  
“ would temper his conduct.” M. Bayle observes, that *Cælius*’s

## Article Tullie.

\* How admirably well does this maxim accord with those words in the above Letter--*The probity of my heart, a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth!*

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" many conspicuous testimonies in this province, Y.R. 703.  
" as well as at *Rome*: Your letter, nevertheless, Bef. Chr.  
" intimates some sort of suspicion of the con- 49.  
" trary. ——————

" If ever you experienced *the probity of my heart*, or observed *a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth*; if ever you discovered, by my conduct in the most important transactions, that I was neither void of spirit nor destitute of abilities, you ought to have believed me incapable of acting a low and little part towards my friends, much more a base and a treacherous one ——————.

letter to *Cicero*, concerning *Dolabella* (whom *Cælius* knew to be a rake and a spendthrift) is exactly in the stile of compliment that would now be used in the like case. " On excuseroit le passé sur la jeunesse; et si l'on n'osoit pas assurer que toutes les imperfections de cet age fussent corrigée, on diroit que le mariage avec une personne si accomplie, avec la fille d'un si excellent pere,acheveroit la guerison." The letter runs thus :

*Marcus Cælius to Cicero.*

" I congratulate you on your alliance with so worthy a man Ep. Fam.  
" as *Dolabella*: For such I sincerely think him. His former viii.  
" conduct, it is true, has not been altogether for his own ad- Melm.  
" vantage. But time has now worn out those little indiscre- vi. 1.  
" tions of his youth: At least, if any of them should still remain,  
" the authority and advantage of your advice and friendship,  
" together with the good sense of *Tullia*, will soon, I am con-  
" fident, reclaim him. He is by no means, indeed, obstinate:  
" And it is not from any incapacity of discerning better, when-  
" ever he deviates from the right path. To say all in one word,  
" I infinitely love him." ——————

" But

Y.R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

492 Conf.

" But abstracted from these numerous and powerful motives, there is *one*, which, of itself, might be sufficient to evince the disposition in which I stand towards you. For, tell me, did ever any man entertain, or had ever any man reason to entertain, so high an esteem for another, as that which you know I am filled with for the illustrious father-in-law of your daughter? If personal obligations indeed can give him a title to these sentiments; do I not owe to Pompey the enjoyment of my Country, my family, my dignities, and even my very self<sup>f</sup>? —

— “ Upon the whole, as you are united, not only by alliance, but by affection to my illustrious friend; what are the sentiments, do you imagine, that I ought to bear towards you? The truth of it is, were I your professed enemy, as I am most sincerely the reverse, yet, after the letter which I lately received from Pompey, I should think myself obliged to sacrifice my sentiment to his request, and be wholly governed by the inclinations of a man to whom I am thus greatly indebted. — I expect every day to hear that you are chosen CENSOR, &c. — Farewel.”

In a subsequent Letter to *Appius*, he writes thus —

Melm.

“ Cicero by no means thought himself so much obliged to Pompey as he here pretends: And all these extravagant professions were a mere artifice (and a thin one it must be owned) to make Pompey believe that he had forgotten the ill usage he had formerly received from him.” *Vid. ad Att. ix. 13.*

“ WHILST

“ WHILST I lay encamped on the banks of Y.R. 703.  
“ the *Pyramus* [a river in *Cilicia*] I received two  
“ letters from you, and both at the same time.—  
“ One of them was dated on *the fifth of April*;  
“ but the other, which seemed to have been writ-  
“ ten later, was without any date. I will answer  
“ the former therefore in the first place, wherein  
“ you give me an account of *your having been ac-*  
“ *quitted of the impeachment exhibited against you*  
“ *for male-administration in this province.* I had Vid. sup.  
P. 205.  
“ before been apprised of many circumstances of  
“ this event by various letters and expresses, as  
“ well as by general report. — But, notwith-  
“ standing your Letter was in some measure an-  
“ ticipated, yet it heightened my satisfaction to re-  
“ ceive the same good news from your own hand.  
“ My information was by this means not only more Vid. sup.  
P. 221.  
“ full than what I had learnt from common fame,  
“ but it brought you nearer to my imagination, and  
“ rendered you in some sort present to those senti-  
“ ments of joy which arose upon this occasion in my  
“ heart. Accordingly, I embraced you in my thoughts,  
“ and kissed the letter that gave me so much reason  
“ to rejoice upon my own account as well as upon  
“ yours. I say, upon my own account, because I look  
“ upon those honours, which are thus paid by the ge-  
“ neral voice of my Country to VIRTUE, industry,  
“ and genius, as paid to myself; being too much  
“ disposed, perhaps, to imagine that these are  
“ qualities to which my own character is no stran-  
“ ger. But, though I am by no means surprised  
“ that this trial should have ended so much to  
“ your credit, yet I cannot forbear being asto-  
“ nished

Ep. Fam.  
iii. 11.  
Melm.  
iii. 11.

Y.R. 703. " nished at that mean and unworthy spirit which  
 Bef. Chr. " carried your enemies to engage in this prosecu-  
 49. " tion." [hinting at Dolabella, whose friendship  
 402 Conf. and alliance Cicero was at this time courting.] —  
 " Farewel : And if you are (as I sincerely hope)  
 " in the possession of the *Censorial* office, reflect  
 " often on the virtues of your illustrious ances-  
 " tor \*."

\* App.

Claud.

Cæcucus.

Dio, p.

147.

Vid. vol.

VIII. p.

402.

Midd. p.

42.

Ep. Fam.

viii. 14.

Dio, p.

150.

In a little time after *Appius's* trial he was chosen CENSOR, together with *Piso*, *Cæsar's* father-in law, the last men who bore that office during the *Aristocracy*, or rather the *Anarchy*, of *Rome*. *Clodius's* Law, mentioned above, which had greatly restrained the power of these Magistrates, was repealed the last year by *Scipio* the Consul (*Pompey's* father-in-law), and their ancient authority restored to them, which was now exercised with great rigour by *Appius*: Who, though really a Libertine, and remarkable for indulging himself in all the luxury of life, yet, by an affectation of severity, hoped to retrieve his character, and pass for an admirer of that ancient discipline, for which many of his ancestors had been celebrated. But this vain and unseasonable attempt of reformation served only to alienate people from *Pompey's* cause, with whom *Appius* was strictly allied: Whilst his Colleague *Piso*, who foresaw that effect, chose to sit still, and suffer him to disgrace the Knights and Senators at pleasure, which he did with great freedom, and, among others, turned *Sallust the Historian* out of the Senate, and was hardly restrained from putting the same affront upon *Curio*. This added strength to *Cæsar*; of whom



whom both the SENATE and Pompey were at this time become extremely jealous: The SENATE, because of Cæsar's amazing victories, which made him idolized more than ever by the PEOPLE: Pompey, because Cæsar, as in all other accomplishments, so even in *military virtue*, appeared now to be his superior beyond compare.

## C H A P. IX.

*The war of Cæsar in Gaul, commenced in the year 695, and continued to the year 703.*

**G**AUL (without including the *Roman province*) was, at the time of Cæsar's going thither, divided into three principal parts, *Aquitain*, *Celtic Gaul*, and *Belgic Gaul*.

*Aquitain*, the *smallest* of the three, was bounded on the North by the river *Garrone*, on the South by the *Pyrenees*, on the West by the *Ocean*, and on the East by the *Roman province*\*.

The *largest* of the three, named *Celtic Gaul*, because inhabited by a people who called themselves *Celtæ*, though by the *Romans* they were called <sup>s</sup> *Galli* [Gauls], had for its boundaries the *Ocean* on the West, the *Rhine* on the East, the *Garrone* on the South, and the *Seine* and the *Marne* on the North.

The two last named rivers made the Southern boundary of *Belgic Gaul*. On its other sides it

C. J. Cæs.  
de Bell.  
Gall. Com.  
lib. i.

Aquitania.

\* contain-  
ing almost  
all Pro-  
vence and  
Languedoc

Gallia  
Celtica.

<sup>s</sup> Cæsar very rarely, if ever, gives the name of *Gauls* to the people of *Aquitania* or of *Gallia Belgica*. Crev.

was encompassed by the *British channel* and the *Lower Rhine*.

Each of these nations had its distinct language, customs, and laws. Of the three, the *Belgæ* (or *Belgic nation*) were the most warlike, because situated the most remote from the refinements and luxury of the *Roman province*, and because continually engaged in war with their neighbours, the *Germans*, on the other side the *Rhine*.

The people  
of Switzer-  
land.

For the same reason the *Helvetii* were distinguished above the rest of the *Celtæ* for their bravery, being almost constantly, either as aggressors, or as acting on the defensive, at war with the *Germans*.

In the Consulship of *M. Messala* and *M. Piso* [Y. of R. 692.] *Orgetorix*, the most opulent and most illustrious of the *Helvetian* nobles, formed a singular project of ambition. Having first gained to his purpose the principal men of the state, he exhorted the people to remove all together in a body out of their own country; representing to them, that, as they surpassed all the other *Celtæ* in bravery, they would find it easy to acquire the sovereignty over the whole country of *Celtic Gaul*. To this proposal the *Helvetii* listened the more readily, not only because they thought themselves confined within limits too narrow for their number (their territory being only 140 miles in length, and 80 in breadth) but because, being bounded on one side by the *Rhine*, a broad and deep river; on another by *Mount Jura* \*, a high ridge of hills that runs between them and the *Segaroni*;

\* Mount  
*St. Claude.*

A MAP OF  
CELTICA  
AQUITANIA  
and THE  
ROMAN PROVINCE

25 30 45 60 75  
Roman Miles

# THE MEDITERRANEAN



*Sequani* †; and on the side of the *Roman* province by the lake ‡ *Leman* and the river *Rhone*, they could not easily make hostile incursions on their neighbours, which restraint was a great grievance, a ground of much discontent to a numerous people that took delight in war.

† Inhabitants of Franche-Comté.  
‡ Lake of Geneva,

Moved by these considerations, and by the authority and persuasions of *Orgetorix*, they presently resolved to set about the providing of all necessaries for the projected migration. They imagined two years would be sufficient for these preparations, and they obliged themselves by a law to begin their march on the third. The whole management of this design was committed to *Orgetorix*, who undertook an embassy to two of the neighbouring states, the *Sequani* and *Aedui*, in order to establish peace and amity with them. As his aim was to make himself King of his own nation, he took this opportunity to persuade *Casticus*, whose father had for many years reigned over the *Sequani*, and been stiled *Friend* by the Senate and People of *Rome*, to possess himself of the same regal authority which his father had held. He likewise persuaded *Dumnorix* the *Aduan* (brother of *Divitiacus*, at that time the leading man in the state, and greatly beloved of the people) to aspire to Royalty, and he gave him his daughter in marriage.

The people of Autun.

The three entered into strict engagements to assist and support one another in their respective schemes; and they entertained the flattering hope, that, having once brought those to effect, they should

should afterwards, with their united forces, easily get possession of all *Celtic Gaul*.

It happened, that the ambitious design of *Orgetorix*, to raise himself to empire at home, became known to his countrymen: Upon which discovery his person was seized, and a capital process commenced against him. Had he been found guilty, the law condemned him to be burnt alive: But, on the day appointed for his trial, his relations, servants, clients, and debtors, assembling in a body to the number of ten thousand, rescued him out of the hands of justice. The people, provoked at this contempt of the laws, resolved to support the authority of them; and the Magistrates had collected a considerable force for that purpose, when *Orgetorix* died suddenly: It was given out he perished by his own hand.

The *Helvetii*, notwithstanding the death of the projector, continued to pursue the project of migration with the same diligence as before: When they had furnished themselves with provisions for three months, and completed their other preparations, they burnt all their towns, twelve in number; their boroughs and villages, amounting to four hundred; and what corn they could not carry off; that, having thus banished all thoughts of returning to their own country, they might proceed in their enterprize with the more determined courage. Before their departure, they strengthened themselves by allies and companions (who after their example, and at their persuasion, burnt and destroyed their respective dwellings).

dwellings) the *Rauraci*, *Tulingi*, *Latobrigi*, and a swarm of *Boii* from *Norica*<sup>h</sup>.

There were only two ways by which they could march out of their own country: One through the territories of the *Sequani*, between mount *Jura* and the *Rhone*, narrow and difficult, in so much that in some places a single file of waggons could hardly pass. The impending mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of men would be sufficient to stop them. The other lay through the *Roman province*, far easier and readier, because the *Rhone*, which flows between the confines of the *Helvetii* and the *Allobroges* \*, a people lately subjected to the *Romans*, but seemingly not yet well affected to their government, was in some places fordable: And *Geneva*, a frontier town of the *Allobroges*, had a bridge which belonged to the *Helvetii*, whose country bordered upon theirs. The *Helvetii* therefore doubted not of obtaining a passage, either by

\* Inhabitants of Savoye and Dauphine.

<sup>h</sup> The first were the people of *Basil*, who then made part of the *Helvetic* body. The second and third were neighbours of the *Helvetii*. This is all we know of them with certainty. The *Boii* were originally inhabitants of the *Bourbonnais*, colonies of whom had settled in *Germany* and in *Italy*. *Norica* was *Bavaria*, and part of *Austria*. Crev.

After the total defeat of this multitude, a roll, written in Greek characters, was found in their camp, and brought to *Cæsar*. It contained a list of all who had set out upon this expedition, not only of those who were able to bear arms, but of the children, women, and old men. By this list it appeared, that the number of the *Helvetii* was 263,000; of the *Tulingi* 36,000; of the *Latobrigi* 14,000; of the *Rauraci* 23,000; of the *Boii* 32,000; in all 368,000.

persuasion or by force, through the territories of the *Allobroges*. Their general rendezvous was to be on the banks of the *Rhone*; and the day they fixed for it was the twenty-eighth of *March*, in the Consulship of *Piso* and *Gabinius*.

[Year of *Rome* 695.]

*Cæsar*, having notice of these proceedings, and that it was the design of the *Helvetii* to attempt a passage through the *Roman* province, hastened his departure <sup>i</sup> from *Rome*; and, posting by great

<sup>i</sup> We see by this account, which is from *Cæsar* himself, that the reason of his sudden and expeditious journey, from his quarters near *Rome* into *Transalpine Gaul*, was the intelligence he received of the motions and purposes of the *Helvetii*; who had fixed upon the twenty-eighth of *March* for their rendezvous on the banks of the *Rhone*, which they were to pass by the bridge at *Geneva*: And that he arrived at *Geneva* time enough to prevent their passage, by breaking down the bridge, receive an embassy from the *Helvetii*, and, by deferring his answer to the thirteenth of *April*, gain time sufficient to assemble forces out of the province, and draw up lines sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, before the said thirteenth of *April*: We cannot, therefore, well suppose, that he left the neighbourhood of *Rome* much later than the middle of *March*.

Nevertheless M. Crevier, who all along seems (like Dr. Middleton) to be strongly biased by prepossession and prejudice against *Cæsar*, finds a different reason from what *Cæsar* himself gives, for his going suddenly and in haste to his province; and gives that journey a different date. He writes thus:—“*Cæsar*, having driven from the Commonwealth the

Crevier,  
tom. xii.  
p. 202.

“two men he most feared [*Cicero* and *Cato*], had no longer  
“any reason to stay in the neighbourhood of the City, but  
“had reason to remove from it: For the partisans of the Ari-  
“stocracy, beginning to recover from the consternation they  
“had been thrown into by the Consulship of *Cæsar*, and the  
“journeys

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journeys into *Farther Gaul*, came to *Geneva*. He began with breaking down the bridge over the

" violence exercised towards *Cicero*, thought of bestowing  
" themselves to do something against the oppressor of the public  
" liberty. Two of the *Prætors*, *L. Damitius* and *C. Mem-  
mias*, would have the acts of *Caesar's* Consulship submitted  
" to the examination of the Senate, in order to their being an-  
" nulled. His *Quæstor* was prosecuted, and he himself attacked  
" by the Tribune *Antistius*; but he implored the aid of the  
" other Tribunes, that he might have the benefit of the law  
" which sheltered from all prosecutions those who were absent  
" in the service of the State: And he made haste to get  
" away."

*Caesar* is here represented as running away from the neighbourhood of *Rome*, like a criminal who feared to be arrested and brought to punishment; — not a word of the *Helvetii*:

— And this running away, which (as was just now observed) could not well be later than about the middle of *March*, was, according to M. Crevier, some time in *April*: For he tells us that *Cicero* went from *Rome* by night in the beginning of *April*, and that *Caesar* did not leave the neighbourhood of *Rome* till he had driven *Cicero* from thence.

Crevier,  
tom. xii.  
p. 181,  
182.

Now what authority has M. Crevier for contradicting *Caesar's* account of the reason which induced him to go away on a sudden, and in haste, to his province, and of the time when he went? *Suetonius* is the only author cited, an Historian remarkable for delighting in detraction, and for having no regard to the order of events, nor even to probability, in many things which he relates. But it happens in the present instance, that, though *Suetonius* says something not true, he does not say that for which he is cited. He does not say that *Caesar* staid in the neighbourhood of *Rome* till he had driven *Cicero* out of it \*, that is, till the month of *April*; he does not postpone to that time the motion made in the Senate by the two *Prætors*; but speaks of it as made in the beginning of *January*: Nor does he represent *Caesar* as having any apprehension of danger from that motion; but, on the contrary, as consenting to have the Senate take cognizance of the acts of his Consulship [*cognitionem Se-  
natus detulit*]. And, according to *Suetonius*, the prosecution,

\* Plutarch  
in *Cæs.*  
tells us,  
that such a  
report  
there was

Rhone; and, as there was at that time but one Roman legion in *Transalpine Gaul*, he ordered

begun against Cæsar's Quæstor, and the attack, made by the Tribune *Antistius* upon Cæsar himself, were not before his sudden departure from the neighbourhood of Rome, but after it.

Sueton. J. — *Functus Consulatu, C. Memmio, Lucioque Domitio Praetoribus, de superioris anni actis referentibus, cognitionem Senatui detulit; nec illo suscipiente, triduoque per irritas altercationes absumpto, in provinciam abiit: Et statim quæstor ejus in præjudicium aliquot criminibus arreptus est. Mox & ipse a L. Antistio tribuno plebis postulatus, appellato demum collegio, obtinuit, cum reip. causa abesset, reus ne fieret. Ad securitatem ergo posteri temporis, in magno negotio habuit obligare semper annuos magistratus, & è competitoribus non alios adjuvare, aut ad honorem pati pervenire, quam qui sibi pepigissent, propugnaturos absentiam suam: Cujus pacti non dubitavit a quibusdam jurandum, atque etiam syngrapham exigere.* [The last part of this tale appeared, I presume, too ridiculous to Dr. Middleton and M. Crevier, to be adopted by them, notwithstanding their great dislike of Cæsar.]

Doctor Middleton conforms his relation to Suetonius, as to the time when the motion was made in the Senate by the two Praetors; but does not conform it either to Suetonius, or to Cæsar, as to the time when Cæsar went to his province: For the Doctor places this journey after Cicero's departure into banishment, that is, in the month of April; whereas Suetonius places it in January, and Cæsar himself, manifestly, not later than about the middle of March.

Midd. 337. The Doctor's words are these: "Cæsar continued at Rome till he saw Cicero driven out of it [i. e. according to + See the Doctor, till about the end of March †]: But had no Midd. p. sooner laid down his Consulship [on the last day of December 350. preceding] than he began to be attacked and affronted him- Sueton. J. self by two of the new Praetors, L. Domitius and C. Me- Cœl. 23. mmius, who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several efforts in the Senate to get them annulled by public authority. But the Senate had no stomach to meddle with an affair so delicate; so that the whole ended in some fruitless debates and altercations [which had lasted only three great

great levies to be made throughout the whole province. The *Helvetii*, being informed of his arrival, deputed several Noblemen of the first rank to wait upon him in the name of the State, and represent, “That they meant not to offer “the least injury to the *Roman* province; that “necessity alone had determined them to the de-“sign of passing through it, because they had no “other way by which to direct their march; that “they therefore intreated they might have his “permission for that purpose.” But *Cæsar* did not think proper to grant their request: How-  
ever, that he might gain time, till the troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble, he told the Ambassadors he would consider of their demand; and that, if they returned by the *thirteenth of April*, they should have his final answer. Mean while, with the legions he then had, and the soldiers that came in to him from all parts of the province, he raised a rampart sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with a ditch from the lake *Lemanus*, into which the *Rhone* discharges itself, to mount *Jura*, which divides the territories of *Sequani* from those of the *Helvetii*. This work finished, he strengthened it with redoubts from space to space, and manned

“days]: And *Cæsar*, to prevent all attempts of that kind in “his absence, took care always, by force of bribes, to secure the “leading Magistrates in his interests; and so went off to his “province of Gaul.” — I do not see how these last words, and so went off, &c. can be reconciled with *Cæsar’s* continuing at Rome till he saw Cicero driv’n out of it. The Doctor seems not consistent with himself.

them

them with troops. When the Ambassadors, on the appointed day, returned for an answer, he told them, that he could not, consistently with the usages of the People of *Rome* on the like occasions, grant any foreign troops a passage through the province: And he let them see, that, should they attempt it by force, he was prepared to oppose them.

The *Helvetii*, driven from this hope, endeavoured, some by the means of boats fastened together, and of floats which they had prepared in great abundance, others by the fords of the *Rhone*, where was the least depth of water, to force a passage over the river; sometimes by day, oftener in the night: But, being constantly repulsed by the strength of the works thrown up, and by flights of darts, they at last abandoned the attempt. One way still remained, which was thro' the territories of the *Sequani*, but so narrow, that, without the consent of the natives, they could not pass. Not able to prevail by their own persuasions, they sent Ambassadors to *Dumnorix* the *Aduan*, that, through his intercession, they might obtain this favour of the *Sequani*. *Dumnorix*, by his popularity and generosity, had great influence with the *Sequani*, and was also well affected to the *Helvetii*, because he had married an *Helvetian*, the daughter of *Orgetorix*. Besides, he was framing to himself schemes of ambition, and wanted to have as many states as possible bound to him by offices of kindness. He readily therefore undertook the negotiation, and he obtained for the *Helvetii* the liberty of passing through

through the territories of the *Sequani*, the two nations mutually giving hostages to secure their not molesting or injuring each other during the march.

*Cæsar* had intelligence of their design; which was to pass through the countries of the *Sequani* and *Ædui* into the territories of the \* *Santones*, which border upon those of the *Tolosati* †, a state that made part of the *Roman* province. He fore-saw many inconveniences likely to arise to the *Romans*, should they have for their neighbours, in an open and plentiful country, a people ill-affected to them, and of a martial disposition. Leaving, therefore, the care of the new works he had raised to *F. Labienus*, his Lieutenant, he himself hastened by great journeys into *Italy*. There he raised two legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round *Aquileia*, out of their quarters; and with these five legions took the nearest way over the *Alps* into *Farther Gaul*. The mountaineers opposed his passage, but without effect: He descended into the country of the *Vacontii* ‡, traversed the territories of the *Allobroges*, crossed the *Rhone*, entered upon the lands of the *Segusii* †, and all this with such expedition, that he overtook the *Helvetii* at the passage of the *Arar* ||.

\* *Sain-tonge.*  
† *People of To-louse.*

+ *Le Di-ois.*

‡ *Le Ly-onnois.*

|| *The Sa-one.*

They had marched their forces through the narrow pafs of mount *Jura*, and the territories of the *Sequani*; and were at this time actually em-ployed in passing the *Arar*. *Cæsar*, informed by his scouts, that three parts of their forces were got over the river, and that the fourth, which

The people of Zurich.

which was the canton of the *Tigurini*, still remained on this side, left his camp about midnight, with three legions, and came up with the troops of the enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared for fighting, and encumbered with their baggage, he attacked them immediately, and put a great number of them to the sword: The rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest woods.

Vid. Vol.  
VII. p.  
140.

The forces of this very canton, about fifty years before, had vanquished and killed the Consul *L. Cassius*, and obliged his army to pass under the yoke. Thus, says *Cæsar*, whether by chance or the direction of the immortal Gods, that part of the *Helvetic state*, which brought so signal a calamity upon the *Roman People*, was the first to feel the weight of their resentment. In this case, *Cæsar* revenged not only the public, but likewise his own domestic injuries; because in the same battle where *Cassius* fell was slain also his Lieutenant, *L. Piso*, the grandfather of *L. Piso*, *Cæsar's* father-in-law.

After this victory, *Cæsar*, throwing a bridge over the river, led his army, without delay, in pursuit of the enemy. The *Helvetii*, dismayed at his sudden approach, as he had spent only one day in crossing the river, which they had not, without the utmost difficulty, accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to him, at the head of which was *Divico*, who had been General of the *Helvetii* in the war against *Cassius*. He addressed *Cæsar* in words to this effect;

" If

*armis non vici sed iudea bona cunctis  
dolidi*

" If you are disposed to conclude a peace,  
 " we are willing to go and settle in what country  
 " you shall think fit to assign us. But, if you per-  
 " sist in the resolution of making war, you will  
 " do well to call to mind the disgrace which be-  
 " fell the *Romans* heretofore, and the experienced  
 " bravery of the *Helvetic* nation."

*Cæsar* answered : " I have the less doubt con-  
 " cerning what will be the issue of a war, as I  
 " do bear in mind that disaster to which you re-  
 " fer, and which I well know to have happened  
 " to the *Romans* undeservedly. Had they been  
 " conscious of any injury by them committed,  
 " had they done any thing which could give  
 " them cause to fear, they would have kept them-  
 " selves upon their guard ; a conduct which ad-  
 " mitted of no difficulty. — But, were I in-  
 " clined to forget old injuries, can you expect I  
 " should forget likewise your late insult in at-  
 " tempting, against my will, to force a passage  
 " through the *Roman* province, and your ravag-  
 " ing <sup>k</sup> the territories of the *Ædui*, *Ambarri*, and  
 " *Allobroges*? Your boasting so insolently of  
 " the victory over *Cassius*, is an additional pro-  
 " vocation of my resentment. However, if you  
 " will make satisfaction to the *Ædui* and their  
 " allies, for the devastations committed in their  
 " countries, as also to the *Allobroges*, and will  
 " give hostages for the performance of your  
 " promises, I am ready to conclude a peace with  
 " you." *Divico* replied : " The *Helvetii* are ac-

<sup>k</sup> Of this injury the sufferers had sent complaints to *Cæsar*.

" *customed*

"customed to receive hostages, not to give them; "and no people are better apprized of this than "the Romans." He said, and retired.

The next day the *Helvetii* decamped: *Cæsar* did the same; and, to observe their motions, sent forward all his horse, which, to the number of four thousand, he had drawn together from the province, and the countries of the *Ædui* and their allies. The cavalry pressing too close upon the rear of the enemy, the latter seized a moment, when they had the advantage of the ground, turned suddenly upon their pursuers, and put them to the rout, with some slaughter of the most advanced. Elated by this success, as having, with no more than five hundred horse, repulsed so great a multitude, they began to assume a bolder appearance, and frequently to face the *Romans*. *Cæsar* kept back his men from fighting, thinking it sufficient for the present to straiten the enemy's forages. In this manner the armies marched for fifteen days together: Between the *Roman* van and the rear of the *Helvetii* the distance did not exceed five or six miles.

In the mean time *Cæsar* daily pressed the *Ædui* for the corn which they had promised in the name of the public: For, by reason of the coldness of the climate, he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the fields, that there was not even sufficient forage for the horses. Neither could he receive those supplies which were coming to him by the *Arar*; because the *Helvetii* had turned off from that river, and he was determined not to

quit

quit the pursuit of them. The *Aedui*, to conceal from him the motive of their conduct, sometimes pretended that the corn was bought up, and ready to be sent; sometimes that it was actually on the way: But, when he saw no end of these delays, and that the day approached for delivering corn to the troops, he called together the *Aeduani* chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his army, and among the rest *Divitiacus*, and their supreme Magistrate <sup>1</sup> *Liscus*. *Cæsar* reproached them severely for not having taken care to supply him in so pressing a conjuncture, and while the enemy was so near: Adding, that, as he had engaged in that war chiefly at their request, he had the greater reason to complain of their request.

Hereupon *Liscus* thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed, “ That there were some among them, who, though but private men, had yet more authority with the people than the Magistrates themselves: That those men had, by artful and seditious speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their corn; insinuating, that, if their own state could not obtain the sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the *Helvetii*, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans; there not being the least reason to question but the Romans, after having subdued the *Helvetii*, would deprive the *Aedui* too, with all the rest of the Gauls, of their liberty: That the

<sup>1</sup> This supreme Magistrate, styled *Vergobret* in the language of the country, was created annually, and had a power of life and death.

“ very

" very same men gave intelligence to the enemy  
" of whatever the *Romans* designed or transacted  
" in their camp ; his authority not being sufficient  
" to restrain them : That he was not ignorant of  
" the danger to which he exposed himself by the  
" discovery he now made, compelled to it by ne-  
" cessity ; his silence being no longer consistent  
" with the safety of the state."

*Cæsar* perceived that *Dumnorix*, the brother of *Divitiacus*, was pointed at by this speech : But not thinking it adviseable that these matters should be debated in the presence of so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the council, retaining only *Liscus* ; whom he then questioned on what he had just said ; and was answered with great courage and freedom. He put the same questions to others ; who all confirmed the truth of what *Liscus* had told him, that *Dumnorix* was a man of an enterprizing spirit, fond of revolutions, and in great favour with the people, because of his liberality : That he had for many years farmed the customs, and other public revenues of the *Ædui*, at a very low price ; no one daring to bid against him : That by this means he had considerably increased his estate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to all about him : That he constantly kept a great number of horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went : That his influence was not confined merely to his own country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring states : That the better to support his interest, he had married his mother to a man of principal rank and authority among the

*Bituriges*,

*Bituriges* \*, matched his sister, and the rest of his kindred, into other the most powerful states; and had himself taken a wife from among the *Helvetii*: That he favoured and wished well to the *Helvetii* on the score of that alliance, and personally hated *Cæsar*, and hated the *Romans*, because by their arrival his power had been diminished, and his brother *Divitiacus* restored to his former credit and authority: That, should the *Romans* be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the sovereignty by means of the *Helvetii*. On the contrary, should they prevail, he must not only give up these hopes, but even all expectation of retaining the influence he had already acquired.

\* People  
of Bour-  
ges.

*Cæsar* learnt also, that, in the late engagement, *Dumnorix*, who commanded the *Aduan* cavalry, was the first who fled, and by his flight struck a terror into the rest of the troops; that it was he who had procured for the *Helvetii* a passage through the territories of the *Sequani*; and had effected an exchange of hostages between the two nations: And that he had done these things not only without permission from his own state, but even without their knowledge: All this, together with his being accused by the chief Magistrate of the *Adui*, seemed to *Cæsar* a sufficient ground for taking cognizance of the matter himself, or ordering the state to proceed against him. One thing, however, restrained him a while from coming to any resolution, his regard for *Divitiacus*, the delinquent's brother, a man of singular probity, a faithful ally of the *Roman* People, and a

friend of *Cæsar's*. That he might not wound a man for whom he had so great a value, *Cæsar* sent for him, and, having removed the usual interpreters, spoke to him by *C. Valerius Procillus*, a Prince of the *Roman* province, his intimate friend. He reminded *Divitiacus* of what, in his own presence, had been said of his brother *Dumnorix* in the council of the *Gauls*, adding the later informations which he had received against him in private; and *Cæsar* earnestly requested of *Divitiacus* to consent, that either he himself or the state might take the matter into consideration. *Divitiacus*, embracing *Cæsar*, begged of him with many tears not to come to any severe resolution against his brother. “What you have heard is “all true, and I myself have more reason than “any man to be dissatisfied with him. At a time “when my authority was great, both at home and “in the other provinces of *Gaul*, and my brother, “because of his youth, but little considered, I “employed my interest to bring him into credit: “And though *Dumnorix* has made use of the “power he acquired by my means to diminish my “favour with the people, yet I still find myself “swayed by my affection for him, and by my re- “gard for the public esteem: For, should my “brother meet with any rigorous treatment from “you, while I myself possess so large a share of “your favour, all men will believe it done with “my consent, and the minds of the *Gauls* be for “ever alienated from me.”

*Cæsar*, observing his concern, took him by the hand, bid him say no more, comforted him,

and

and assured him that, for his sake, he would overlook not only the injuries done to himself, but to the Republic. He then sent for *Dumnorix*, and in his brother's presence declared the subjects of complaint he had against him, and admonished him to avoid for the future giving any ground for suspicion ; adding, that he would pardon what was past for the sake of his brother : *Cæsar* appointed, however, some persons to have an eye over his behaviour, and to observe what company he frequented.

The same day having learnt by his scouts, that the enemy had posted themselves under a hill, eight miles from his camp, he sent out a party to view the ground, and examine the ascent of the hill. These reporting it to be extremely easy, he detached, about midnight, his Lieutenant *Labienus*, (to whom he imparted the design he had formed) with two legions, and with the same men, for guides, who, the day before, had examined the ground, to take possession of the summit of the hill. At three o'clock in the morning, having first sent forward his cavalry, he himself followed with the foot. He had directed *Considius*, an officer of reputation, who had served in the army of *Sylla*, and afterwards in that of *Marcus Crassus*, to go with the scouts to reconnoitre.

At day-break, when *Labienus* had executed his commission, and *Cæsar* was within a mile and a half of the enemies camp, they knowing nothing yet either of his or *Labienus*'s approach, *Considius* came galloping back, and assured *Cæsar*,

that the summit of the hill was possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen the *Gallic* ensigns there.

*Cæsar* retired to a rising ground, and drew up his men in order of battle. *Labienus*, whose instructions were not to engage the enemy till he saw the rest of the army approaching, that the attack might be made on all sides at the same time, having gained the top of the hill, waited the arrival of the *Roman* main body, without stirring from his post. The day was far spent before *Cæsar* learnt from his scouts that *Considius*, blinded by his fear, had made a false report, and that the enemy had decamped. The rest of that day *Cæsar* followed the enemy, and pitched his camp within three miles of them.

\* Autun.

The next day, as the time drew near for delivering out corn to the army, and as he was not above eighteen miles from *Bibracte* \*, the capital of the *Ædui*, where he hoped to find sufficient supplies for the subsistence of his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the *Helvetii*, and directed his march thither. The enemy informed of this motion by some deserters, and either ascribing it to fear, because *Labienus*, though possessed of the higher ground, had not attacked them the day before; or flattering themselves with the hopes of intercepting *Cæsar's* provisions, all on a sudden changed their resolution, and, instead of continuing their march, began to pursue and harass the rear-guard of the *Romans*. *Cæsar* retired to a hill, and sent his cavalry to sustain the charge,

while

while he drew up his forces in battalia. His four veteran legions he ranged in three lines towards the middle of the ascent; and above them he posted his two legions newly raised in *Cisalpine Gaul*, and all the auxiliaries; in such wise, that the whole hill was covered with his troops: The baggage was committed to the care of those on the upper ground. The *Helvetii* repulsed the *Roman* cavalry, formed themselves into a phalanx, and advanced in close order to attack the *Roman* van.

*Cæsar*, having sent away first his own horse, and then the horses of all his officers, that, by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory, encouraged his men, and began the charge. The *Romans*, who fought from the higher ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy, easily broke their phalanx, and then fell upon them sword in hand. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the enemy being at length obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards a hill, and the rest sheltered themselves behind their carriages, which they had drawn together into one place before they began the battle. During this whole action, though it lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, no man saw the back of an enemy. The fight was renewed with great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued till the night was far spent. After a long dispute, the *Romans* got possession of the baggage and camp of the enemy. A son and daughter of *Orgetorix* were found

\* The people of Langres.

among the prisoners. Only one hundred and twenty thousand of the *Helvetii* survived this defeat; who, retreating all that night, and continuing their march without intermission, arrived on the fourth day in the territories of the *Lingones* \*. The *Romans*, detained by the care of looking after their wounded, and of burying their dead, continued upon the spot three days: But *Cæsar* sent messengers and letters to signify to the *Lingones*, that, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same calamities which the *Helvetic* fugitives were under, they must not furnish them with corn or other necessaries: And, after three days repose, he set forward to pursue the enemy.

The *Helvetii*, compelled by an extreme want of all things, sent Ambassadors to him to treat about a surrendry. These meeting him on the way, and throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant terms, and with many tears, begged for peace. *Cæsar* gave them no express answer at that time; he only ordered that the *Helvetii* should wait for him in the place where they then were; which they accordingly did. Upon his arrival, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to their camp. Upon their complying with these terms, they were admitted to a surrendry. The *Helvetii*, *Tulingi*, and *Latobrigi*, he ordered to return to their own countries, and rebuild the towns and villages they had burnt: And because, having lost all the corn, they were utterly destitute of subsistence, he gave it in charge to the *Allobroges* to supply them.

them. *Cæsar's* design, in sending the *Helvetii* home, was, that their lands might not be left unoccupied, and the *Germans*, dwelling on the other side the *Rhine*, be thereby tempted to pass over and take possession of them; by which they would become neighbours to the *Allobroges*, and the *Roman* province in *Gaul*. The *Boii*, at the request of the *Adui* themselves, who esteemed them highly on account of their courage, were permitted to settle in the *Aduan* territories, where lands were assigned them, and they were, by degrees, admitted to all the rights and privileges of natives.

The war with the *Helvetii* being ended, Ambassadors from all parts of *Gaul*, men of principal consideration in their several states, waited upon *Cæsar* to congratulate his success, which, they said, had been highly advantageous to *Gaul* in general, the *Helvetii* having left their own country with a view to make all the other states tributary to them; and these Ambassadors requested, on the part of their constituents, "that they might have his permission to hold, on a day prefixed, a general assembly of all the provinces of *Gaul*; "there being some things, which they wanted to propose to him, which concerned the whole nation in common." Their request was granted; they fixed a day for the assembly; and they bound themselves by an oath not to disclose what should be transacted there, but to such persons as should be named for that purpose by general consent.

Upon the rising of the council, the same chiefs of the state, who had come before to *Cæsar*, came again to him, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, concerning matters that regarded their own and the common safety. *Cæsar* complying, they all threw themselves at his feet, and with tears represented to him, that it was of no less importance to them to have their present deliberations kept secret, than to succeed in the petition they were going to make; because, should any discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the extremest cruelties. *Divitiacus*, the *Æduan*, in the name of the rest, spoke thus:

“ Two factions divide all *Gaul*: At the head  
 “ of one are the *Ædui*; of the other the *Arverni*.  
 “ After a contention of many years between  
 “ these for the superiority, the *Arverni*, in con-  
 “ cert with the *Sequani*, came at last to a resolu-  
 “ tion of calling in the *Germans*: Of these, fifteen  
 “ thousand only came over the *Rhine* at first;  
 “ but, finding *Gaul* an agreeable and plentiful  
 “ country, others soon followed, insomuch that at  
 “ present there are no less than 120000 of them  
 “ here. The *Ædui* and their dependants have  
 “ frequently tried their strength against them in  
 “ battle, but, by successive defeats, have lost all  
 “ their nobles, senate, and cavalry. Broken by  
 “ these calamities, they, who formerly held the  
 “ chief sway in *Gaul*, both by their own bravery  
 “ and the favour and friendship of the *Roman*  
 “ People, are now reduced to the necessity of  
 “ sending

“ sending some of the principal men of their  
“ state to the *Sequani*, to remain with them as  
“ hostages; and of obliging themselves by an  
“ oath, neither to demand their hostages back,  
“ nor to implore the assistance of the *Roman Peo-*  
“ *ple*, nor to refuse a perpetual submission to the  
“ dominion and authority of the *Sequani*. I alone  
“ of all the *Aedui* refused to take the oath, or  
“ give my children for hostages; and on that ac-  
“ count I fled my country, and went to *Rome* to  
“ implore the assistance of the Senate, as being  
“ the only man in the state who had not laid him-  
“ self under the restraints of hostages and an oath.  
“ After all, it has fared worse with the victorious  
“ *Sequani* than with the vanquished *Aedui*; be-  
“ cause *Ariovistus* has seated himself in their ter-  
“ ritory, seized a *third part* of their lands, the  
“ most fertile in *Gaul*, and has lately ordered  
“ them to yield up another *third* to the *Harudes*,  
“ who, to the number of 24000, came over the  
“ *Rhine* a few months ago, wanting habitations  
“ and a settlement. In a few years all the native  
“ *Gauls* will be driven from their territories, and  
“ the *Germans* be transplanted hither from the  
“ other side of the *Rhine*; our climate far excel-  
“ ling that of their country, and our different ways  
“ of living not admitting a comparison.—*Ario-*  
“ *vistus* is a man of a savage, passionate, and ty-  
“ ranical disposition, whose government is no  
“ longer to be born; and unless we find some re-  
“ source in you and the People of *Rome*, the  
“ *Gauls* must, like the *Helvetians*, abandon their

“ country,

“ country, and seek some other settlement remote  
“ from the *Germans*, wherever fortune shall point  
“ it out. Were these complaints and representa-  
“ tions to come to the knowledge of *Ariovistus*,  
“ I doubt not but he would exercise the greatest  
“ cruelties upon all the hostages in his hands :  
“ But it will be easy for you, by your own autho-  
“ rity, the dread of the army you command, the  
“ fame of your late victory, and the terror of the  
“ Roman name, to hinder any more *Germans* from  
“ coming over the *Rhine*, and to defend *Gaul*  
“ from the insults of *Ariovistus*.”

When *Divitiacus* had made an end of speak-  
ing, all who were present began, with many tears,  
to implore *Cæsar's* aid. He observed, that the  
*Sequani* alone did nothing of all this ; but pensive,  
and with downcast looks, kept their eyes fixed on  
the ground. Wondering what might be the cause,  
he questioned them upon it. Still they made him  
no answer, but continued silent, as before, with  
the same air of dejection. When he had inter-  
rogated them several times, without being able to  
obtain one word in return, *Divitiacus*, the *Æduan*,  
resumed the discourse, and observed, “ that the  
“ condition of the *Sequani* was by much more  
“ deplorable and wretched than that of the rest  
“ of the *Gauls* ; as they alone durst not, even in  
“ secret, complain of their wrongs, or apply any  
“ where for redrefs, and no less dreaded the cru-  
“ elty of *Ariovistus* when absent, than if actually  
“ present before their eyes : That the other states  
“ had it still in their power to escape by flight;

“ but

“but the *Sequani*, who had received him into their territories, and put him in possession of all their towns, were exposed to suffer every kind of torment.”

*Cæsar* encouraged the *Gauls*, and promised to have regard to their complaints; he told them he was in great hopes that, out of regard to him and the authority of the *Roman* People, *Ariovistus* would put an end to his oppressions. Having returned this answer, he dismissed the assembly.

Many urgent reasons occurred upon this occasion to *Cæsar*, why he should consider seriously of the grievances which the *Gauls* had complained of, and undertake their redress. He saw the *Ædui*, friends and allies of the People of *Rome*, held in subjection and servitude by the *Germans*, and compelled to give hostages to *Ariovistus* and the *Sequani*; which, in the present flourishing state of the *Roman* affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous consequence to suffer the *Germans* to accustom themselves to come over the *Rhine* in great multitudes and settle in *Gaul*: For this fierce and savage people, having once possessed themselves of the whole country, were but too likely, after the example of the *Cimbri* and *Teutoni*, to break into the *Roman* province, and thence advance even into *Italy*.

These considerations induced *Cæsar* to send Ambassadors to *Ariovistus* with the proposal of an interview, and to desire that he would appoint a place for it, in order to their conferring upon certain

certain public affairs of the highest importance to them both. *Ariovistus* answered, “ That, if he had wanted any thing of *Cæsar*, he would have gone to him in person ; and that *Cæsar*, if he had any business with him, must come to him : That he could neither venture, without an army, into those provinces of *Gaul* where *Cæsar* commanded, nor bring an army into the field without great trouble and expence. That he wondered extremely what business either *Cæsar* or the People of *Rome* could have in that part of *Gaul* which he had conquered.”

On the report of this answer, *Cæsar* sent another embassy, with commission to speak thus to the King : “ Since you have so little sense of the great obligations you lie under to the *Roman People*, and to *Cæsar*, in whose Consulship you were stiled King and friend by the Senate, as to refuse a conference with him, and decline treating of affairs that regard the common interest, he sends you the particulars of what he requires of you : First, not to bring any more Germans over the Rhine into *Gaul*. In the next place, to restore the hostages you have received from the *Ædui*, and permit the *Sequani* likewise to restore the hostages given to them. Lastly, to forbear all injuries towards the *Ædui*, and neither make war upon them nor upon their allies. If you comply with these conditions, it will establish a perpetual amity between you and the *Roman People* : But, if you do not comply, *Cæsar* will think himself bound to have regard to the just complaints of the *Ædui*, and the other

"other allies of *Rome* in this country; the Senate  
"having decreed, in the Consulship of *M. Messala*  
"and *M. Piso* [Y. of R. 692.] that *whichever should*  
"have in charge the province of Gaul, should, so  
"far as was consistent with the interest of the Re-  
"public, protect and defend them."

To this *Ariovistus* sent the following reply:  
"That, by the laws of war, the conqueror had  
"a right to impose what terms he pleased upon  
"the conquered: That the People of *Rome* did  
"not govern the vanquished by the prescriptions  
"of other nations, but according to their own  
"pleasure: That he did not intermeddle with  
"their conquests, nor interrupt them in the free  
"enjoyment of their rights; nor ought they to  
"concern themselves with what regarded him:  
"That the *Ædui*, having tried the fortune of  
"war, had been overcome and rendered tributary  
"to him, and that *Cæsar* would be highly unjust  
"if he attempted to deprive him of his revenues,  
"or to diminish them. That he was resolved not  
"to part with the hostages which the *Ædui* had  
"put into his hands; but would, nevertheless,  
"engage, not to make war either upon them, or  
"upon their allies, provided they observed the  
"treaty he had made with them, and readily paid  
"the tribute agreed upon: If otherwise, they  
"would find the title of friends and allies of the  
"People of *Rome* of little advantage to them:  
"That as to *Cæsar's* menace of not neglecting the  
"complaints of the *Ædui*, he would have him to  
"know, that none had ever entered into a war  
"with *Ariovistus* but to their own destruction."

At

At the same time that *Cæsar* received this reply, Ambassadors arrived from the *Ædui* and *Treviri*; from the *Ædui*, to complain that the *Harudes*, who had lately come [from *Germany*] into *Gaul*, were plundering their territories, so that even by their submissions and hostages they could not obtain peace of *Ariovistus*; from the *Treviri*, to inform him that a hundred cantons of the *Suevi*, headed by two brothers, were arrived upon the banks of the *Rhine*, with design to come over that river. *Cæsar*, deeply affected with this intelligence, determined to begin the war without delay: And fearing lest this new band of *Suevi* should strengthen the forces of *Ariovistus*, he advanced expeditiously towards the King, and the third day was informed, that he approached with all his forces to seize *Vesontio*\*, the capital of the *Sequani*. *Cæsar* judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this design, as the town was well fortified by nature, and stored with all sorts of ammunition. Marching, therefore, day and night, without intermission, he possessed himself of the place, and put a garrison into it.

\* Begun.  
son.

While he continued here a few days, to settle the affair of his convoys and supplies, a sudden terror seized his whole army. It was occasioned by the curiosity of his men, and the reports of the *Gauls*, who talked much of the prodigious stature of the *Germans*, their invincible courage, and wonderful skill in arms. The terror first began among certain young officers of the *Roman* army, who had voluntarily and gaily followed

*Cæsar*

*Cæsar* into Gaul, and were but little acquainted with military affairs. Some of these, under various pretences, desired leave to return home; and others, though, out of shame, they seemed willing to continue in the camp, were not able to put on a cheerful countenance, or to refrain from lamenting, with their companions, the dangers to which they fancied themselves exposed. Wills were made all over the camp, and the consternation began to seize even the veteran soldiers, the Centurions, and the officers of the cavalry: Only, to avoid the reproach of cowardice, they said, “it was not the enemy they feared, but the narrow passes and forests that lay between them and *Ariovistus*, and the difficulty they should find in getting provisions.” Some even intimated to *Cæsar*, that when he gave orders for marching, he would not be obeyed.

*Cæsar* hereupon called a council of war, and, having summoned thither all the Centurions of the army, spoke to them to the following effect: — “*Ariovistus*, during my Consulship, earnestly sought the alliance of the *Roman People*; why then should any one imagine he will so rashly and hastily depart from his engagements? On the contrary, so soon as he comes to know my demands, and the reasonable conditions I am about to propose to him, he will, I am firmly persuaded, be very far from rejecting either my friendship or that of the *Roman People*. But if, urged on by madness and rage, he should resolve upon war, what, after all, have you to be afraid

“ afraid of? Why should you distrust either your  
 “ own courage or my conduct? You are to deal  
 “ with enemies of whom, in the memory of our  
 “ fathers, trial has been already made. By our  
 “ victory over the *Teutoni* and *Cimbri*, the army  
 “ itself acquired no less glory than *Caius Marius*,  
 “ the General who commanded it.—They are  
 “ the very same *Germans* with whom the *Helvetii*,  
 “ though not a match for our army, have so  
 “ often fought, and whom they have so often  
 “ vanquished. The defeat which the *Gauls* suf-  
 “ fered, was rather by the conduct and craft of  
 “ the *Germans*, than by their superior bravery.  
 “ But though the King, by a stratagem, might  
 “ baffle a rude and undisciplined soldiery, he  
 “ cannot hope to prevail by such means against a  
 “ *Roman* army. As to those who shelter their  
 “ cowardice under the pretence of narrow passes,  
 “ and the difficulty of procuring provisions, it  
 “ argues, I think, no small presumption to betray  
 “ such a distrust of their General's conduct, or to  
 “ prescribe to him what he ought to do. These  
 “ things fall properly under my care: The *Se-*  
 “ *quani*, *Luci* †, and *Lingones*, are to furnish me  
 “ with provisions: The corn is now ripe in the  
 “ fields: As to the ways, you yourselves will soon  
 “ be judges of them.

† People  
of Lorrain,  
about  
Toul.

“ I am not in the least disturbed by what is  
 “ whispered about, that the army will not obey  
 “ me; for no General was ever so slighted by his  
 “ soldiers, when neither ill success, nor rapacious  
 “ covetousness, nor other crimes, had drawn that  
 “ misfortune

“ misfortune upon him : In all these respects I  
 “ imagine myself secure, as the whole course of  
 “ my life bears witness to my integrity ; and my  
 “ good fortune has shewn itself in the war against  
 “ the *Helvetii*. I am therefore resolved to ex-  
 “ cuse, without delay, what I had intended to put  
 “ off a little longer. I shall give orders for de-  
 “ camping this very night, three hours before  
 “ day, that I may know as soon as possible,  
 “ whether honour and a sense of duty, or an  
 “ ignominious cowardice, have the ascendant in  
 “ my army : Nay, should all the rest of the troops  
 “ abandon me, I will nevertheless march with the  
 “ *Tenth Legion* alone, of whose fidelity and cou-  
 “ rage I have not the least doubt, and who shall  
 “ serve me for my *Prætorian guard*.” [*Cæsar*  
 had always favoured and chiefly confided in this  
 legion, remarkable for its intrepid bravery.]

This discourse made a wonderful change in the minds of all, and produced an uncommon alacrity, and eagerness for the war. *The tenth legion*, in particular, returned him thanks, by their Tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expressed of them ; and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other legions less industrious, by their Tribunes and principal Centurions, to reconcile themselves to their General, protesting that they had never entertained either doubt or fear, nor had ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to him alone, to direct in matters of war. *Cæsar*, having accepted of their submission, and being informed by *Divitiacus* (in whom of all the *Gauls* he most confided) that,

by taking a circuit of about forty miles, he might avoid the narrow passes, and lead his army through an open country, he set forward three hours after midnight, as he had said; and, after a march of seven days, understood by his scouts, that he was within four and twenty thousand paces of *Ariovistus's* camp.

The King, informed of *Cæsar's* arrival, sent Ambassadors to acquaint him, that, as they were come nearer to each other, he was willing to have an interview with him, which he believed might now be without danger. *Cæsar* did not decline the proposal, imagining that the *German*, now offering of his own accord what he had before refused, when requested, might perhaps be disposed to hearken to reason. The fifth day after was appointed for the interview; and, in the interval, frequent deputations passed and repassed from one side to the other, to regulate the circumstances and conditions of it. *Ariovistus*, under pretence that he feared an ambush, demanded that *Cæsar* should bring no infantry with him: Both he and the King were to be attended by their cavalry only. To this *Cæsar* consented; yet, not caring to trust his safety to the *Gauls*, he dismounted all the *Gallic* cavalry, and gave their horses to the men of the tenth legion, that, in case of danger, he might have a guard on which he could rely.

In the midst of a large plain, there was a rising ground equally distant from both camps: At this place, by appointment, the conference was to be held. *Cæsar* stationed the legionary soldiers, whom

whom he had converted into troopers, two hundred paces from the mount. *Ariovistus* did the same with the *German* cavalry. The two Commanders advanced to meet one another, each accompanied by ten friends, or principal officers; for so *Ariovistus* had desired it might be. The conference was on horseback. *Cæsar* began by reminding the King of his obligations to the Republic. “ You have been stiled *friend* and *ally* “ by the Senate, and vrey considerable presents “ have been sent you: These honoires, conferred “ by the *Romans* on very few, and only for sig- “ nal services to the State, have been bestowed “ on you, not on account of any just claim you “ had to them, but merely by my favour and “ the bounty of the Senate.” He mentioned likewise the ancient alliance which had subsisted between the *Romans* and *Ædui*, in whose favour the Senate had made many honourable decrees. He added: “ The *Ædui* always held the first “ rank and authority in *Gaul*, even before their “ alliance with *Rome*; and it is the invariable “ maxim of the *Roman* People, not only to defend “ their friends and allies in the possession of their “ just rights, but likewise to study the increase “ of their honour, interest, and dignity: There- “ fore it can never be supposed that they will “ submit to see their friends stript of those privi- “ leges, which had belonged to them before the “ commencement of that friendship.” And he concluded with repeating the same demands which he had before made by his Ambassadors; *That the King should not make war upon the Ædui or*

their allies; that he should restore to them their hostages; and that, if he could not oblige the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he should suffer no more of them to come into Gaul.

Ariovistus answered: "I crossed the Rhine, "not of my own motion, but by invitation and "intreaty from the Gauls. The great hopes and "expectations they gave me were my only in- "duement to quit my country: The settlements "I have in Gaul were assigned to me by the Gauls "themselves; the hostages were voluntarily sent; "and the tribute I receive is in consequence of "the rights of war: I did not make war upon "the Gauls, they made war upon me: Their "several states brought their united forces against "me; but I found means to vanquish and dis- "perse them: One battle sufficed: If they are "again resolved to try the fortune of war, I am "prepared to receive them; but, if they chuse "peace, it will be unjust in them to refuse a tri- "bute which they have hitherto voluntarily paid. "The friendship of the Roman People ought not "to be a detriment to me, but an honour and a "security; I courted it in no other view: But "if, on account of my alliance with them, I must "submit to lose my tributes, and my rights over "the people I have subdued, I am no less willing "to give up that alliance than I was ambitious "to obtain it. I have indeed brought over a mul- "titude of Germans into Gaul, yet not with any "design of disturbing the country, as appears by "my not coming but at the request of the na- "tives. My arrival in Gaul was prior to that  
" of

"of the *Romans*, whose armies have never till  
"now passed the boundaries of their own pro-  
vinces. What can they mean by coming into  
"a country that belongs to me? why do they  
"concern themselves with a part of *Gaul* that  
"is no less my property than the province itself  
"is theirs? As to the pretence of alliance be-  
"tween the *Romans* and *Ædui*, I am not so much  
"a barbarian, or so wholly a stranger to the af-  
"fairs of the world, as not to know, that the  
"*Ædui* neither assisted the *Romans* in their late  
"war against the *Allobroges*, nor received any  
"assistance from them in their many conflicts with  
"me and the *Sequani*. I have reason to be jea-  
"lous of your pretended regard for the *Ædui*,  
"and have but too much reason to suspect, that  
"the continuance of the *Roman* army in *Gaul*  
"can be with no other design than that of op-  
"pressing me. If you do not therefore with-  
"draw your troops out of these parts, I shall no  
"longer look upon you as a friend, but as an  
"enemy. And I am well assured, that, should  
"I happen to kill you in battle, I should do a  
"pleasure to many of the nobles and great men  
"at *Rome*, who have explained themselves to  
"me by couriers, and whose favour and friend-  
"ship I might procure by your death: But if you  
"will retire, and leave me in the undisturbed  
"possession of *Gaul*, I will not only amply re-  
"ward you, but will engage, at my own cost and  
"hazard, to put a happy conclusion to any war  
"you shall think fit to undertake."

In answer to this discourse, *Cæsar* offered many reasons why he could not depart from his first demands : “ That neither his own honour, nor “ that of the *Roman* People, would suffer him to “ abandon allies, who had deserved so well of the “ Republic. That it no way appeared to him, that “ *Ariovistus* had a juster claim to *Gaul* than the “ *Romans* : That the *Arverni* and *Ruteni* † had “ been subdued by *Q. Fabius Maximus*; who “ yet, contented with their submission, had nei- “ ther reduced their country into a province, nor “ subjected it to a tribute : That, if antiquity of “ title was to decide the question, the *Romans* had “ an undoubted right to the sovereignty of *Gaul*: “ Or, if the decree of the Senate was to take “ place, *Gaul* must remain free, and subject only “ to its own laws.”

Whilst these things passed at the interview, *Cæsar* was informed that *Ariovistus*’s cavalry were drawing nearer the eminence, and had even cast some darts at his horsemen. Hereupon he immediately broke off the conference, retreated to his own men, and strictly charged them to forbear all acts of hostility. He did not fear the success of an engagement between his chosen legion and the *German* cavalry ; but he was desirous to maintain a conduct perfectly clear, and not give the enemy the least ground to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an ambush by a pretended conference. When it was known in the camp that *Ariovistus*, at the interview, had haughtily ordered the *Romans* to depart out of *Gaul* ; that his cavalry had insulted *Cæsar*’s guard;

† La Rou-  
ergue.

guard ; and that this had put an end to the conference; it spread throughout the whole army an ardent desire of coming to a battle.

Two days after, *Ariovistus* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, to propose a renewal of the negotiation ; and that he would either appoint a day for their meeting again, or depute some one to bring the treaty to a conclusion. *Cæsar* saw no reason for granting a second interview, especially when he considered that the *Germans*, as experience had taught him, could not be restrained from falling upon his men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal officers ; it seemed too great a venture, to expose them to the perfidy of these barbarians. He therefore cast his eyes upon *C. Valerius Procilius* <sup>a</sup>, a young man of eminent virtue and gentle manners, and whose knowledge of the *Gallic* language, which *Ariovistus*, by long residence in the country had learnt to speak readily, fitted him in a particular manner for this embassy : And as the *Germans* could have no motive to insult him, *Cæsar* thought him safe from that danger. With him was joined, in the same commission, *M. Mettius*, a person who had a connexion with *Ariovistus* by the ties of hospitality. Their instructions were, to hear the King's proposals, and bring a report of them to *Cæsar*. But no sooner were they arrived in *Ariovistus*'s camp, than, in presence of the whole army, calling out to know their business, and whether

<sup>a</sup> He was the son of *C. Valerius Caburus*, who, being made free of the City by *C. Valerius Flaccus*, had, according to custom, taken the name of his Patron.

they were come as spies, he commanded them to be put in irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

The same day he came forward with all his forces, and lodged himself under a hill, six miles from the *Roman* camp. The day after, he went two miles beyond it, to cut off their communication with the *Aedui* and *Sequani*, from whom they received all their provisions. *Cæsar*, for five days successively, drew up his men in order of battle before the camp, that, if *Arivostus* had a mind, he might not be without an opportunity of coming to an engagement. The *Germans* kept all that time within their lines; only between the cavalry of the two armies there were daily skirmishes. The *German* manner of fighting was this: They had about six thousand horse, who chose a like number out of the foot, each his man, and all remarkable for strength and agility. These continually accompanied them in battle, and served as a rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire: If the action became dangerous, these advanced to their relief: If any horseman was wounded, and fell from his horse, these gathered round to defend him: If speed was required, either for a hasty pursuit or sudden retreat, so nimble and active were they by continual exercise, that, laying hold of the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with them in running.

*Cæsar*, finding that *Arivostus* declined a battle, turned his thoughts chiefly to provide for the freedom of his convoys. With this view he marked

marked out a place for a camp, six hundred paces beyond that of the enemy; and thither he marched with his whole army, drawn up in three lines. The first and second line had orders to continue under arms, while the third was to employ themselves in fortifying this new camp. *Ariovistus* detached sixteen thousand light-armed foot, and all his horse, to hinder the work, but without effect: The intrenchments were finished, and *Cæsar*, leaving two legions there, with part of the auxiliaries, led back the remaining four to his other camp. The next day, drawing out all his troops from both camps, he again offered the enemy battle, which *Ariovistus* still declined: *Cæsar* retired about noon. *Ariovistus* then detached part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. A sharp conflict ensued, which lasted till sun-set; when *Ariovistus* sounded a retreat. *Cæsar* enquiring of the prisoners, why *Ariovistus* declined an engagement, learnt, that it was the custom among the *Germans* for the women to decide by lots and divination, when it would be proper to hazard a battle: And that these had declared, that the army could not be victorious if they fought before the new moon.

*Cæsar* hereupon resolved to force the enemy, without delay, to a battle: At the head of all his forces, in three lines, he advanced quite up to the head of their camp. The *Germans* now appeared before their intrenchment: They were distributed by nations, and disposed at equal distances one from another, and the whole army encompassed with a line of carriages, to take away

away all hope of safety by flight. The women, mounted upon these carriages, weeping and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, as they moved forwards, not to suffer them to become slaves to the *Romans*. *Cæsar* began the battle in person at the head of his right wing, having observed the enemy to be weakest on that side. Their left wing was soon routed and put to flight, but their right had the advantage, and were like to overpower the *Roman* left wing by numbers. Young *Craffus*, who commanded the cavalry, observing this, made the third line advance to support them. The battle was renewed, and the enemy every where put to the rout: Nor did they cease their flight till they had reached the banks of the *Rhine*, about fifty miles distant from the place of combat. There only a few escaped; some by swimming, others by boats. Of the latter was *Ariovistus*, who, embarking in a small vessel which he found by the edge of the river, got safe to the other side. All the rest were cut to pieces by the *Roman* cavalry. *Ariovistus* had two wives; one a *Sueve*, whom he had brought with him from *Germany*; the other a *Norican*, King *Vocation's* sister, whom he had married in *Gaul*. Both perished in this flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, and the other taken prisoner. *Procillus*, whom, bound with a triple chain, his keepers had dragged after them in their flight, fell in with *Cæsar* in person as he was pursuing the *German* cavalry. *Cæsar's* joy for his victory was exceedingly heightened by his good fortune in recovering, out of the hands of the enemy

enemy, his intimate and familiar friend, universally esteemed for his probity. *Procillus* told him, that lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive upon the spot, or the execution be deferred to another time; and that the lot, three times favourable, had preserved his life. *Mettius* was likewise recovered and brought to *Cæsar*.

This battle being reported beyond the *Rhine*, the *Suevi*, who were advanced as far as the banks of that river, thought it adviseable to return to their own country; but, retreating in disorder and confusion, were attacked by the *Ubii*, a people bordering upon the *Rhine*, who put many of them to the sword.

*Cæsar*, having thus, in one campaign, given a happy conclusion to two very considerable wars, went into winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the season of the year required. He distributed his army among the *Sequani*, and, leaving *Labienus* to command in his absence, set out for *Cisalpine Gaul*, to preside in the assembly of the states.

In the winter, whilst *Cæsar* was in that country, he was alarmed by frequent reports, confirmed by letters from *Labienus*, that all the *Belgæ* had joined in a league against the *Roman Republic*, and ratified it by an exchange of hostages.

The causes of this confederacy were: First, their fear, lest the *Romans*, having subdued all the rest of *Gaul*, should afterwards turn their arms against them: In the next place, the persuasions

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. ii.  
† The peo-  
ple of the  
Nether-  
lands.

sions and importunity of some among the *Celtæ*; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the neighbourhood of the *Germans* in *Gaul*, so were they no less displeased to see a *Roman* army take up its winter-quarters, and grow habitual, in the country: Others from a levity and inconstancy of temper, fond of every project that tended to a revolution. Lastly, some were influenced by ambitious views; it being usual in *Gaul* for those who were the most powerful in their several states, and had men and money at command, to exercise over their fellow-subjects a kind of sovereignty, which they foresaw would be greatly checked by the authority and credit of the *Romans* in *Gaul*.

[Year of *Rome* 696 \*.]

*Cæsar*, upon receiving these messages and reports, levied two new legions in *Cisalpine Gaul*, and early in the spring sent *Q. Pedius*, his Lieutenant, to conduct them over the *Alps*; and he himself, as soon as there began to be forage in the fields, went to the army. He commissioned the *Senones* † and other *Gauls*, who bordered on *Belgic Gaul*, to inform themselves of the motions and designs of the confederates, and send him from time to time an exact account. They all agreed in reporting, that the *Belgæ* were levying troops, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous. Whereupon *Cæsar*, thinking he

† The  
people of  
*Senones*.

\* *Cn. Corn. Lentulus Spinther*, and *Q. Metellus Nepos*,  
Consuls.

ought no longer to delay marching against them, decamped, and in fifteen days arrived on the confines of the *Belgæ*.

As his approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected, the *Rhemi*†, who of all the *Belgæ* lay the nearest to *Celtic Gaul*, dispatched the two principal men of their state to represent to *Cæsar*: “That they put themselves and fortunes under the power and protection of the *Romans*, as having neither approved of the designs of the rest of the *Belgæ*, nor had any share in their confederacy against the People of *Rome*: That, on the contrary, they were ready to give hostages, execute his commands, receive him into their towns, and furnish him with corn, and other provisions for his army: That indeed the rest of the *Belgæ* were all in arms, and that the *Germans*, on this side the *Rhine*, had associated with them: Nay, that so universal was the infatuation, that the *Rhemi* had not been able to dissuade from entering into the confederacy the *Sueffones*, a people united to them by the nearest ties of blood and friendship, both being subject to the same laws, living under the same form of government, and acknowledging one common Magistrate.”

*Cæsar* learnt from the *Rhemi*, that the *Belgæ* were for the most part *Germans* originally, who, inticed by the fertility of the country, had crossed the *Rhine*, driven out the ancient inhabitants of that part of *Gaul*, and settled themselves there.

— That, as to their numbers, the *Belloraci*, the

† The  
people of  
Rheims.

The peo-  
ple of  
Beauvais.

The people of Soissons.

most considerable of the several states, were able to muster 100,000 fighting men, and out of that number had promised to select 60,000 for the war: That next to them in dignity were the *Sueffones*, over whom, of late years, *Divitiacus*, the most powerful prince of *Gaul*, had been King; but that their present sovereign was *Galba*, whose singular prudence and justice had procured him, by the consent of all the confederates, the supreme command of the war: That these had within their territories twelve fortified towns, and had promised to bring into the field 50,000 men: That the like number had been stipulated by the *Nervii*<sup>b</sup>, esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the *Belgic* nations; and that the lesser states were to furnish troops proportionably.

*Cæsar*, exhorting the *Rhemni* to continue firm in their alliance, and promising amply to reward their fidelity, ordered the whole body of their Senate to repair to his camp, and the sons of the principal nobility to be brought him as hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the day

<sup>b</sup> The *Nervii* possessed the country between the *Scheld* and the *Sambre*. Their chief cities are thought to have been *Cambray*, *Valenciennes*, and *Tournay*. The *Atrebates* (people of *Artois*) were to furnish 15000: The *Ambiani* (people of *Amiens*) 10000: The *Morini* (people of *Terouane* and *Boulogne*) 25,000: The *Menapii* (people of *Ghent*, *Antwerp*, and the sea-coast of *Brabant*) 9000: The *Caletes* (people of *Caux*) 10,000: The *Velocasses* and *Veromandui* (people of *Vexin* and *St. Quentin*) the like number: The *Aduatichi* (people of *Namur*) 29,000: And the *Condruſi*, *Eburones*, *Cæſari*, and *Pæmani*, all comprehended under the common name of *Germans*, 40,000.

appointed. He then addressed himself to *Divitiacus*, the *Aduan*, representing, in the warmest manner, of what consequence it was to the common cause to divide the forces of the enemy, that the *Romans* might not be under the necessity of encountering so great a multitude at once. This division, he told him, might easily be effected, if the *Adui* would march their forces into the country of the *Bellovaci*, and begin to plunder it and lay it waste. With these instructions he dismissed him.

Being soon after informed by his scouts and by the *Rhemni*, that the united forces of the *Belgæ*, were marching towards him in a body, and that they were even advanced within a few miles, he, with all the expedition he could, passed his army over the *Axona*, which divides the *Rhemni* from The Aisne. the rest of the *Belgæ*, and encamped on the farther side of it; putting himself in such a situation as to secure all behind him, cover one side of his camp with a river, and render the communication with the *Rhemni*, and those other states whence he expected to be supplied with provisions, safe and easy.

The *Belgæ*, having been disappointed in an attempt upon *Bibrax*, a town belonging to the *Rhemni*, and likewise in an attempt to pass the *Axona*; and finding that provisions began to be scarce, and that the *Romans* could not be drawn to fight at a disadvantage, called a council of war. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every man to his own country, with a resolution, however, to assemble from all parts in defence

defence of that state whose territories should be first invaded by the *Romans*: For they concluded it much safer to carry on the war at home, where they might have provisions, and every thing at command, than venture a battle within the confines of a foreign state. These reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful consideration: For the *Bellovaci*, upon advice that their territories would quickly be invaded by *Divitiacus* and the *Ædui*, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards.

In pursuance of the resolution above-mentioned, the *Belgæ* broke up their camp about the second watch of the night. All was noise and tumult: Not regarding either order in their march or the command of their officers, each man pressed to be in the foremost rank, that he might get the sooner home; insomuch that their retreat had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. *Cæsar*, who had immediate notice of this from his scouts, apprehending some stratagem, because he knew not yet the reason of their departure, would not stir out of his trenches in the night: But early in the morning, upon more certain intelligence of their retreat, detached his Lieutenants, *Pedius* and *Cotta*, with all the cavalry, after them. *Lambinus* had orders to follow with three legions. The enemy suffered a great slaughter in their flight, the *Romans* little or no loss. The latter, about sun-set, gave over the pursuit, and returned to the camp, in obedience to the orders they had received.

The

The next day, before the enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their consternation, *Cæsar* led his army into the territories of the *Sueffones*, which joined to those of the *Rhemi*, and, after a long march, reached *Noviodunum*. He was in *Noyon*. hopes of carrying the town by assault, as being destitute of a sufficient garrison: But, as the ditch was broad, and the wall very high, the defendants, though few in number, withstood all his efforts. Wherefore, having fortified his camp, he began to provide engines, and get every thing in readiness for a siege. Mean time, such of the *Sueffones* as had escaped the late slaughter, threw themselves, during the night, into the town. But *Cæsar* advancing his preparations with great expedition, and approaching, under cover of his mantlets, to the very walls, where he cast up a mount, and planted his battering towers, the *Gauls*, astonished at the greatness of the works, as having never seen nor heard of any such before, and at the dispatch wherewith they were carried on, sent deputies to treat about a furrendry; and the *Rhemi* interceeded for them.

*Cæsar*, having received the principal men of the *Sueffones* as hostages (amongst whom were two sons of *Galba* their King) and obliged them to deliver up all their arms, admitted them to a furrendry, and led his army against the *Bellovaci*. These, retiring with their effects into *Bratuspantium*\*, their capital city, and, understanding that *Cæsar* was advanced within five miles of it, sent a deputation of their old men, who came forth in

venerable procession to meet him, signifying by outstretched hands, and the most submissive terms, that they put themselves under his power and protection, and did not pretend to appear in arms against the People of *Rome*: And when he approached nearer the city, and encamped within view of the walls, the women and children from the ramparts, with extended arms, according to the custom of their country, besought the *Romans* for peace. Hereupon *Divitiacus*, who, after the retreat of the *Belgæ*, had dismissed the *Ædui*, and returned to *Cæsar's* camp, interposed in behalf of the *Bellovaci*, pleading : “ That “ they had always lived in strict friendship with “ the *Ædui*, and, by the artful insinuations of “ their chiefs, had been seduced to forsake their “ ancient allies, and take up arms against the “ *Romans*, whom they had represented as holding “ the *Ædui* under an ignominious tyranny and “ oppression : That the authors of that advice, “ seeing its pernicious effects, were retired into “ *Britain*. ” *Cæsar*, out of regard to *Divitiacus* and the *Ædui*, promised pardon and protection to the *Bellovaci*; but as these were possessed of very extensive territories, and surpassed in power, and number of forces, all the other *Belgic* states, he demanded six hundred hostages.

These being accordingly delivered, together with all their arms, *Cæsar* left their city and advanced into the country of the *Ambiani* \*, who, upon his approach, immediately submitted. Adjoining to these were the *Nervii* †; of whose manners

\* People of Amiens.

† People of Cambresis.

manners and genius *Cæsar*, enquiring, learnt :  
 " That they suffered no resort of merchants into  
 " their city, nor the importation of wine, or of  
 " any thing tending to luxury, which, they thought,  
 " enfeebled the mind, and extinguished its martial  
 " fire : That they were men of a warlike spirit, and  
 " were continually reproaching the rest of the *Bel-*  
 " *gæ* for ignominiously submitting to the *Roman*  
 " yoke ; and had openly declared their resolution  
 " of neither sending Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, nor  
 " accepting any terms of peace."

*Cæsar*, after a march of three days through their territories, understood from some prisoners :  
 " That he was now advanced within ten miles of  
 " the *Sambre*, on the other side of which the ene-  
 " my had posted themselves, and there waited the  
 " coming of the *Romans* : That they had been  
 " joined by the *Atrebates* ¶ and *Veromandui* ||,  
 " neighbouring nations, whom they had persuaded  
 " to take part in the fortune of the war : That  
 " they expected also to be reinforced by the *Adu-*  
 " *atici*, who were already on their march : And  
 " that all their women, and such as, on account of  
 " age, were unfit to bear arms, had been conveyed  
 " to a place of safety, inaccessible by reason of  
 " the marshes that surrounded it." The two  
 armies posted themselves on two hills, opposite to  
 each other, the *Sambre* running between, which  
 was not, in that part, above three feet in depth.

¶ People of  
Artois.  
|| People of  
Verman-  
dois, a  
part of  
Picardy.

The battle which ensued was bravely and resolutely fought on both sides, and with great variety of fortune : Each army possessed itself of the

enemy's camp : The *Roman* cavalry were once broken and put to flight : The twelfth and the seventh legions reduced to the utmost distress : Nor was there any body of reserve from which they could expect succour. In this extremity, *Cæsar*, snatching a buckler from one of the soldiers, and, pressing to the front of the battle, called upon the Centurions by name, and encouraged the rest. His arrival inspired the legionaries with new hope ; and, every one being ambitious of distinguishing himself in the presence of his General, they redoubled their efforts, and checked the progress of the enemy. In the mean time, two new-raised legions, that had been placed in the rear of the *Roman* army, and been appointed to follow and guard the baggage, hearing of the battle, advanced with all possible speed : And *Labienus*, who had made himself master of the enemy's camp, observing from the hill on which that stood, how matters went with *Cæsar*, detached the tenth legion to his assistance.

The arrival of this detachment produced so great a change in favour of the *Romans*, that many of the soldiers, who, before lay oppressed with wounds, now resuming courage, renewed the fight : Nay, the very servants of the camp, unarmed as they were, observing the consternation of the enemy, rushed among their armed battalions. The cavalry too, striving, by extraordinary efforts, to wipe off the ignominy of their late flight, charged the enemy in all places where the void spaces between the legions suffered them to advance.

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vance. Mean time, the *Nervii*, now very hard pressed, exerted themselves with such determined courage, that, their front ranks being cut off, those who stood behind mounted the bodies of the slain, and thence continued the fight: And when these too, by their fall, had raised a mount of carcases, those who remained, ascending the pile, poured their javelins upon the *Romans* as from a rampart, and even returned the darts thrown at them by their enemies. Fame therefore (says *Cæsar*) did not deceive in proclaiming so loudly the bravery of this people.

In a battle, maintained with such obstinacy, the loss of the vanquished must necessarily be prodigious: The very name and nation of the *Nervii* were in a manner quite extinguished: The old men, who, with the women and children (as above related) had been conveyed into a place surrounded with bogs and morasses, upon the report of this terrible overthrow, resolved, with the consent of all that survived the late destruction, to send a deputation to *Cæsar*, and surrender themselves. These deputies, in reciting the calamities of their country, represented, that of six hundred Senators there remained only three; and that from sixty thousand fighting men their soldiers were reduced to five hundred. *Cæsar* readily took them under his protection, allowing them free and full possession of their towns and territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring nations to abstain from doing them any injury.

The *Aduatici* <sup>c</sup>, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their forces to join the *Nervii*, and hearing of their total defeat, immediately returned home; and then abandoning all their other towns and castles, conveyed themselves and their riches into a place which nature had strongly fortified: For it was on every side surrounded with high rocks and precipices, having only one avenue of about two hundred feet broad, that led to the town by a gentle rising. Here they raised a double wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther security, they laid great numbers of huge stones and strong-pointed beams.

On the first arrival of the *Roman* army before the town, the inhabitants made frequent sallies from it, and engaged the besiegers in flight skirmishes. But *Cæsar* having drawn a line of contravallation twelve feet high, fifteen miles in circumference, and every where well fortified with redoubts, they kept themselves within their walls. When the *Romans* had finished their approaches, and cast up a mount, and were preparing a tower of assault behind their works, the besieged from

<sup>c</sup> This people were descended from the *Teutoni* and *Cimbri*, who, in their march towards the *Alps* and *Italy*, left their heavy baggage on this side the *Rhine*, with a detachment of six thousand men to guard it. These, after the final overthrow of their countrymen, being for many years in wars with the neighbouring states; sometimes acting on the offensive, sometimes on the defensive; at length, with the consent of all the bordering nations, obtained peace, and settled themselves in this place.

their battlements at first derided them, and in contemptuous language asked the meaning of that prodigious engine raised at such a distance ! With what hands or strength, men of the size and make of the *Romans* (whose small stature the *Gauls*, who were for the most part very tall, despised) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a machine against their walls ? But when they saw it removed, and approaching near the town, astonished at the new and strange appearance, they sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for peace. These, being introduced, told him, “ That they “ doubted not but the *Romans* were assisted in “ their wars by the Gods themselves ; it seeming “ a more than human task to transport, with such “ facility, an engine of that amazing height, by “ which they were brought upon a level with “ their enemies, and enabled to engage them in “ close fight. That they therefore put themselves “ and their fortunes into his hands, requesting “ only, that, if his clemency, of which they had “ heard much, should determine him to spare “ them, he would not deprive them of their arms : “ That the neighbouring nations were almost all “ their enemies, against whom they could not de- “ fend themselves if their arms were taken away ; “ and that they would chuse to undergo any for- “ tune from the hands of the *Romans*, rather than “ expose themselves to be cruelly slaughtered by “ those, over whom they had been wont to exer- “ cise dominion.

To this *Cæsar* answered, “ That, to conform “ himself to his usual conduct on such occasions,

" and not for any merit of theirs, he was willing  
" to grant them peace, provided they submitted  
" before the battering-ram touched the walls;  
" but that no surrendry would be accepted, un-  
" less they delivered up their arms: That he  
" would take the same care of them as he had be-  
" fore done of the *Nervii*, and lay his expres-  
" commands upon the neighbouring nations to  
" abstain from all injuries towards a people who  
" had put themselves under the protection of the  
" *Romans*." The Ambassadors returning with this  
answer, their countrymen accepted, in appearance,  
the conditions offered them; and threw so vast a  
quantity of arms into the ditch before the town,  
that the heap almost reached to the top of the  
wall. Nevertheless, as was afterwards known,  
they retained about a third part, and concealed  
them within the town. The gates being thrown  
open, there was peace for the remaining part of  
that day.

In the evening, *Cæsar* ordered the gates to be  
shut, and his soldiers to quit the town, that no  
injury might be offered to the inhabitants during  
the night. The *Aduatici*, imagining that the  
*Romans*, after the surrendry of the place, would  
either set no guard at all, or, at most, keep watch  
with little care, armed themselves partly with  
those weapons they had secretly retained, and  
partly with targets, made of bark or wicker, and  
covered over hastily with hides, and made a furi-  
ous sally about midnight with all their forces, on  
that side where the *Roman* works seemed to be of  
easiest access. The alarm being immediately  
given

given by lighting fires, as *Cæsar* had directed, the soldiers ran from the neighbouring forts to the place of action. A very sharp conflict ensued : For, the enemy now driven to despair, and having no hope but in their valour, fought with all possible resolution ; though the *Romans* had the advantage of the ground, and poured their javelins upon them both from the towers and the top of the rampart. About four thousand were slain upon the spot ; the rest retired into the town. Next day the gates were forced, no one offering to make the least resistance, and the army having taken possession of the place, the inhabitants, to the number of fifty-three thousand, were sold for slaves.

About the same time *Publius Crassus*, whom *Cæsar* had sent with a legion against the *Veneti*<sup>\*</sup>, and six other neighbouring states<sup>a</sup>, inhabiting the sea-coast, dispatched messengers to acquaint him, that all those states had submitted to the dominion of the *Romans*.

\* The people of Vannes.

The campaign being ended, and all the provinces of *Gaul* subdued, such was the opinion conceived of this war among the Barbarians round about, that even the nations beyond the *Rhine* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, offering to give hostages, and submit to his commands : But he, being then in haste to return to *Italy* and *Illyricum*, ordered them to attend him next spring. Having put his army into winter-quarters, in the territo-

<sup>a</sup> The *Unelli*, *Ossmii*, *Curiosolyæ*, *Sesuvii*, *Aulerci*, and *Rbedones*. The exact situation of these is unknown.

The people of the *Andes*, *Turones*, and *Carnutes*, which states lay nearest to the provinces that had been the seat of the war, he himself set out for *Italy*.

The Senate, informed by letters from *Cæsar* of his successes, decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days, a number never granted before to any General <sup>c</sup>.

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. iii.

*Cæsar*, upon his departure for *Italy*, sent *Sergius Galba*, with the twelfth legion, against the *Nantuates* <sup>d</sup>, *Veragri*, and *Seduni*, whose territories extended from the confines of the *Allobroges*, the lake *Lemanus*, and the river *Rhone*, to the top of the *Alps*. His design, in this expedition, was to open a free passage over those mountains for the *Roman* merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous exactions. *Galba* executed his commission, made himself master of several forts, received Ambassadors from the nations all round, and having settled the terms of peace with them, received hostages for their fidelity. Having quartered two cohorts among the *Nantuates*, he himself, with the rest of the troops, took up his winter-quarters in a town of the *Veragri*, called *Oeldurus*. It was situated in the midst of a valley, upon a plain of no great extent, and bounded on all sides with very high mountains.

<sup>e</sup> *Pompey* was the first General to whose honour so many as ten days had been decreed. *Vid. Vol. VIII. p. 93, 94.*

<sup>f</sup> The *Nantuates* are said to have been the ancient inhabitants of that part of Savoye now called *Lechablais*. The chief town of the *Veragri*, was *Aquatum*, now *St. Maurice*. The capital of the *Seduni* was *Sion* in Switzerland.

As

As the city was divided into two parts by a river, he left one to the *Gauls*, and assigned the other to his soldiers, commanding them to fortify it with a ditch and rampart. After many days spent here, he was suddenly informed, that the *Gauls* had abandoned, in the night, that part of the city which had been allotted to them; and that the impending mountains were covered with the *Viragri* and *Seduni*. Upon this intelligence, *Galba*, who had neither completed the fortifications of his camp, nor laid in a sufficient store of corn and other provisions, as little apprehending an insurrection of this kind among a people who had submitted and given hostages, speedily assembled a council of war: The danger was imminent and unexpected; there was no room to hope for succours, or for supplies of provision, the enemy being in possession of all the avenues to the camp. Some of the council, thinking the case desperate, declared for abandoning the baggage, and attempting by a rally to recover their old quarters: But the greater number were for reserving this expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time defending the camp in the best manner they could. It was not long before the enemy came rushing down upon them from all parts, and began the assault with a shower of stones and darts. When the battle had lasted upwards of six hours without intermission, the *Romans* not only found their strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of weapons wherewith to annoy the enemy. The *Gauls* on the other hand, urged the combat with greater fury than ever; and,

meeting

meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to demolishing the rampart, and filling up the ditch. All was giving way before them, when *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first rank, and highest reputation for courage, who had received many wounds in the battle against the *Nervii*; as likewise *Volusenus*, a man equally distinguished for his conduct and his bravery, came to *Galba*, and represented to him that the only expedient now left was to make a sudden sally, and put all upon the issue of one bold attack. Accordingly *Galba*, calling the Centurions together, directed them immediately to signify to the soldiers, that they should for some time keep only upon the defensive, and when they had a little recovered their strength, and furnished themselves with the weapons thrown at them by the enemy, upon a signal given, to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their valour. The orders were punctually obeyed: The *Romans*, rushing furiously upon the enemy, gave them no time either to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an attack, or to recover out of the confusion into which it threw them: And thus fortune changed sides. Of thirty thousand fighting men, who had been engaged in the assault, more than 10000 perished upon the spot: The rest fled in terror and confusion. *Galba*, seeing the enemy entirely dispersed, quitted the pursuit and retired within his intrenchments. The next day, unwilling to expose himself a second time to the inconstancy of fortune, and being in great want of corn and forage, set fire to the town, and began his march back into the province. As

there

there was no enemy in the field to molest or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the legion safe into the country of the *Nantuates*, and thence into the territories of the *Allobroges*, where he put them into winter-quarters.

The insurrection being thus entirely quelled, *Cæsar*, who believed that tranquillity was now re-established in *Gaul* (the *Belgæ* being subdued, the *Germans* expelled, and the inhabitants of the *Alps* compelled to submit) made a journey, in the beginning of the winter, into *Illyricum*; when all on a sudden a new war broke out in *Celtic Gaul*. The occasion of it was this: The seventh legion, commanded by young *Craffus*, had been quartered among the *Andes*, a people bordering upon the ocean. As there was a great scarcity of corn in those parts, *Craffus* sent some officers of the cavalry to solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. Of these states the *Veneti* were by far the most powerful, not only on account of their abundant shipping, wherewith they drove a mighty traffic to *Britain*, but because most of the nations that trade on those seas were tributaries to them. They began to revolt by detaining the officers sent to them by *Craffus*, hoping, by this means, to recover the hostages put into his hands. The neighbouring states moved by their example and authority, (as the *Gauls* are in general very sudden and forward in their resolves) detained, for the same reason, the officers sent to them, and, speedily dispatching embassies from one to another, entered into a strict confederacy for supporting

the

the common cause; earnestly solliciting, at the same time, the inland provinces to rise in defence of that liberty they had received from their ancestors, and not tamely submit to the ignominious yoke of the *Romans*. All the states upon the sea-coast coming readily into this alliance, they jointly sent Ambassadors to *Crassus* to acquaint him, that he must first restore to them their hostages, if he expected to have his officers restored to him.

*Cæsar*, receiving intelligence of these things from *Crassus*, and being then at a great distance from *Gaul*, sent orders for building a great number of galleys upon the *Loire*, and for drawing together, from the province, mariners, rowers, and pilots. These orders were executed with good dispatch; and he himself, as soon as the season of the year permitted, went to the army.

[Year of *Rome* 697 <sup>z.</sup>]

The *Veneti* and their allies, not ignorant of the greatness of their crime, in detaining and loading with irons, Ambassadors, a name ever looked upon, among all nations, as sacred and inviolable, made preparations in proportion to the danger that threatened them. The natural situation of their country gave them confident hopes of being able to defend themselves: For the passes by land were every where cut asunder by many friths and arms of the sea; and the approach by sea was

<sup>z</sup> *Cn. Corn. Lentulus Marcellinus, and L. Martius Philippus, Consuls.*

not

not less difficult on account of the small number of harbours, the little knowledge the *Romans*, accustomed only to the navigation of the *Mediterranean*, had of the art of governing ships on the ocean, and their total ignorance of the coast. Neither did the *Veneti* believe it practicable for the *Roman* army to continue long in that country, by reason of the great scarcity of corn; and they had a mighty confidence in the strength and number of their shipping.

*Cæsar*, to restrain those of the *Gauls* who had not yet declared themselves, and to hinder the confederates <sup>b</sup> from uniting their forces into one army, divided his troops, and dispersed them into different parts of *Gaul*. He sent *Labienus* towards *Treves* with a body of cavalry. *P. Crassus*, at the head of twelve legionary cohorts, passed the *Garonne*, and entered into *Aquitain*, to prevent the enemies receiving any supplies from that quarter. Another of his Lieutenants, *Titurius Sabinus*, with three legions, found employment for the people who inhabited the coasts of *Basse Bretagne*, and of *Normandy* as far as *Lisieux*. To *D. Brutus* was given the command of the fleet, and *Cæsar* himself conducted the land forces.

Most of the enemies towns were built upon promontories, and points of land, whose feet were washed by the sea at high water, and left dry at

<sup>b</sup> *Cæsar* tells us, that the *Veneti* brought into their alliance the *Osfimii*, *Lexovii*, *Nannetes*, *Ambiani*, *Morini*, *Diablintes*, and *Menapii*; and dispatched Ambassadors into *Britain*, which lies over against their coast, to sollicit assistance from thence.

ebb: So that neither his land forces nor his ships could stay long before them.

Cæsar, duly considering this, perceived plainly, that he shoud never be able to reduce the *Veneti* but by a naval battle. He resolved therefore to wait for his fleet. His fleet arrived; and the enemy did not delay to come out of their ports to fight. Full of confidence in their naval strength and skill, they, with 220 tall vessels, fell furiously upon the *Romans*. The construction of their ships, which were much higher than the *Roman* galleys, gave the *Gauls* a considerable advantage in throwing their darts; and the *Romans* suffered much at first from this circumstance. But Cæsar had fortunately provided a great number of sharp crooked scythes, like those that were used in sieges. With these, fixed to the end of long poles, the *Romans*, laying hold of the tackle of the enemy's vessels, towed them away by force of rowing; then, cutting the cables, the mainyards fell down, whereby the enemy, who relied on their sails and rigging, were at once deprived of the use of them: And now, the dispute depending wholly on courage and manhood, the *Roman* soldiers, who fought under the eye of their General, and of a vast number of witnesses (for all the hills that looked upon the sea were covered with spectators) easily obtained the victory.

The *Veneti*, observing that the *Romans* had already boarded and made themselves masters of a great part of their fleet, began to think of providing for the safety of the rest by flight. Accordingly

cordingly they tacked about to run before the wind: But all on a sudden there ensued so dead a calm, that not a vessel could stir out of its place; and then the *Romans* took them with great ease. After a conflict that had lasted from nine in the morning, a very few escaped under favour of the night.

This victory put an end to the war with the *Veneti*; for they had lost the whole body of their youth, as well as the most eminent men among them for rank or authority, and all their naval strength. Those who survived this defeat, having no resource left, surrendered themselves to *Cæsar's* mercy; who thought it necessary to proceed against them with severity, that he might impress upon the minds of the *Gauls* for the future a proper regard to the sacred character of Ambassadors. He condemned therefore all their Senators to death, and sold the people for slaves.

The arms of *Cæsar* prospered on every side. At the same time that he vanquished the *Veneti*, *Titurius Sabinus* obtained a great victory over the united forces of the *Unelli*, *Eburovices*, and *Lexovii* †. The two last mentioned nations were so furiously bent upon the war, that they massacred their Senate for opposing it. After this cruel execution, they joined their troops to those of the *Unelli*, whose conductor *Viridovix* was recognized for Generalissimo of the army of the three nations. Under his command they advanced against the *Romans*, and, approaching near their camp, defied them to battle. *Sabinus* pretended fear, kept close within his intrenchments, and, by

† Inhabitants of  
Coutance,  
Evreux,  
and Li-  
sieux.

means of a pretended deserter, deceived the enemy into a belief that he was the next night to steal privately out of his camp, in order to go to the succour of his General, much distressed by the *Veneti*. By this stratagem he drew the *Gauls* to attack him in his camp, which was upon an eminence. Mounting it with precipitation, they arrived quite out of breath. *Sabinus* instantly caused all his troops to sally out upon them by two gates at once. The assailants, not able to support the very first shock, took to flight; the *Roman* cavalry pursued them, and almost finished the destruction of that numerous army.

Much about the same time, *P. Crassus* arrived in *Aquitain*. Having made due provision of corn, raised some cavalry, assembled his auxiliary troops, and strengthened his army with a select body of volunteers from *Toulouse*, *Carcasson*, and *Narbonne*, states in that part of the *Roman* province that lies nearest to *Aquitain*, he advanced with all his forces to the territories of the *Sotiates*\*. *Crassus*, with great slaughter, put them to the rout, and presently after invested their capital. They made a brave resistance for some time; but finding that the *Romans* would surmount all the difficulties that could be thrown in their way, they sent to *Crassus*, requesting that they might be admitted to a surrendry.

\* Inhabiting the country about Aire.

The defeat of the *Sotiates*, and the reduction of their city, roused the other states of *Aquitain* to unite themselves against the conqueror: And they procured assistance from the *Spaniards* their neighbours.

neighbours. *Craffus* attacked them in their camp, and of fifty thousand men, of which their strength consisted, scarce a fourth part escaped being cut in pieces. The fruit of this victory was the submission of all *Aquitain*.

[This was the last service performed by *P. Craffus* in the war of *Gaul*; for, with *Cæsar's* permission, he went soon after to *Rome*, and the next year into *Asia*, taking with him a thousand *Gallic* horse, to assist his father in his expedition against the *Parthians*.]

When *Cæsar* had finished the war against the *Veneti*, the season was far advanced: Nevertheless, as the *Morini*<sup>1</sup> and *Menapii*, who were situated in the northern part of *Gaul*, and who, though they had entered into the league which was just dissolved, had taken no step yet to shew their submission to the *Romans*, *Cæsar*, *who thought nothing done, while there remained any thing to do*<sup>k</sup>, marched against them in order to finish his conquest. At his approach they retired, with all their effects, into the woods and morasses, with which their country abounded, hoping to find there a safe shelter. But *Cæsar* resolved to lay low those immense forests; and with the trees which he cut down he made a kind of rampart to cover the flanks of his army against any sudden

<sup>1</sup> The *Morini* probably inhabited the sea-coast from the *Somme* to the *Scheld*: The *Menapii* both banks of some part of the lower *Rhine*.

<sup>k</sup> Nil actum credens, dum quid superesset agendum.

*Lucan.* ii. 657.

incursions of the Barbarians. He had made a considerable progress in this work, when, the bad weather coming on, and the continual rains requiring that he should find some shelter for his army, necessity compelled him to leave his conquest incomplete. Having ravaged the country and burnt the villages, he retired, and distributed his troops into winter-quarters in the territories of the *Aulerci-Eburovices, Lexovii*, and the other newly subdued states<sup>1</sup>.

[Year of Rome 698.]

J. C. Com.  
lib. iv.

THE next year [when *Pompey* and *Craffus* were Consuls] a great body of the *Uspetes* and *Ten-chtheri, German* nations, passed the *Rhine*, not far from its mouth. The hostilities of their neighbours the *Suevi*, who had for many years harassed them with continual wars, and hindered them from cultivating their lands, were the cause of their making this emigration.

The *Suevi*, by far the most warlike and considerable of all the *Germans*, were divided into a hundred cantons, each of which used to send yearly into the field a thousand armed men. The rest, who continued in their several districts, employed themselves in cultivating the lands. These husbandmen became the next year soldiers, and were succeeded in the care of the lands by the troops that had served the year before. Thus they lived in the continual exercise of agriculture and

<sup>1</sup> For what passed at *Rome* this year, 697, in relation to *Cæsar*, see above, p. 21, 22, &c.

war alternately. In the distribution of the lands, no such thing was allowed among them as property or private possession, their residence in any place being confined to one year. They had little trade, having nothing to sell but spoils taken in war. They suffered no wine to be imported into their territories, as thinking that it both enervated the mind, and unfitted the body for exercise and labour.

Having tried the strength of their neighbours, the *Ubii*, in many wars, they found them too numerous and potent to be dispossessed of their territories; yet they prevailed so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and very much reduce their power.

But the *Ufipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, before mentioned, after many years resistance, were at length totally driven out of their possessions by the *Suevi*. Having wandered over many regions of *Germany* during the space of three years, they arrived at last upon the banks of the *Rhine*, where the *Menapii* had houses, lands, and villages, on both sides the river. These, alarmed at the approach of so prodigious a multitude (for they were not an army, but two nations, who marched in a body, men, women, and children, to the number of above 430,000) they abandoned all their habitations on the right bank of the *Rhine*, and, retiring to the left side, disposed their troops in a proper manner, to hinder the passage of the invaders. The *Germans* tried every expedient; and finding they could neither force a passage, nor steal over

privately, by reason of the strict watch kept by the *Menapii*, had recourse to stratagem. They gave out, that they would, without delay, go back to their own country; and, to gain credit to this report, they, in fact, thitherward made a three-days march. The *Menapii* were deceived. Such of them as had dwelt on the farther bank of the *Rhine* returned to their habitations, secure and fearless of danger. Surprized by the *German* cavalry, who in one night recovered the whole ground of the three-days march, they were all put to the sword: And the *Germans*, having seized the shipping before the *Menapii* on this side had intelligence of their approach, passed the river, took possession of towns and villages, and supported themselves the rest of the winter with the provisions there found.

*Cæsar*, informed of these things, and dreading the levity of the *Gauls*, who were very changeable in their councils, and fond of novelties, made all the haste he could to join his army. Upon his arrival he found that things were fallen out exactly as he [had apprehended: Some of the states of *Gaul* had sent Ambassadors to the *Germans*, inviting them to leave the banks of the *Rhine*, and assuring them that all their demands should be readily complied with. The *Germans*, allured by these hopes, had already penetrated into the territories of the *Eburones* and *Condruſi*, both which nations were under the protection of the *Treviri* †. *Cæsar* assembled the chiefs of the *Gauls*, dissembled his knowledge of their secret designs, and by soft words endeavoured to confirm them

The people  
about  
Liege and  
Namur.  
† People  
of Treviri.

them in their alliance with the People of *Rome*: He then demanded of them a certain number of horse, and prepared to march against the *Germans*.

When he came within a few days march of their camp, Ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him in words to the following effect: "The *Germans* have no design of beginning a war with the People of *Rome*; they are come into these parts against their inclination, having been forcibly driven from their former dwellings. If the *Romans* are disposed to accept of their friendship, they will rest satisfied with the quiet possession of those lands they have already conquered, or with such as the *Romans* shall think proper to assign them: In bravery they yield to the *Suevi* alone, for whom the immortal Gods themselves are not an equal match."

*Cæsar* made such reply as best suited his present views: But the conclusion of his speech was of the following purport: "That he could enter into no treaty of friendship with them, so long as they continued in *Gaul*: That men unable to defend their own territories were not likely to make conquests in other countries: That there were no uncultivated lands in *Gaul*, sufficient for so great a multitude, without invading the properties of others: But that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the *Ubii*, whose Ambassadors were then in his camp to complain of the injuries done them by the *Suevi*, and request his aid against their en-

"croachments: And this he promised to obtain  
"for them from the *Ubii*." The Ambassadors  
replied, "That they would report to their coun-  
trymen what he had said, and in three days re-  
turn with an answer; requesting that in the  
mean time he would not advance with his  
army."

¶ Probably  
the people  
of Breda  
and Boisle-  
duc.

But this *Cæsar* refused, as knowing that, a few days before, they had sent a great body of cavalry over the *Meuse*, to forage and plunder in the territories of the *Ambivariti* ¶. He thence concluded, that they asked for delay, because they waited the return of that party. *Cæsar* therefore still advanced. When within twelve miles of the enemy, he was met by the Ambassadors on the day appointed: They were very earnest in their request that he would advance no farther; but not being able to prevail, intreated him that he would restrain the cavalry of his advanced guard from doing any act of hostility: And in the mean time permit them to send Ambassadors to the *Ubii*; from whose Senate and Magistrates if they could obtain, under the sanction of a solemn oath, the conditions proposed by *Cæsar*, they declared themselves ready to accept them: Only they desired, that he would allow them the space of three days to bring matters to a final issue. *Cæsar* believed that they had no other view in what they said, than to gain time till their cavalry should arrive: He told them, nevertheless, that, for the sake of water, he would that day advance four miles, and no farther; but desired that their chiefs would attend him the day after to acquaint him

him with their demands. In the mean time he sent orders to the officers of his cavalry not to attack the enemy ; and, in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground till he should come up with the rest of the army.

But the *Germans*, though their cavalry did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those who had been sent to forage, yet, seeing the *Roman* horse advance without caution, fell suddenly upon them. These, amounted to five thousand, but having no apprehension of an attack, because they knew that the *German* Ambassadors had been with *Cæsar* a little before, and had obtained a day's truce, were easily thrown into disorder and put to flight. The *Romans* lost seventy-four men <sup>m</sup>. And now *Cæsar* resolved

<sup>m</sup> " This battle," says M. *Crevier*, " is of very great importance, on account of the circumstance of its being fought at a time when there was a negotiation actually on foot between *Cæsar* and the *Germans*. By whom the hostility was begun, and consequently upon whom the reproach of perfidy ought to fall, is a problem, that labours under some difficulty. *Cæsar* threw the fault upon the Barbarians : But several persons at *Rome* were persuaded, that it was he who had violated the faith of the negotiation : And when the Senate were decreeing him honours for his exploits in this campaign, *Cato* gave it as his opinion, that *Cæsar* should be delivered up to the *Germans*; to the end that he alone might suffer the punishment of his breach of faith, and the Commonwealth not be answerable for it to Gods or men.

Tom.XII.  
P. 506.

" It is difficult to decide upon a point so obscure, and concerning which the interest of *Cæsar*, on one hand, lessens the weight of his evidence ; and hatred and partiality, on the other, may have carried *Cato* beyond due bounds. It is known that *Cæsar* was not scrupulous in morals" [for he was

neither

neither to give audience to the Ambassadors of the *Germans*, nor admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had treacherously sollicited for a truce, and afterwards broke it themselves. He likewise

too much addicted to gallantry] “but his proceedings were “frank and generous, at least outwardly so; and how little “care soever he took to have truth and justice really on his  
 side, he always affected to have the appearances of them. It  
 “must, nevertheless, be allowed, that appearances are not for him  
 “here. It is not probable, that eight hundred horsemen should  
 “think of attacking five thousand.” Surely it is less probable,  
 that eight hundred horse should beat five thousand, unless the  
 latter were “surprized and unprepared (as *Cæsar* says they  
 “were) because trusting to the truce granted at the enemy’s  
 “request.” M. Crevier proceeds: “And what seems to prove  
 “the good faith of the *Germans* is, that, the day after the battle,  
 “they sent their deputies again to *Cæsar*, to make apologies,  
 “and to continue the negotiation.” If they were perfidious in  
 attacking the *Roman* cavalry, it is no wonder that *Cæsar* shewed  
 no regard to their apology, but considered them as no less per-  
 fidious in their new deputation. But, with relation to the notable  
 advice said to have been given by *Cato* to the Senate, what evi-  
 dence is there of the fact, that *Cato* did deliver that opinion? Is  
 it sufficiently warranted? Who is the historian that records it?  
*Plutarch*, the only writer we have who mentions the matter,  
 gives us *Tanusius Geminus* for his authority. And who was this  
*Tanusius* or *Tamusius*? (He is cited by *Suetonius* for several tales  
 of the slanderous kind, that carry no face of probability.)  
*Vossius*, concerning him, writes thus: *Ex Senecæ verbis liquet,*  
*fuisse annales Tamusii, quales illi Volusii, qui eodem vixit tempore.*  
*De eo sic Catullus:*

*Annales Volusii cacata charta.*

Add to this, the great unlikelihood that *Cato*, envious and  
 malicious as he was, even almost to madness, whenever *Cæsar*’s  
 name was in question, should yet expose his weakness to so  
 great a degree, as, in the Consulship of *Craffus* and *Pompey*, to  
 give an advice concerning *Cæsar*, which at any time must appear  
 senseless and impracticable.

De Hist.  
Lat. lib. i.  
cap. xii.

considered that it would be downright madness to delay coming to an action, till the *German* army should be augmented by their cavalry, then absent; and, besides, he was perfectly well acquainted with the levity of the *Gauls*, among whom the successful attack made by the *Germans* had given them a considerable reputation. A very lucky accident fell out to bring about *Cæsar's* purpose: For the very next morning the *Germans*, persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, came in great numbers to his camp; all their nobility making part of the embassy. Their pretended design in coming was to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the day before; but their real motive was to obtain, if possible, another insidious truce. *Cæsar*, overjoyed to have them thus in his power, caused them to be secured; and immediately drew his forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom he supposed terrified by the late disaster, were commanded to follow in the rear.

Having drawn up his army in three lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight miles, he appeared before the enemies camp. Their consternation was not a little increased by the unexpectedness of his appearance, and the absence of their own officers; they had hardly time to take counsel, or to arm: Their camp was presently forced: The women and children betook themselves to flight on all sides. *Cæsar* sent the cavalry in pursuit of them: The *Germans*, hearing a noise behind them, and seeing their wives and children put to the sword, threw down their arms, and fled out

out of the camp. Being arrived at the conflux of the *Rhine* and *Meuse*, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther, they threw themselves into the river; where, through fear, weariness, or the force of the current, they almost all perished. And thus the *Romans*, without the loss of a man, put an end to this formidable war. *Cæsar* offered those of the *Germans* whom he had detained in his camp liberty to depart: But they, dreading the resentment of the *Gauls*, whose lands they had ravaged, chose rather to continue with him, and they obtained his consent.

*Cæsar* had various reasons for resolving to lead his army over the *Rhine*: But what chiefly swayed him was, that, seeing the *Germans* were so easily induced to transport their forces into *Gaul*, he thought it might be of no small service to let them see that the *Romans* wanted neither resolution nor ability to transport an army into *Germany*. Add to this, that the cavalry of the *Uspetes* and *Tenctheri*, who, having passed the *Meuse* (as was above related) to forage and plunder, and escaped thereby the disaster of the late defeat, had, upon receiving the news of it, repassed the *Rhine*, and retired into the territories of the *Sicambri* †; and *Cæsar*, having demanded that these troops should be delivered up to him, had received for answer, “ That the *Rhine* was the “ boundary of the *Roman* empire: That if he “ thought it unjustifiable in the *Germans* to pass “ over into *Gaul* without his leave, upon what pre-“ tence could he claim any power or authority on “ the *German* side of that river?”

† From  
whom the  
Franks  
were de-  
scended.

But

But *Cæsar* had a third reason: For the *Ubii*, who alone, of all the nations beyond the *Rhine*, had sent Ambassadors to him, entered into alliance with him, and given him hostages, earnestly entreated him to come to their assistance, they being very hard pressed by the *Suevi*. They said, that his shewing himself in *Germany* would be alone sufficient to secure repose to them for the future; and they offered him boats to transport his legions.

*Cæsar* thought that it was neither safe, nor for the dignity of the *Roman* name, to make use of boats for crossing the *Rhine*. To build a bridge would be difficult, on account of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of the river: Nevertheless he undertook it; and the work was completed in ten days, reckoning from the time they began to bring the timber to the bank of the river. *Cæsar* led over his army; and leaving a strong guard on each side the stream, marched directly into the territories of the *Sicambri*; who, so soon as they heard that the bridge was begun, had, by advice of the *Uspetes* and *Tenchtheri*, withdrawn, with their effects, into the neighbouring woods and deserts. *Cæsar* made but a short stay in their country, burnt their villages, cut down their corn, and marched into the territories of the *Ubii*. The *Suevi*, in pursuance of an order of their national council, acted as the *Sicambri*, only with this difference, that all such as were able to bear arms met, by command, at a place of general rendezvous, in the very heart of their country, there to

*Cæsar*  
builds a  
bridge over  
the Rhine.

wait the arrival of the *Romans*, and give them battle. But *Cæsar*, having accomplished all he intended, in carrying his arms over the *Rhine*, which was to spread an universal terror among the *Germans*, take vengeance of the *Sicambri*, and set the *Ubii* at liberty, after a stay of only eighteen days in *Germany*, led back his army into *Gaul*, and broke down the bridge.

Cæsar pre-  
pares to  
pass into  
Britain.

Though but a small part of the summer now remained, *Cæsar* resolved to pass over into *Britain*, having certain intelligence that, in all his wars with the *Gauls*, they had constantly received assistance from thence. He foresaw that the season of the year would not permit him to finish the enterprize; yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, should he only take a view of the island, learn the temper and manners of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all which the *Gauls* were perfect strangers. The merchants who traded thither, and of whom he enquired, could neither tell him what was the extent of the island, nor what was the strength of the nations that inhabited it, nor their skill in war, nor what harbours they had, fit to receive large ships. For which reason, before he embarked, he thought proper to send *C. Volusenus* with a galley, to get some knowledge of these things; commanding him to return with all expedition, when he had informed himself as fully as opportunity would allow. *Cæsar* himself marched with his whole army into the territories of the *Morini*; because thence was the nearest

nearest passage into *Britain*. Here he ordered a great many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him, and the fleet which he had made use of the year before in his war with the *Veneti*.

Mean while the *Britons*, having notice of his design by the merchants that resorted to their island, Ambassadors from many of their states came to him, with an offer of hostages, and submission to the authority of the People of *Rome*. To these Ambassadors he gave a favourable audience, and, exhorting them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own country. With them he dispatched *Comius*, whom he had constituted King of the *Atrebates*, a man, in whose virtue, wisdom, and fidelity, he greatly confided, and whose authority in the island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to enter into an alliance with the *Romans*; letting them know, at the same time, that *Cæsar* designed, as soon as possible, to come over in person into their island.

*Volusenus*, having taken a view of the country, so far as it was possible for a man who was resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself in the hands of the Barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted *Cæsar* with his discoveries.

While *Cæsar* continued in the country of the *Morini*, for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies arrived from almost all their cantons, to excuse their late war with the People of *Rome*,

and

and to promise an entire submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely ; because a war with these people would have obliged him to postpone his expedition into *Britain*. He therefore ordered them to send him a great number of hostages ; and, on their compliance, received them into his friendship. Having got together about eighty transports, he thought these would be sufficient for carrying over two legions. His galleys he distributed to his Quæstor, Lieutenants, and chief officers of the navy. Eighteen vessels, which he had appointed to transport his cavalry, were detained by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off. The rest of the army, under the command of *Titurius Sabinus* and *L. Aurunculeius Cotta*, were sent against the *Menapii*, and those cantons of the *Morini*, which had not submitted. *P. Sulpicius Rufus* had the charge of the harbour where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

Things being in this manner settled, and the wind springing up fair, *Cæsar* weighed anchor about midnight, ordering the cavalry to embark at the other port, and follow him. About nine in the morning he himself, with a part of the fleet, reached the coast of *Britain*, where he saw all the cliffs covered with the enemies forces. From those cliffs it was easy for them to pour down their javelins upon the *Romans*. Not thinking this, therefore, a convenient landing-place, he cast anchor at three in the afternoon, purposing to wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, having called

Cliffs of  
Dover.

called the Lieutenants and military Tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from *Volusenus*; instructed them in the part they were to act; and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and upon a signal given, agreeably to the rules of military discipline; expedition and dispatch being more especially requisite in sea-affairs, because of all the most liable to sudden changes. Having dismissed them, and finding both the wind and weather favourable, he made the signal for weighing anchor, and, after sailing about eight miles farther, he arrived at a Deal. smooth open shore.

But the Barbarians, perceiving his design, had sent before them their cavalry, and their chariots, such as they commonly made use of in battle; and, following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose his landing. And indeed the difficulty of effecting it was great on many accounts: For the *Roman* ships drew so much water, that they could not come very near the shore; and it was a painful service for the soldiers, loaded with a weight of armour, and unacquainted with the place, to leap from the ships, and, wading breast-high through the waves, encounter an enemy; who, standing upon dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, had the free use of their arms; and, knowing perfectly the ground, could also boldly spur on their horses against the invaders. All these circumstances spread a terror among the *Romans*, wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they shewed not their

\* Balistæ.

wonted alacrity, and cheerful readiness to advance against the enemy. *Cæsar*, observing this, ordered some of his galleys, which drew less water than his transports, to draw nearer the shore, and endeavour, by showers of darts from the engines \* which they carried, to drive the enemy to some distance. This proved of considerable service to them: For the surprize occasioned by the make of the galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, made the Barbarians halt, and presently after begin to give back. But the *Roman* soldiers still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts, the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the Gods for success, cried out aloud: “Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the *Roman* eagle into the hands of the enemy: For my part, I am resolved to discharge my duty to *Cæsar* and the Commonwealth.” Instantly he jumped into the sea, advanced with the eagle, and was followed by all that were in the ship: Which being perceived by those in the other vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy.

The *Britons* defended themselves with resolution; nor were the *Romans* able to get firm footing till *Cæsar* ordered some small boats to be manned with recruits, and go to the assistance of the foremost ranks; by which means they were soon enabled to put the enemy to the rout. But, as the cavalry were not yet arrived, *Cæsar* could not pursue the runaways, nor advance far into the island.

The

The vanquished, soon after their defeat, dispatched Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for peace, offering hostages and an intire submission to his commands. With these Ambassadors came *Comius*, whom *Cæsar* (as above related) had sent before him into *Britain*. The natives had feized him as soon as he landed, and, though charged with a commission from *Cæsar*, thrown him into irons. Upon the late defeat, they thought proper to release him and send him back; casting the blame upon the multitude. *Cæsar*, after some reproaches for having begun the war against him after they had sent Ambassadors to him into *Gaul* to sue for peace, at length told them he would forgive their fault; and commanded them to send a certain number of hostages. Part were delivered immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to send in a few days. In the mean time they disbanded their troops; and the several chiefs came to *Cæsar's* camp, to negotiate their own concerns and those of the states to which they belonged: A peace being thus concluded four days after *Cæsar's* arrival in *Britain*.

The eighteen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, of whom we have spoken above \*, put to sea with a gentle gale: But, when they had so near approached the coast as to be within view of the camp, so violent a storm all on a sudden arose, that, being unable to hold on their course, some were obliged to return to the port whence they set out, and others driven to the farther end of the island westward, not without great danger, There

\* p. 304

they cast anchor: But the waves rising very high, so as to fill the ships with water, they were again, in the night, obliged to stand out to sea, and make for the continent of *Gaul*. That very night it happened to be full moon, when the tides upon the sea-coast always rise highest, a thing, in those days, wholly unknown to the *Romans*. Thus, at one and the same time, the galleys, which *Cæsar* had caused to be drawn up on the strand, and the transports that were at anchor in the road, were raised up, tossed about, and beat to pieces by the tempestuous waves. Nor was it possible to attempt any thing for their preservation. This disaster spread a general consternation through the camp: For there were no other ships to carry back the troops, nor any materials to repair those that had been disabled by the tempest. And, as it had been all along *Cæsar's* design to winter in *Gaul*, he was wholly without corn to subsist the troops.

All this being known among the *British* chiefs, who, after the battle, had repaired (as was just now said) to *Cæsar's* camp, they began to hold conferences among themselves. They plainly saw that the *Romans* were destitute of cavalry, shipping, and corn; and judged, from the smallness of their camp, that the number of their troops was but inconsiderable; in which notion they were the more confirmed, because *Cæsar*, having brought over the legions without baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of ground. They thought therefore they had now a fair opportunity

portunity to rid themselves of the invaders, and effectually put a stop to all future attempts upon *Britain*. Having, therefore, entered into a confederacy, they gradually left the camp, and began to draw the islanders together. But *Cæsar*, though he was not yet apprised of their design, yet conjecturing their intention, from the disaster which had befallen his fleet, and the delays formed in relation to the hostages, made preparations accordingly. He sent reapers every day into the field and stored his camp with corn. The timber of the ships that had been most damaged he ordered to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to *Gaul* for what other materials he wanted. As the soldiers were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was soon in a condition to sail, being diminished only by twelve ships. During these transactions, a cloud of dust appeared suddenly on the side where the seventh legion was supposed to be foraging. As but one field remained unreeped, the enemy suspected that the *Romans* would go thither to forage; and had therefore hid themselves, during the night, in the woods, there waiting till the reapers had quitted their arms, and dispersed themselves for the work in hand: Then sallying out on a sudden they began to surround them with horses and chariots. *Cæsar*, conjecturing how matters went, marched away with the cohorts that were upon guard, and ordered those that were in the camp to follow him as soon as possible. He had gone but a little way, when he saw his men with great difficulty sustaining the

fight, being driven into a small compass, and exposed on all sides to the darts of the assailants. Upon his approach the enemy made a stand, and the *Romans* recovered from their fear. However, *Cæsar*, not thinking it a proper time for a general engagement, stood a while facing the enemy, and then led back his legions to the camp. The continual rains that followed for some days, both kept the *Romans* within their intrenchments, and with-held the enemy from attacking them. Mean time the *Britons* dispatched messengers into all parts to make known to their countrymen how favourable an opportunity they had of enriching themselves with spoil, and of securing themselves for ever from all future invasions, by forcing the camp of the *Romans*, whose number was very small. By this means having drawn together a great body of horse and foot, they boldly advanced towards the *Roman* intrenchments. *Cæsar* drew up his legions in order of battle before the camp, and gave the *Britons* so warm a reception, that they presently turned their backs and fled. He pursued them, with great slaughter, till his men were out of breath; and then returned to his camp. The *Britons*, disheartened by the loss they had sustained, dispatched Ambassadors the same day to sue for peace; which *Cæsar* readily granted, upon their promising to send him over into *Gaul* double the number of hostages he had required before. His want of horse, and the fear of exposing his fleet to another storm, if he staid till the equinox, made him hasten his departure.

The

The same night therefore, the wind proving favourable, he weighed anchor, and arrived safe in *Gaul*; whence he immediately wrote to the Senate, acquainting them with his exploits in *Britain*; for which a supplication, or general thanksgiving, was decreed for twenty days <sup>n</sup>.

The *Britons*, it would seem, were not much awed by *Cæsar's* arms; for of all the states who had promised to send him hostages, two only performed their engagements. He resolved therefore to make a new descent the following spring with a more powerful fleet and army. With this view, before he returned to *Italy*, where he usually passed a part of the winter, he ordered his Lieutenants to refit the old ships, and build as many new ones as they could,

When he had finished what he had to do in *Cisalpine Gaul*, he set out for *Illyricum*, upon advice that the *Pirustæ*, a people of that country, were making devastations in the province [that is, in those parts of *Illyricum* which recognized the *Roman* government.] When he arrived there, he ordered the several states to furnish their contingents, and appointed a place of general rendezvous. *Cæsar* was put to no other trouble than that of appearing in the country to compel the injurious Barbarians to give hostages and make satisfaction for the damage they had done.

<sup>n</sup> See above, p. 42, and 53, for those transactions at *Rome* of the year 698, wherein *Cæsar* was interested.

[Year of *Rome* 699 \*.]J. Cæs.  
Comm.  
l. v.

THE order which *Cæsar* had left with his Lieutenants had been executed with such diligence during his absence, that, at his return into *Gaul*, he found six hundred transport ships, and twenty-eight galleys, ready to be launched in a few days. He ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port *Itius*, the island being there not above thirty miles distant from the continent : But because the *Treviri* seemed disposed to rebellion, having neither appeared at the general diets of *Gaul*, nor submitted to the orders of the Republic, and were reported to have even sollicited assistance from *Germany*, he marched into their territories with four legions and eight hundred horse ; being desirous totally to quiet *Gaul* before he engaged in his enterprize against *Britain*. Two of the principal men of the *Treviri*, *Indutiomarus* and *Cingetorix*, were at this time competitors for the supreme authority. The latter, so soon as he heard of the arrival of *Cæsar*, came to him and assured him, that he and all his party would continue firm to their duty. The other soon after submitted, finding himself deserted by some principal men of his own party. *Cæsar* exacted of him two hundred hostages, among whom were to be his son, and all his nearest relations, specified by name. *Indutiomarus* complied : Nevertheless, *Cæsar*, assembling all the principal men of *Treves*,

\* *L. Domitius Abenobarbus*, and *App. Claudius Pulcher*, Consuls.

reconciled them one after another to *Cingetorix*, thinking it of importance to establish thoroughly the authority of a man, of whose inviolable attachment he had received convincing proofs.

This affair being settled, *Cæsar* hastened with his legions to port *Itius* <sup>o</sup>, where he found four thousand *Gallic* horse, and all the prime nobility

<sup>o</sup> *Calais or Boulogne.*

" *Cæsar* was now upon his second expedition into *Britain*, Midd. p.  
 " which raised much talk and expectation at *Rome*, and gave Ci- 494.  
 " cero no small concern for the safety of his brother, who, as one  
 " of *Cæsar's* Lieutenants, was to bear a considerable part in it.  
 " But the accounts which he received from the place soon eased  
 " him of his apprehensions, by informing him, that there was  
 " nothing either to fear or to hope for from the attempt; no danger  
 " from the people, no spoils from the country. In a letter to *Atti-*  
*Ad Quint.*  
*Ad Att.*  
*iv. 16.*  
 " *cus*: We are in suspense, says he, about the British war: It is  
 " certain that the access of the island is strongly fortified; and it  
 " is known also already, that there is not a grain of silver in it, nor  
 " any thing else but slaves; of whom you will scarce expect any,  
 " I dare say, skilled in musick or letters. In another to *Treba-*  
*vii. 7.*  
*Ep. Fam.*  
*Ad Att.*  
*iv. 16.*  
 " *tius*: I bear that there is not any gold or silver in the island:  
 " If so, you have nothing to do but to take one of their chariots  
 " and fly back to us.

" From their railleries of this kind (says Dr. Middleton) one  
 " cannot help reflecting on the surprizing fate and revolutions of  
 " kingdoms: How *Rome*, once the mistress of the world, the  
 " seat of arts, empire, and glory, now lies sunk in sloth, igno-  
 " rance, and poverty; enslaved to the most cruel as well as to the  
 " most contemptible of tyrants, superstition and religious imposition:  
 " While this remote country, antiently the jest and contempt  
 " of the polite *Romans*, is become the happy seat of liberty,  
 " plenty, and letters, flourishing in all the arts and refinements  
 " of civil life; yet running, perhaps, the same course which  
 " *Rome* itself had run before it; from virtuous industry to  
 " wealth, from wealth to luxury, from luxury to an impatience  
 " of discipline and corruption of morals; till, by a total dege-  
 " neracy and loss of virtue, being grown ripe for destruction, it

of

of the several states assembled. *Cæsar's* design was to leave behind him a few only of these nobles, on whose fidelity he could rely, and to take the rest into *Britain* as hostages, in order to prevent any commotions in *Gaul* during his absence.

Among those whom he resolved to carry away with him, was *Dumnorix* the *Eduan*; because he knew him to be a lover of novelties, ambitious, enterprizing, and of great interest and authority among the *Gauls*. *Dumnorix* at first earnestly requested to be left behind; sometimes pretending that he was unused to the sea, and afraid of it; sometimes, that religious engagements required him to stay at home: But, finding his reasons had no weight with *Cæsar*, he began to cabal among the *Gallic* nobles, advising them not to leave the continent, and telling them that *Cæsar's* intention was undoubtedly to destroy them all; but that, not daring to do it in their own country, he was carrying them into *Britain*, where he hoped to find a favourable opportunity of executing his cruel purpose.

" falls a prey at last to some hardy oppressor, and, with the loss  
 " of liberty, losing every thing else that is valuable, sinks gradually again into its original barbarism."

This reflection is undoubtedly very judicious, as far as it regards the danger to which our country, with respect to its liberties, is exposed by the corruption of its morals: But who would not imagine that, in the opinion of the Author, *Ancient Rome was free from superstition and religious imposture?* Who would imagine that the Author had written a book with this title: *The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their Heathen Ancestors?*

*Cæsar*, though fully informed of these practices, yet, in consideration of the *Ædui*, a nation for which he had a singular regard, satisfied himself with endeavouring to traverse the designs of the malecontent; being determined, nevertheless, to continue inflexible, and to prefer the interest of the Commonwealth to every other consideration. While detained at the port about five and twenty days, during which the north-west wind, very common on that coast, hindred him from sailing, he studied to keep *Dumnorix* in his duty by ways of gentleness and persuasion, not neglecting, however, to watch all his motions. At length, the wind springing up fair, he ordered both horse and foot to embark. As the execution of this order universally engaged the attention of the camp, *Dumnorix* seized the opportunity to draw off the *Æduan* cavalry; and he began his march homeward. *Cæsar* had early notice of it, instantly put a stop to the embarkation, and, postponing every other business, sent out a strong party of horse to pursue the *Æduan*, and bring him back. Their orders were to kill him in case of disobedience or resistance. They overtook him; he refused to return, defended himself sword in hand, and implored the assistance of his followers, often crying out to them, *that he was free, and the subject of a free state*. The Romans, pursuant to the orders they had received, surrounded and slew him; upon which all the *Æduan* cavalry returned to *Cæsar*.

And

And now *Cæsar*, leaving *Labienus*, with three legions and two thousand horse, to secure the port, provide corn, and have an eye upon the transactions of the continent, embarked on board his vessels the same number of horse, together with five legions; and, weighing anchor about sun-set, arrived with his whole fleet, the next day by noon, on the *British* coast, where he landed without opposition, in the same place which he had found so convenient the year before. The *Britons* had assembled in vast multitudes to oppose his landing, as he afterwards understood by the prisoners; but, being terrified at the sight of so numerous a fleet, which, with the vessels that private persons had provided for their own use, amounted to eight hundred and upward, had quitted the shore, and retired to the hills. *Cæsar* left ten cohorts and three hundred horse to secure the fleet; and with the rest marched in quest of the enemy, whom, agreeably to the intelligence he had received, he found posted on the farther side of a river\*, about twelve miles from the place where he had landed. They made some efforts to hinder his passage, but were quickly driven from their post, and put to flight. However, the day being far spent, *Cæsar*, who was wholly unacquainted with the country, would not pursue them, but chose to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.

\* Supposed  
to be the  
Stour,

Early the next morning he sent out, in pursuit of the enemy, his troops both horse and foot, divided into three bodies: These were but just come within sight of the *British* army, when they received orders from *Cæsar* to proceed no farther, but

but return to the camp. Some horsemen, dispatched by *Q. Atrius*, had brought him word that, by a dreadful storm in the night before, his fleet was in a manner destroyed. This made him hasten back to the sea-side. Forty of his ships, he saw, were entirely lost, and the rest so damaged as to seem almost irreparable. Nevertheless he set all the carpenters of both the fleet and the army to work, and sent over to *Gaul* for others, ordering, at the same time, *Labienus* to build as many ships as he could, by the labour of the legions that were with him. And, to prevent the like misfortune thereafter, he drew all his ships on shore, and enclosed them within the fortifications of his camp. This stupendous work was completed in ten days, the soldiers labouring the whole time without intermission. The ships being thus secured, and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as before, and returned to the place where he had ceased the pursuit of the enemy.

Upon his arrival he found their numbers greatly increased. The chief command and administration of the war had, by common consent, been conferred upon *Cassibelanus*, King of the *Trinobantes*\*; whose territories (says *Cæsar*) were divided from the maritime states by the river *Thames*, at eighty miles distance from the sea. This prince had hitherto been engaged in almost continual wars with his neighbours: But the terror, caused by the arrival of the *Romans*, making the *Britons* unite among themselves, they intrusted him with the whole conduct of the war.

\* The people of Middlesex and Essex.

The *Britons*, in the beginning, gained some slight advantage over the *Romans*, surprized and astonished at their manner of employing their chariots in battle; but in an attempt which they afterwards made to cut off the *Roman* foragers, they suffered so terrible a slaughter from the *Roman* cavalry whom *Cæsar* sent to the assistance of the foragers, that the auxiliary troops of *Cassibelanus* abandoned him, returning to their respective countries: Nor did the *Britons* any more, with their united forces, engage the *Romans*.

*Cæsar* marched towards the *Thames*, in order to penetrate into the kingdom of *Cassibelanus*. The river was fordable but in one place, and not there without much difficulty; and the enemy were drawn up in great numbers on the other side: They had likewise fortified the bank with sharp stakes, and driven a great number of these into the bed of the river, so as to be covered by the water. Of this *Cæsar* had intelligence from prisoners and deserters: Nevertheless he undertook to force his passage; and he succeeded. The legions advanced with so much expedition and alacrity, though up to their necks in water, that the enemy, unable to sustain the charge, be-took themselves to flight.

*Cassibelanus* from that time determined to avoid a general action: Disbanding his other forces, he kept with him only four thousand chariots, with which he watched opportunities to cut off the *Roman* stragglers; or, when he had enticed the *Romans*, by a prospect of booty, to a disadvantageous

tageous ground, to start from his ambush, and fall upon them by surprize. These frequent alarms obliged *Cæsar* to order his cavalry to keep always so near the foot, as to be sure of having the support of these when necessity required.

And now several of the states round about sent ambassadors to make their submission to *Cæsar*. Of these the *Trinobantes* were the first. Their King *Imanuentius* had been put to death by *Cassibelanus*, and *Mandubratius*, the son of that unfortunate Prince, was now in *Cæsar's* army, to whom he had fled, even into *Gaul*, for shelter and protection. The *Trinobantes* desired *Cæsar* to send him back to govern them. They obtained their request; and, in compliance with *Cæsar's* demands, sent him forty hostages, and supplied him with corn.

The protection granted to the *Trinobantes* securing them from the insults of the soldiers, several other party states sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, and submitted. From them he had intelligence, that he was not far from the capital <sup>p</sup> of *Cassibelanus*, which was situated amidst woods and marshes, and whither great numbers of men and cattle were retired. Thither *Cæsar* marched his legions: And though the place appeared to be exceeding strong, both by art and nature, he nevertheless attacked it in two several quarters, and, after a short resistance carried it; the *Britons* retiring to another part of the wood.

<sup>p</sup> A town among the *Britons* was nothing more than a thick wood, fortified with a ditch and a rampart, to serve as a place of retreat against the incursions of their enemies.

While these things passed on the north side of the *Thames*, four petty Kings of *Kent*, by order from *Cassibelanus*, drew all their forces together, purposing to fall by surprize on the naval camp of the *Romans*: But these, sallying out against them as they approached, put them to the rout with great slaughter, took one of the four Kings prisoner, and returned safe to the camp. *Cassibelanus*, discouraged by so many losses; the devastation of his territories, and, above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for peace, by the mediation of *Comius* of *Arras*.

*Cæsar*, designing to pass the winter in *Gaul*, because of the frequent commotions in that country, and reflecting that but a small part of the summer remained, during which it would be easy for the *Britons* to protract the war, demanded hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute which *Britain* should pay to the *Romans*. At the same time he took *Mandubratius* and the *Trinobantes* under his protection, strictly charging *Cassibellanus* to give them no molestation. Having received the hostages, he led his forces back to the sea-side, where he found his fleet repaired. The time of the equinox drew near: He seized therefore the opportunity of a favourable gentle breeze, weighed anchor about ten at night, and brought his whole fleet safe to the continent. He was the first of the *Romans*, says *Tacitus*, who transported an army into *Britain*: He terrified the natives, and became master of the coast; yet it would seem, that he only gave his countrymen a view of

of *Britain*, not the possession of it. *Tac. Agric.*

n. I 3.

Having laid up his fleet, and held a general assembly of the *Gauls* at *Samarobriva*\*, his next affair was to put his legions into winter-quarters; and as the crop this year had been very thin, by reason of the great droughts, he was obliged to quarter his men in different provinces. One legion he quartered on the *Morini*†, under the command of *C. Fabius*: Another among the *Nervii*‡, under *Q. Cicero*: A third with the *Ædui*§, under *L. Roscius*: And a fourth in the country of the *Rhemni*, on the borders of the *Treviri*, under *Labienus*. Three were sent into *Belgium*||, over whom he appointed three commanders, his Quæstor *M. Crassus*, *L. Munatius Plancus*, and *C. Trebonius*. The eighth and last, which *Cæsar* had newly raised on the other side of the *Po*, were sent, together with five cohorts, among the *Eburones*†, between the *Rhine* and the *Meuse*, where *Ambiorix* and *Cativulcus* reigned. At the head of this last body were two of *Cæsar's* Lieutenants, *Q. Titurius Sabinus* and *L. Aurunculeius Cotta*. By this distribution of his legions, *Cæsar* thought he had found a remedy against the scarcity of corn; and yet they lay all within the compass of one hundred miles, except the legion under *L. Roscius*, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly country. He resolved, however, not to leave *Gaul* till he

\* People  
of Tero-  
enne in  
Artois.  
† People  
of Cam-  
bresis.

|| The pre-  
sent Picar-  
dy, a part  
of Belgic  
*Gaul*.

‡ People  
of Liege.

\* In the text of *Cæsar* we read *Effui* [an unknown people] but *Vossius* thinks we should read *Ædui*, the *Autunois*.

had received assurances that their quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

<sup>†</sup> People of  
Chartres.

Among the *Carnutes* <sup>†</sup> lived *Tasgetius*, a man of distinguished birth, and whose ancestors had been possessed of the sovereignty of that state. *Cæsar* had restored him to the dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of the many services he had done him in all his wars. It was now the third year of his reign, when he was openly assassinated. The affair was laid before *Cæsar*, who, fearing lest the great number concerned in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, ordered *L. Plancus*, with a legion from *Belgium*, to march speedily into the country of the *Carnutes*, fix his winter-quarters in that province, seize all who had been concerned in the murder, and send them to him.

Scarce fifteen days had elapsed since the arrival of the legions in their appointed quarters, when a general conspiracy of the *Gauls* broke out, discovering itself first in the revolt of the *Eburones*. Their two chiefs or Kings, *Ambiorix* and *Cativulcus*, had been to meet, in a friendly manner, on their frontiers, *Sabinus* and *Cotta*; and had supplied them with corn: But now, instigated by *Indutiomarus* of *Treves*, they excited their people to take up arms; and, having fallen by surprize on some *Roman* soldiers who were cutting wood, and put them to the sword, came with a great body of troops to attack the camp where the Legion was entrenched. Repulsed with loss, they had recourse to cunning and perfidy, demanding a conference, and pretending that they had something

thing to say which concerned the common interest, and might put an end to the present differences.

Accordingly *Arpinius*, a *Roman Knight*, a friend of *Sabinus*; and *Junius of Spain*, who had frequently before been sent to *Ambiorix*; were deputed to treat. *Ambiorix* addressed them in words to this effect: “ I have in no sort forgot the many “ obligations I am under to *Cæsar*, who freed me “ from the tribute I was wont to pay to the *Adu-* “ *atci*, and restored to me my son and nephew, “ whom that people, after receiving them as ho- “ stages, had treated as slaves. The hostilities I “ have just now committed were not the effect of “ my own private animosity against the *Romans*, “ but were the act of the whole state; where the “ government is of such a nature, that the people “ have as much power over me as I have over the “ people. Even the state itself in a manner has “ been forced into this war: I can appeal to my “ own weakness for the truth of what I say, be- “ ing not so very unskilled in affairs, as to ima- “ gine that the *Eburones* are a match for the *Ro-* “ *mans*. It is a scheme concerted by all the states “ of *Gaul*, to assault in one day, this very day, all “ the quarters of the *Roman army*, so that no one “ may be able to succour another. It was not easy “ for us to resist the importunity of those of our “ own nation, especially when the propofal was to “ act in concert, for the recovery of liberty. But, “ having performed what the common voice of “ my country demanded, I think I may now listen “ to that of gratitude: I find myself compelled “ by my attachment to *Cæsar*, and by my friend-

"ship for *Sabinus*, to give you notice of the ex-  
"treme danger to which your legion is exposed.  
"A great body of *Germans* has actually passed  
"the *Rhine*, and will be here in two days at far-  
"thest: *Sabinus* and *Cotta* therefore are to con-  
"sider whether it will be advisable to retire with  
"their troops, and, before the neighbouring states  
"can be apprized of their design, go and join *La-*  
"*bienus* or *Cicero*, who are neither of them distant  
"above fifty miles. As for myself, I promise,  
"by all that is sacred, to secure your retreat  
"through my territories; and I undertake this  
"the more readily, as I shall thereby not only dis-  
"charge my duty to my country, in delivering  
"it from the inconvenience of wintering the *Ro-*  
"*mans*, but at the same time I shall manifest my  
"gratitude to *Cæsar*." Having made this speech,  
he withdrew.

*Arpinius* and *Junius* reported what they had heard to the Lieutenants, who thought the information not to be neglected, though it came from an enemy: For it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the *Eburones*, a weak and inconsiderable people, should, unsupported, presume to rise up in arms against the *Romans*: They laid the matter therefore before a council of war. *Cotta*, with a great number of the military Tribunes, and Centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their winter-quarters, before they had received orders from *Cæsar* so to do. They alledged that their camp was well fortified, and might be defended against all the forces of the *Germans*: That

it

it was well stored with provisions, so as to be in no danger of distress on that account. And lastly, that nothing could be more dishonourable or injudicious, than, in affairs of the greatest moment, to take measures upon the information of an enemy.

*Sabinus*, on the other hand, exclaimed, that it would be too late to think of retiring, when the enemy, strengthened by the accession of the *Germans*, should come against them; or when the *Romans* in the nearest quarters to them should have received some considerable blow: That *Cæsar* was unquestionably gone into *Italy*; and that the enemy knew it, which gave the *Carnutes* the boldness to think of assassinating *Tasgetius*, and the *Eburones* of assaulting the *Roman* camp. "Who could imagine *Ambiorix*, without "a certainty of being supported, would have "embarked in so dangerous an enterprize?" He added, "My advice is in all respects safe; "because, if no such confederacy has been formed, "we have nothing to apprehend in marching to "the nearest legion; if, on the contrary, all *Gaul* "and *Germany* are united, expedition alone can "save us from destruction: Whereas, by following the advice of *Cotta*, though we may defend "ourselves for a while, we are sure in the end "of perishing by famine." The dispute grew warm, and continued long: *Cotta* and the principal officers strongly opposing the march of the troops. At last *Sabinus* raising his voice, that he might be heard by the soldiers without: "Be "it so then (says he) since you seem so resolyed:

“ I am not the man who is afraid of death. But  
“ if any misfortune happen, those who hear me  
“ will know whom to blame. In two days, did  
“ not you oppose it, we might easily reach the  
“ quarters next us ; and there, in conjunction  
“ with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common  
“ danger : Whereas, by keeping the troops sepa-  
“ rate, and at a distance, you reduce them to the  
“ necessity of perishing by sword or famine.”

The officers, surrounding their Generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their disension.—That, whatever resolution was taken, whether to go or stay, the danger was by no means great, provided they acted in concert ; but their disagreement threatened the troops with inevitable destruction. The debate continued till midnight : When at length *Cotta*, vanquished by importunity, yielded to *Sabinus*. Orders were given for marching by break of day. The remainder of the night was none of it passed in sleep, each man being taken up in chusing what things to carry with him ; so that their want of rest rendered them incapable of a vigorous defence, in case of being attacked upon their march. At day-break they left their camp, not like men acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if *Ambiorix* had been their particular friend ; marching in a very extended column, and followed by a great train of baggage.

The enemy, judging, from the hurry and bustle in the camp, that the *Romans* intended to leave it, placed themselves in ambush in a wood, and there waited for them at about two miles di-  
stance ;

stance; and, when the greater part of the army had entered a large valley, suddenly appeared, and attacked them both in front and rear.

Then *Sabinus*, like one conscious of having neglected all the necessary precautions, and unable to hide his concern, ran up and down among the troops, beginning to dispose them in order of battle; but with an air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of success, as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last moment of execution. But *Cotta*, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the departure of the troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common safety, calling to and encouraging the men like an able General, and at the same time fighting with the bravery of a common soldier: And, because the great length of the column rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the places where their presence was necessary, orders were given to quit the defence of the baggage, and form into an orb. This disposition, though not improper in these circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy consequences; for, being considered as the effect of terror and despair, it discouraged the *Romans*, and augmented the confidence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such occasions, many of the soldiers, quitting their ensigns, hurried away to fetch from the baggage the things they most valued, and filled all parts with uproar and lamentation.

The *Gauls* conducted themselves with great prudence: Their officers proclaimed through the ranks: "Let no man stir from his post; the baggage of the *Romans* and every thing they have shall be yours; but let your first care be to secure the victory." The *Romans*, not being fewer in number or less brave than the enemy, cherished a hope, though they had neither a General nor fortune on their side, that yet by their bravery they should be able to surmount all difficulties; and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, so as to come to close fighting with the enemy, a considerable slaughter of the *Gauls* ensued. This being observed by *Ambiorix*, he ordered his men to cast their darts at a distance, avoid a close fight, retire before the *Romans* when they advanced, and pursue them when returning to their standards. These orders were exactly followed, much to the advantage of the enemy. The *Romans* however still maintained their ground; and, though the fight had continued from sun-rise till two in the afternoon, they had done nothing, in all that time, unworthy of the *Roman* name. At length *Balventius*, who the year before had been made first Centurion of a legion, a man of distinguished courage, and great authority among the troops, had both his thighs pierced through with a dart. *Lucanius*, an officer of the same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was killed after a brave resistance: And *Cotta*, the Lieutenant, encouraging the several cohorts

and companies, received a blow on the mouth from a sling.

These disasters totally dispirited *Sabinus*; who, perceiving *Ambiorix* at a distance animating his troops, sent his interpreter, *Cn. Pompey*, to beg quarter for his soldiers and for himself. *Ambiorix* answered: "That, if *Sabinus* desired a conference, " he was ready to grant it, and to pledge his " faith, that no hurt should befall his person; " and that, as to the *Roman* soldiers, he hoped " to prevail with the multitude to spare them " too." This answer *Sabinus* communicated to *Cotta*, proposing to him that they should go and confer with *Ambiorix*, from whom he hoped to obtain quarter both for themselves and their men. *Cotta* absolutely refused to go to an armed enemy, and persisted in that resolution. *Sabinus*, attended by such of the officers as were then about him, set forward; and when he drew near to *Ambiorix*, being commanded to lay down his arms, obeyed; ordering those that were with him to do the same: After which, being gradually surrounded, while *Ambiorix* purposely spun out a long discourse, he was perfidiously murdered. Then the *Gauls*, according to their custom, raising a shout and crying out victory, charged the *Roman* troops with great fury, and put them into disorder. *Cotta*, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp they had quitted in the morning; of these, *Petrosidius*, the standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments,

trenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before them. Those that remained, with much difficulty, sustained the attack till night; but, having no hope of preservation, killed one another to the last man. A few, who had escaped out of the battle in the field, got by different ways to *Labienus's* camp, and brought him the news of this sad event.

*Ambiorix*, elated with his victory, marched immediately, at the head of his cavalry, into the country of the *Aduatichi*, which bordered upon his territories. Having informed them of his success, and rouzed them to arms, he the next day arrived among the *Nervii*, and urged them not to lose the favourable opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the yoke of slavery, and revenging the injuries they had received from the *Romans*. He added: "Two of their "Lieutenants have been slain, and a great part "of their army cut in pieces: It will be an easy "matter, by a sudden attack, to destroy the le- "gion quartered in your country, under the com- "mand of *Cicero*; and I myself am ready to "assist you in the enterprize." By this speech he drew in the *Nervii*. They dispatched messengers forthwith to the cantons dependent on their state, and, having assembled what forces they could, came unexpectedly upon *Cicero's* quarters, who had heard nothing yet of the fate of *Sabinus*. Here it unavoidably fell out, that, by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, the *Roman* soldiers who had been sent out to cut wood for firing,

firing, and for the fortification of the camp, were intercepted and put to the sword; after which the *Eburones*, *Aduatichi*, and *Nervii*, with their allies and tributaries, amounting to a formidable army, came and attacked the camp. The *Romans* instantly flew to arms, mounted the rampart, and sustained that day's assault, though with difficulty; for the enemy placed all their hopes in dispatch, and firmly believed, that, if they came off conquerors upon this occasion, they could not fail of victory every where else.

*Cicero's* first care was to write to *Cæsar*, promising the messengers great rewards if they carried the letters safe: But, as all the ways were beset with the enemies troops, most of his couriers were intercepted. Of the materials which had been brought for fortifying the camp, 120 towers were built with incredible dispatch during the night, and the works about the rampart completed. Next day the enemy, much stronger than before, attacked the camp and filled up the ditch, but were again repulsed by the *Romans*. This continued for several days together. The night was wholly employed in repairing the breaches made by day; insomuch that neither the sick nor the wounded were exempted from labour. *Cicero* himself, though much out of order, would take no repose even during the night, unless when the soldiers constrained him to it.

In the mean time some officers of the *Nervii*, who were well acquainted with *Cicero*, desired a conference with him: To this he having given consent,

consent, they addressed him in the same strain that *Ambiorix* had used to *Sabinus*: They said that all *Gaul* was in arms: That the *Germans* had passed the *Rhine*: That *Cæsar* and the rest of the *Romans* were besieged in their winter-quarters. They told him likewise of the fate of *Sabinus*, and, to gain credit, produced *Ambiorix*, adding: “It is in vain for you to expect relief from those who are in the utmost distress: We mean not, however, any injury to you or to the *Romans*; but only to prevent their wintering in this country, and bringing that practice into a custom: You are at liberty therefore to leave your quarters, and may retire, in safety and without molestation, whithersoever you please.” To this *Cicero* made a short answer: “It is not usual with the people of *Rome* to accept conditions from an armed enemy: But, if you will lay down your arms, I promise to be your mediator; and will permit you to send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, from whose justice you may reasonably expect redrefs.”

The *Nervii*, not succeeding by this stratagem, surrounded the camp with a line, the rampart of which was eleven feet high, and the ditch fifteen deep. They had learnt something of this in their former wars with *Cæsar*, and they got further instructions from their prisoners: But, being unprovided of the tools necessary in this kind of service, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig up the earth with their hands, and carry it in their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their number:

ber: For in less than three hours they completed a line of fifteen miles in circuit. The following days were employed in raising towers proportioned to the height of the *Roman* rampart; and in preparing scythes and wooden galleries, in which they were again assisted by the prisoners.

On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind arising, they began to throw red-hot balls of clay, and burning javelins, upon the barracks of the *Romans*, which, after the manner of the *Gauls*, were thatched with straw. These soon took fire; and the flames were in a moment spread by the wind into all parts of the camp. The enemy falling on with a mighty shout, as if already secure of victory, advanced their towers and galleries, and prepared to scale the rampart. But such was the constancy of the *Roman* soldiers, that though the flames surrounded them on every side, and they were oppressed with showers of darts, and saw their huts, their baggage, and their whole fortunes in a blaze, yet not only did they continue firm in their posts, but scarce a man offered so much as to look behind him; so intent were they on fighting and repelling the enemy. This was by much the hardest day for the *Roman* troops; but had nevertheless this fortunate issue, that the greatest number of the enemy were on that day wounded or slain: For, as they had crowded close up to the ramparts, those behind prevented the front ranks from retiring. The flames abating by degrees,

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and the enemy having brought forward one of their towers even to the foot of the rampart, the Centurions <sup>†</sup> of the third cohort drew off their men a little, beckoning to the *Gauls*, and challenging them to enter: But, as not a man of them would run the hazard, the *Romans* attacked

<sup>†</sup> In this legion were two Centurions of distinguished valour, *T. Pulfio* and *L. Varenus*, who stood fair for being raised to the first rank of their order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's promotion contended with great eagerness for precedence. In the heat of the attack before the rampart, *Pulfio* said to *Varenus*: “What hinders you now, or what more glorious opportunity would you desire of signalizing your bravery? “This, this is the day for determining the controversy between “us.”—Instantly he sallied out of the camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the *Gauls*. Nor did *Varenus* decline the challenge; but, thinking his honour at stake, followed at some distance. *Pulfio* darted his javelin at a *Gaul* in the enemy's van, and transfixed him: He fell dead; the multitude covered him with their shields, and all poured their darts upon *Pulfio*, giving him no time to retire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck fast in his belt. This accident gave the enemy time to surround him, before he could make use of his right hand to draw his sword. *Varenus* flew to his assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the whole multitude, quitting *Pulfio*, as fancying the dart had dispatched him, turned upon *Varenus*. He met them with his sword drawn, charged them hand to hand; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest: But pursuing them with too much eagerness, stepped into a hole, and fell down. *Pulfio* hastened to his relief; and both together, after having slain a multitude of the *Gauls*, and acquired infinite applause, retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that each owed his life to his rival; nor was it possible to determine which of them had the better title to the prize of valour.

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them on all sides with stones, drove them from the tower, and set it on fire.

As the defence every day became more difficult, chiefly by the great multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of defendants, *Cicero* sent letter after letter to inform *Cæsar* of his danger. Many of these couriers, falling into the enemies hands, were tortured to death within view of the *Roman* soldiers. There was at this time in the *Roman* camp a *Nervian* of distinction, by name *Vertico*, who in the beginning of the siege had fled to *Cicero*, and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man engaged one of his slaves, by the hope of liberty and a promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to *Cæsar*. The slave passed through the camp of the *Gauls* unsuspected, as being himself of their nation, and arrived safe at *Cæsar's* quarters.

*Cæsar*, receiving the letter about five in the afternoon, immediately dispatched a messenger to *Marcus Crassus*, who was quartered among the *Bellovaci* twenty-five miles off, ordering him to draw out his legion at midnight, and march with all possible expedition to join him. *Crassus* came away with the courier. *Cæsar* sent likewise to *C. Fabius*, who wintered with the *Morini*, to lead his legion into the country of the *Atrebates*, which was in the way to *Cicero*: And he wrote to *Labienus* to meet him upon the frontiers of the *Nervii*, if it could be done with safety. He himself, in the mean time, assembled about four hundred horse from the nearest garrisons, resolving

solving not to wait for those parts of his army which lay at too great a distance.

\* Amiens. At nine in the morning he had notice from his scouts of the arrival of *Crassus*. That day he marched twenty miles, leaving *Crassus* with a legion at *Samarobriva* \*, where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, public papers, and all the provisions which had been laid up for the winter. *Fabius*, in consequence of his instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his legion. *Labienus*, who had been informed of the death of *Sabinus*, and the destruction of the troops under his command, and who saw all the forces of *Treves* advancing against him; fearing, lest, if he should quit his quarters, the enemy might construe it into a flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their attack, especially as they were flushed with their late success against *Sabinus*, wrote to *Cæsar*, informing him of that disaster, and of the danger that would attend the quitting his camp; and that all the forces of the *Treviri*, both horse and foot, were encamped within three miles of him.

*Cæsar* approved his reasons, though he thereby found himself reduced from three to two legions: And well knowing that all depended upon expedition, he made forced marches, reached the territories of the *Nervii*, and there learnt from some prisoners the state of the siege, and the danger the legion was in. Immediately he engaged a *Gallic* horseman, by the promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to *Cicero*: It was written in *Greek* characters, that, if it fell into the enemies

mies hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The messenger had orders, in case he found it impracticable for him to get into the *Roman* camp, to tie the letter to a javelin, and throw it in. In this letter *Cæsar* sent word to *Cicero*, that he was already on the march to relieve him, and would be up very soon; exhorting him to defend himself in the mean time with his wonted bravery. The *Gaul*, fearing to be discovered and intercepted, threw the letter into the camp as he had been ordered: But the javelin, accidentally sticking in a tower, remained there two days unperceived: On the third a soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to *Cicero*; who immediately read it in full assembly, and thereby diffused universal joy through the camp. Presently after, they perceived the smoke of the villages fired by *Cæsar* in his march, which put the arrival of succour beyond all doubt.

The *Gauls*, having notice of it also by their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege and march away to meet *Cæsar*. Their army consisted of about 60,000 men. *Cicero*, now at liberty, applied himself again to *Vertico* for the slave above spoken of, whom, having admonished him to use the utmost diligence and circumspection, he dispatched with a letter to *Cæsar*, informing him, that the enemy had raised the siege, and were advancing against him with all their forces. *Cæsar* received the letter about midnight, communicated the contents to his army, and exhorted them to meet the enemy with courage. Next day he decamped early, and, after a

march of four miles, discovered the *Gauls* on the other side of a large valley, with a rivulet in front. As the siege of *Cicero's* camp was now raised, *Cæsar* had no longer any reason to be in a hurry : He encamped, therefore, in the most convenient spot he could find, and completed his intrenchments. His army, consisting of no more than seven thousand men, without baggage, required but a very small camp ; nevertheless, to inspire the enemy with the greater contempt of him, he contracted it as much as possible ; and, in the mean time, sending out scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the valley with safety.

The rest of the day passed in slight skirmishes near the brook ; but the main body of the army on both sides kept within their lines : The *Gauls*, in expectation of more forces, which were not yet come up : *Cæsar*, that, by pretending fear, he might draw the enemy to his side of the valley. Early the next morning, the enemy's cavalry, approaching the camp of the *Romans*, charged their cavalry ; which, by *Cæsar's* orders, purposely gave ground and retired behind the works. At the same time he ordered the ramparts to be raised higher, and the gates to be barricaded ; and that the soldiers, in the execution of these orders, should run up and down tumultuously, and affect an appearance of timidity and concern. The enemy, invited by all these appearances, crossed the valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous place. The *Romans* in the mean while retiring from the rampart, the *Nervii* approached still nearer,

nearer, cast their darts on all sides within the trenches, and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim that, if any of the *Gauls* or *Romans* had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do till nine o'clock, after which no quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their contempt, that, thinking they could not break in by the gates (which, to deceive them, were stopped up with a single row of turf) some began to scale the rampart, and others to fill up the ditch. But then *Cæsar*, sallying forth by all the gates at once, and charging them briskly with his cavalry, put them to so precipitate a flight, that not a man offered to make the least resistance. Great numbers were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their arms. The same day he joined *Cicero* with all his forces, when, beholding the towers, galleries, and other works of the *Gauls*, he could not help being struck with admiration. He then reviewed *Cicero's* legion, and found that not a tenth man had escaped unwounded; which gave him a just idea of the greatness of the danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous defence they had made. He bestowed great commendation on the legion and its commander; and addressed himself to the Centurions and military Tribunes by name, of whose valour *Cicero* made honourable mention.

In the mean time, the report of *Cæsar's* victory flew with incredible speed, through the country of the *Rhemi*, to *Labienus*. For, though he lay at the distance of fifty miles from *Cicero's* camp,

where *Cæsar* did not arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet before midnight a shout was raised by the *Rhemis* at the gates of *Labienus's* camp, by which they notified *Cæsar's* victory, and their congratulations on that success. This news being carried to the *Treviri*, *Indutiomarus*, who had determined to attack the camp of *Labienus* the next day, made off in the night, and retired with all his forces into his own country. *Cæsar* sent back *Fabius* with his legion to his former quarters, resolving to take up his own for the winter near *Samarobriva* with three legions, and to continue in person with them, *Gaul* being then universally in motion. For the defeat and death of *Sabinus* spreading every where, the states of *Gaul* were almost every one of them meditating a revolt; with which view they sent messengers and deputies into all parts, to concert measures, and agree upon the properst place where to begin the war.

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But *Cæsar*, having summoned the principal noblemen of every state to attend him, and having made them sensible that he was no stranger to their designs, prevailed, partly by menaces, and partly by exhortations, to keep the greatest part of *Gaul* in its duty. The *Senones*, however, a potent state, and of great authority among the *Gauls*, formed the design of assassinating *Cavarinus*, whom *Cæsar* had given them for a King; whose brother *Moritagus* had held the sovereignty at the time of *Cæsar's* arrival in *Gaul*, and whose ancestors had long been in possession of that dignity. *Cavarinus*, having intelligence of the plot,

thought proper to fly ; whereupon pursuing him to the very frontiers, they drove him from his kingdom, and sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to justify their conduct : But, upon his ordering their whole Senate to repair to him, they refused to comply. And of such influence was this example among the Barbarians, that some at last became hardy enough to declare open war ; and so great a change did it produce in the inclinations of all, that, except the *Ædui* and *Rhemi*, who had been always particularly distinguished and favoured by *Cæsar* (the first, on account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity to the People of *Rome* ; the last, for their late services in the *Gallic* war) scarce was there a single state in all *Gaul* that did not give cause of suspicion. Nor is it, in truth, to be much wondered at, that a people of high spirit, and famed above all other nations for their military virtues, could not with patience see themselves so fallen from their former height of glory, as to be forced to bend under the yoke of *Roman* domination.

*Indutiomarus* and the *Treviri* ceased not, during the whole winter, to send Ambassadors over the *Rhine*, soliciting the *German* states, offering them money, and assuring them that the greater part of the *Roman* army was already cut off : But no one of those states could be persuaded to come into their designs : Because, having twice before tried their fortunes with the *Romans*, first in the war of *Ariovistus*, and then in the defeat of the *Tenctheri*, they were resolved, they told them, to run no more hazards. *Indutiomarus*, disappointed of this hope, was not less active in draw-

ing forces together, soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, providing horses, and encouraging even out-laws and convicts, by the promise of great rewards, to engage in his service. And so great credit and authority had he by this means acquired in *Gaul*, that, from all parts, embassies and messages were sent to solicit his alliance and friendship.

Finding himself thus voluntarily courted; on one side by the *Senones* and *Carnutes*, whom a consciousness of guilt incited thereto; on another by the *Nervii* and *Aduatichi*, who were actually preparing for a war with the *Romans*; so that, if he once took the field, forces would not be wanting; he called an assembly of the states in arms. This, according to the custom of the *Gauls*, implies an actual commencement of war; and, by a standing law, obliges all their youth to appear in arms at the assembly; in which they are so very strict, that whosoever has the misfortune to come last, is put to death, in sight of the multitude, with all manner of torments. In this assembly, *Cingetorix*, the son-in-law of *Indutiomarus*, and who (as related above) had declared for *Cæsar*, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his estate confiscated. After which *Indutiomarus* acquainted the council, That the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and several other states of *Gaul*, had solicited his assistance; that he accordingly intended to join his forces with theirs, taking his route through the territories of the *Rhemi*, and giving up their lands to be plundered; but that, before he began his march, he was de-

firous

furious of mastering the camp of *Labienus*: And, to effect this, he gave the necessary directions.

*Labienus*, whose camp, both by the nature of the ground, and the fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing; but was wholly intent upon a project to give the enemy some considerable blow. Informed by *Cingetorix* and his adherents of the speech made by *Indutiomarus* in the council of *Gaul*, he sent deputies to the neighbouring states, to sollicit them for a recruit of horse, and appointed a day of rendezvous for the cavalry they should send: In the mean time, by an affectation of fear, the *Roman* was contriving to beget presumption and security in the mind of his enemy. The stratagem succeeded. The King, at the head of his cavalry, came every day quite up to the camp of the *Romans*, insulting them with opprobrious language, and challenging them to fight. The *Romans* making no answer, the *Gauls* retired towards night, and, without observing any order, dispersed themselves. *Labienus* had, unknown to the enemy, received into his camp by night all the horse he had sent for. One evening, therefore, when the enemy had retreated in their careless manner, he ordered all his cavalry to make a sally on a sudden, strictly cautioning and charging his men, that, as soon as they had put the *Gauls* to flight (which happened according to his expectation) they should every one single out *Indutiomarus*, nor attempt to kill or wound any other, till they saw him slain: For *Labienus* was unwilling that any delay, occasioned by the slaughter of the rest, should give

the General an opportunity to escape; and he promised great rewards to the man who should kill him. This measure succeeded: For, as all were intent upon the destruction of *Indutiomarus* alone, he was overtaken and slain in passing a river, and his head brought to the camp. The Roman cavalry, in their return, put all to the sword that came in their way. Upon the news of this defeat, the forces of the *Eburones* and *Nervii* returned home; and *Gaul* was somewhat quieter the rest of the winter.

J. C.  
Comm.  
lib. vi.

*Cæsar*, for many reasons, expecting greater commotions in *Gaul*, ordered his Lieutenants, *M. Silianus*, *C. Antistius Reginus*, and *T. Sextius*, to levy recruits. And as *Pompey*, now Proconsul, had, during his second Consulship (688) enlisted, in *Cisalpine Gaul*, a considerable number of soldiers, to the amount of a legion, but had not put them into that form, (the public affairs detaining him near the city) *Cæsar* requested of him to set those forces on foot, form them into a legion, and send it to him: For he thought it of the utmost importance, towards securing a proper respect from the *Gauls* for the time to come, to give them such an idea of the power of *Italy*, as might convince them, that it was not only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, but even to bring a greater force into the field. “Friendship and the good “of the Commonwealth, says *Cæsar*, equally de-“termined *Pompey* to comply with his request:” And the Lieutenants having with great diligence executed their commissions, three new legions, containing double the number of cohorts lost with *Sabinus*,

*Sabinus*, were brought into *Gaul* before the end of winter.

After the death of *Indutiomarus*, slain as related above, the *Treviri* conferred the command on his relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting the *Germans*, and gained them by force of money; and they associated *Ambiorix* in the confederacy. *Cæsar* found that he was threatened with war on all sides; the *Nervii*, *Aduatichi*, *Menapii*, with all the *Germans* on that side the *Rhine*, were actually in arms: The *Senones* refused to attend him, pursuant to his orders; and were tampering with the *Carnutes*, and other neighbouring states: And that the *Treviri* were soliciting the *Germans* by frequent embassies: He judged therefore that it would be necessary to open the campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the winter was over, he drew together the four nearest legions, and fell unexpectedly into the territories of the *Nervii*, before they could either assemble in a body, or find means to save themselves by flight. Having carried off a great number of men and cattle, enriched the soldiers with booty, and laid waste the country, he compelled the inhabitants to give hostages, and then led back his legions into their winter-quarters<sup>s</sup>.

<sup>s</sup> For the events and transactions, at *Rome*, in this year 699, see above, p. 105, 106.

[Year of *Rome* 700<sup>t.</sup>.]

EARLY in the spring, *Cæsar* summoned a general assembly of *Gaul*. No deputies from the *Senones*, or the *Carnutes*, or the *Treviri*, appearing, he looked upon this as the beginning of a revolt, Paris. adjourned the session, and transferred it to *Lutetia*; whose inhabitants, though they had been united with the *Senones* for one hundred years past, did not appear to be concerned with them in their present measures. The same day in which he declared the adjournment, he set out with his legions against the *Senones*, and made such haste, that *Acco* their chief, not having time to collect his forces, ordered the multitude to shelter themselves in their towns: But before this could be done the *Romans* appeared. Intreaties were now the only resource left to the *Senones*. *Cæsar*, at the request of his faithful allies the *Ædui*, whose clients they were, pardoned them; but demanded of them one hundred hostages; and these he committed to the custody of the *Ædui*. The *Carnutes* likewise submitted, and obtained the same conditions by the mediation of the *Rhemi*, their patrons. *Cæsar* then went to *Lutetia*, put an end to the session of the states, and ordered the *Gauls* to furnish him with a body of cavalry.

*Celtic Gaul* being thus restored to a state of tranquillity, *Cæsar* turned his thoughts to the war with the *Treviri*, and with *Ambiorix*, King of the

<sup>t.</sup> *N. B.* *Cn. Domitius Calvinus*, and *M. Valerius Messala*, the Consuls of the year 700, did not enter on their magistracy before the middle of July.

*Eburones*, purposing to revenge, by his death, the slaughter of the *Roman* cohorts.

He knew that *Ambiorix* was in friendship with the *Menapii*, a fierce nation, who, living in a country full of woods and morasses, had hitherto eluded the efforts of the *Roman* army, and had never made the least step towards a submission to *Cæsar*: He knew likewise, that, by means of the *Treviri*, he had entered into an alliance with the *Germans*. *Cæsar* thought it adviseable, therefore, to deprive him of those two supports, before he attacked him in person. This resolution being taken, he sent the baggage of the whole army to *Labienus* in the country of the *Treviri*, ordered him a reinforcement of two legions, and marched himself against the *Menapii* with five legions, who carried nothing with them but their arms. The *Menapii* were soon constrained to submit and give hostages. *Cæsar* granted them peace on condition of their engaging not to admit *Ambiorix*, or any one from him, into their territories. These things settled, he left *Comius* of *Arras* there, with a body of horse, to keep them in awe, and set out himself against the *Treviri*.

In the mean time *Labienus*, by pretending fear and flight, had drawn the *Treviri* over a river, that was between him and them; and had then with great ease put them to the rout. The *Germans*, who were coming to their assistance, hearing of their defeat, returned home; and the relations of *Indutiomarus*, who had been the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to retire with them: And within a few days the whole state submitted.

*Cingetorix,*

*Cingetorix*, who had always continued faithful to the *Romans*, was thereupon invested with the supreme authority.

*Cæsar*, after his arrival at *Treves* from the country of the *Menapii*, resolved, for two reasons, to pass the *Rhine* a second time; to punish the *Germans* for sending succours to the *Treviri*, and to deter them from giving or promising a retreat to *Ambiorix*. In consequence of this resolution, he set about making a bridge, which was finished in a few days. Upon his arrival on the *German* side of the river, Ambassadors came to him from the *Ubii*, to assure him that they had neither sent troops to the assistance of the *Treviri*, nor in any instance departed from their engagements; and they requested that he would spare their territories, and not, out of a general hatred to the *Germans*, involve the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. *Cæsar*, upon enquiry, found that the *Ubii* were wholly innocent, and that the aids sent to the *Treviri* were from the *Suevi*. These, upon certain information of the arrival of the *Roman* army, had retired to the remotest part of the country with all their forces, and those of their allies; and there they waited the coming of the enemy at the entrance of an immense forest, called *Bacenis* <sup>u</sup>, which served as a barrier between the *Cherusci* and the *Suevi*, to prevent their mutual incursions <sup>v</sup>.

<sup>u</sup> *Cellarius* takes it to be the forest of *Hartz* in Lower Saxony, in the principality of *Wolfenbutel*.

<sup>v</sup> On this occasion, says *Cæsar*, it may not be improper to say somewhat of the manners of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, and *Cæsar*,

*Cæsar*, fearing the want of provisions, because *Germany* was but ill cultivated, resolved not to

the difference of customs between these two nations. A spirit of faction prevails throughout *Gaul*, and that not only in their several states, districts, and villages, but almost in every private family. — When *Cæsar* arrived in the country, the *Ædui* were at the head of one faction, and the *Sequani* of the other. The latter being the weaker, because the *Ædui* had several considerable states in their dependance, they united with *Ariovitus* and the *Germans*, whom, by great presents and promises, they drew over the *Rhine* to their assistance. This alliance made them so powerful, that, having worsted their adversaries in several battles, and killed almost all their nobility, they forced the states dependent upon the *Ædui* to have recourse to them for protection; obliged the *Ædui* themselves to give the children of their principal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not to attempt any thing against the *Sequani*, and resign up to their possession a part of their territories; and by this means they rendered themselves in a manner sovereigns of all *Gaul*. *Divitiacus*, in this necessity, applied himself to the Senate of *Rome* for relief, but without effect. *Cæsar's* arrival soon changed the face of affairs. The *Æduan* hostages were sent back, their former clients restored, and new ones procured them by *Cæsar's* interest; it appearing, that such as were under their protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder lot than others: By all which their fortune and authority being considerably enlarged, the *Sequani* were obliged to resign the sovereignty. The *Rhemi* now held the second place: And, as they were known to be in the same degree of favour with *Cæsar*, such of the *Gauls* as could not get over their old animosity to the *Ædui*, put themselves under the protection of the *Rhemi*. These were extremely attentive to the interests of their clients, and thereby both preserved their old authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such therefore was the then situation of *Gaul*: The *Ædui* possessed indisputably the first rank, the *Rhemi* were next in consideration and dignity.

Over all *Gaul*, there are only two orders of men in any degree of honour and esteem: For the common people are little advance

advance any farther : But, to keep the enemy still in some fear of his return, and to prevent

better than slaves ; attempting nothing of themselves, and having no share in the public deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with debt, heavy tributes, or the exactions of their superiors, they make themselves vassals to the great, who exercise the same jurisdiction over them as masters do over slaves. The two orders of men, with whom, as we have said, all authority and distinction are lodged, are the *Druïds* and the *Nobles*. The *Druïds* preside in matters of religion, have the care of public and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of the Gods. They have the direction and education of the youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all controversies, whether public or private, the decision is left to them : And if any crime is committed, any murder perpetrated ; if any dispute arises touching an inheritance, or the limits of adjoining estates ; in all such cases they are the supreme judges. They decree rewards and punishments : and if any one refuses to submit to their sentence, whether Magistrate or private man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted among the *Gauls* ; because such as are under this prohibition are considered as impious and wicked : All men shun them, and decline their conversation and fellowship, lest they should suffer from them by contagion. They can neither have recourse to the law for justice, nor are capable of any public office. The *Druïds* are all under one chief, who possesses the supreme authority in that body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excells the rest, he succeeds : But if there are several candidates of equal merit, the affair is determined by a plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they have even recourse to arms before the dispute can be decided. Once a year they assemble at a consecrated place in the territories of the *Carnutes*, whose country is supposed to be in the middle of *Gaul*. Hither such as have any suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to the decrees of the *Druïds*. Their institution is supposed to have come originally from *Britain* ; and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect in it, travel thither for instruction. The *Druïds* never go to war, are exempted from taxes and military service, their

their sending succours into *Gaul*, after his re-passing the river, broke down only about two

and enjoy all manner of immunities. These mighty encouragements induce many to put themselves, of their own accord, under the discipline of this order; and many are made to enter into it by their parents and relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of verses by heart, and often spend twenty years upon this institution: For it is deemed unlawful to commit their statutes to writing; though in other matters, whether public or private, they make use of *Greek* characters. They seem to me (adds *Cæsar*) to follow this method for two reasons: To hide their mysteries from the knowledge of the vulgar; and to exercise the memory of their scholars, which would be apt to be neglected, had they letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal maxims, that the soul never dies, but after death passes from one body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by disarming death of its terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the world and our earth, the nature of things, and the power and prerogatives of the immortal Gods.

The other order of men are the Nobles [*Cæsar* calls them *Equites*, Cavaliers; doubtless because they fought on horseback, as at this time the *Polish* nobility do, and as those among us formerly did, whom our ancestors called *Men of arms*]; who, when any war breaks out (and before *Cæsar's* arrival the *Gauls* were almost every year engaged in war, either offensive or defensive) take all the field, at the head of their clients and dependents; and the greater number of these, the more honourable the leader; for the *Gauls* have no other measure of dignity and grandeur.

The whole nation is extremely addicted to superstition: Whence, in threatening distempers, and the imminent dangers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice men, or engage themselves by vow to such sacrifices; in which they make use of the ministry of the *Druuids*: For it is a prevalent opinion among them, that the life of one man cannot be ransomed but by the life of another; insomuch that they have established even public sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge Co-hundred

hundred feet of his bridge on the *German* side; and, to secure the rest, built at the extremity a

*loffuses* of osier twigs, into which they put men alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire amidst the flames. They prefer for victims such as have been convicted of theft, robbery, or other crimes; believing them the most acceptable to the Gods: But, when criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to suffer. *Mercury* is the chief deity with them: Of him they have many images, account him the inventor of all arts, their guide and conductor in their journeys, and the patron of merchandize and gain. Next to him are *Apollo*, and *Mars*, and *Jupiter*, and *Minerva*. Their notions in regard to them are pretty much the same with those of other nations. *Apollo* is their God of physic; *Minerva* of works and manufactures; *Jove* holds the empire of heaven; and *Mars* presides in war. To this last, when they resolve upon a battle, they commonly devote the spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in a place appointed for that purpose: And it is common in many provinces to see these monuments of offerings piled up in consecrated places. Nay, it rarely happens, that any one shews so great a disregard of religion, as either to conceal the plunder, or pillage the public oblations; and the severest punishments are inflicted upon such offenders.

The *Gauls* fancy themselves to be descended from the god *Pluto*; which, it seems, is an established tradition among the *Druuids*. For this reason they compute their time by nights, not by days; and in the observance of birth-days, new moons, and the beginning of the year, always commence the celebration from the preceding night. In one custom they differ from almost all other nations; which is, that they never suffer their children to come openly into their presence, until they are of age to bear arms: The appearance of a son in public with his father, before he has reached the age of manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

Whatever fortune the woman brings, the husband is obliged to equal it out of his own estate. This whole sum, with its annual product, is left untouched, and goes always to the survivor. The men have power of life and death over their

tower

tower of four stories, where he left a garrison of twelve cohorts, and strengthened the place with

wives and children : And when any father of a family of illustrious rank dies, his relations assemble, and, upon the least ground of suspicion, put even his wives to the torture like slaves. If they are found guilty, iron and fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even animals, are thrown into the pile : And formerly, such of their slaves and clients as they loved most, sacrificed themselves at the funeral of their Lord.

In their best regulated states they have a law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the public, whether by rumour or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the Magistrate, without imparting it to any one else : For the nature of the people is such, that rash and unexperienced men, alarmed by false reports, are often hurried to the greatest extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the highest consequence. The Magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the multitude what they think needful for the service of the Commonwealth : Nor do the laws permit to speak of state affairs, except in public councils.

THE *Germans* differ widely in their manners from the *Gauls*. For neither have they *Druuids* to preside in religious affairs, nor do they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They acknowledge no Gods but those that are objects of sight, and by whom they are apparently benefited, the *Sun*, the *Moon*, and *Vulcan* [Fire]. Of others they know nothing, not even by report. Their whole life is addicted to hunting and war; and from their infancy they are inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem those most who continue longest strangers to women, as imagining nothing contributes so much to stature, strength, and vigour of body : But to have any commerce of this kind before the age of twenty, is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal any irregularity this way, because they bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave the greatest part of their bodies naked.

all manner of works. To *C. Volcatius Tullus* he gave the charge of the fort and garrison. He

Agriculture is little regarded amongst them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed boundaries. The Magistrates, and those in authority, portion out yearly, to every canton and family, such a quantity of land, and in what part of the country they think proper ; and the year following remove them to some other spot. Many reasons are assigned for this practice ; *Lest, seduced by habit and continuance, they should learn to prefer tillage to war : Lest a desire of enlarging their possessions should gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel the weaker : Lest they should become curious in their buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of heat and cold : Lest avarice should get footing amongst them, whence spring factions and discords.* Finally, *to preserve contentment and equanimity among the people, when they find their possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.*

It is accounted honourable for states to have the country all around them lie waste and depopulated. For they think it a proof of bravery to expel their near neighbours ; and a part of prudence thus to provide against sudden incursions. When a state is engaged in war, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of Magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with power of life and death. In time of peace there are no public Magistrates ; but the chiefs of the several provinces and clans administer justice, and decide differences within their respective limits. Robbing has nothing infamous in it, when committed without the territories of the state to which they belong : They even pretend that it serves to exercise their youth, and prevent them from falling into sloth. When any of their princes offers himself publickly in council to be the leader of an expedition, such as approve of it rise up, declare themselves ready to follow him, and for this are applauded by the whole multitude. They who go back from their engagement, are looked upon as traitors and deserters, and lose all esteem and credit for the time to come. The laws of hospitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of protection himself,

himself, as soon as the corn began to be ripe, marched against *Ambiorix* and the *Eburones*, taking his way through the forest of *Arden*. *Basilus*, whom he sent before him with all the cavalry, pushed on with such expedition, and so

and defence; their houses are open to receive them; and they plentifully supply their wants.

Formerly the *Gauls* exceeded the *Germans* in bravery, often made war upon them, and, as they abounded in people beyond what the country could maintain, sent several colonies over the *Rhine*. Accordingly, the more fertile parts of *Germany*, in the neighbourhood of the *Hercynian* forest (which I find mentioned by *Eratosthenes* and other Greek writers under the name of *Orcinia*) fell to the share of the *Volcae Tectosages* \*, who settled in those parts, and have ever since kept possession. They are in the highest reputation for justice and bravery, and no less remarkable than the *Germans* for poverty, abstinence, and patience of fatigue, conforming themselves to the *German* customs both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the *Roman* province, and an acquaintance with commerce, have introduced luxury and plenty among the *Gauls*: Whence, becoming gradually an unequal match for the *Germans*, and being worsted in many battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in martial prowess.

The *Hercynian* forest, of which mention was just now made, is about nine days journey in breadth: For as the *Germans* are ignorant of the art of measuring land, they have no other way of computing. It begins from the borders of the *Helvetii*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci*, and, following directly the course of the *Danube*, extends to the territories of the *Anartes* and *Daci*: Thence, turning from the river to the left, it runs through a multitude of different regions: And though there are many in the country who have advanced six days journey into the forest, yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or to have discovered how far it extends.

\* A people of *Gallia Narbonensis*, of whom whole armies passed not only into *Germany*, but into *Asia*.

well concealed his approach from the enemy, that he surprized great numbers of them in the field. Being informed by them of the place whither *Ambiorix* had retired with a few horse, thither he without delay directed his course.

*Fortune*, says *Cæsar*, has a considerable share in all human concerns, and particularly in those of war. For, as it was a very extraordinary chance, that *Basilus* should come upon *Ambiorix* before he had the least notice of his approach, so was it equally an effect of fortune, that the *Gaul*, after having lost his arms, horses, and chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his house, which was surrounded with a wood; it being customary among the *Gauls*, in order to avoid the heats, to build in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. His attendants and friends, possessing themselves of a narrow pass, sustained the attack of the *Roman* cavalry for some time; during which, one of his servants having provided him with a horse, he got safely off.

*Ambiorix*, seeing the storm that was going to break on his country, and knowing that he could not possibly assemble an army strong enough to make head against *Cæsar*, dispatched messengers privately through the country, to signify to the *Eburones*, that every one should shift for himself as well as he could. They followed his advice, and, dispersing themselves, retired, some into woods, others to inaccessible morasses, others to places near the sea, which at high water became islands. Many, abandoning their country

altogether,

altogether, trusted themselves and their fortunes to the faith of foreigners. *Cativulcus*, who had shared the rule with *Ambiorix*, being very old and infirm, and therefore incapable of supporting the fatigues of either war or flight, poisoned himself, after venting bitter imprecations against his colleague for drawing him into so fatal an enterprize.

*Cæsar's* intention was utterly to extirpate the *Eburones*: The difficulty was how to find them. With this view he divided his forces, and deposited the baggage of the whole army in the fort of *Aduatrica* <sup>x</sup>, which was situated in the heart of their country, the late quarters of the unfortunate *Sabinus* and *Cotta*. As its works were still entire, the labour of the soldiers would be the less. The fourteenth legion, one of the three lately levied in *Italy*, he left to guard the fort, under the command of *Q. Cicero*. Dividing the rest of his army, he sent *Labienus* with three legions towards the sea-coast, and the provinces that bordered upon the *Menapii*: *Trebonius*, with the like number of legions, he commissioned to lay waste the country adjoining to the *Aduatici*; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the *Scheld*, and to the extremities of the forest of *Arden*, whither he was informed that *Ambiorix* had retired with a few horse. *Cæsar*, at his departure, promised to return at

*Tongres,*  
in the  
country of  
*Liege*.

<sup>x</sup> The *Aduatici* were a distinct people from the *Eburones*; and their capital, according to many geographers, was *Namur*. *Crevier*.

the end of seven days, the legion which he had left in garrison being provided with corn only for that time: And he exhorted *Labienus* and *Trebonius*, if they found it consistent with the public advantage, to return with their legions at the same time; that consulting together, and taking their measures from the conduct of the enemy, they might resolve whither next to carry the war.

The *Eburones*, as was before observed, had no formed body of troops, no garrison, no fortified town to defend by arms, but were a dispersed multitude. Wherever a cave, or a thicket, or a morass, offered them shelter, thither they retired. This made it difficult for *Cæsar* and his army to take their revenge on this perfidious race; whom he could not attack with his united forces, nor, without great danger to his men, suffer them in small parties to seek out the enemy in their hiding-places. He sent messengers therefore to the neighbouring states, inviting them all, by the hopes of plunder, to join in the extirpation of the *Eburones*. Accordingly, great numbers flocked suddenly thither from all parts. The *Eburones* were attacked on all sides, and the havock continued till the seventh day, which *Cæsar* had appointed for returning to his camp. It then evidently appeared, says *Cæsar*, what influence fortune has in war. The report being spread among the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, that the territories of the *Eburones* were given up to be plundered, and that all without distinction were invited to share in the spoil, the *Sicambris*,

*Sicambri*, who had afforded a retreat to the *Ufpetes* and *Tenchtheri* (spoken of above) assembled immediately a body of two thousand horse, passed the river in barks, about thirty miles below *Cæsar's* bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards the territories of the devoted nation. Many of the scattered people fell into their hands, and abundance of cattle; and the invaders, allured by this success, pushed on still farther. Inquiring of the prisoners concerning *Cæsar*, they understood that he had left the country with his whole army, and was a great way off. "What makes you lose your time (says one of the prisoners) in the pursuit of acquisitions trifling and insignificant, when fortune offers you so rich a booty? In three hours you may reach *Aduatrica*, where the *Romans* have deposited all their wealth. The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the rampart, much less to make sallies." The *Sicambri*, full of hope, marched directly towards *Aduatrica*, under the guidance of the captive who had given them the information.

Vid. supra,  
p. 623.

*Cicero*, who hitherto had kept his soldiers strictly within the camp, according to *Cæsar's* orders, nor had suffered so much as a servant to straggle beyond the lines, seeing the seventh day arrive, began to despair of *Cæsar's* return; who, he heard, was marched farther into the country. Wearied out therefore with the continual murmurings of the soldiers, who complained that he kept them up like men besieged; and not suspecting that any accident could befall him within the small extent of three miles, especially from

an enemy in a manner totally dispersed, he sent out five cohorts to forage in a field, separated from the camp by only a single hill. About three hundred men, who had been sick, and were now pretty well recovered, joined the detachment : These were followed by almost all the servants of the camp, together with a vast number of carts and carriage horses. In that very instant the *German* cavalry arrived, and, without discontinuing their course, endeavoured to force an immediate entrance by the *Decuman* gate. As their march had been covered by a wood, they were not perceived till they were just upon the camp ; insomuch that the fettlers, who kept their booths under the rampart, had not time to retire within the intrenchments. The cohort upon guard could scarce sustain the first onset, so surprized and struck were the soldiers by the sudden and unexpected attack. The whole camp was in an uproar, every one enquiring of another the cause of the confusion ; nor could they determine which way to advance the standards, or where to post themselves. Some reported, that the camp was already taken ; others, that the *Germans*, having destroyed *Cæsar* and his troops, were come victorious to assault it. The greater number, full of imaginary fears, called to mind the fate of *Cotta* and *Sabinus*, who perished on that very spot.

Among the sick in the garrison was *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first rank, of whom honourable mention has been already made. This officer, though he had not tasted food for

five

five days, rushed unarmed out of his tent. Seeing the enemy at hand, and the danger extreme, he snatched up the first arms that offered, and posted himself in the gate of the camp. The Centurions of the cohort upon guard followed his example, and for a while sustained the enemies charge. *Sextius* expired under a multitude of wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. But the *Romans* now had begun to resume their courage; so far at least as to mount the rampart, and make a shew of defending themselves.

Meantime the foragers, returning, heard the noise at the camp. They sent some horsemen before to learn the cause of it, who were quickly apprized of the danger. The new levies, unexperienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes upon the officers, waiting their orders. Not a man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed and disconcerted by the unexpected accident. The *Germans*, when they perceived the *Roman* ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of the camp, imagining at first that it was *Cæsar* with the legions; but discovering in a short time how few they were whom they had to deal with, fell upon them on all sides.

The servants of the camp fled to the nearest rising ground; whence being presently driven, they threw themselves amongst the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby increased their terror. Some retired to a hill, there to defend themselves in the best manner they could: But the veteran soldiers

soldiers of the detachment, mutually encouraging one another, and being led on by their commander *C. Trebonius*, a *Roman Knight*, broke through the midst of the enemy, and all to a man arrived safe at the camp. The servants and cavalry following them, and assisting their retreat, were likewise by their bravery preserved. But the troops which had retired to the hill, being unexperienced in military affairs, did not persist in the resolution they had taken of defending themselves there, but in a short time, quitting the advantage of their situation, endeavoured to gain the camp : But they failed in the attempt : A few only escaped ; the rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Barbarians.

The *Germans*, despairing now to force the camp, repassed the *Rhine* with the booty which they had deposited in the woods : But, even when they were gone, the terror the *Romans* were under continued to be so great, that *Volumnius*, arriving in the camp the same night with the cavalry, could not persuade them that *Cæsar* and the army were safe : They persisted in believing that the infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the cavalry alone had escaped, it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the *Germans* would have dared to attack the camp, had no misfortune befallen the *Roman* army. *Cæsar's* arrival quickly put an end to their fears.

Being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the cohorts to forage : Observing, that in war nothing ought to be left to fortune, whose power had shewed itself

self evidently in the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very gates of the camp. But nothing in this whole affair appeared to him more wonderful than that the *Germans*, having crossed the *Rhine* with the purpose of plundering the territories of *Ambiorix*, should do him a most acceptable service, by falling upon the *Roman* camp.

*Cæsar* marched a second time to harass and distress the enemy, and having drawn a great number of troops together from the neighbouring states, sent them into all parts upon this service. Such devastation was made, that it seemed likely, if the enemy escaped the sword for the present, they would afterwards perish by famine. Nothing was left unattempted to take *Ambiorix* prisoner, the parties that were sent out in search of him believing they should thereby gain the highest favour with *Cæsar*, whose good fortune wanted only this to render it complete. But all their endeavours were fruitless: *Ambiorix* found means to hide himself in the woods and morasses; whence removing privately in the night, he escaped into other countries accompanied only by four horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

*Cæsar* in this expedition had lost only two cohorts; and, having laid waste the whole country, led back his army into the territories of the *Rhemni*. There he summoned a general assembly of *Gaul*, to examine into the affair of the *Senones* and the *Carnutes*; and having passed sentence against

against *Acco*, the author of the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some, fearing a like fate, fled; whom having banished by a decree of the assembly, he quartered two legions in *Treves*, two among the *Lingones*, and the remaining six in the country of the *Senones*: And, having provided the army with corn, he went, pursuant to his design, into *Italy*, to hold the assemblies of *Cisalpine Gaul*.

J. Cæs.  
Comm.  
I. vii.

While *Cæsar* was on the *Italian* side of the *Alps*, the *Gauls* on the other side plotted a general revolt, and made a more vigorous effort, than they had ever done before, to shake off the *Roman* yoke. The execution of *Acco*, chief of the *Senones*, had alarmed all the great men, each thinking himself exposed to the same treatment. And what more especially encouraged their making an attempt at this time to recover their freedom, were the intestine commotions and seditions at *Rome*, which the death of *Clodius* had occasioned, and which they thought would detain *Cæsar* a long time in *Italy*. Besides, as his ten legions were stationed in the remote extremity of *Gaul*, on the north and the east, if the country between him and them revolted, it would not be easy for him to rejoin them, when he should be at leisure to do it; nor would the legions, without their General, to dare leave their winter-quarters. And lastly, they came to this conclusion, that it was better to die bravely in the field, than not regain their former martial glory, and the liberty derived to them from their ancestors.

Such were the debates and resolutions in the private councils of the *Gauls*, held in woods and remote places for the sake of secrecy. The *Carnutes*, declaring themselves ready to submit to any danger for the common safety, offered to be the first to take up arms against the *Romans*; and because the exchanging of hostages might occasion a too early discovery of their design, they proposed, that the other states should bind themselves by a solemn oath, sworn before the military ensigns collected together (which is the most sacred obligation among the *Gauls*) not to abandon them during the course of the war. This offer of the *Carnutes* was received with universal applause, and the oath taken by all present: after which, the time for action being fixed, the assembly separated.

When the appointed day came, the *Carnutes*, headed by two men of desperate resolution, flew on a sudden to *Genabum*, massacred the *Roman* Citizens who had settled there on account of trade, and seized their effects. Among the slain was *C. Fufius Cotta*, a *Roman* Knight of eminence, to whom *Cæsar* had committed the care of supplying the army with provisions. The fame of this massacre soon spread into all the provinces of *Gaul*: for, when any thing extraordinary and important happened, it was their custom to publish it from place to place by outcries, which, being successively repeated by men stationed on purpose, were carried with incredible expedition over the whole country. And thus it was on the present occasion; what had

had been done at *Genabum* about sun-rising, was known before nine at night in the territories of the *Arverni*, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles.

Instigated by this example, *Vercingetorix*, the son of *Celtillus*, of the nation of the *Arverni*, a young nobleman of great power and interest (whose father had presided over all *Celtic Gaul*, and for aiming at the sovereignty had been put to death by his countrymen) calling his clients and followers together, easily persuaded them to a revolt. His design being discovered, the people immediately flew to arms; and *Gobannio* his uncle, with the other principal men of the state, dreading the consequences of so rash an enterprize, united all their authority against him, and expelled him the city of *Gergovia*.<sup>7</sup> But *Vercingetorix*, not discouraged by this opposition, having engaged in his service a considerable number of outlaws and fugitives, soon made himself master of *Gergovia*, and drove out of the country all those who had so lately forced him to leave that city. He was, upon this, saluted King by his followers, and immediately dispatched Ambassadors into all parts to exhort the confederate states to continue firm to their engagements. The *Senones*, *Parisii*, *Pictones*, *Cadurci*, *Turones*, *Aulerci*, *Lemovices*, *Andes*, and the nations bordering upon the ocean, readily came into the alliance, and with unanimous consent

<sup>7</sup> City of *Auvergne*, the ruins of which are visible two leagues south-east of *Clermont*: the mountain is still called *Gergoie*.

declared him Generalissimo of the league. Invested with this authority, he demanded hostages of the several states, ordered them, at a prefixed time, to furnish him with a certain number of men and arms; and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a numerous cavalry. To an extreme diligence, he joined an extreme rigour of command: For greater faults, the criminals, after having been tortured, were burnt alive; and for lighter offences, they had their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put out, and were in that condition sent home to serve as an example to the rest. Thus by the severity of his punishments he obliged the irresolute to declare themselves in his favour.

Having assembled a considerable army, he sent *Luterius* of *Quercy*, a bold and enterprizing man, with part of the forces, against the *Rutheni*\*; and marched himself into the territories of the *Bituriges*. This people, upon his arrival, dispatched Ambassadors to the *Ædui*, under whose protection they were, to demand succours against the enemy. The *Ædui*, by the advice of the Lieutenants *Cæsar* had left with the army, ordered a body of horse and foot to the assistance of the *Bituriges*; but those troops advanced no farther than the banks of the *Loire*, which divides their country from that of the *Bituriges*, and after halting there a few days, returned home, pretending that they had received information, that in case they passed the river, they would be treacherously attacked on one side by the *Bituriges*, whom they went

\* The inhabitants of Rouergue.

to

to assist, and on the other by the *Arverni*: On their departure, the *Bituriges* immediately joined the forces of the revolted states.

[Year of Rome 701 <sup>z.</sup>.]

*Cæsar*, upon the first report of this insurrection, left *Italy*, and set out for *Transalpine Gaul*. On his arrival there he found it very difficult to resolve, in what manner to join the army; for should he order the legions to repair to the *Province*, he foresaw they would be attacked on their march in his absence; and should he himself proceed to the Quarters of the legions, he was not without apprehension of danger, even from those states, that seemingly continued faithful to the *Romans*.

In the mean time *Luterius* of *Quercy*, who had been sent by *Vercingetorix* into the territories of the *Rutheni*, brought over that state to the alliance of the *Arverni*. Advancing from thence

\* People of the *Age-nois*. among the *Nitobrigi* \* and *Gabali* †, he received hostages from both nations; and having got together a numerous body of troops, drew towards

† Those of the *Gevaudan*. *Narbonne*, to attack the *Romans* on that side.

*Cæsar*, informed of his design, thought it incumbent on him first to provide for the security of the *Province*. He therefore flew to *Narbonne*, secured that town, placed garrisons in the towns of the *Rutheni*, subject to the *Romans*, also in those of the *Volsci*, *Tolosati*, and other states bor-

<sup>z</sup> For the events and transactions at *Rome* in the year 700, see above, p. 109, 134.

dering upon the enemy. *Luterius*, not daring to march forwards among so many *Roman* garrisons, thought proper to retire. Thus *Cæsar* was left at liberty to execute the project he had formed of penetrating into the country of the *Arverni*, through the territories of the *Helvii*, which were separated from each other by the high mountain *Cebenna*. With this view he joined a part of the provincial forces, and the recruits he had brought from *Italy*, whom he had before ordered to rendezvous on the frontiers of the *Helvii*, and proceeding on his march, opened a way over the *Cebenna*, with infinite labour to the soldiers, the mountain being covered with snow to the depth of six feet. The *Arverni*, who looked upon the *Cebenna* as an impenetrable barrier, impassable in that season even to single men, were altogether unprepared on the arrival of the *Romans*; and *Cæsar*, to strike a general terror among them, ordered his cavalry to spread themselves on all sides over the country.

Fame and messengers from the state soon informed *Vercingetorix* of the calamity of his country. The *Arverni* gathered round him, and, with looks full of dismay, conjured him to have regard to their fortunes, and not abandon them to the ravages of the enemy; especially as he now saw that the whole war was pointed against them. *Vercingetorix*, moved by their intreaties, broke up his camp, and marched towards *Auvergne*. This *Cæsar* had foreseen: and his scheme being to amuse the enemy on that side, while he stole off to his legions, he staid only two days in the

camp; and leaving young *Brutus* to command in his absence, with orders to disperse the cavalry as wide as he could, he set out on pretence of going for a reinforcement, promising to return, if possible, in three days. But posting by great journeys to *Vienne*, he there joined the new levied cavalry, whom he had sent thither some time before. From thence travelling day and night, without taking any rest, through the country of the *Ædui*, to prevent by his expedition any designs they might form against his person, he at length reached the confines of the *Lingones*, where two of his legions wintered; and sending immediately to the rest, he drew them all together, before the *Arverni* could be apprized of his arrival in those parts.

*Vercingetorix*, upon notice of this junction, led back his army into the territories of the *Bituriges*, and invested *Gergovia*, a town belonging to the *Boii*, where they had been settled by *Cæsar* after the defeat of the *Helvetii*, and made subject to the *Æduan* state. This motion of the enemy greatly perplexed the *Roman* General. If he continued incamped with his Legions during the rest of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of the *Ædui* to the attempts of the enemy, he had reason to apprehend that the *Gauls*, seeing him afford no protection to his friends, would universally revolt. On the other hand, if he took the field too early, he risqued the want of provisions and forage, by the great difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving, however, not to submit to an affront that

must

must for ever alienate the minds of his allies, he in the strongest terms enjoined the *Aedui* to be diligent in supplying him with the necessary provisions, dispatched messengers to the *Boii* to inform them of his approach, and exhort them to continue firm to their duty: then leaving two Legions with the baggage of the whole army at *Agendicum* \*, he began his march to the relief of *Gergovia*.

He arrived the next day before *Vellaunodunum* †, a city of the Senones, which surrendered after a siege of two days. In two days more he reached *Genabum*, where the *Roman* citizens had been lately massacred by the *Carnutes*. *Cæsar's* sudden approach had not left the enemy time to prepare for a defence; they therefore attempted to make their escape in the night by a bridge over the *Loire*. To prevent the execution of such a design, *Cæsar* had ordered two legions to be in readiness under arms: and about midnight, being informed by his scouts that the enemy were stealing off, he set fire to the gates of the town; the legions entered, pursued the fugitives over the bridge, and almost intirely destroyed them. The town was plundered and burnt.

† Beaune  
in Gati-  
neau.

Here *Cæsar* passed the *Loire*, and, marching into the territories of the *Bituriges*, sat down before *Noviodunum* †. The inhabitants sent deputies to treat of a surrendry, but before the articles agreed upon could be put into execution, the cavalry of *Vercingetorix* appeared at a distance. This General of the *Gauls*, informed of *Cæsar's* ‡ Nouan,

approach, had raised the siege of *Gergovia*, and marched to meet the *Romans*. The besieged, on this prospect of relief, though they had already given hostages, and received into the town some centurions and soldiers of the *Roman* army, with great clamours flew to arms, shut the gates, and manned the walls. The *centurions* in the town judging, from the noise among the *Gauls*, that they had some new project in view, had cautiously posted themselves at one of the gates, and getting all their men together, retreated without loss to the camp. *Cæsar* soon dispersed the enemies horse, which was not supported by the body of the army; and the people of *Noviodunum*, disappointed and terrified at the defeat of their friends, feized immediately on all those who had been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, sent them prisoners to *Cæsar's* camp, and delivered up the town. From thence *Cæsar* marched on to *Avaricum*, the strongest and most considerable city of the *Bituriges*.

*Vercingetorix*, alarmed at the loss of so many towns in so short a time, called a general council of his followers, and represented to them: "That it was necessary to resolve upon a very different plan of war, from that which they had hitherto pursued; and, instead of giving battle to the *Romans*, they should bend their whole aim to intercept their convoys and foragers: That this might be easily effected, as they themselves abounded in cavalry, and in the present season of the year, there being no forage in the fields,

" the enemy must unavoidably disperse themselves into the distant villages for subsistence, " and thereby give daily opportunities of destroying them. That, where life and liberty were " at stake, property and private possession ought " to be little regarded ; that therefore the best " resolution they could take was, at once to burn " all their houses and villages, from the territories of the *Boii* to wherever the *Romans* might " extend their quarters for the sake of forage : " That they themselves had no reason to apprehend scarcity, as they would be plentifully supplied by those states, whose territories they were " ready to defend at so great loss ; whereas, the " enemy must either be reduced to the necessity " of starving, or making distant and dangerous " excursions from their camp ; that it equally answered the purpose of the *Gauls*, to defeat the " *Roman* army, or seize upon their baggage and " convoys ; because without these last, it would " be impossible for them to carry on the war : " That, in his opinion, they would do well to set " fire even to the towns themselves, which were " not strong enough to be perfectly secure against " all danger ; as by this means they would neither " become places of retreat to their own men, to " screen them from military service ; nor contribute to the support of the *Romans* by the supplies and plunder they might furnish : He added, that though these things were indeed grievous, yet they ought to reflect that it was still " more grievous to see their wives and children " dragged into captivity, and be themselves put

" to the sword, the unavoidable fate of the con-  
" quered."

This proposal being approved by all, more than twenty cities of the *Bituriges* were burnt in one day; the like was done in other states; nothing but conflagrations were seen over the whole country; and though the natives bore this desolation with extreme regret, they comforted themselves with the hopes, that it was the sure way to a speedy victory, which would amply recompence their losses. The fate of *Avaricum* was solemnly debated in council, whether it should be burnt or defended; the *Bituriges* falling prostrate on the ground, earnestly begged that they might not be obliged to burn with their own hands one of the most beautiful cities of *Gaul*, the ornament and the security of their state; especially as the town itself, almost wholly surrounded by a river and morasses, and affording but one very narrow approach, was, from the nature of its situation, capable of an easy defence. *Vercingetorix* at first opposed their request, but at length moved by their prayers, and the generous compassion of the army, he yielded, and sent a strong garrison to defend the town.

This affair determined, he followed *Cæsar* by easy marches, and chose for his camp a place surrounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen miles distant from *Avaricum*. There he had hourly intelligence by his scouts, of all that passed before the town; and sent his orders from time to time to the garrison. He kept a constant watch upon the *Roman* convoys, and foragers, whom,

notwithstanding their vigilance, he frequently cut off, when necessity obliged them to seek for provisions at too great a distance.

*Cæsar* having incamped on that side, where the river and morasses left a narrow access to the town, began to raise a mount, bring forward his battering engines, and prepare two towers of assault; without attempting to make lines of circumvallation, which the nature of the ground rendered impossible. He was continually soliciting the *Æduans* and *Boii* for corn, but received no great supplies from either; partly through the negligence of the *Æduans*, who were not zealous in the affair; partly through the inability of the *Boii*, who, possessing an inconsiderable territory, soon consumed all the corn their land produced. The army were for many days altogether without bread, and had nothing to appease their hunger but the cattle brought from distant villages: yet not an expression was heard among the soldiers unworthy the majesty of the *Roman* name, or the glory they had acquired by former victories. And when *Cæsar* visited the different quarters of the legions in person, and offered to raise the siege, if they found the famine insupportable; they with one voice requested him not to do it, adding,  
“ That, during the many years they had served  
“ under him, they never yet had met with any  
“ check, or formed any enterprize in which they  
“ had not succeeded; that they could not but look  
“ upon it as inglorious to abandon a siege they  
“ had once begun; and had rather undergo the  
“ greatest hardships, than not revenge the blood

“ of the *Roman* Citizens, perfidiously massacred  
“ by the *Gauls* in *Genabum*. ”

And now the towers began to approach the walls, when *Cæsar* was informed by some prisoners, that *Vercingetorix*, having consumed all the forage round him, had removed his camp nearer to *Avaricum*, and was gone himself at the head of the cavalry, and the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in their intervals, to form an ambuscade for the *Romans*, in a place where it was supposed they would come the next day to forage. Upon this intelligence, setting out about midnight in great silence, he arrived the next morning at the enemies camp. But they having had timely notice by their scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in order of battle on an open hill. *Cæsar* immediately ordered all his soldiers to prepare for an engagement.

The hill itself where the enemy stood, rising all the way with an easy ascent, was almost wholly surrounded by a morass difficult and dangerous to pass, though not above fifty feet over. Here the *Gauls*, confiding in the strength of their post, and having broke down all the bridges over the morasses, appeared with an air of resolution. They had formed themselves into different bodies, according to their several states; and planting select detachments at all the avenues and fords, waited with determined courage, that, if the *Romans* should attempt to force their way through, they might fall upon them from the higher ground, while embarrassed in the morasses.

The

The *Romans*, full of indignation, that the enemy should dare to face them, loudly demanded to be led to battle. *Cæsar* checked their ardour, and endeavoured to make them sensible, that in attacking an army so strongly posted, the victory would be attended with the loss of many brave men; adding, that he could not be too tender of the lives of those, whom he found ready to encounter every kind of danger for his glory. Having by this speech comforted the soldiers, he led them back the same day to *Avaricum*, and applied himself wholly to the carrying on of the siege.

*Vercingetorix*, upon his return to the camp, was accused by the army of treason. The removal of his quarters nearer to those of the enemy, his departure at the head of all the cavalry, his leaving so many troops without a commander in chief, and the opportune and speedy arrival of the *Romans* during his absence; all these things, they said, could not easily happen without design, and gave great reason to believe, that he had rather owe the sovereignty of *Gaul* to *Cæsar's* favour, than to the free choice of his countrymen. To this charge he replied: "That the removal of his camp was occasioned by the want of force, and made at their own express desire: "That he had posted himself nearer to the *Romans*, on account of the advantage of the ground, which secured him against all attacks: "That cavalry were by no means wanted in a morass, but might have been extremely serviceable in the place to which he had led them: "That he purposely forebore naming a commander

" mander in chief at his departure, lest the impatience of the multitude should have forced him to give battle; to which he perceived they were all strongly inclined, through a certain weakness and effeminacy of mind, that rendered them incapable of bearing long fatigue: That whether accident or intelligence brought the *Romans* to their camp, they ought to thank, in the one case fortune, in the other the informer, for giving them an opportunity of discovering, from the higher ground, the inconsiderable number of the enemy, and despising their feeble efforts; for, not daring to hazard an engagement, they had ignominiously retreated to their camp: That for his part, he scorned treacherously to hold an authority of *Cæsar*, which he hoped soon to merit by a victory, of which both he and the rest of the *Gauls* had now a certain prospect: That he was willing to resign the command, if they thought the honour, done him by that distinction, exceeded the advantages procured by his conduct." He added: " To convince you of the truth of what I have said, hear the *Roman* soldiers themselves." Instantly he produced some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a few days before, and whom by severity and hard usage he had brought to his purpose. These, according to the instructions they had received, declared, " That they were legionary soldiers: That, urged by hunger, they had privately stolen out of the camp, to search for corn and cattle in the fields: That the whole

army

" army was reduced to so weak a condition, as no  
" longer to be capable of supporting fatigue :  
" That the General had therefore resolved, if the  
" town held out three days longer, to draw off his  
" men from the siege." " Such (said *Vercingetorix*)  
" are the services you receive from the man,  
" whom you charge with treason. To him it is  
" owing, that, without drawing a sword, you see  
" a powerful and victorious army almost wholly  
" destroyed by famine. He has moreover taken  
" effectual care, that, when necessity compels them  
" to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state  
" shall receive them into its territories."

The whole multitude set up a shout ; and, as their manner was, clashing their arms, to denote their approbation of the speaker, proclaimed *Vercingetorix* a consummate general, whose fidelity ought not to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved the highest praise. They decreed that ten thousand men, chosen out of all the troops, should be sent to reinforce the garrison of *Avaricum*; it seeming too hazardous to rely upon the *Bituriges* alone for the defence of a place, whose preservation, they imagined, would necessarily give them the superiority in the war.

Though the *Romans* carried on the siege with incredible vigour, yet was their progress greatly obstructed by the address and contrivance of the *Gauls*. For they were a people of singular ingenuity, quick of apprehension, easily imitating whatever they saw practised by others. They turned aside, with ropes, the hooks made use of by the

*Romans*,

*Romans*, and after having seized them, drew them into the town with engines. They likewise endeavoured to undermine the mount; an art they were perfectly skilled in, as their country abounded with iron-mines. At the same time they raised towers on all parts of the wall, covered them with raw hides, and in frequent fallies by day and night, either set fire to the mount, or fell upon the workmen. In proportion as the *Roman* tower increased in height, by the continual addition to the mount, in the same proportion did they advance the towers upon their walls <sup>a</sup>, raising one story above another. And counter-working the mines with the utmost diligence, they either filled them with great stones, or poured melted pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the end.

<sup>a</sup> The fortified towns, among the *Gauls*, had their walls mostly built in the following manner. Long massy beams of wood were placed upon the ground, at the distance of two feet one from another, and so as to constitute by their length the thickness of the wall. These being again crossed by others, which served to bind them together, had their intervals on the inside filled up with earth, and on the outside with large stones. The first rank thus completed and firmly joined, a second was laid over it, with the same distance between the beams; but these did not rest upon the beams of the order below, but were placed above their intervals, and filled up as before with earth and stones. In this manner the work was carried to a proper height, and the building was as useful as beautiful. For as the variety and regular intermixture of the materials pleased the eye, so the stone was proof against fire, and the beams against the battering-ram; for being fastened on the inside with continued planks, they could neither be disjointed, nor thrown down.

Such

Such were the obstacles the *Romans* met with in this siege. But the soldiers, though much incommoded, during the whole time, with cold and perpetual rains, yet, by dint of labour, overcame all difficulties, and at the end of twenty-five days, had raised a mount three hundred and thirty feet broad, and eighty feet high. When it was brought almost close to the walls, *Cæsar*, according to custom, attended the works, and encouraged the soldiers to labour without intermission; a little before midnight it was observed to smoke, the enemy having undermined and fired it. At the same time they raised a mighty shout, and sallying from two of their gates, vigorously attacked the works. Some threw lighted torches and dry wood from the walls upon the mount, others pitch and all sorts of combustibles; so that it was not easy to know, on which side it was proper first to send relief. But, as *Cæsar* kept always two legions upon guard in the trenches, besides great numbers employed in the works, who relieved one another by turns, his troops were soon in a condition, some to oppose those that sallied from the town, others to draw off the towers, and make openings in the mount; whilst the rest endeavoured to extinguish the flames.

The fight continued with great obstinacy during the remaining part of the night. The enemy still entertained hopes of victory, and persisted with the more firmness, as they saw the mantlets that covered the towers burnt down, the *Romans* being unable to rescue them for want of shelter. Fresh troops were continually advancing from the

town

town to relieve the fatigued, the enemy believing that the safety of *Gaul* depended on that critical moment. Here (says *Cæsar*) I cannot forbear mentioning a remarkable instance of intrepidity, to which I was myself a witness upon this occasion. A certain *Gaul*, posted before the gate of the city, threw, into the fire, balls of pitch and tallow to feed it. This man, being exposed to the discharge of a *Roman* battery, was struck through the side with a dart, and expired. Another, striding over his body, immediately took his place. He also was killed in the same manner. A third succeeded; to the third a fourth: nor was this dangerous post left vacant, till the fire of the mount was extinguished, the enemy repulsed on all sides, and an end put to the conflict.

The *Gauls*, having in vain tried all methods of defence, consulted the next day about leaving the town, in consequence of the orders they had received from *Vercingetorix*. This they hoped easily to effect in the night; as that General's camp was not far off, and the morasses between them and the *Romans* would serve to cover their retreat. Night came, and the besieged were preparing to put their scheme in execution; when suddenly the women running out into the streets, and throwing themselves at their husbands feet, conjured them, with many tears, not to abandon to the fury of an enraged enemy them, and their common children, whom nature and weakness rendered incapable of flight. Finding their entreaties ineffectual (for, in extreme danger, fear often

often excludes compassion) they began to set up a loud cry, to inform the *Romans* of the intended escape. This alarmed the garrison, who, apprehending the passages would be seized by the enemy's cavalry, desisted from their attempt.

Next day *Cæsar* brought forward the tower, and gave the necessary directions concerning the works. A heavy rain chancing just then to fall, he thought it a favourable opportunity of effecting his purpose, especially as he observed that the walls were negligently guarded. Wherefore, ordering the soldiers to abate a little of their ardour in the works, and having instructed them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted the Legions, who advanced under cover of the machines, to seize at last the fruit of so many toils. Then promising rewards to those who should first scale the town, he gave the signal of attack. The *Romans* rushed suddenly upon the enemy from all parts, and in a moment possessed themselves of the walls. The *Gauls*, terrified at the vigour of the assault, and driven from their towers and battlements, drew themselves up in the form of a triangle in the market-place, expecting that the *Romans* would advance to attack them. But observing that they still kept upon the walls, and were endeavouring to get possession of their whole circuit, they began to fear lest they should be shut up on every side. Therefore throwing down their arms, they ran tumultuously to the farthest part of the town, where many of them were slain by the legionaries, the narrowness of

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the gates obstructing their flight. Others were slaughtered by the cavalry without the walls. The *Romans*, regardless of plunder, but eager to revenge the massacre of *Genabum*, and exasperated by the obstinate defence of the place, spared neither old men, women, nor children; insomuch that of all that multitude, amounting to about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred, who had quitted the town upon the first alarm, escaped safe to *Vercingetorix*. He received them into his camp in the dead of the night: For, fearing lest their entrance by day, and in a body, should occasion a tumult among the troops; he had sent out his friends, and the principal noblemen of each province, to meet them by the way, and conduct them to the quarters of their several states.

*Vercingetorix*, having called a council, comforted the soldiers, and exhorted them not to be discouraged by their late misfortune. He said, "The *Romans* had not overcome by bravery, or "in the field, but by their address and skill in "sieges, an art the *Gauls* were little acquainted "with; that they deceived themselves, who in "war expected success to attend every enterprise; "that he himself, as they all knew, had never ad- "vised the defence of *Avaricum*, and could not "but impute the present disaster to the impru- "dence of the *Bituriges*, and the too easy compli- "ance of the rest: That he hoped, however, soon "to compensate their loss by superior advantages, "as he was using his utmost endeavours to bring "over the other states, which had hitherto refused "their

"their concurrence, and to form one general confederacy of all *Gaul*, against whose united strength, not the whole world would be able "to prevail: That he had even in a great measure effected his design, and in the mean time "only required of them, for the sake of the common safety, immediately to fortify their camp, "the better to secure themselves from the sudden "attacks of the enemy." This speech was not unpleasing to the *Gauls*, and the rather, that notwithstanding so great a blow, *Vercingetorix* neither retired from public view, nor seemed to have lost any thing of his wonted courage. They even entertained a higher opinion of his prudence and foresight; as from the first he had advised the burning of *Avaricum*, and at last sent orders to abandon it. Thus ill success, which usually sinks the reputation of a commander, served only to augment his credit, and give him greater authority among the troops. At the same time, from the assurances he had given them, they were full of hopes that the other states would accede to the alliance. And now for the first time the *Gauls* set about fortifying their camp; being so humbled by their late misfortunes, that, though naturally impatient of fatigue, they submitted to every task imposed upon them by their General.

*Vercingetorix* on his side was extremely active to bring over to the confederacy the other provinces of *Gaul*, endeavouring, by presents and promises, to gain the leading men in each state. For this purpose he made choice of fit agents, who, by their address, or peculiar ties of friendship,

were most likely to influence those to whom they were sent. He provided arms and cloathing for the troops that had escaped from *Avaricum*, and to repair the loss sustained by the taking of that place, gave orders to the several states in alliance to furnish a certain number of men, and send them to the camp, by a day prefixed. At the same time he required of them, that all the archers, of which there were great numbers in *Gaul*, should be sought out and sent to the army. By these measures he soon filled up the places of those he lost at the siege of *Avaricum*. In the mean time *Theutomatus*, the son of *Ollovico*, and King of the *Nitobrigi*, whose father had been stiled friend and ally by the Senate of *Rome*, came and joined *Vercingetorix* with a great body of horse, which he had raised in his own territories, and in the province of *Aquitain*.

*Cæsar* finding great plenty of corn and other provisions at *Avaricum*, stayed there several days to refresh his troops, after their late sufferings from scarcity and fatigue. Spring was now approaching, and as the season invited him to take the field, he resolved to march against the enemy, either to draw them out of the woods and marshes, or besiege them in their fortresses. While he was preparing for this expedition, deputies arrived from the *Ædui* to beg he would interpose his authority to settle the differences in their state. "Every thing there, they told him, threatened an intestine war. That as it was their custom to be governed by a single magistrate, who possessed the supreme power for one year, two

"Noblemen

" Noblemen contended for that office ; each affirming his election was according to law. The one was *Convictolitanis*, an illustrious and popular young man ; the other *Cotus*, of an ancient family, great authority, and powerful relations, whose brother *Videliatus* had held the same magistracy the year before : That the whole state was in arms, the senate and people divided ; nor had they hopes of escaping a civil war, but in his care and timely endeavours to put an end to the contest."

Although *Cæsar* was sensible it would greatly prejudice his affairs, to quit the pursuit of the war, and leave the enemy behind him ; yet reflecting on the mischiefs that arise from divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent so powerful a state, in strict amity with the people of *Rome*, and which he had always in a particular manner cherished and befriended, from having recourse to violence and arms, which might drive the party that least confided in his friendship, to seek the assistance of *Vercingetorix*, he resolved to make it his first care, to put a stop to the progress of those disorders. And because, by the constitutions of the *Ædui*, it was not lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass beyond the limits of the state, that he might not seem to infringe their privileges, he resolved to go thither in person, and summoned the senate and the two candidates to meet him at *Decetia*. The assembly was very numerous, and it appeared that *Cotus* had been declared chief magistrate by his own brother, in presence of only a few electors privately called together, without regard to time.

or place, and even contrary to the express laws of the state, which prohibited two of the same family to hold the supreme dignity, while he who first obtained it was alive, or so much as sit together in the senate. *Cæsar* therefore obliged *Cotus* to resign in favour of *Convictolitanis*, who, upon the expiration of the office of the preceding magistrate, had been elected in due form by the priests.

This sentence being passed, *Cæsar* exhorted the *Ædui* to lay aside their quarrels, and apply themselves solely to the business of the present war; to expect with confidence the full recompence of their services, as soon as the reduction of *Gaul* should be compleated; and to send him immediately all their cavalry, and 10,000 foot, to form a chain of posts for the security of his convoys. He then divided his army into two parts. Four legions, under the conduct of *Labienus*, he sent against the *Senones* and *Parisii*, and the other six he led in person along the banks of the *Allier*, towards the territories of the *Arverni*, with a design to invest *Gergovia*. Part of the cavalry followed *Labienus*; part remained with *Cæsar*. *Vercingetorix* having notice of these motions, broke down all the bridges upon the *Allier*, and marched along the other side of the river.

As both armies were continually in view, encamped almost over-against each other, and the enemies scouts so stationed, that it was impossible for the *Romans* to make a bridge for carrying over their forces, *Cæsar* began to be uneasy, lest  
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he should be stopped in his progress the greatest part of the summer by the river, the *Allier* being seldom fordable till towards autumn. But he soon found means to compass his end. He encamped in a place covered by woods, over-against one of those bridges which *Vercingetorix* had caused to be broke down. The next day remaining there concealed with two legions, he sent forward with all the baggage the other four, dividing them into six corps, that the number of the legions might appear compleat, and ordered them to march as far as they could. When, by the time of the day, he judged they were arrived at the place of their encampment, speedily he rebuilt the bridge upon the old piles, the lower part of which the enemy had left standing ; marched over the troops he had with him, and, having chose a proper place for his camp, recalled the rest of his forces. *Vercingetorix* being informed, that the *Romans* had passed the river, marched on before them by long journeys, that he might not be forced to a battle against his will.

*Cæsar*, after five days march, came before *Gergovia*, where he had a slight engagement with the enemy's cavalry. Having taken a view of the place, which he found situated on a very high hill, all whose approaches were extremely difficult, he not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but resolved not to invest it, till he had secured a supply of provisions for his army. *Vercingetorix* was encamped near the town, where

he had disposed the forces of the several states in different divisions, separated from one another by moderate intervals. As his army covered the whole summits of the hill, it made a very formidable appearance. Every morning, by day-break, the chiefs of each state, who composed his council, assembled in his tent, to advise with him, and receive his orders: and he scarcely let a day pass, without detaching some cavalry, intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the *Romans*, that he might make trial of the spirit and courage of his men. There was a rising ground, that joined to the foot of the hill on which the town stood, well fortified by nature, being very steep on all sides. This eminence, though of such importance to the *Gauls*, that if the *Romans* should get possession of it, they could in a great measure deprive them of water and forage, was yet but indifferently guarded. *Cæsar* therefore leaving his camp about midnight, dislodged the enemy before any assistance could arrive from the town, seized the hill, and having placed two legions to defend it, drew a double ditch twelve feet deep from the greater to the lesser camp, that the soldiers might pass and repass without danger.

While these things were transacted at *Gerovia*, *Convictolitanis* the *Æduan*, to whom, as we have before related, *Cæsar* had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being bribed by the *Arverni*, endeavoured to engage in the confederacy some young noblemen, the chief of whom were *Litavicus* and his brothers, of the most distinguished

family in the country. With these he shared the money he had received, and exhorted them to consider, "That they were free, and born to command : That the *Ædui* alone obstructed the victory of the league, that their authority restrained the other states from joining in the common cause, and that their concurrence in it would not leave the *Romans* a possibility of supporting themselves in *Gaul*. That he himself indeed was under some obligation to *Cæsar*, at least so far as an equitable decision deserved that name, but he still owed more to his country; adding, that the *Ædui* had no greater reason to have recourse to the *Roman* General, in what regarded their laws and customs, than the *Romans* had in the like case to apply themselves to the *Ædui*." The representations of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, soon prevailed with the young noblemen. They offered to become the chief conductors of the enterprize; and nothing remained but to consult on the proper means for accomplishing their design; for they well knew, that the state would not be easily induced to engage in the war. It was agreed, that *Litavicus* should have the command of the 10,000 foot appointed to join *Cæsar*, and that his brothers should be sent before. They also concerted in what manner the rest of the project should be executed.

*Litavicus* having taken the command of the army, and led them within thirty miles of *Gergovia*, suddenly called the troops together, and

addressing them with tears : “ Whither, soldiers, said he, are we going ? All our cavalry, all our nobility are slain. *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus*, men of the first quality in the state, accused by the *Romans* of treason, are put to death without a trial. But learn these things of those who have escaped the slaughter ; for, as to me, overwhelmed with grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, I am unable to utter our calamities.” He then produced some, whom he had before instructed for that purpose, who repeated to the multitude, “ That the greatest part of the *Æduan* cavalry had been put to the sword, under pretence of their holding intelligence with the *Arverni* ; and that they themselves had escaped with great difficulty by mixing with the *Roman* soldiers.” Hereupon the whole army called aloud to *Litavicus*, entreating him to provide for their safety ; “ As if, said he, there was room for counsel, or any choice left, but that of marching directly to *Gergovia*, and joining the *Arverni*. Can we doubt, after so black an instance of *Roman* perfidy, but that they are already on their way to destroy us ? Let us, therefore, if any spirit or courage remains in us, revenge the death of our countrymen, so unworthily slain, and put these inhuman spoilers to the sword.” He then pointed to some *Roman* Citizens, who had taken the opportunity of their march to bring a large supply of corn and provisions to the camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, the *Romans* put to death

death with cruel torments, and messengers dispatched through all the territories of the *Ædui*, to spread the same forgery of the massacre of the cavalry and princes, and excite them to take the like vengeance on the common enemy.

*Eporedorix*, the *Æduan*, a young nobleman of distinguished birth, and great interest in the state; as likewise *Virdumarus*, of the same age and equal authority, though not so well descended (whom *Cæsar*, on the recommendation of *Divitiacus*, had raised from a low condition to the highest dignities) were both at this time in the *Roman* camp. Between these two was a competition for greatness; and in the late dispute about the magistracy, the one had declared warmly for *Convictolitanus*, the other for *Cotus*. *Eporedorix*, having notice of *Litavicus*'s design, came at midnight to *Cæsar*'s tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated him not to suffer the state, through the mischievous counsels of a few young men, to fall off from the alliance of the *Romans*, which he foresaw must happen, if they should join the enemy with so many thousand men, whose safety would neither be neglected by their relations, nor disregarded by the state.

This intelligence gave *Cæsar* extreme concern, because he had always had a particular regard for the *Ædui*. He therefore immediately drew out four legions, together with all the cavalry; nor had he time to contract his camp, because the affair seemed wholly to depend upon expedition. He left *C. Fabius*, his Lieutenant, to command

mand in his absence with two legions. *Litavicus's* brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had some time before escaped to the enemy. Having exhorted the soldiers to bear the fatigue chearfully in so pressing a conjuncture, they marched with great alacrity, and about five and twenty miles from *Gergovia* came within sight of the *Ædui*. *Cæsar* immediately detached the cavalry to retard and stop their march; but with strict charge to abstain from slaughter. He ordered *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus*, whom the *Ædui* had lamented as dead, to ride up and down among the squadrons, and call to their countrymen. They were soon known, and *Litavicus's* forgery being detected, the *Ædui* stretched out their hands, offered to submit, and throwing down their arms, begged their lives might be spared. *Litavicus*, with his clients (who by the custom of the *Gauls* cannot without infamy abandon their patrons, even in the greatest extremity of fortune) fled to *Gergovia*.

*Cæsar*, having dispatched messengers to the *Ædui* to inform them, that from a regard for their state he had spared those, whom by the right of war he might have put to the sword, after allowing the army three hours rest, marched back to *Gergovia*. About half way he was met by a party of horse, sent by *Fabius*, to acquaint him with the danger that threatened his camp. They told him, "That the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, relieving the fatigued with supplies of fresh men, while the *Romans* were kept

" kept to continual labour ; for the vast extent  
" of ground they had to defend, obliged them to  
" be perpetually upon the rampart. That the  
" multitude of arrows and darts discharged by  
" the *Gauls* had wounded many of the soldiers,  
" notwithstanding the protection received from  
" the engines, which yet had been of good ser-  
" vice in repelling the assailants : That *Fabius*,  
" upon the retreat of the enemy, had closed up  
" all the gates of the camp except two, carried  
" a breast work quite round the rampart, and  
" made preparation for sustaining the assault the  
" next day." *Cæsar*, upon this news, hastened  
his march with all diligence, and, seconded by the  
ardour of the troops, arrived in the camp before  
sun-rising.

While these things passed at *Gergovia*, the *Ædui*, upon receipt of the first dispatches from *Litavicus*, staid not for the confirmation of the report; but prompted, some by avarice, others by revenge, and many hurried on by a levity and rashness, natural to that people, who are always ready to give credit to every flying rumour, ran immediately to arms, plundered the *Roman* Citizens, killed some of them, and sold others for slaves. *Convictolitanus* incited to the utmost this fury of the multitude, that, by engaging them in desperate acts of violence, he might render a return to right measures the more difficult. At his instigation, they obliged *M. Aristius*, a military Tribune, who was upon his way to join the army, to quit *Cabillonum*, promising not to molest him in his journey : they engaged also several

veral *Roman* merchants, who resided there on account of traffick, to quit their habitations; then attacking them treacherously on the road, they stripped them of their baggage, and invested day and night those who made resistance. But as soon as they had intelligence, that all their troops were in *Cæsar's* power, they ran to *Aristius*; assured him that nothing had been done by public authority; ordered informations to be brought against those, who had been concerned in pillaging the *Romans*; confiscated the estates of *Litavicus* and his brothers, and sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, to excuse what had happened. This they did with a view to recover their troops; but unwilling to part with the plunder, in which great numbers had shared, conscious of guilt, and dreading the punishment they deserved, they began privately to concert measures of war, and by their Ambassadors solicited other states to join them. Though *Cæsar* was not ignorant of those practices, he spoke with the greatest mildness to the *Æduan* deputies, assuring them that he would not consider the imprudence and levity of the multitude as a crime of the whole nation, nor upon that account lessen his regard for the state. Apprehending however an universal revolt of *Gaul*, and that he might be surrounded by all the forces of the states at once, he began to think of retiring from *Gergovia*, and drawing his whole army again into a body; yet in such a manner, that a retreat, occasioned by the fear of a general insurrection, should not carry with it the appearance of a flight.

While he was intent on these thoughts, fortune seemed to present him with an opportunity of acting against the enemy with success. For coming into the lesser camp, to take a view of the works, he observed a hill quite destitute of troops, that for some days before was scarce to be seen for the multitude that covered it. Wondering what might be the cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked daily in great numbers to his camp. They all agreed with *Cæsar's* scouts, that the back of the hill was almost an even ground, but narrow and woody in that part where a passage led to the other side of the town : That the enemy were extremely afraid of losing this post, because the *Romans*, who had already possessed themselves of one hill, if they should seize the other, would in a manner quite surround them, become masters of all the outlets, and entirely cut off their forage : That *Vercingetorix* had therefore drawn all his forces on that side, in order to fortify the passage.

*Cæsar*, upon this intelligence, dispatched some squadrons of cavalry towards that place about midnight, ordering them to ride up and down with as much noise as possible. At day-break he drew a great number of mules and carriage-horses out of the camp, without their usual harness, and furnishing the grooms and waggoners with helmets, to make them appear like cavalry, commanded them to march round the hill. With these he joined some squadrons of horse, who, for the greater shew, were to range a little more freely.

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The whole detachment had orders to move towards the same place, taking a very large circuit. All these dispositions were seen from the town, which commanded a full view of the *Roman* camp, though the distance was too great to distinguish objects with certainty. At the same time *Cæsar*, the more effectually to deceive the enemy, detached a legion towards the eminence; and when it was advanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. This increasing the suspicion of the *Gauls*, they immediately led all their forces to defend that post. *Cæsar* seeing their intrenchments abandoned, made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and standards, and file off in small parties from the greater to the lesser camp, that they might not be perceived from the town. He then opened his designs to his Lieutenants, whom he had appointed to command the several Legions, directing them above all things to moderate the ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plunder, or desire of fighting, might not carry them too far. He represented to them the danger they were exposed to by the disadvantage of the ground, for which there was no remedy but dispatch; and that he intended only to make a sudden attack, not to fight a battle. These precautions taken, he gave the signal to engage, and at the same time dispatched the *Ædui* by another ascent, to charge the enemy on the right.

The wall of the town was about twelve hundred paces distant from the foot of the hill, without

out reckoning the breaks and hollows. The compass the troops were obliged to take, to moderate the steepness of the ascent, added still to this space upon the march. About half way up the hill, the *Gauls* had run a wall of large stones, six feet high, the better to defend themselves against the attacks of the *Romans*. Between this and the plain, the enemy had no troops; but the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of the town, was crowded with the camps of their several states.

The signal being given, the *Romans* immediately mounted the hill, sealed the nearest wall, and possessed themselves of three of the enemies camps. Such too was the expedition wherewith they carried them, that coming suddenly upon *Theutomatus*, King of the *Nitobrigi*, as he was reposing himself in his tent about noon, he very narrowly escaped being taken: he was obliged to fly half naked, and had his horse wounded under him.

*Cæsar*, having accomplished all he had in view, ordered a retreat to be sounded; and the tenth legion, which fought near his person, obeyed; the other legions did not hear the signal, being separated from him by the valley; but the Lieutenants and military Tribunes, according to the instructions given by *Cæsar* in the beginning, commanded them to halt. Nevertheless, elated with the hopes of a speedy victory, and the remembrance of their former successes, they thought nothing impracticable to their valour; nor did they desist from the pursuit, till they had reached

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the walls and gates of the town. Upon this a great cry arising from all parts, those that were farthest from the place of assault, terrified by the noise and tumult, and imagining the enemy already within the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. The women throwing their money and cloaths from the walls, with naked breasts, and extended arms, conjured the *Romans* to spare their lives, and not, as at *Avaricum*, sacrifice all to their resentment, without distinction of age or sex. Some being let down from the wall, delivered themselves up to the soldiers. *L. Fabius*, a Centurion of the eighth Legion, told his troop, that he had not yet forgot the plunder of *Avaricum*, and was resoved no man should enter the place before him. Accordingly, having with the assistance of three of his company got upon the town-wall, he helped them one after another to do the like.

In the mean time the *Gauls*, who, as we have before related, were gone to defend the post on the other side of the town, excited by the cries of the combatants, and the repeated accounts that the enemy had entered the place, sending all the cavalry before to stop the progress of the *Romans*, advanced in great crouds to the attack, and as they arrived drew up under the walls. They soon became formidable by their multitude, and the women, who a little before had implored the compassion of the *Romans*, now began to encourage their own troops, shewing their dishevelled hair, and producing their children, according to the

the custom of the *Gauls*. The contest was by no means equal either in respect of numbers, or of the ground; and the *Romans*, already fatigued with their march, and the length of the combat, were little able to sustain the attack of fresh and vigorous troops.

*Cæsar* perceiving the disadvantages his troops laboured under, began to fear the event: sending therefore to *Sextius* his Lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, he ordered him to draw out the cohorts with all expedition, and post them at the foot of the hill upon the enemy's right: that if the legions engaged should give way, the cohorts might deter the *Gauls* from pursuing them. He himself advancing a little with the tenth legion, waited the issue of the combat.

While the conflict was maintained with the utmost vigour on both sides; the enemy trusting to their post and numbers, the *Romans* to their courage; suddenly the *Ædui*, whom *Cæsar* had detached by another ascent on the right to make a diversion, appeared on the open flank of his men. As they were armed after the manner of the *Gauls*, this sight greatly terrified them, and though the *Ædui* extended their right hands in token of peace, yet still the *Romans* imagined it a stratagem to deceive them. At the same time *L. Fabius* the Centurion, and those who had mounted the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were thrown down by the enemy from the battlements. *M. Petreius*, a Centurion of the same legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates,

finding himself overpowered, and despairing of safety, because he was already covered with wounds, turned to the soldiers that followed him, and said : “ Since I find I am unable to save both “ myself and you, I will do my utmost to preserve “ your lives, which, through too eager a desire “ of glory, I have brought into this danger ; “ seize the opportunity, and retire.” Then rushing on, killed two of the enemy, drove the rest from the gate, and seeing his men approach to his assistance, he cried : “ In vain do you endeavour to preserve my life : my blood and strength “ forsake me. Go therefore, while you may, and “ rejoin your legion.” Continuing still to fight, he expired soon after, generously sacrificing his own life to the safety of his followers.

The *Romans*, thus pressed on all sides, were at length driven from the place. But the tenth legion, which had been posted on a more advantageous ground to cover their retreat, checked the impetuous pursuit of the *Gauls*, and was sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, who had quitted the lesser camp under *Sextius*, and possessed themselves of an eminence. The legions having reached the plain, immediately halted, and faced about towards the enemy ; who advancing no farther than the foot of the hill, returned back to their intrenchments. The *Romans* lost forty-six centurions, and about seven hundred men.

*Cæsar* having assembled the army the next day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice of the soldiers, “ That they had taken upon themselves

"to judge how far they were to proceed, and  
"what they were to perform; regarding neither  
"the signal to retreat, nor the orders of their of-  
"ficers. He represented to them the danger of  
"fighting on disadvantageous ground, and remind-  
"ed them of his own conduct at the siege of *Ava-*  
"*ricum*, when, having surprized the enemy with-  
"out a general, and without cavalry, he had cho-  
"sen rather to give up a certain victory, than, by  
"attacking them in a difficult post, hazard a con-  
"siderable loss: That as much as he admired  
"their courage, which neither the intrenchments  
"of the camps, nor the height of the hill, nor  
"the walls of the town could check; so much did  
"he blame their licentiousness and arrogance,  
"who thought they knew more than their Ge-  
"neral, and could see better than him the way to  
"conquest: That he looked upon obedience and  
"moderation, as virtues no less essential to a good  
"soldier, than valour and magnanimity." In the  
end he exhorted them "not to be discouraged by  
"their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the  
"bravery of the enemy, which was entirely ow-  
"ing to the disadvantage of the ground, on  
"which they fought." He still persisted in his  
design of retiring from *Gergovia*, but first drew  
out his legions on the plain, and offered battle to  
the enemy; which *Vercingetorix* declined, not  
thinking it advisable to quit the advantage of his  
situation; and *Cæsar* returned to his camp, after  
a small but successful skirmish between the caval-  
ry. The following day he again drew out his  
army, and thinking he had done enough to con-

firm the courage of his own men, and abate the pride of the *Gauls*, he decamped and marched towards the territories of the *Ædui*. The enemy made no attempt to pursue him. He arrived the third day on the banks of the *Allier*, and having repaired the bridge, passed over with his whole army.

Here *Eporedorix* and *Viridomarus* informed him, that *Litavicus* was gone with all the cavalry to sollicit the *Ædui* to revolt; and that it importred greatly, that they should be there before him, to confirm the state in their attachment to the *Romans*. Though *Cæsar* was by many proofs fully convinced of the perfidy of the *Ædui*, and foresaw that the departure of these men would hasten the revolt, yet not to give ground of offence, or betray any fear, he did not think it advisable to detain them. After enumerating the many services he had done the *Ædui*; “ That “ having found them low and depressed, shut up “ within their towns, depriyed of their lands, “ without troops, tributaries to their enemies, and “ ignominiously obliged to give hostages, he had “ not only restored them to their former condition, “ but had raised them to a degree of power and “ authority beyond what they had ever possessed;” he dismissed them.

*Noviodunum* was a town belonging to the *Ædui*, conveniently situated on the banks of the *Loire*. Here *Cæsar* had lodged all the hostages of *Gaul*, his provisions, the public money, and great part of his own and his army’s baggage: here also he kept the horses brought from *Italy* and *Spain* for the

the service of the war. When *Eporedorix* and *Viridomarus* arrived at this place, and were informed how the *Æduan* state was disposed: "That " *Litavicus* had been received into *Bibracte*; " that *Convictolitanes*, the chief magistrate, and " almost all the senate, had repaired thither to " meet him; that Ambassadors had been publicly " sent to *Vercingetorix*, to conclude a treaty of " alliance;" they thought the present favourable opportunity was by no means to be neglected. Having therefore put to the sword the garrison of *Noviodunum*, with all the *Romans* found in the place, they divided the money and horses, ordered the hostages to be conducted to *Bibracte*, and set fire to the town. Then drawing together the troops cantoned in the neighbourhood, they placed guards along the banks of the *Loire*, and began to scour the country with their cavalry; in order to cut off *Cæsar's* convoys, and oblige him, through want of provisions, to return into the *Roman Province*. This they thought the more easy to effect, as the *Loire* was then considerably swelled by the melting of the snow, and did not appear to be any where fordable.

*Cæsar*, sensible that a retreat into the *Roman Province* over the *Cebenna* would be both inglorious and difficult, and that it was necessary to rejoin *Labienus* with the legions under his command, and come to an action with the enemy before they could draw all their forces together, resolved to cross the *Loire*, though he should be under a necessity of building a bridge over it. Therefore, marching day and night with the ut-

most diligence, he arrived unexpectedly on the banks of the river. His cavalry very opportunely having found a ford, which however was so deep that the water reached to the shoulders of his men, he placed his horse higher up in order to break the stream, and carried over his army without loss ; the enemy being so terrified at his boldness, that they did not dare to make any opposition. Finding an abundance of corn and cattle in the fields, he plentifully supplied his army, and directed his march towards the country of the *Senones*.

While *Cæsar* was thus employed, *Labienus* on his side, leaving at *Agendicum*, to guard his baggage, the new levies lately arrived from *Italy*, marched with four legions to *Lutetia*, a town of the *Parisii*, situated in an island of the *Seine*. Upon notice of his approach, the enemy drew together a great army from the neighbouring states ; which was commanded by *Camulogenus*, an *Aulerician*, who, though very much advanced in age, was raised to that honour for his singular knowledge in the art of war. This General pitched his camp near the town behind a large morass, whose waters ran into the *Seine*, and obstructed all the passages on that side. *Labienus* attempted, by the means of hurdles covered with mold, to make a passage through it ; but not succeeding, he silently made off in the night, and retired as far as *Melodunum*, a city of the *Senones*, situated also in an island of the *Seine*. There having seized about fifty boats, and filled them with soldiers, with a view of storming the town ; the

the inhabitants terrified at this new manner of attack, and being too few to defend the place, because the greater part of them had joined *Camulogenus*, yielded without making any resistance. *Labienus* immediately repaired the bridge, which had been cut down on his approach, crossed the *Seine*, and following the course of the river, marched back to *Lutetia*. The *Gauls* informed of his motions set fire to the town, broke down the bridges, and encamped on the other side of the river over-against the *Romans*.

It was now every where known, that *Cæsar* had left *Gergovia*, and that the *Ædui*, with many other states of *Gaul*, had joined in the revolt. It was likewise reported that *Cæsar* had been obliged to return into the *Roman Province*. At the same time the *Bellovaci*, who bordered upon the territories of the *Parisii*, were raising troops with all diligence. In this situation of affairs, *Labienus*, menaced on one side by this war-like people, and pressed on the other by the army of *Camulogenus*, saw it was no proper time to think of making conquests, but rather in what manner to secure his retreat to *Agendicum*, where he had left all his baggage, with the rest of his troops, and from which place he was now separated by a large river. This he effected in the following manner.

He had brought from *Melodunum* the fifty boats found there, the command of which he gave to as many *Roman Knights*, and ordered them to fall down the river silently four miles be-

low *Lutetia*, and there wait his arrival. Five cohorts, the least fit for action, were appointed to guard the camp; the other five of the same legion were directed to march up the river with all the baggage, making as much stir and noise as possible; while a few barks that attended them increased this noise with their oars. Soon after their departure, he marched with three legions to the boats that waited for him, and passed them over. *Camulogenus*, informed at day-break of these motions, imagined that the legions were ordered to pass the river in three different places, and dividing his army into three corps, one he left to guard the passage over-against the *Roman* camp; another had orders to march up the river as far as the *Romans* should proceed that way; and the rest, being the greatest part of his troops, he led himself against *Labienus*. On his approach, the *Roman* General drew up his army, and gave the signal for battle. At the first charge, the seventh legion, which formed the right wing, routed the left of the *Gauls*. But their right wing, where *Camulogenus* commanded in person, and which was engaged with the twelfth legion, maintained its ground with the utmost bravery; the conflict was long and doubtful, till the seventh legion, leaving the pursuit of the left, faced about and attacked the *Gauls* in the rear. Thus surrounded, they still obstinately maintained the fight, and were with their General cut to pieces. *Labienus* having gained a compleat victory, retired to *Agendicum*, and from thence marched with all his forces and joined *Cæsar*.

The

The revolt of the *Ædui* gave great strength to the confederacy. Interest, money, authority, were all employed to procure the concurrence of the states, that still continued quiet. The hostages found at *Noviodunum*, were made a means to compel some of them. But it was with great reluctance that the *Ædui* submitted to the command of *Vercingetorix*, an *Arvernian*; they loudly demanded to have the chief conduct of the war, which not being consented to by *Vercingetorix* and his friends, the affair was referred to the decision of a general assembly of the revolted states, summoned to meet at *Bibracte* for that purpose, where the public voice declared *Vercingetorix* General in chief.

Confirmed in his command, he demanded of the states to furnish him with fifteen thousand horse. He told them, “he was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he had no intention to refer the decision of the war to fortune, or hazard a pitched battle; but would endeavour to intercept the convoys of the enemy by the means of his superior cavalry; which he judged the easiest and safest way to ruin them: That the confederates must resolve to destroy their corn and houses, and patiently submit to a present loss, which would be rewarded by perpetual liberty.” He ordered the *Ædui* and *Segusi* to raise ten thousand foot, to whom having joined eight hundred horse, he gave the command of them to *Eporedorix*’s brother, with directions to attack the *Allobroges*. On the other hand, he commissioned the *Gabali*, and some can-

tons

tons of *Auvergne*, to make an irruption into the territories of the *Helvii*, and sent the *Rutheni*, and *Cadurci*, into those of the *Volsci-Arecomici*. He neglected not, however, both by public ambassadors and private agents, to sollicit the concurrence of the *Allobroges*; endeavouring to gain the leading men by presents, and allure the state by an offer of the sovereignty of the *Roman Province*.

*L. Cæsar*, who commanded in those parts, had levied twenty-two cohorts in the *Province*, and with them prepared to make head on all sides. The *Helvii* venturing to come to an engagement with the enemy, were defeated, and forced to shelter themselves in their walled towns. But the *Allobroges*, placing detachments at proper distances along the banks of the *Rhone*, guarded all the avenues of their country with great diligence.

*Cæsar*, seeing that the enemy was much superior in cavalry, and that his communication with *Italy* and the *Province* was cut off, had recourse to his *German* allies beyond the *Rhine*, of whom he obtained a supply of cavalry, with some light-armed infantry accustomed to fight amongst them. On their arrival, finding that they were but indifferently mounted, he gave them the horses of the Tribunes and other officers of his own army, and marched through the frontiers of the *Lingones* into the country of the *Sequani*, in order to be at hand to succour the *Roman Province*.

The forces of the enemy from *Auvergne*, and the cavalry of all the confederate states, were now

now met at the general rendezvous, and formed a very numerous army. *Vercingetorix*, elated with the prosperity of his affairs, and suffering himself to be led into a contempt of *Cæsar*, whom he thought had no other view, but of retiring into the *Roman Province*, rashly deviated from that prudent plan of war, which he had hitherto so steadily pursued. He followed the *Romans*, and posted himself at about four miles distance from their army in three camps. Having assembled the officers of the cavalry, he endeavoured to persuade them that the time of victory was come. He told them, “ That the *Romans* were at last “ obliged to leave *Gaul*, and retreat into the “ *Province*: That this retreat secured liberty for “ the present, but did not ascertain future tran-“ quillity; as the *Romans* would doubtless soon “ return with greater forces, and persist in the “ design of enslaving them: That it was therefore “ highly expedient to attack them now, while “ they marched encumbered with their baggage: “ That in this attack their cavalry would never “ dare to stir from the main body of the army; “ and if the infantry faced about, in order to “ assist them, they would thereby be unable to “ continue their march: If, as was more likely, “ they abandoned the baggage to provide for “ their own safety, they would be deprived of “ every conveniency, and return home covered “ with ignominy and reproach: That to strike a “ greater terror into the enemy, he would, dur-“ ing the action, keep all his infantry under arms “ before the camp.” These words were followed

“ by

by the acclamations of all the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath never to return home, nor see again their parents, wives or children, if they did not twice pierce through the *Roman* army.

This proposal being approved, and the oath administered to all, *Vercingetorix* the next day attacked the *Romans* on their march; he had divided his cavalry into three bodies, two of which moved towards the flanks of the enemy's army, while the third began to charge and harass them in front. *Cæsar* formed also his horse into three divisions, and ordered them to advance against the *Gauls*, while the infantry halted, and covered the baggage, which was received into the center. Wherever the *Roman* cavalry gave way, or appeared hard pressed, thither *Cæsar* sent detachments from the legions, which both checked the progress of the *Gauls*, and confirmed the courage of his own men. At last the *Germans* on the right, having driven the enemy from an eminence, pursued them with great slaughter to the river, where *Vercingetorix* was posted with the infantry. The rest of the *Gallic* cavalry perceiving the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehensive of being surrounded, betook themselves likewise to flight. Three *Aduan* noblemen of distinguished rank were brought prisoners to *Cæsar*: *Cotus*, General of the cavalry, who the year before had been competitor with *Convictolitanus* for the supreme magistracy; *Cavarillus*, who after *Litavicus*'s revolt, was appointed to command the infantry, and *Eporedorix*, who had been Generalissimo

ralissimo of the *Æduan* forces in the war against the *Sequani* before *Cæsar's* arrival in *Gaul*.

*Vercingetorix* seeing his cavalry routed, drew off the infantry, and immediately retreated towards *Alesia*, a town belonging to the *Mandubii*. *Cæsar* pursued him till night, cut three thousand of his rear to pieces, and arrived the next day before *Alesia*. After examining the situation of the town, he resolved to take advantage of the consternation of the enemy, and lay siege to it.

*Alesia* was situated on the top of a very high hill, at the bottom of which ran two rivers that washed it on two sides. Before the town was a plain extending about three miles in length, but on every other side the place was surrounded, at a moderate distance, by a ridge of hills, whose summits were nearly of an equal height. Under the walls, on the side facing the East, lay encamped all the forces of the *Gauls*, which were defended by a ditch, and a rampart six feet high. The line of circumvallation made by the *Romans* took in a circuit of eleven miles. Their camp was conveniently situated, and strengthened with three and twenty redoubts, in which centinels were placed by day, and a strong guard by night.

Whilst the *Romans* were employed in these works, *Vercingetorix* ventured another engagement with the cavalry, in the plain between the hills. The battle was sharply maintained on both sides, but the *Romans* beginning to give ground, *Cæsar* detached the *Germans* to their assistance,

and

and drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp, that he might be ready to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's infantry. The sight of the legions encouraged his men; the *Gauls* were put to the rout, and crowding upon one another in their flight, obstructed their entrance at the gates of their camp, and gave the *Germans*, who pursued them to their intrenchments, an opportunity of destroying great numbers, and carrying off a multitude of prisoners.

*Vercingetorix* now resolved to dismiss his cavalry, before *Cæsar* had compleated his lines. At their departure he enjoined them, “ To repair to their respective states, and assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. He set forth the many services he had done them, and conjured them not to neglect his safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy one who had deserved so well of the common liberty. He told them, that, if they were dilatory in the execution of his orders, 80,000 chosen men must perish with him: That he had scarce corn for thirty days, and that with the utmostconomy it could not be made to last much longer.” After giving these instructions, he sent them away silently about nine at night, on the side where the *Roman* line was not yet finished. He then distributed among his soldiers all the cattle in the place, but ordered the corn to be brought in to him, resolving to deliver it out sparingly and by measure. He entered the town with all his forces, and having prepared for an

an obstinate defence, waited for the expected succours.

*Cæsar*, informed of these dispositions by the prisoners and deserters, constructed his fortifications in the following manner. He first drew a perpendicular ditch twenty feet wide. All the other works he made four hundred feet farther from the town than that ditch. This he did to secure his workmen from the darts of the enemy by day, and his works from sudden and nocturnal sallies. Observing therefore the distance above-mentioned, he made two other ditches, each fifteen feet broad, and as many deep, and filled the innermost, which lay in a low and level ground, with water from the river. Behind these he raised a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened with a parapet and battlements; and to prevent the enemy from getting over, a fraise ran along the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, with branches cut into points, like the horns of a stag. On the whole work were placed turrets, eighty feet distant one from another.

But as the soldiers were employed to fetch provisions, bring materials, and work at the fortifications, which considerably lessened the number of troops left to defend them, and as the enemy sometimes sallied out to attack the lines, *Cæsar* judged it necessary to make the following addition to his works, that they might not require so many men to guard them. Between the first and second ditches that were nearest the town, he run a trench five feet deep, and fixed

in

in it small trees and strong branches, the tops of which he had caused to be sharpened. He then filled the trench with earth, so that nothing appeared above ground but the sharp points of the branches, which must necessarily run into those who attempted to pass them : and as they were five rows of them, interwoven in a manner with each other, they could not be avoided. In the front of these he caused pits to be dug three feet deep, and something narrower at bottom than at top. In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened at the top, which rose only four inches above the level of the ground, into which they were planted three feet deeper than the pits, to keep them firm. The pits were covered with bushes to deceive the enemy. There were eight rows of them at the distance of three feet from each other, and disposed in the form of a Quincunx. The whole space between the pits and the advanced ditch was sowed with crows-feet, or Cal-trops, of an extraordinary size.

These works compleated, he drew another line fourteen miles in compass, constructed in the same manner as the former, and carried through the most even places he could find, to serve as a barrier against the enemy without ; that if the *Gauls* should attack the camp, they might not be able to surround it with their troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. To prevent the danger his men might be exposed to, when in quest of provisions and forage, he laid in a sufficient store of both for thirty days.

Whilst

Whilst these things passed before *Alesia*, a general council being held by the chiefs of the *Gauls*, it was not thought adviseable to assemble all that were able to bear arms, as *Vircingetorix* had desired, but to order each nation to furnish a contingent; lest so great a multitude should occasion a scarcity of provisions, and render the observance of military discipline impracticable. The *Ædui*, with their vassals the *Segusi*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci Brannovices*, and *Branuari*, were rated at thirty-five thousand men. A like number was demanded of the *Arverni*, in conjunction with their dependents the *Cadurci*, *Gabali*, and *Velauni*. The *Senones*, *Sequani*, *Bituriges*, *Xantones*, *Rutheni*, and *Carnutes*, were ordered each to furnish twelve thousand; the *Bellovaci*, ten thousand; the *Lemovices*, the same number; the *Pictones*, *Turoni*, *Parisii*, *Helvii*, *Sueffiones*, each eight thousand; the *Ambiani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Petricorii*, *Nervii*, *Morini*, *Nitobrigi*, *Aulerci Cenomani*, each five thousand; the *Atrebates*, four thousand; the *Bellocasii*, *Lexovii*, and *Aulerci Eburovices*, each three thousand; the *Rauraci* and *Boii*, thirty thousand; the maritime and *Armorian* states, of which number were the *Curioselites*, *Rhedones*, *Caletes*, *Oifsmii*, *Lemovices*, *Veneti*, and *Unelli*, each six thousand. The *Bellovaci* alone refused to furnish the troops required, declaring that it was their design to wage an independent war with the *Romans*, without being subject to the command of any foreign General or state: however, at the request of *Comius*, they sent a body of two thousand men.

*Comius*, as has been before related, had been singularly faithful and serviceable to *Cæsar* in his *Britannic* expedition : in consideration of which, his countrymen had been exempted from tribute, restored to the full enjoyment of their laws and privileges, and had their territories enlarged by the addition of the country of the *Morini*. But such was the present zeal of the *Gauls* to vindicate their liberty, and recover their ancient military glory, that neither friendship nor benefits received had any influence on them, but all with one consent devoted themselves and their fortunes to the support of this war. They raised an army of two hundred and forty thousand foot, and eighty thousand horse, and the country of the *Ædui* was the place of general rendezvous. Four commanders in chief were appointed, *Comius*, the *Atrebation*, *Viridumarus* and *Eporedorix*, *Æduans*, and *Virgasillaunus* of *Auvergne*, cousin-german to *Vercingetorix*. To these were added a select number of men, chosen from among the several states, to serve as Counsellors to the Generals in the conduct of the war. The whole army advanced towards *Alesia* with great alacrity, confident that the *Romans* would not so much as sustain the sight of so vast a multitude, especially as they would be attacked by another numerous army from the town.

The troops shut up in *Alesia*, having consumed all their provisions, finding the day appointed for the arrival of succours expired, and knowing nothing of what was transacted among the *Ædui*, summoned a council of war to debate on what  
was

was requisite to be done in the present extremity. Various were the opinions proposed: some advised a surrendry; others were for sallying forth, while yet their strength would permit, in order to break through the enemy, or die bravely in the field. Amongst the rest, *Critognatus*, a man of the first rank and authority in *Auvergne*, addressed the assembly in a speech, which, says *Cæsar*, deserves to be mentioned for its singular and detestable inhumanity. He said, “ I shall “ take little notice of the opinion of those, who, “ under the name of a surrendry, advise you to “ an ignominious servitude. Such should neither “ be esteemed *Gauls*, nor suffered to come into “ this assembly. Let me rather apply myself to “ them who approve of a general sally. In this “ proposal you seem to think there is something “ worthy of our ancient bravery. It is not cou- “ rage that inspires such thoughts, but weakness “ and an effeminacy of mind, which render us “ unable to bear want for a few days. It is “ easier to find men who will voluntarily rush on “ death than such as can patiently endure pain. “ I should not however be against this proposal, “ which has something generous in it, if only “ our own lives were at stake. But on our pre- “ sent determination depends the fate of all “ *Gaul*, which we have stirred up to our assist- “ ance. How would it dishearten our relations “ and friends to see eighty thousand of their “ countrymen slaughtered in one place, and be “ obliged to fight in the midst of their dead bo-

“ dies! Deprive not then of your assistance those,  
“ who, to save you, have exposed themselves to  
“ the greatest dangers; nor, through folly and  
“ rashness, or imbecillity of mind, destroy at  
“ once the expectations of *Gaul*, and condemn her  
“ to perpetual servitude. If the expected succours  
“ are not arrived exactly at the appointed time,  
“ ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and  
“ constancy of your countrymen? Can you think  
“ that it is for amusement only that the *Romans*  
“ labour on those lines towards the country?  
“ Though you hear not from your friends, be-  
“ cause all communication is interrupted, yet  
“ you may learn their approach from your ene-  
“ mies, who, through fear of them, work day and  
“ night on those fortifications. What then do  
“ I propose? What, but to do as our ancestors  
“ did in the war with the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*;  
“ a war much less important than the present?  
“ Compelled to shut themselves up in their towns,  
“ and reduced to a distress equal to that we now  
“ suffer, rather than surrender to their enemies,  
“ they fed upon the bodies of those whom age  
“ had rendered useless in war. Had we no such  
“ precedent to follow, yet still I should esteem it  
“ glorious, in the noble cause of liberty, to give  
“ one to posterity. The *Cimbri*, after spreading  
“ desolation over the country, at length with-  
“ drew their forces, and repaired to other re-  
“ gions; leaving us in the full enjoyment of our  
“ lands, laws, and liberties. But the *Romans*, en-  
“ vying a people so renowned and powerful in  
“ war,

" war, aim at nothing less than to take possession  
" of our cities and territories, and reduce us to  
" perpetual servitude. This has ever been the  
" object of their wars. If you are unacquainted  
" with what passes in distant countries, cast your  
" eyes upon the adjoining *Gaul*, which, reduced  
" into the form of a *Province*, deprived of its laws  
" and privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary  
" sway of *Rome*, groans under the yoke of end-  
" less slavery." When all had delivered their  
opinions, it was resolved, that such as were unfit  
for war should be obliged to quit the town, and  
every expedient be tried, rather than agree to  
the proposal of *Critognatus*: but if relief were  
long deferred, and necessity urged, they deter-  
mined to submit to his advice, rather than con-  
sent to a surrendry. The *Mandubii*, natives of  
the town, were ordered to leave it with their  
wives and children. When they came to the  
*Roman* lines, they with tears petitioned to be  
received as slaves, and to be saved from perish-  
ing by famine: but *Cæsar* having planted guards  
along the rampart, refused to admit them into  
his camp.

At length *Comius* and the other Generals of  
the *Gauls* appeared with their army before *Ale-  
sia*, and encamped on a hill not above five hun-  
dred paces from the *Roman* lines. The next day  
they drew out their cavalry, and covered the  
whole plain under the hill: the infantry were  
stationed at some distance on the heights. Great  
was the joy of the besieged at this sight; they

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immediately came forth with all their forces, posted themselves before the town, and having filled up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, prepared for a vigorous attack.

*Cæsar*, having disposed his troops along both his lines, ordered the cavalry to march out and charge the enemy. The *Gauls* had interspersed among their horse some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain them, and check the impetuosity of the *Roman* cavalry. Many of these being wounded at the first onset, were obliged to quit the battle. The *Gauls* seeing they had the advantage, and that the *Romans* were hard pressed by numbers, set up a general shout, both within and without the place, to give new life to their troops. As the action passed in view of both armies, the desire of applause and fear of ignominy spurred on both parties to exert their utmost bravery. After a conflict that lasted from noon till near sun-set, victory still continuing doubtful, the *Germans* in close order charged furiously the *Gauls* upon one side, and routed them. Their flight leaving the archers exposed, they were all surrounded and cut to pieces. The success was equal in other parts of the field, where the *Romans*, pursuing the runaways to their camp, gave them no time to rally. The troops on the side of the town, despairing of victory, retired disconsolate within the walls.

After the interval of a day, which was spent in providing a great number of fascines, scaling-ladders, and iron hooks, the *Gauls* issued out of

their camp about midnight, and approaching the *Roman* lines, set up a shout, to give notice to the besieged of their arrival, threw their fascines into the ditch, and endeavoured by a discharge of stones, darts, and arrows, to drive the *Romans* from the rampart. At the same time *Vercingetorix* gave the signal, and led forth his men to the attack. While the *Gauls* kept at a distance from the *Roman* lines, they did great execution by the multitude of their darts; but in proportion as they advanced, they either entangled themselves among the Caltrops, or tumbling into the pits, were wounded by the pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts discharged from the towers and rampart. Finding, when day appeared, that they had not forced any post in the lines, and fearing to be taken in flank by some troops that were sallying from the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated to their camp. The besieged, on their side, after much time spent in making preparations for the assault, and filling up the advanced ditch, seeing their countrymen were retired, before they could so much as approach the works, returned into the town without effecting any thing.

The *Gauls*, thus twice repulsed with great loss, thought it proper to change the plan of their attack. North of the town was a hill of too great compass to be taken into the *Roman* lines, and *Cæsar* had been obliged to place a camp on the ascent, in a disadvantageous situation, as it was commanded by the summit. *G. Antistius Reginus* and *C. Caninius Rebilus* guard-

ed this quarter with two legions. The *Gallic* Generals, informed by their scouts of the situation of this camp, resolved to form the attack on that side. Having concerted their plan, they selected fifty-five thousand of their best men, and assigned the command of them to *Vergaſſilaunus* of *Auvergne*, with directions to begin the assault at noon. This General, marching out in the evening, arrived before day-break at the back of the hill on which the *Roman* camp above-mentioned was situated. There lying concealed, he ordered his troops to take refreshment. About noon he approached the quarters of the two legions. At the same time the *Gallic* cavalry advanced into the plain, and the rest of the army drew out before their camp. *Vercingetorix*, observing these motions, led forth his troops from *Alesia*, carrying with him fascines, covered galleries, long poles, hooks, and other instruments prepared to force the lines. The fight began on all sides at once, and was maintained by the *Gauls* with great ardour. The *Romans*, having such extensive works to guard, scarcely sufficed for the defence of them all. What greatly contributed to disturb them was the cries of the combatants behind, which informed them that their safety depended on the valour of others.

The chief stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifications, where *Vergaſſilaunus* charged with his forces. The eminence which commanded the declivity of the hill gave his men great advantage. Some threw darts, others advanced under cover

cover of their shields formed into a tortoise, fresh troops continually succeeded in the room of the fatigued. The earth they threw up against the lines not only enabled them to mount the rampart, but filled the pits and ditches, and frustrated the design of the works made in the ground. The *Romans*, thus continually pressed, had neither strength nor weapons left to make resistance.

*Cæsar*, who had chosen a post from whence he could see all that passed, observing the danger his men were in on that side, sent *Labienus* with six cohorts to their assistance ; ordering him, if he was not able to defend the works, to draw off the troops, and sally out upon the enemy ; yet this only in case of extremity. He went in person to the rest of his men, and exhorted them to bear up courageously under the present fatigue, representing that the fruit of all their former victories depended upon the issue of that critical moment.

The *Gauls*, under the command of *Vercingetorix*, despairing to force the intrenchments in the plain, on account of the great strength of the works, attacked them in the higher and uneven ground, whither they brought all the instruments for the assault. They soon drove the *Romans* from the towers by a discharge of darts, filled up the ditches and pits with earth and fascines, and began to pull down the rampart and breast-work with their hooks.

*Cæsar* first sent young *Brutus*, with six cohorts, to the aid of his men ; after him, *C. Fabius*,

*bius*, with seven more ; and, as the contest grew warmer, led in person fresh troops to their assistance. Having restored the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he hastened to the side where *Labienus* was engaged. He drew four cohorts from the nearest fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, and commanded the rest to take a circuit round the outward works, and fall upon the enemy's rear. *Labienus*, finding that neither the rampart nor ditch were sufficient to stop the progress of the *Gauls*, drew together about thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and sent to inform *Cæsar* of his design to sally out upon the enemy. *Cæsar* immediately quickened his march, that he might be present at the action.

His arrival being known from the colour of his garments, by which he used to distinguish himself in a day of battle, and the troops and cohorts he had ordered to follow him appearing, the fight was renewed. The *Gauls* raised on all sides a mighty shout, which, being returned from the rampart, was carried quite round the lines. The *Romans* having cast their darts, fell furiously upon the enemy sword in hand. At the same time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in their rear ; fresh cohorts flocked continually to the assistance of those already engaged ; the *Gauls*, unable to sustain the violent shock, took to flight, and being met by the *Roman* cavalry, a dreadful slaughter ensued. *Sedulius*, chief and general of the *Lemovices*, was slain upon the field

field of battle ; *Vergasillaunus* of *Auvergne* was made prisoner in the pursuit ; seventy-four colours were taken ; and, of so numerous an army, very few regained their camp. The rout and slaughter being observed from the town, the besieged, on their side despairing of success, drew off their troops from the attack. The rest of the *Gauls* instantly abandoned their camp ; and had not the *Romans* been exhausted by the continual fatigue of the day, the whole *Gallic* army might have been destroyed. However, about midnight, *Cæsar* detached the cavalry to pursue them, who falling in with their rear, slew and took great numbers. The rest fled to their several cities.

The next day, *Vercingetorix*, assembling a council, represented to the besieged ; “ That “ he had undertaken that war, not from a motive “ of private interest, but to recover the common “ liberty of *Gaul* ; and that, since there was a “ necessity of yielding to fortune, he was willing “ to become a victim for their safety, whether “ they should think proper to appease the anger “ of the conqueror by his death, or to deliver him “ up alive.”

Deputies were immediately sent to *Cæsar* to receive his commands. He ordered them to surrender their arms, and deliver up all their chiefs. Having seated himself at the head of his lines, their leaders were brought before him, and *Vercingetorix* was delivered up, together with their arms. *Cæsar*, reserving the *Ædui* and the *Arverni*,

*ni*, as a means to recover those two nations, divided among his soldiers the rest of the prisoners.

These affairs dispatched, he marched into the territories of the *Ædui*, and received the submission of their state. There he was addressed by the Ambassadors of the *Arverni*, who promised an entire obedience to his commands. Having exacted a great number of hostages, and restored to those two states twenty thousand captives, he sent his legions into different parts of *Gaul* to keep the country in subjection. *T. Labienus*, with two legions and the cavalry, was quartered among the *Sequani*, jointly with *M. Sempronius Rutilus*. *C. Fabius* and *L. Minutius Basilus* were ordered with two legions into the country of the *Rhemsi*, to defend it against the attempts of the *Bellovaci*, their neighbours. *C. Antistius Reginus* had his station assigned him among the *Ambivareti*; *T. Sextius* among the *Bituriges*; and *C. Caninius Rebilus* among the *Rutheni*; each with one legion. *Q. Tullius Cicero* and *P. Sulpicius* were placed at *Cabillo* and *Matisco* upon the *Arar* in the country of the *Ædui*, and were charged with the care of the provisions. He himself took up his winter-quarters at *Bibracte*.

Thus ended this memorable campaign, in which *Cæsar* gave those proofs of military skill and valour which have been the object of the admiration of the greatest Generals in all ages. Having sent an account of his victory to the *Roman Senate*, they decreed a *Thanksgiving* of twenty days.

The

The unsuccessful event of this campaign had convinced the *Gauls*, that they were not able to resist the *Romans* by any army they could bring together into one place; but they persuaded themselves, that if many states revolted at once, and set on foot many separate wars, the *Romans* would have neither time nor troops sufficient to oppose them all. And though some of those states must be sufferers, yet that misfortune, they thought, should be born with, since their particular loss would purchase the liberty of the rest. Many states therefore agreed to this plan, and began to make preparations for renewing the war. To disappoint their views, *Cæsar* judged it necessary to use the utmost expedition. Leaving *M. Antony*, the Quæstor, to command in his winter-quarters, he set out on the last of *December* from *Bibracte* with his cavalry, and went to the camp of the thirteenth legion, which he had placed among the *Bituriges*, not far from the territories of the *Aedui*. To these he joined the eleventh legion, whose quarters lay nearest; and, leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, marched with the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the country of the *Bituriges*. By this sudden and unexpected arrival he found them unprepared, and dispersed up and down in the fields. He forbade setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an invasion, that he might neither alarm the enemy nor expose himself to the want of corn and forage, if it should be necessary

Year of  
*Rome* 702<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> For what passed at *Rome* this year, see above, p. 154.

to advance far into the country. Many thousands of the *Bituriges* were made prisoners, surprized by the *Roman* cavalry before they could retreat into their towns. Such as escaped fled in great terror to the neighbouring states. But *Cæsar* pursued them with great expedition, and those states, anxious for their own safety, submitted, gave hostages, and were received into his protection. The *Bituriges*, seeing that his clemency left the way still open to his friendship, followed their example, and were pardoned: *Cæsar*, to recompence the fatigue and labour of his soldiers, gave two hundred sesterces to every private man, and two thousand to every Centurion; and, having sent back the legions to their winter-quarters, returned again to *Bibracte*, after an absence of forty days. He had not been there above eighteen days, when Ambassadors arrived from the *Bituriges* to implore his assistance against the *Carnutes*, who were laying waste their country. *Cæsar* set out to their relief with the sixth and fourteenth legions, which had not been engaged in the last expedition. The *Carnutes*, hearing of his approach, abandoned their towns and villages, consisting then mostly of little cottages, ran up in haste to defend them from the cold, and fled different ways. *Cæsar*, thinking it sufficient, in that severe season of the year, to have dispersed the forces that began to assemble, and prevented their rekindling the war, encamped at *Genabum* during the remaining part of the winter.

A new and more difficult war gave him more serious employment in the beginning of the spring. The *Rhemi*, by frequent embassies, informed him, that the *Bellovaci*, the most distinguished for bravery of all the *Belgic* or *Gallic* nations, with some of the neighbouring states, under the conduct of *Correus*, General of the *Bellovaci*, and *Comius* the *Atrebation*, were raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, with design to invade the territories of the *Sueffones*, a people subject to the jurisdiction of the *Rhemi*. Honour and interest required of him to undertake the defence of allies, who had deserved so well of the Commonwealth. He marched therefore immediately, with four legions, into the country of the *Bellovaci*, which he found abandoned by its inhabitants. The few prisoners his cavalry made had been left as spies. These informed him, “ That all those “ capable of bearing arms had assembled in one “ place, and been joined by the *Ambiani*, *Au-*“ *lerci*, *Caletes*, *Vellocaſſii*, and *Atrebates*; that “ they had chosen for their camp a rising ground, “ surrounded with a difficult morass, and dis-“ posed of their baggage in woods that lay be-“ hind them; that many of their chiefs were in “ the army, but the principal authority rested “ in *Correus*, because he was known to bear an “ implacable hatred to the *Roman* name; that, “ a few days before, *Comius* had left the camp to “ sollicit aid of the *Germans*, who were their “ nearest neighbours, and abounded in troops; “ that it had been resolved among the *Bellovaci*, “ with

" with consent of all the chiefs, and at the earliest desire of the people, to offer battle to Cæsar, if, as was reported, he came at the head of only three legions, lest they should be afterwards obliged to fight upon more unequal terms, when he had got his whole army together; but, if he brought greater forces with him, to continue within their camp, intercept his convoys, and cut off his forage, which in that season of the year was extremely scarce."

In consequence of this information, Cæsar resolved to try every method to draw the enemy into a contempt of his numbers, and thereby induce them to hazard a battle. He had with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, all veterans of approved valour; and though the eleventh, which he had also drawn out of its winter-quarters, was not of equal standing, nor had attained the same reputation of bravery, they were yet chosen men, of great hopes, and had served under him eight campaigns. Calling therefore the army together, he laid before them the advices he had received, and exhorted the soldiers to behave themselves with their usual courage. He arrived before the enemy's camp much sooner than they expected, and, as he approached, disposed the legions in the following order. The seventh, eighth, and ninth legions marched in front, the baggage followed, and the eleventh legion formed the rear. Thus there appeared in view no more than three legions, the number the Gauls had determined to encounter.

But,

But, when they saw the *Romans* advancing against them with a steady pace, they did not think it proper to follow the resolution which had been reported to *Cæsar*; and either fearing the event of a battle, or surprized at his sudden approach, or desirous to penetrate further into his intentions, they would not descend from the higher ground, but drew up in arms before their camp. *Cæsar*, though earnest to come to an engagement, yet, considering the multitude of the enemy, and the advantage of their situation, contented himself for the present to encamp directly over-against them, being separated from them by a deep but narrow valley. He threw up before his camp a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened by a proportionable breastwork, and secured it by two ditches, each fifteen feet wide, with perpendicular sides. Upon the rampart he raised, at small distances, turrets of three stories, and joined them to each other by galleries, which had little parapets of osier before them. Thus the works were defended by a double range of soldiers; one of which fighting from the galleries, and secured by their height, would with more boldness and advantage launch their darts against the enemy; the other, though nearer danger, and placed upon the rampart, were yet screened by the galleries from the impending darts. All the entrances of the camp were secured by strong gates, over which he placed turrets of a greater height than the rest.

Cæsar had a twofold design in these fortifications; one, by the greatness of the works, to make the enemy believe he was afraid of them, and thereby increase their presumption; the other, to enable him to defend his camp with a few troops, when it should be necessary to go far in quest of corn and forage. There happened frequent skirmishes between the two camps, carried on for the most part with missive weapons at a distance, by reason of a morass that separated the combatants. Sometimes the auxiliary Gauls and Germans in the *Roman* army crossed the morass and pursued the enemy; sometimes the *Bellovaci*, having the advantage, passed in their turn and drove back the *Roman* auxiliaries. And as the *Romans* daily sent out parties to forage, who were obliged to disperse themselves over the country, their men were sometimes surprized and cut to pieces by the detachments of the enemy. In one of these encounters, the *Rhemis*, auxiliaries in Cæsar's army, lost a great part of their cavalry. The *Bellovaci*, having observed the daily stations of the horse destined to guard the *Roman* foragers, placed a chosen body of foot in ambush in a wood, and sent some squadrons of cavalry to draw the enemy into the snare. The cavalry of the *Rhemis*, upon guard that day, suddenly discovering the *Gallic* horse, and despising their small numbers, attacked and pursued them with such eagerness, that, being surprized and almost surrounded by the foot, they fled with precipitation, lost many of their men, and, among

the

the rest, their commander *Vertiscus*, the chief man of their state. This General, though so far advanced in years that he could hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the custom of the *Gauls*, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor suffer his people to fight without him.

*Cæsar*, finding that the enemy kept within their camp, and considering that he could neither force their intrenchments without great loss, nor with so small an army inclose them within lines, wrote to *C. Trebonius* to join him with three legions. Upon their arrival, the Generals of the *Bellovaci*, fearing a siege like that of *Alesia*, ordered all those who were weak, and less fit for service, to be sent away by night, and with them the baggage of the army. But, before this confused and numerous train could be put in order, day-light appeared; and the *Gauls*, to hinder the *Romans* from disturbing the march, drew up in arms before their camp. *Cæsar* did not think it proper to attack them in so advantageous a post, nor was he willing to let them retire without loss. To be in readiness for the pursuit, he passed the morafs with his legions, and seized an eminence which commanded the enemy's camp, and was separated from it only by a small valley. The *Gauls*, confiding in the strength of their post, did not decline fighting, if they were attacked, and both armies remained in order of battle the whole day. At night the *Bellovaci*, seeing the *Romans* prepared for the pursuit, made use of

the following stratagem to secure their own retreat. Having collected and placed at the head of their line all the fascines in the camp, they set fire to them at once, and, being concealed by the smoke, marched off with the utmost diligence to another advantageous post ten miles distant. *Cæsar*, though he suspected that this was a contrivance to cover their flight, yet fearing also an ambuscade, and that they might possibly continue in the same post, to draw his men into a place of disadvantage, followed but slowly with his army, and suffered the enemy to escape.

The *Bellovaci* from their new camp carried on the same defensive war, and in frequent ambuscades attacked and cut to pieces the *Roman* foragers. *Cæsar*, having suffered many losses of this kind, was at last informed by a prisoner, that *Correus*, General of the *Bellovaci*, had chosen six thousand of his best infantry, and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade in a place abounding in corn and grass, and where it was therefore presumed the *Romans* would come to forage. Upon this intelligence he sent the cavalry, who formed the ordinary guard of the foragers, before, intermixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, and he himself followed with some legions to support them. The *Gauls* had disposed their forces in ambush round the plain where the *Romans* were to forage, which extended a mile every way, and was environed with thick woods or a deep river. The *Roman* cavalry entered the plain, troop by troop, with great resolution, knowing that

that the legions were behind to sustain them. *Correus* immediately appeared, but with a few men, and fell upon the nearest squadrons. The *Romans*, prepared for the attack, did not flock together in crowds, which frequently happens among the cavalry on occasions of sudden surprize, and often throws them into confusion ; but, preserving the proper distances, received the enemy in good order ; nor did they suffer themselves to be taken in flank. The rest of the *Gallic* cavalry then broke from the woods, and advanced to the aid of those who fought under *Correus*. The contest was maintained with great heat and equal advantage, till the infantry of the *Gauls*, advancing slowly in order of battle, obliged the *Romans* to give way ; but their light-armed infantry, marching up speedily, and posting themselves in the intervals of the squadrons, restored and continued the fight. Soon after, both sides had notice that *Cæsar* was approaching with his forces in order of battle. The *Roman* cavalry then redoubled their efforts, lest the legions should share with them the honour of the victory. The enemy, on the other hand, lost courage, and fled different ways : But, being obstructed by the same difficulties of the ground in which they hoped to have entangled the *Romans*, the greatest part of them were put to the sword. *Correus*, whose resolution no misfortune could abate, would neither quit the field nor accept of quarter ; but, fighting to the last with invincible courage, and

wounding several of his enemies, forced them at length to transfix him with their javelins.

The *Bellovaci*, and the other states in their alliance, finding that their General was slain, their cavalry and the flower of their infantry destroyed, and dreading the approach of the *Roman* army, speedily assembled a council, in which it was resolved, by common consent, to send Ambassadors and hostages to *Cæsar*. *Comius* alone refused to join in the treaty, from a distrust of the *Romans*, who had attempted the year before, by the order of *Labienus*, to assassinate him treacherously at an interview with *Volusenus Quadratius*, where he was grievously wounded by a *Roman* Centurion.

*Cæsar* granted peace to the *Bellovaci* and their allies, and, having thus subdued the most warlike nations of *Gaul*, he divided his troops into several bodies, under the command of his Lieutenants, and sent them into different parts, to keep the whole country in subjection. He himself marched into the territories of the *Eburones*, with a view to get *Ambiorix* into his power. But the *Gaul* flying before him, *Cæsar* destroyed the country with fire and sword, killing or taking prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, that he might render *Ambiorix* odious to his people, as the cause of so great a calamity, and preclude his being again received into the state. He then dispatched *Labienus*, with two legions, against the *Treviri*, who bordering upon *Germany*, and being exercised in continual wars with that nation, differed but

little from them in barbarity and fierceness; nor ever submitted to his commands, unless enforced by the presence of an army. Leaving *M. Antony*, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the *Bellovacis*, to prevent any new insurrection among the *Belgeæ*, he marched into the country of the *Carnutes*. They had been lately reduced by his Lieutenant *Fabius*, who had defeated *Dumnacus*, the General of the *Gauls* in those parts, destroyed or dispersed his army, and expelled him out of that and the neighbouring countries. *Cæsar* pardoned the *Carnutes*, on their delivering up *Guttervaulus*, the prime mover and incendiary of the war. This man had hid himself, even from his countrymen; but, being diligently sought after by the people, desirous to appease *Cæsar's* resentment, they soon found him, and brought him to the camp, where he was beaten with rods and beheaded.

*Caninius*, one of *Cæsar's* Lieutenants, had defeated the *Cadurci* in battle, under their Generals *Drapes* and *Luterius*, and was besieging *Uxellodunum*, a strong fortress in that country. Thither *Cæsar* repaired, and found the circumvallation completed. Many reasons determined him to continue the siege. He could not raise it without dishonour; the obstinacy of the garrison, which consisted of only two thousand men, deserved exemplary punishment; and, if the place were not reduced, the *Gauls* might imagine that not strength but constancy had been wanting to enable them to resist the *Roman* arms; a persuasion which might perhaps induce other states,

who had the advantage of strong towns, to endeavour again to assert their liberty; especially as it was generally known that only one year of his government remained, during which if they could but hold out, they had no farther danger to apprehend. *Cæsar*, understanding from the deserters that the besieged were well stored with provisions, determined, if possible, to deprive them of water.

*Uxellodunum* stood upon a steep rock, which was almost surrounded by a river, where the townsmen used to water. There was no possible way to turn the course of this river, because it flowed so near the foot of the rock, and in so low a channel, that ditches could not be sunk deep enough to receive it. But the descent to it from the town was so difficult and steep, and lay so open, that the people, in coming to it, could be easily annoyed by the *Romans*. *Cæsar*, taking advantage of this circumstance, posted archers and slingers, with some engines, over-against all the places of access. This forced the townsmen to water at a fountain which issued close under the walls, on the side where the town was not surrounded by the river. To deprive them of this resource, *Cæsar* undertook to raise a terrass over-against the fountain, which could not be performed without incredible fatigue, almost continual fighting, and much danger to the soldiers; for they were exposed to the assaults of the enemy, who fought in safety, at a distance, and from the higher ground. A terrass notwithstanding

withstanding was raised, sixty feet high, and a tower of ten stories placed upon it; not indeed equal to the height of the walls, for which no works were sufficient, but to command the fountain. From this tower the *Romans* continually played their engines upon all the accesses to the spring, which made it extremely dangerous to water there; insomuch that not only cattle and beasts of burden, but great numbers of people, perished by thirst.

The besieged were not dismayed by this distress. They filled many barrels with tallow, pitch, and dry wood, and, having set them on fire, rolled them down upon the works; and at the same time charged the *Romans* with great fury. The machines soon were on fire: But *Cæsar*, to give his men time to extinguish it, and to draw off the enemy, ordered some troops to ascend the hill on all sides, and raise a great shout, as if preparing to scale the walls. This alarming the inhabitants, they recalled their men to the defence of the town; and the *Romans*, being relieved from the attack, soon put a stop to the flames. The place continued to hold out with great obstinacy, till *Cæsar* contrived to drain the fountain by mines. When the besieged saw it suddenly become dry, they imagined it an event brought about not by human wisdom but by the will of the Gods; and therefore, despairing of success, they immediately surrendered themselves.

*Cæsar,*

*Cæsar*, satisfied that his clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his severity on this occasion would be imputed to cruelty; as he perceived there would be no end of the war, if other states of *Gaul* should in like manner revolt; resolved, by a signal example of punishment, to deter them from such projects. He ordered the hands of all those whom he found in arms to be cut off; granting them their lives, that their punishment might be the more conspicuous. *Drapes*, who had been made prisoner by *Caninius*, either out of indignation for his captivity, or dreading a severer fate, put an end to his life by abstaining from food. *Luterius*, who had escaped out of the battle when *Drapes* was taken prisoner, falling into the hands of *Eparnactus* of *Auvergne*, a faithful friend to the *Romans*, was by him delivered bound to *Cæsar*.

About this time *Labienus* sent intelligence that he had engaged the cavalry of the *Treviri* with success, killed a great number on the field of battle, with many *Germans* who had joined them, and made prisoners the greatest part of their chiefs; amongst the rest *Surus* the *Æduan*, a man of distinguished birth and valour, and the only one of that nation who had till then continued in arms. Thus the whole country being pacified, *Cæsar* marched with two legions into *Aquitain*, which *P. Crassus* had in a great measure reduced to his obedience. On his arrival, the states sent Ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. At *Narbonne* he ordered his army into winter-quarters,

ters, under the command of his Lieutenants. *M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Q. Tullius,* were quartered in *Belgium* with four legions; two were sent into the country of the *Ædui*; two into that of the *Turones*, bordering upon the *Carnutes*, to hold the maritime states in awe; and the remaining two were stationed amongst the *Lemovices*, not far from *Auvergne*. He held at *Narbonne* the usual assemblies of the province, decided the differences subsisting among the states, recompensed those who had distinguished themselves by their fidelity and services, and, after dispatching all those affairs, repaired to the legions in *Belgium*, and took up his winter quarters at *Nemetocenna*\*.

\* Arras.

Here he found all quiet; even *Comius*, that bitter enemy to the *Romans*, had been received into friendship. This *Atrebatic* General, who had headed the armies of the *Bellovaci*, retired to his *German* allies, when matters were compounded with *Cæsar*, but always kept a watchful eye upon the motions of his countrymen, that, in case of a war, he might be ready to offer them his counsel and assistance. Finding that the state now submitted quietly to the *Romans*, he employed the troops that remained with him to support himself and his followers by plunder, and frequently carried off the convoys that were going to the *Roman* winter-quarters. *M. Antony* sent against him *C. Volusenus Quadratus*, an officer of distinguished valour; the man who, by the order of *Labienus*, had lately attempted to kill him at an interview, and

and who still preserved a particular hatred to him. These two mortal enemies soon met in battle : *Volusenus*, after a successful engagement, urged by an eager desire of making *Comius* prisoner, rashly pursued him with only a few attendants. The *Gaul*, by a precipitate flight, drew the *Roman* a considerable way from the main body of his army ; then, turning to his own men, he called upon them to revenge the wound he had so treacherously received. They instantly faced about, charged their pursuers, and repulsed them. *Comius*, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furiously against *Volusenus*, and drove his spear through his thigh. The *Romans*, seeing their Commander dangerously wounded, fought with redoubled fury, and put the enemy to flight a second time, with considerable slaughter. *Comius* escaped by the swiftness of his horse ; but, as he had lost the greatest part of his men, he sent a deputation to *Antony*, offering to retire wherever he should order him, to submit to any terms that should be imposed on him, and to give hostages for his good behaviour ; requesting only that so much regard might be had to his fears, as that he should not be obliged to appear in the presence of any *Roman*. *Antony*, before the arrival of *Cæsar*, consented, took hostages, and granted him peace.

This campaign effectually completed the reduction of *Gaul* and put an end to the *Gallic* war, in the course of which it is said that *Cæsar* either took by force eight hundred towns, or made them yield to the terror of his arms ; that he subdued

three hundred different nations ; that he defeated in battle three millions of men, of which more than one million were killed in the field, and another million made prisoners <sup>c</sup>.

[Year of Rome 703 <sup>d</sup>.]

The ninth and last year of his government was quite pacific. In his winter-quarters at *Nemetocenna* in *Belgium*, and in the following year, he made it his business to ingratiate himself with the *Gauls*, and deprive them of all pretence for a revolt. He treated the several states with respect, imposed no new burdens upon them, and was extremely liberal to their chiefs. By these means he prevailed with them, wearied and exhausted by long and unsuccessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet, attendant on their present submission. Thus he had leisure, in this last year, to fix his attention on *Rome*, where a contest for and against him was carried on with great vehemence ; a contest which ended in that memorable civil war, that changed the form of the *Roman* government into *Monarchic Despotism*.

<sup>c</sup> Plut. in Cæs. Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 25.

<sup>d</sup> For the transactions at *Rome* in this year, 703, see p. 187.

The END of the NINTH VOLUME.



